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Viewing cable 09DJIBOUTI10, NADR-FUNDED PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DJIBOUTI10 2009-01-06 12:01 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Djibouti
VZCZCXRO0439
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0010/01 0061201
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061201Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9879
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3404
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT MARC NORMAN AND AF/E 
NAIROBI FOR POLOFF S.MADSEN 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC DJ SO
SUBJECT: NADR-FUNDED PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC 
INITIATIVE 
 
REF: 08 STATE 128554 (NOTAL) 
 
1. SUMMARY.  Per guidance in reftel, Embassy Djibouti submits the 
following proposal for $500,000 to establish a "Djibouti-Somalia 
Counter-Terrorism Border Post" (DSCBP) at Loyada, along the 
currently porous border between Djibouti and Somalia. 
Implementation of this proposal would enable the USG to provide 
TIP/PISCES and additional surveillance capability to the Government 
of Djibouti that would the GODJ to improve entry control and 
identify/capture terrorists traveling from neighboring Somalia.  The 
DSCBP will not only help ensure the continued safety and stability 
of Djibouti--a key Muslim partner in the GWOT--but also strengthen 
vitally needed force protection for more than 2,500 U.S. military 
personnel stationed in Djibouti at the only U.S. military base in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
PROPOSAL DETAILS 
---------------- 
 
2. This proposal has been reviewed by, and has the concurrence of, 
East Africa Coordinator for the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) 
Samuel Madsen. 
 
A. Project Name: Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post 
(DSCBP) 
 
B. Implementing agency:  U.S. Department of State, American Embassy 
Djibouti, Regional Security Office (RSO) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DJIBOUTI-SOMALIA COUNTER-TERRORISM BORDER POST 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post (DSCBP) is 
designed to help secure the porous southern border in Djibouti 
adjacent to Somalia/Somaliland by establishing a border post and 
related TIP/PISCES and additional surveillance capability to improve 
entry control and identify/capture terrorists.   The DSCBP will not 
only help ensure the continued safety and stability of Djibouti--a 
key Muslim partner in the GWOT, but also strengthen vitally needed 
force protection for more than 2,500 U.S. military personnel 
stationed in Djibouti at the only U.S. military base in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
4. Simultaneous bombings by suspected Somali terrorists on October 
29, 2008--of the Somaliland presidential palace, UN offices, and 
Ethiopian diplomatic facilities in neighboring Hargeisa; and of 
several key targets in Puntland--highlight the active terrorist 
threat that exists in the region, one that includes elements of 
al-Shabaab, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), and al-Qaida East Africa. 
 The resignation in December 2008 of President Yusuf as head of 
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), coupled with the 
anticipated withdrawal in early 2009 of Ethiopian military forces 
from Somalia, also underscore the continued fragility of the Somali 
security situation and the urgent need to assist the Government of 
Djibouti with the means to secure its borders against terrorist 
threats. 
 
5. The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post will aid in 
securing the border by supporting the Government of Djibouti (GoDJ) 
to establish a functioning border post between Djibouti and 
Somalia/Somaliland.  This post will be established at Loyada (the 
only official border crossing point between Djibouti and Somalia), 
and will serve as immigration border checkpoint for Djiboutian 
police and immigration officers to properly identify, screen and 
detain persons as necessary.  Other USG agencies are committed to 
providing TIP/PISCES connectivity to this post, as well as 
experienced USG mentors to ensure sustainment of these critical CT 
measures. 
 
6. Objective: The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post 
seeks to address a critical counter-terrorism requirement stemming 
from Djibouti's proximity to Somalia/Somaliland.  Although Djibouti 
borders the comparatively peaceful self-declared independent 
Republic of Somaliland, both Somaliland and Djibouti have seen an 
influx of refugees and undocumented migrants from war-torn and 
unstable southern Somalia.  Djibouti has effective entry control 
measures in place at its international airport, but not at its land 
borders, of which Loyada is the most critical. 
 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000010  002 OF 003 
 
 
7. Djibouti is particularly attractive as a terrorist target since 
it is host to the only U.S. military base in Africa, Camp Lemonier, 
which serves as the headquarters to over 2,500 U.S. and coalition 
troops serving with the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA), who are conducting operations in 13 African countries. 
Efforts to promote Djibouti's border security will not only help 
strengthen force protection for U.S. and allied troops but also 
assist U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the Horn of Africa. 
Other USG installations based in Djibouti include an important naval 
refueling center; a VOA broadcasting facility that transmits to much 
of the Arabian peninsula and East Africa; and a USAID 
pre-positioning warehouse for up to 30,000 metric tons of 
humanitarian food assistance.  In addition to U.S. targets, Djibouti 
also hosts some 3,500 French forces. 
 
8. The Djiboutian government is itself a target for serving as the 
venue for Somali reconciliation talks that are actively opposed by 
extremist terrorist elements.  The Somalia-based terrorist group al 
Shabaab has now vowed to launch attacks outside of Somalia.  Recent 
threat reporting in other channels underscores that Djibouti is 
genuinely at risk. 
 
9. In line with Mission Strategic Plans, the Office of Regional 
Affairs has committed to installing a Terrorist Interdiction 
Program/ Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation 
System (TIP/PISCES) at the Loyada border upon establishment of the 
immigration and police post.  As Djibouti is increasingly a regional 
hub for travel, financial transactions, and port services, assisting 
the GODJ to tighten border controls against possible terrorists and 
other malafide travelers will promote security and stability not 
only in Djibouti, but throughout the entire region. 
 
10. The host government is a close partner of the United States on a 
range of security and counter-terrorism issues, and has expressed 
strong endorsement of additional programs to enhance border 
security. 
 
--------------- 
PROJECT DETAILS 
--------------- 
 
11. The objective of this program is to provide the Government of 
Djibouti with a fully functioning and effective immigration/border 
post, equipped with complete office automation, photo identification 
system, surveillance vehicles, and an expanded screening facility to 
house undocumented migrants and possible terrorists attempting to 
cross Djibouti's borders.  Additional surveillance vehicles and 
night vision equipment will permit the GODJ authorities to improve 
monitoring of remote locations along the border, where illicit 
travelers often cross.  The border post will be linked to 
TIP/PISCES.  The Government of Djibouti has already demonstrated its 
ability to use such equipment and similar measures effectively at 
Djibouti International Airport.  This project would extend this 
capability to the most important and most vulnerable land border 
crossing - that with Somalia/Somaliland. 
 
12. This border post facility will allow the GoDJ to: 
--Identify and register travelers (including immigrants, IDPs, and 
refugees) legally crossing the border from Somalia. 
--Patrol the border and interdict malafide travelers illegally 
crossing the border. 
--Provide a base of operations for Djiboutian police and immigration 
forces along the border to deter, identify, detain and deport 
malafide travelers and capture terrorists. 
--Deploy TIP/PISCES capability at Djibouti's most vulnerable land 
border crossing. 
 
13.  Timeline: To achieve the objectives, the border post would be 
built over a 6- to 9-month schedule.  Because of limited expertise 
in country, a technical advisor will be contracted in-country to 
provide oversight and monitoring and evaluation of the project until 
completion of the border post facility. 
 
14. Coordinating Office: Regional Security Officer will serve as the 
Post Coordinator and work in conjunction with Refugee Officer, 
Office of Regional Affairs, Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
(NCIS), and the Department of Defense (U.S. Africa Command and 
CJTF-HOA), who will work together in development of this initiative. 
 Border security has broad implications for all the agencies and 
subordinate sections involved.  State, NCIS, and DOD are primarily 
interested in the security and counterterrorism implications of the 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000010  003 OF 003 
 
 
open border. 
 
15.  Implementation and Evaluation: The Deputy Chief of Mission 
(DCM) will oversee coordination to ensure all program requirements 
are met.  State will be the lead agency for implementation, with 
interagency assistance.  State possesses the manpower, contracting 
expertise, and coordinating authority to ensure the success of the 
program.  Interagency efforts will be coordinated through existing 
structures at the Embassy, supervised by the DCM. 
 
16. The technical advisor, working in collaboration with the host 
government, will apprise coordinator with impediments of progress. 
The coordinator, technical advisor, and relevant interagency 
partners will meet to discuss course corrections and present them to 
the host government with concurrence.  The technical advisor will 
work with the host government in implementing and modifying plans. 
 
 
 
17. Cost Allocation (estimated): 
 
$250K    Construction of new Immigration Post 
         (Physical structure for immigration post) 
 
$50K  Office automation for Immigration Post 
      (Computers, copy machines, fax phones, cameras, etc.) 
 
$100K Surveillance Vehicles 
      (Three 4X4 patrol vehicles with night vision 
      equipment) 
 
$50K     Technical Advisor 
         (Technical advisor to oversee implementation) 
 
$50K     Training 
         (Training on equipment and law enforcement procedures) 
 
 Total: $500,000 
 
18. Embassy Point of Contact: Ellen Tannor, Regional Security 
Officer (RSO), email: TannorE@state.gov, phone: (253) 35-5734 or 
(253) 820672. 
 
SWAN