Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09DHAKA44, BANGLADESH: WHAT WE NEED TO DO IN THE NEXT 180 DAYS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DHAKA44.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAKA44 2009-01-12 10:40 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO4544
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKA #0044/01 0121040
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121040Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8111
INFO RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000044 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, F, P, AND S/CRS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID BG
 
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH: WHAT WE NEED TO DO IN THE NEXT 180 DAYS 
 
REF: Dhaka 1224, Dhaka 1361 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Bangladesh's return to democracy following the successful 
December 29 Parliamentary elections presents significant 
opportunities for advancing U.S. Government (USG) interests in the 
country and the region.  Embassy Dhaka has identified five major 
mission objectives for the USG to focus on over the next 180 days: 
1) consolidating the democratic transition, 2) promoting stability 
and security, 3) making development assistance effective, 4) 
promoting strategic partnership, and 5) increasing U.S. Mission 
effectiveness.  To achieve these objectives, the Embassy requests 
$10 million in additional Democracy and Governance funds.  Embassy 
Dhaka considers coordinated implementation of this strategy over the 
coming months by all USG agencies critical to its success. 
 
----------------------------------- 
180 DAY TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) With assistance from the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Embassy Dhaka recently 
began a comprehensive strategic planning effort outlining USG goals 
and priorities during the first six months, or 180 days, after the 
election of the new Government of Bangladesh (GOB).  The strategic 
planning process, begun in early December 2008 and facilitated by 
S/CRS in both Washington and Dhaka, identified five strategic 
objectives as USG priorities for the first six months of a new 
government.  The interagency transition planning team identified the 
necessary tasks to achieve each objective, developed metrics and 
indicators of success, and completed a risk assessment with 
mitigation strategies for each of four worst-case scenarios, which 
include: a return to corrupt political practices, significant 
post-election violence, the danger of ungoverned spaces, and the 
possibility of economic collapse.  In addition to identifying key 
near-term priorities, the 180-Day Transition Plan has clarified key 
areas for further funding over the longer term.  This exercise will 
be synchronized with the FY 2010 Mission Strategic Plan. 
 
---------------------- 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
---------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Bangladesh's December 2008 Parliamentary elections present 
a key opportunity to strengthen Bangladesh's incipient democracy. 
The first major objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan is to 
ensure the "Smooth transition to a fully functional democratic 
government committed to reforms and accepted by the opposition." 
This will be achieved by encouraging formation of a new GOB quickly 
while minimizing political retribution, encouraging the continuation 
of the Caretaker Government's reform agenda, and ensuring political 
stability during the transition.  Given funding constraints, Embassy 
Dhaka has embarked upon this objective with almost no funding for 
democracy and governance (D/G) activities.  Additional resources are 
urgently needed to initiate a more robust DG program to include 
legislative strengthening activities for the newly elected 
parliament designed to help the opposition play a constructive role. 
 Ideally, we will also strengthen political parties and encourage 
them to embark upon an irreversible path towards internal reform. 
At the same time, Bangladesh requires better governance at the 
municipal and regional levels to strengthen democracy reform in 
country.  We estimate a modest program to achieve these goals would 
require restoring the previously cut $10 million annual D/G funding 
for each of the new Bangladeshi administration's five years in 
office. 
---------------------- 
STABILITY AND SECURITY 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) By supporting implementation of the Caretaker Government's 
roadmap, Bangladesh's military demonstrated its commitment to return 
to its traditional role and provide the newly-elected GOB the space 
it requires to exercise civil authority.  Given the country's 
historical context the military remains wary of a complete 
disengagement from politics.  The second objective of the 180-Day 
Transition Plan focuses on enhancing civilian control of the 
military, continuous professionalization of the security forces, and 
combating terrorism.  Maintaining strong levels of funding for 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), Counter 
Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), and other programs facilitating professional 
military education is crucial.  At the same time, expansion of the 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), International Criminal 
Investigative Assistance and Training Program (ICITAP), and other 
security-related programs is needed to facilitate true police 
 
DHAKA 00000044  002 OF 002 
 
 
reform, make meaningful improvements to the system of border 
management, and provide further training to the Rapid Action 
Battalion (RAB). 
 
---------------------- 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) An elected government provides an opening to deepen 
engagement on a host of development related policy issues.  There is 
also an opportunity to promote the reemergence of an independent 
media and strengthen civil society.  The third objective of the 
180-Day Transition Plan encourages the GOB to use an open 
consultative process to establish development priorities, recognize 
development linkages to energy, economic, and trade policy, and to 
create the space for free and independent media.  Even more than 
with other objectives, achievement of this goal will require close 
coordination with other bilateral and multilateral development 
partners. 
 
------------------------------- 
PROMOTING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The transition to a new government is an opportunity to 
remind Bangladesh of its importance as a key democratic partner of 
the U.S.  The fourth objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan seeks 
to highlight the importance of our bilateral relationship, and 
encourage the GOB to play a constructive role in international 
bodies and adopt a new approach to regional cooperation.  Despite 
its good intentions and strong track record, the Caretaker 
Government was never fully able to remove the stigma of its creation 
as a result of a military intervention.  A freely elected government 
will be able to act bilaterally, regionally, and globally without 
this stigma. 
 
------------------------------------- 
INCREASING U.S. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) During its two years in power, the Caretaker Government was 
unable to focus on resolving numerous Embassy management and 
consular concerns.  With a new GOB, there may be opportunities for 
quick resolution of long-standing issues that could greatly enhance 
the Mission's effectiveness in promoting a stable democracy in 
Bangladesh.  The fifth objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan 
urges the GOB to adopt policies that facilitate legitimate travel 
and seeks GOB agreement on policies that will enhance the Mission 
support platform.  We estimate that addressing Consular concerns 
with the GOB will require no additional expenditure of USG funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
COMMENT: MAXIMIZING USG GOALS DURING THE TRANSITION 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (SBU) A more stable, effective Bangladesh will allow the USG to 
effectively promote democracy, development, and the denial of space 
to terrorists.  The USG is well positioned to play a leadership role 
in each of these areas to encourage and assist the new GOB to make 
good on its promises to fight graft, enhance prosperity, and promote 
a new political atmosphere of cooperation.  During the 180 day 
planning process, we were able to identify short-term opportunities 
the Mission could pursue with limited additional resources.  In the 
FY 2010 MSP, we will highlight longer term ways in which Embassy 
Dhaka can advance these important goals as well as the additional 
resources that will be necessary to achieve our objectives. 
 
9. (SBU)  Embassy Dhaka greatly appreciates the outstanding support 
provided by TDY Planner Michael Michener and looks forward to 
continuing collaboration with S/CRS and other Washington-based 
elements of the Country Team. 
MORIARTY