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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000080

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USAID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS REFERENDUM: WHAT'S AT STAKE

Classified By: A/POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON, REASON 1.4 (D)

¶1. (C) Summary. President Chavez is seeking to concentrate even more power in his hands via the February 15 referendum to eliminate term limits. Should he win, we expect Chavez will try to govern at least until 2019 and to steer his government in an even more authoritarian direction. Should he lose, Chavez may feel compelled to slow down his Bolivarian revolution to shore up his public support, or alternatively try to impose it on growing opposition. A loss would embolden Chavez's critics and potentially spur greater pluralism within Chavismo. This will likely be the most important test of Chavez's popularity before the 2010 legislative elections. Post recommends avoiding public statements that insert the USG into Venezuela's domestic election. Post also recommends concentrating available USAID/OTI support for non-partisan efforts that promote a free and fair electoral process. End Summary.

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Another Referendum
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¶2. (C) President Chavez's second bid to eliminate presidential term limits is a major political gamble with high stakes for Venezuela's fragile democracy. The proposed amendment referendum will be Venezuela's fifth popular referendum since Chavez was first elected in 1999 (He has won three out of four so far). The Venezuelan president proposed in 2007 a major reform package that would have changed 69 articles of the 1999 Constitution, including allowing for indefinite presidential reelection. Venezuelans narrowly defeated the reform package in a December 2007 referendum, largely due to absentionism among Chavista voters.

¶3. (SBU) Chavez announced January 5 that he would alter the amendment proposal language to remove term limits for all elected officials, rather than just the president. The new referendum question, in convoluted language, asks voters whether they would approve of an "expansion of political rights" to permit popularly elected officials to be reelected indefinitely. The amendment would alter the articles of the constitution which deal with term limits for the president (Article 230), governors (160), mayors (174), and state and national legislators (162 and 192). Under the 1999 Constitution, all elected positions are currently subject to term limits.

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Venezuela At A Crossroads
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¶4. (C) President Chavez has successfully accrued greater executive power at the expense of all other branches of government over the course of his nine years in government. His "Bolivarian revolution," or more recently his undefined "Socialism of the XXI Century," continues to enjoy majority support, largely as a result of generous (but unsustainable) government social spending and Chavez's charismatic message of social inclusion. Chavez seeks to extend his administration at least until 2019 and to replace residual forms of representative democracy with his own top-down, single-party version of "participatory democracy." With economic constraints looming in 2009, it remains to be seen how Chavez will be able to sustain his popularity during a period of greater economic austerity. He may be tempted to employ more sticks in the absence of carrots, although his popularity has suffered whenever he has most exhibited his authoritarianism.

¶5. (C) In late 2008, Chavez suggested he would take a number of steps that would significantly damage Venezuela's fragile democracy. Among the canaries in the mineshaft for 2009, it remains to be seen whether the GBRV will jail Maracaibo Mayor and 2006 consensus opposition presidential candidate Manuel Rosales on selectively applied corruption charges. The GBRV could also close Globovision, the opposition-oriented cable news network. The GBRV closed RCTV, the opposition-oriented free-to-air network, in May 2007. The National Assembly could enact a Law of International Cooperation, which would starve civil society of independent international support and put at risk the USG's democracy promotion programs. Chavez also suggested in late 2008 that Vicente Diaz, the only independent among the National Electoral Council's five rectors, should consider resigning.

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If The Referendum Passes?
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¶6. (C) Chavez would almost certainly claim a "yes" victory as both a mandate to concentrate even more power in his hands and proof that he is a democratic leader. The Venezuelan president has sought to frame the referendum as both a plebiscite on him personally and as strengthening democracy by offering Venezuelans the "choice" to reelect him to a third term. More recently, by falsely accusing opposition leaders of conspiring with the Charge in Puerto Rico, he is also trying to frame this election as a contest between the United States ("the empire") along with its allies ("pitiyanquis") against his Bolivarian revolution. Chavez dominates all branches of government, and the ability to run again in 2012 will help him consolidate that hold. Extending his political life beyond 2012 also gives him time to try to overcome the looming economic crisis as well as to apply even greater pressure on the democratic opposition and civil society.

¶7. (C) There are few -- if any -- contenders within Chavismo who could successfully challenge an indefinite Chavez administration. The trouncing of pro-government and PSUV dissidents in the November 2008 state and local elections and the failure of several of Chavez's key allies to win seats indicate that, electorally, he is the only figure who remains to lead the "revolution." Although Chavez's popularity has slipped somewhat since 2006, he still remains far and away the most popular Venezuelan politician. Furthermore, he has been able to consolidate his personal control over nearly every public Venezuelan institution and is flagrant in his partisan abuses of them. Some pundits argue that the only remaining institutional check on his authority is the limit on presidential terms.

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And If It Fails?
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¶8. (C) President Chavez calibrates the extent to which he deepens and accelerates his Bolivarian revolution based on his perceptions of public support. If he loses the referendum, the Venezuelan president may be forced to temper his efforts to consolidate power in the executive branch and to cow opposition to his government. Alternatively, Chavez may draw the wrong conclusion that he needs to go after his political and civil society opponents even more. Chavez's popularity, however, would almost certainly be eroded by even balder efforts to clamp down on his critics. Chavez could also make another legally suspect run at eliminating presidential term limits later -- via a constituent assembly or petition drive -- but the political risks and potential costs would probably only accumulate.

¶9. (C) A loss could also potentially open the door for ambitious leaders within Chavismo who over the next four years could feel emboldened to challenge the President's all-encompassing control of both the PSUV and Venezuela's political institutions. A fresh PSUV face could be appealing to Chavista supporters who are loathe to risk their gains under Chavismo by voting for the opposition, but who might support a Chavez alternative. Newly reelected Governor of Lara State Henry Falcon, for example, is a capable administrator with his own personal base of support and a troubled relationship with Chavez. Any new PSUV leader would be unlikely to reestablish the singular strangle-hold on authority that Chavez has managed, suggesting the possibility of a more pluralistic and democratic PSUV potentially more open to the United States. Falcon has reportedly shown some willingness in the past to work with local American-owned businesses.

¶10. (C) Opposition leaders would also be likely to feel emboldened by a definite end to Chavez's presidential tenure. Although Chavez would still have four more years to govern, he would increasingly be viewed locally as a lame duck rather than a potential president-for-life. Several promising young opposition figures, notably incoming Miranda Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski and Sucre municipality mayor Carlos Ocariz, have had some success running issue-based campaigns that appealed to voters across party lines. Opposition wins of key, densely-populated regions in November have positioned them to be a newly powerful force in countering Chavez's reach in the near-term. A third consecutive electoral setback for Chavez would also send a strong signal that Chavez is increasingly governing out of step with the majority of Venezuelans.

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National Assembly Elections
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¶11. (C) The upcoming referendum will also be a major test of Chavez's support before Venezuela holds National Assembly elections in late 2010. Chavez's PSUV party dominates the unicameral legislature in the wake of the opposition's foolish boycott of the 2005 parliamentary elections. While Chavez may be able to retain an absolute majority in the National Assembly, he needs to maintain a two-thirds majority in order to appoint and remove Supreme Court justices and other key public officials, including the Attorney General and the Comptroller General. The latter was responsible for administratively disqualifying several hundred candidates prior to the November election, restricting the political ambitions of several key opposition candidates.

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Our Strategy
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¶12. (C) Chavez is already framing the upcoming referendum not just as a plebiscite on his rule, but as a contest between Venezuelan sovereignty and the (U.S.) "empire." We recommend limiting USG public comment on the issue of the indefinite reelection to avoid inadvertently giving strength to Chavez's specious justifications. In the end, this is an issue for Venezuelans to decide at the polls, although we recommend reiterating the importance of a free and fair electoral process. As opportunities arise, we will discuss the benefits of the 22nd Amendment to American democracy and note that every other country in the Western Hemisphere with a presidential form of government has term limits.

¶13. (C) We recommend utilizing available USAID/OTI resources to support Venezuelan civil society efforts to monitor the electoral process and ensure transparency at the polls. Time, however, is short. Specifically, we suggest that OTI resources be used to support non-partisan protect-the-vote efforts involving civil society groups, including student groups engaged in electoral monitoring. With so much at stake in the upcoming election, training and mobilizing poll watchers will be vital to deterring ballot stuffing. OTI has an excellent track record of success in all of the aforementioned areas that can be built upon over the next four weeks.

CAULFIELD