VZCZCXRO5688
PP RUEHAST RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHEG #0138/01 0270903
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270903Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1472
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000138 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA FOR SCHALL, ISN/CTR FOR KCHITTENDEN AND LHICKOCK, 
ENERGY FOR RSALERNO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO PARM PGOV ECON KFLU KSTH KSCA EAGR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT ENTERS THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF HIGH 
CONTAINMENT LABS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and comment: Five Egyptian research 
organizations are planning to build Biosafety Level Three 
(BSL-3) laboratories in which they can work with indigenous 
or exotic agents like Rift Valley Fever and strains of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (AI).  Three of the groups, VSVRI, 
the state-subsidized animal vaccine monopoly, VACSERA, the 
state-owned human vaccine monopoly, and CLEVB, the GOE's 
animal vaccine regulator, have the financial wherewithal to 
build the labs.  The other two groups-- the Ministries of 
Health and Population (MOHP) and Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation (MALR)-- have strong support from ministers who 
view BSL-3 labs as prestigious "must have" projects.  None of 
the groups, however, are likely to be able to construct, let 
alone operate, a safe BSL-3 facility without U.S. technical 
assistance. All the organizations have received assistance 
from the U.S. Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement 
Program (BEP) and the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 
(NAMRU-3). End summary and comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 3 LABS CRITICAL LINK IN BIOSAFETY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have 
published safety guidelines for labs that handle infectious 
microorganisms. These guidelines cover practices, equipment, 
and facilities (everything from access to drinking 
fountains), and they vary depending on the work to be done 
and the threat posed by the virus or bacteria involved. The 
guidelines speak in terms of biosafety levels 1, 2, 3, and 
4-- the higher the number, the greater the risk, and the more 
demanding the precautions required to protect lab workers, 
the environment and the community. A BSL-3 lab is designed to 
safely handle agents which, when inhaled, may cause serious 
injury or death. NAMRU-3 currently operates the only BSL-3 
lab in Egypt, although has the ability to upgrade to BSL-4 in 
less than 24 hours, if necessary. 
 
------------------------ 
THE EGYPTIAN BSL PLAYERS 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) VSVRI, VACSERA and CLEVB may need BSL-3 facilities 
to do the work they plan to do, and they have the cash or the 
financing in place to proceed with the projects. The Ministry 
of Health and Population and Ministry of Agriculture and Lab 
Reclamation labs need BSL-3 facilities, but they do not have 
the financial wherewithal to proceed with construction at 
this time. VSVRI has broken ground and is expected to 
complete the first Egyptian-owned BSL-3 lab.  At least two 
Egyptian universities also have BSL-3 aspirations: Ain Shams 
and Beni Sueif.  Ain Shams has begun the process; sources 
indicate it is probably 6 months to a year away from opening 
a BSL-3 lab.  Beni Sueif has just begun the process, and its 
prospects for success are uncertain. 
 
-------------------------------- 
USG TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO DATE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Biosecurity and counter-terrorism experts agree that 
bioterrorism is a critical threat to US security, and 
insecure labs around the world are a major part of the 
problem. Three separate groups, the National Intelligence 
Council, Britain's IPPR Commission on National Security in 
the 21st Century, and the Graham Commission, published 
reports in late 2008 echoing these concerns. Against this 
backdrop, the USG has rendered considerable technical 
assistance to each of the five Egyptian organizations seeking 
to build BSL-3 labs. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) In late July 2008, representatives of all five 
Egyptian groups traveled to Sandia National Laboratories in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, to participate in a BEP-sponsored 
training program, entitled "Controlling Laboratory Biorisks," 
at Sandia. The training, which ended August 4, 2008, included 
a trip to Colorado State University's new BSL-3 facility in 
Ft. Collins. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In mid-November 2008, representatives from six USG 
Agencies (DOS, USDA, HHS-CDC, DOE-Sandia, DOD-NAMRU-3 and the 
FBI) met with the Egyptian organizations pursuing BSL-3 labs 
in al-Ain al-Sokhna, Egypt for a BEP-sponsored BSL-3 
 
CAIRO 00000138  002 OF 003 
 
 
Planning, Programming and Operations Workshop. The 
participants discussed their BSL plans and agreed on the 
importance of a culture of biosecurity, risk assessments 
tailored to Egypt's particular situation, international 
support, a national strategy, training, and national 
standards. Participants agreed MOHP and MALR needed BSL-3 
capabilities to deal with emerging infectious diseases and 
needed US technical assistance to build and operate high 
containment labs. Some participants, while grateful for 
NAMRU-3's support, stressed the need for Egyptian-owned BSL-3 
facilities. After the workshop, BEP conducted follow-up 
visits to MOHP, MALR, VACSERA and VSVRI. A BEP representative 
also met with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
briefed the Ministry on BEP's activities in Egypt. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Sandia, BEP and NAMRU-3 continue to work with the 
Egyptian organizations on risk assessments, assessments none 
of the organizations had undertaken prior to the meeting in 
Sokhna. Additionally, Dr. Mohamed Khalifa of MALR has agreed 
to spearhead the creation of the Egyptian Biosafety 
Association. BEP may fund this effort. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
EGYPT: CROSSROADS FOR PANDEMIC DISEASES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) MOHP's Central Health Laboratories are located just 
a few blocks from the American Embassy in Cairo.  Dr. Hala 
Esmat, the Director of the laboratories, makes a compelling 
case for BSL-3 capability. Her laboratories routinely handle 
AI and Rift Valley Fever viruses and other dangerous 
pathogens. The labs storage cabinets contain these viruses as 
well as anthrax bacteria and other "select agents." She and 
her team are very concerned about AI and Rift Valley Fever, 
which are endemic here, and the possible entry of these and 
other diseases from Sudan, Libya and elsewhere.  As Esmat put 
it, "We live in a dangerous neighborhood." Esmat told us 
MOHP Minister Hatem El-Gabaly ordered her to build a BSL-3 
lab and told her the resources would be available to do so. 
Dr. Nasr El-Sayid, the Minister's closest advisor, told 
ESTHOff that BSL-3 capability would further burnish MOHP's 
reputation as the go-to lab for certain African and the 
Middle Eastern countries that rely on MOHP's reputation for 
discretion.  He said he routinely receives requests from 
neighboring countries to conduct confidential lab tests on 
samples. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: MOHP is a long way from being able to 
construct and run a BSL-3 lab. Despite the Minister's 
commitment to the project, there is no evidence the money is 
available. Esmat also lacks a strong supporting team. End 
Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
MIN. OF AGRICULTURE: "WE ARE THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE." 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) MALR, like MOHP, stakes a strong claim for BSL-3 
capabilities. In the words of Dr. Mohamed Khalifa Hassan, 
Technical Manager for the Central Laboratory for Veterinary 
Quality Control on Poultry Production (CLQP), Egypt is 
Europe's backyard, and MALR is the West's first line of 
defense against pandemic threats including AI and Rift Valley 
Fever. AI has killed 23 of the 52 Egyptians it has afflicted 
to date, and Rift Valley Fever killed 200 of the 400 
Egyptians it struck during the last outbreak in 2003.  Both 
these diseases are endemic in Egypt. 
MALR currently operates two laboratories: the Animal Health 
Research Institute (AHRI) and CLPQ. According Dr. Mona Ali, 
the Director of the labs, MALR Minister Amin Abaza is 
committed to building a BSL-3 lab at its central Cairo 
facility and, if the financing can be arranged, a separate 
BSL-3 facility at the Agricultural Research Center outside of 
Cairo that will be able to handle large animals. 
 
--------------------------- 
STATUS OF ONGOING PROJECTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Veterinary Serum and Vaccine Research Institute 
(VSVRI), the GOE-backed animal vaccine monopoly located in 
Abbasia near NAMRU-3, has the ready cash ($8 million) to 
build a Foot and Mouth (F&M)vaccine production facility 
incorporating BSL-3 capabilities and the additional resources 
 
CAIRO 00000138  003 OF 003 
 
 
($4.5 million) needed to refurbish an existing AI facility to 
include a BSL-3 area. VSVRI has contracted with Atlas 
Construction Company to build the F&M plant and construction 
is underway.  VSVRI's Deputy Director, Dr. Adel Azab, is 
determined to incorporate BSL-3 capabilities into VSVRI's 
facilities. 
 
¶12. (SBU) VSVRI's next-door-neighbor, the Central Laboratory 
for Evaluation of Veterinary Biologics (CLEVB), has also 
taken a few steps toward establishing a BSL-3 facility. CLEVB 
is the GOE's gatekeeper for all would-be animal vaccines. It 
tests all imported and locally-produced animal vaccines for 
safety and efficacy. No animal vaccine is used in this 
country without CLEVB's seal of approval.  CLEVB has begun to 
renovate space in its Abbasia facility, which is located 
adjacent to VSVRI. Dr. Elham El-Ebiary, CLEVB's Director, 
told ESTHOff CLEVB has secured a credit line of 8 million 
Egyptian pounds (LE) from the Islamic Development Bank. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In a visit to CLEVB late last year, ESTHOff was 
allowed to inspect CLEVB's poultry vaccine challenge test 
area, which is located in the building's basement. Several 
trials were underway involving chickens and ducks in several 
different rooms. There was little effort to comply with 
biosafety standards. The rooms were not sealed. The stench in 
the hallway was overpowering. The facility appeared to be 
unsuitable for a BSL-3 lab. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Holding Company for Biological Products and 
Vaccines (VACSERA) in Agouza, Giza, the Ministry of Finance's 
human vaccine monopoly, is taking a more cautious approach to 
BSL-3. Of all the entities pursuing the BSL-3 Holy Grail, 
VACSERA, with its 4,200 employees, $100 million in annual 
sales, state-of-the-art production facilities, Ministry of 
Finance backing, and strong management, seems to be the best 
positioned to build a BSL-3 lab.  MOHP Minister El-Gabaly 
recently announced that the GOE was increasing its efforts to 
produce an AI vaccine effective against a pandemic virus 
before any outbreak, a so-called "pre-pandemic" vaccine. Dr. 
Abdul Rahman Shahin, MOHP's spokesperson, has confirmed that 
VACSERA is tasked to work on a human H5N1 vaccine project. 
VACSERA welcomes USG help with BSL efforts. 
 
----------------------------- 
NEXT STEPS: A BRAVE NEW WORLD 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment: The USG's efforts in support of BSL-3 
projects in Egypt have generated an enormous amount of 
goodwill with the groups who want to build the labs, and the 
ministries involved. Representatives of the five Egyptian 
groups have repeatedly expressed their appreciation for this 
support, and the groups have granted BEP unfettered access to 
their plans and their facilities. Embassy Cairo, including 
NAMRU-3, strongly supports the BEP initiatives here. In the 
interest of biosafety and enhancing our cooperation with key 
governmental and academic entities,  the USG should continue 
to make every effort to insure that the BSL-3 labs are built 
and run safely and securely. 
SCOBEY