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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, AND USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL ETRD KSUM ENRG EFIN BR CU OAS
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON 
RELATIONS WITH NEW USG 
 
REF: A. 2008 BRASILIA 1636 
     ¶B. 2008 BRASILIA 1637 
     ¶C. 2008 BRASILIA 1638 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  In a January 21 meeting, Brazilian 
Presidential Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio 
Garcia told Ambassador Sobel that the GOB is very optimistic 
about relations with the Obama Administration.  He stressed 
that President Lula is eager to meet President Obama. 
Energy, climate change, and addressing the regional effects 
of the economic crisis are all potential areas for 
Brazil-U.S. cooperation in Garcia's view, but trade is not. 
Describing U.S. relations with Latin America and the 
Caribbean as "complicated," he cautioned that good regional 
relations would depend on a more collaborative style from the 
USG and, in particular, on an opening by the U.S. 
Administration toward Cuba.  Garcia thought energy would be 
the most promising area for cooperation at the upcoming 
Summit of the Americas.  He dismissed the Organization of 
American States (OAS) as largely irrelevant to solving the 
region's problems.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Garcia opened by saying how pleased he was that both 
Ambassador Sobel and WHA A/S Tom Shannon are staying on. 
"This ensures good relations with the United States," he 
said, adding that relations had been excellent with the 
previous U.S. Administration because President Lula and 
President Bush "knew how to respect each other even when they 
disagreed."  Relations with the United States, he said, "are 
fundamental" for Brazil, and the GOB wants to maintain and 
increase the good relations built during the Bush 
Administration.  Lula is not always the most diplomatic in 
the way he speaks, he said, but he has a great fondness for 
President Obama, and this has been enhanced by his sense that 
President Obama's views toward collective security, 
multilateralism, and the ways to address the economic crisis 
"coincide with ours."  Although personal relations with 
President Bush were always "warm and personal," Lula is now 
"very optimistic." 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked where Garcia saw possibilities 
for cooperation, particularly with the Summit of the Americas 
coming up in April.  Garcia said that energy is a natural 
basis for cooperation and should be deepened.  He also said 
that Lula is committed to helping the smaller and poorer 
countries of the region withstand the economic downturn, 
explaining that they are especially vulnerable because they 
are dependent on the U.S. economy, U.S. remittances, or oil 
(which, he added, is the key to Venezuelan President Chavez's 
success).  He suggested that one possibility for cooperation 
in this area would be to expand our "triangular" cooperation 
on biofuels, in which the United States provides capital, 
Brazil and the United States provide technical expertise, and 
recipient countries provide the labor and land to develop 
their own biofuel production.  On climate change, Garcia said 
that an early discussion between the United States and Brazil 
"could change the world." 
 
¶4. (C) On the political side, Garcia began, "the two 
presidents will need to speak frankly."  Relations between 
the United States and Latin America are not easy, he said, 
and are as complicated with U.S. friends in the region as 
they are with those countries hostile to the United States. 
With regard to complications with U.S. friends, Garcia 
mentioned Colombia with a knowing nod, but without providing 
any details.  (Note: GOB officials are cultivating relations 
with Colombia in advance of an upcoming visit by President 
Uribe to Brazil.  End note.)  He then cited Mexico, 
highlighting the surprise announcement made by President 
Calderon at the December summit of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in Bahia, Brazil, at which Calderon 
 
BRASILIA 00000095  002 OF 003 
 
 
proposed a LAC regional organization (reftels A, C).  On the 
"hostile" side, Garcia said that Bolivia's Morales wants to 
"re-establish" relations with the United States after the 
January 25 referendum, and that Brazil wants to help him do 
that.  Venezuela's Chavez, likewise, will be ready to engage 
after the February 15 vote.  "Until then," he counseled, 
"silence is best" on the part of the United States. 
 
¶5. (C) With regard to cooperation specifically aimed at the 
Summit of the Americas, Garcia cautioned that Brazil "can't 
appear to be a country that wants to be the leader in the 
region."  (Comment: This is an odd assertion in the wake of 
the Bahia summits (reftels), which have been widely 
interpreted as a not so subtle attempt to do just that.  End 
comment.)  Garcia thought energy held out the greatest hope 
as an issue around which the hemisphere could agree, but 
added that it will be difficult because each country faces 
different conditions and problems.  The most important thing 
for the United States, he said, will be to change the method 
and approach of engagement with the region, toward a more 
collaborative and consultative style. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the possibility of 
addressing trade at a regional level.  Garcia responded that 
it is hard to ponder trade issues outside of Doha, as other 
initiatives all have serious problems.  The Ambassador asked 
about trade facilitation measures.  Garcia said that if the 
United States had proposals, the region would listen, but was 
clearly doubtful; he lamented that the last effort to 
conclude Doha had failed, and expressed frustration that, in 
the view of the GOB, the United States had thrown up the 
final road blocks. 
 
¶7. (C) Noting that Brazil is taking on the rotating 
presidency of the OAS, the Ambassador asked how Garcia viewed 
the possibility for initiatives in that forum and prospects 
for its renewal. Garcia responded that the there is "enormous 
doubt" in the region about the possibilities for having a 
real "hemispheric policy."  The relations are always 
asymmetric, he said, adding that, "When I was young, the OAS 
was known as the 'Ministry of U.S. Colonies,'" although, he 
conceded, "this has changed a little bit."  Garcia said that 
the OAS has proved ineffective in addressing regional crises, 
citing the Ecuador-Colombia dispute and Bolivia's internal 
crisis which, he said, had been resolved outside the OAS, by 
a few South American countries and by UNASUL, respectively. 
(When the Ambassador noted that the United States had 
purposefully not inserted itself in these instances, Garcia 
remarked that "some of our best soccer players are those who 
can contribute to the team without ever touching the ball." 
Brazil will continue to participate in the OAS, Garcia said. 
But, citing American "25th hour" support for SYG Insulza as 
an error, he stressed that change in the OAS will depend on a 
change in U.S. policy toward the region, and toward Cuba in 
particular. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked how central discussion of Cuba 
would be, in Garcia's view, to establishing relations with 
the region.  "You can't talk about Latin America," he 
responded, "without talking about Cuba."  It has become a 
"sign" for the region.  Garcia urged a "strong" U.S. overture 
to Cuba "without conditions," such as removing the embargo. 
It would be, he said, a small price to pay for a large gain. 
On the one hand, he said, the Cubans would be astounded and 
embarrassed, and the United States would gain the moral high 
ground.  On the other, he stressed that, on the basis of his 
long relationship with Cuba and knowledge of Cuban history, 
he was certain the Cubans would never agree to a proposal 
that had explicit conditions attached.  The Ambassador asked 
if Raul Castro's proposal for a prisoner exchange, made 
during his December 18 visit to Brasilia, was the Cubans' own 
idea.  Garcia said his impression was that it was Raul's 
idea, that is was spontaneous and had not been vetted in 
 
BRASILIA 00000095  003 OF 003 
 
 
Havana.  "Raul is a military man," Garcia said.  "He 
understands the correlation of forces." 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador raised difficulties that had just 
cropped up getting Brazilian visas for DEA agents in Bolivia 
to move from La Paz to Brazil (see septel).  Garcia knew 
nothing of the issue, but used it to make a "general comment" 
regarding U.S. policy in the region.  The United States, he 
said, has a longstanding resistance to foreign and 
multilateral interference in its policies.  For example, 
President Bush had told Garcia how difficult it was for the 
United States--and not just the Bush Administration--to deal 
with the United Nations.  This creates difficulties for both 
the United States and Brazil, because it limits the way 
cooperation can take place.  There are many areas where we 
all share interests.  Bolivia wants to stem the drug problem 
because if they don't, cartels will threaten Morales (just 
look at the problems Mexico is having, he added).  But "there 
are ways and there are ways," he said, suggesting that DEA, 
and the United States more broadly, are too heavy-handed and 
need to be more consultative in our approach.  "I'm not a 
diplomat,though" he joked, "just an old leftist who has been 
placed at the President's side." 
 
¶10. (C) As the meeting ended, Garcia made a point of saying 
that President Lula is greatly interested in meeting 
President Obama as soon as possible, whether at the bilateral 
CEO Forum in New York in March, the G-20 meeting in London in 
April, or the mid-April Summit of the Americas.  President 
Obama would be welcome in Brazil, a visit which would be seen 
as "a great success and signal" for the region. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment: Garcia, who is Lula's closest foreign policy 
advisor, was remarkably frank and expansive in this 
discussion, sensing perhaps an opportunity to have an early 
influence on the new U.S. Administration.  Garcia is no 
friend of the United States or U.S. foreign policy; Lula's 
emphasis on South-South relations over those with the United 
States and Europe is largely his brainchild.  But unlike some 
other senior GOB officials, Garcia has adopted Lula's 
pragmatic approach to foreign policy.  He values the close 
relationship Brazil has cultivated with the United States and 
enjoys comparing notes and working collaboratively with us on 
regional issues, which are generally his domain.  Garcia's 
care to note Lula's affinity for President Obama and his 
interest in an early meeting echoes similar statements by 
Lula's chief of staff, Gilberto Carvalho, Strategic Planning 
Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and other senior GOB 
officials.  At the same time, in a regional context, GOB 
officials including Garcia continue to view relations with 
the United States through a "spheres of influence" prism. 
This makes them wary of working through the OAS or the SOA, 
and will likely make it challenging to work with them in 
defining concrete proposals for the hemisphere. 
SOBEL