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INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8969
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7152
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3398
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS ETTC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN SERVICE CHIEFS PRAISE DEFENSE 
COOPERATION, COMPLAIN ABOUT STATE DEPARTMENT 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 34 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 35 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 41 
     ¶D. 08 BRASILIA 1589 
     ¶E. SAO PAULO 27 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL.  REASON: 1.5 (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  On January 14, Ambassador Sobel hosted the 
Chiefs of the three Brazilian Services, Gen. Enzo Peri, ADM 
Julio Soares de Moura Neto and Brig. Juniti Saito for a 
discussion of the U.S.-Brazil defense relationship and 
possibilities for future cooperation.  Each of the Chiefs 
said cooperation with their counterpart U.S. service was 
excellent and gave his priorities for upcoming cooperation. 
Ambassador Sobel highlighted opportunities for defense 
industrial cooperation citing Boeing's efforts to find 
partners for the FX2 program as a model.  The three stressed 
the need for better transparency of  U.S. export licensing, 
with Saito saying that the perception in Brazil that slow 
licensing times reflect a State Department policy aimed at 
restricting Brazil's access to military technology was 
creating "problems at the political level," a veiled 
reference to high level resistance to the purchase of Boeing 
Super Hornet fighters.  The Chiefs all cited the new Defense 
Strategy as an important step forward as it gave the issue of 
national security greater prominence in the national 
political scene.  They were less positive on whether there 
would be resources available to carry out the ambitious 
strategy but felt the document would allow for a stronger 
case for resources to be directed to defense.  Regarding 
future cooperation, Moura Neto underlined the importance of 
in country construction of major projects, e.g. ships.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  At a January 14 lunch, Ambassador Sobel invited the 
service Chiefs to discuss U.S.-Brazil security cooperation, 
in particular, their views on areas for enhancing the 
relationship.  All three began by saying that they enjoyed 
close and productive relationships with their counterpart 
U.S. services.  Admiral Moura Neto cited personnel exchanges 
as a success for the navy and hoped to 
expand such exchanges, if approved, to include the U.S. Coast 
Guard (the Brazilian navy performs the coast guard mission) 
as well.  Brigadeiro Saito stated that while the overall 
relationship was strong with the U.S. as Brazil's most 
important supplier, there was room for improvement in the 
processing 
of export licenses by the State Department.  General Enzo 
mentioned exchanges of army engineers as a fruitful area for 
cooperation. 
 
FUTURE EQUIPMENT - TO BE MADE IN BRAZIL 
--------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C)  All three chiefs underlined the growing emphasis the 
Brazilian government is placing on developing Brazilian 
industry.  Moura Neto said the Navy's highest priority was 
coastal patrol craft, to be followed by a new generation of 
frigates ("escort ships"), but the government would only 
authorize acquisition of such ships if they were to be built 
in Brazil.  (NOTE: He did not mention the politically popular 
submarine program as a priority.  End note.)  The other 
Chiefs had similar views.  Enzo noted that Brazil was seeking 
to be able to perform maintenance of Black Hawk helicopters 
in 
country, rather than in the U.S.  Saito and Moura Neto agreed 
that future aircraft procurement for the navy and air force 
would depend on building aircraft in country.  Ambassador 
Sobel cited AVIBRAS, whom he met with recently (ref e), as a 
company intent on exploiting the potential for greater 
cooperation between U.S. and Brazilian defense industries. 
 
CHALLENGES - IT'S ALL THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FAULT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶4.  (C)  The service chiefs each weighed in on what they 
perceive as the major problem with the U.S.-Brazil security 
relationship -- State Department export licensing.  Each 
service has examples of cases in which delays in the 
licensing process have caused difficulties for the 
Brazilians.  Examples include gyroscopes for the air force, 
Black Hawk parts for the army and a radar antenna.  (Note: 
While 
these problems have most typically been due to exporter 
error, the common denominator has been State Department 
licensing.  End note.)  Saito said that he believes our 
 
BRASILIA 00000073  002 OF 002 
 
 
system is "run by bureaucrats," adding that State policies 
are based on an unwarranted view that Brazil cannot be 
trusted to protect sensitive technologies.  Enzo emphatically 
stated that  he believes State's actions to limit exports 
reflect the lack of a "policy of state" in favor of advancing 
the defense partnership with Brazil .  Ambassador Sobel 
pointed out that data indicate no worse a rate of denial and 
RWA for Brazil than 
most other major importers of ITAR controlled items and noted 
that the recently convened Technology Security Dialogue can 
help remove misunderstandings.  With a clear view toward the 
FX2 decision, Saito warned that the perceived State 
Department opposition to technology transfer to Brazil was 
creating "problems at a political level." 
 
DEFENSE STRATEGY - POSITIVE FOR THE MILITARY 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  Responding to a question of how the ambitious plans 
for military modernization would be resourced, Moura Neto 
stated that while this was an economic (as opposed to 
military) question, the advantage of the strategy document 
(see ref a for discussion) was that it made the question of 
defense resources a national one.  By recognizing Brazil's 
"strategic vulnerabilities," the strategy had put the 
question of defense in the forefront of the national debate. 
Enzo added that this would be a much more positive 
development for the military as it put them "inside" of 
national development instead of on the sidelines where they 
have been since the end of military rule.  While the strategy 
document contains many demands on limited resources, 
including equipment, support to inefficient industries and 
training for national service, the military views it as 
positive because it signifies a greater 
understanding of the importance of the military. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶6.  (C)  The warning from Saito, whom post considers a key 
ally in our FX2 bid, is the clearest indication yet that the 
obstacles to the F18 sale cited in refs c and d are real and 
that we still have considerable ground to cover in countering 
the perception that the USG, and the State Department in 
particular, cannot be counted on to approve the necessary 
technology transfer.  The service chiefs got the point that 
the offer of the F18 signified an unprecedented willingness 
to approve technology for Brazil that would pay dividends in 
both military and defense industry cooperation in the future, 
but the political problem cited by Saito remains acute. 
SOBEL