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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR ENRG BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFENSE MINISTER ON FIGHTER COMPETITION, 
NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY TEAM 
 
REF: IIR 6 809 0067 09 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  The Brazilian Air Force's FX2 fighter competition is 
between the United States and France, Defense Minister Nelson 
Jobim told Ambassador Sobel on January 8.  However, Brazil's 
defense relationship with the French is prospering because of 
French President Sarkozy's personal relationships and 
involvement.  Brazil is looking to advance and coordinate 
development of nuclear energy by creating a nuclear "czar," 
Jobim said, and Energy Minister Edson Lobao, who has emerged 
from a competitive domestic policy making apparatus as the 
clear leader on all energy policy matters, will have a lead 
role on nuclear energy, as well.  According to Jobim, Lula 
wants to work with the new U.S. Administration on strategic 
issues, and as Lula's most trusted foreign policy advisor, 
Marco Aurelio Garcia will be a critical player.  End summary. 
 
- - - Fighter Competition between U.S. and France - - - 
 
¶2. (C) With Brasilia largely shut down for summer/Christmas 
holidays, Jobim invited the Ambassador to his home January 8 
for a private meeting.  He told the Ambassador that the FX2 
fighter competition is between the U.S. F-18 and the French 
Rafale.  (Note: the Swedish Grippen is the third plane in the 
competition.  End note.)  He said that there were three main 
criteria: price, which was not so important; technology, 
which the F-18 Super Hornet does very well on (the Navy 
"loves" it; Air Force chief Juniti Saito "likes" it); and 
technology transfer, which is the "core" criterion.  He said 
tech transfer could extend beyond the plane itself to other 
possible collaboration, and was excited to hear that Boeing 
was working with a Brazilian company on a UAV, as it might 
prevent Brazil having to buy UAVs from Israel, which had 
become politically sensitive.  Jobim plans to talk with 
Embraer over the next 30 days to get their views.  The more 
Boeing can do to represent Brazilian products in the United 
States and to allow for transfer of U.S. technology to 
Brazil, the stronger the U.S. bid will be. 
 
¶3. (C) Jobim said that the defense relationship with the 
French has prospered because of President Sarkozy's personal 
relationship with Lula.  Sarkozy had assigned "ownership" of 
the relationship to his military advisor, and "the embassy 
just gets in the way."  When there is a question about 
whether technology can be transferred, Sarkozy tells the 
bureaucracy what to do.  Jobim said that the defense 
agreements signed during Sarkozy's late December visit to Rio 
de Janeiro were negotiated by the Defense Ministry.  Two of 
the elements were aimed at cooperation on the "soldier of the 
future" and a border surveillance network.  The third, 
related to the fighter competition, was inserted by Defense 
over the objections of the Air Force in an effort to spur 
greater engagement in the competition by the United States 
and Sweden.  (Note: Thus far, all of these agreements exist 
only on paper.  End note.) 
 
- - - Brazil Reviewing Its Nuclear Energy Policy - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Jobim said that key GOB ministers, including Trade and 
Development, Science and Technology, Defense, and Casa Civil 
(Dilma Rousseff) are currently reviewing the GOB's nuclear 
energy with a view toward speeding development of clean 
nuclear energy.  It is likely that the GOB will appoint a 
nuclear energy "czar" to oversee the activities of the 
ministries with nuclear responsibilities, and a retired 
admiral, Othon Pinheiro da Silva, is the leading candidate 
for the position.  More broadly, Jobim said that Energy 
Minister Edson Lobao, who became Minister in early 2008 when 
former Energy Minister and current Presidential Chief of 
Staff Dilma Rousseff was still widely regarded as the de 
facto Energy Minister, has now emerged as the leading figure 
in managing Brazil's energy policy, and will have an 
important role on nuclear energy policy, as well.  (See also 
reftel.) 
 
BRASILIA 00000068  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
- - - Brazil's Foreign Policy Team: Who's on First - - - 
 
¶5. (C) According to Jobim, President Lula wants to engage the 
new U.S. Administration early on "strategic issues."  Jobim 
said that Marco Aurelio Garcia has a close and long-standing 
relationship with Lula that makes him "critically important" 
to Lula's foreign policy decision-making.  It is also 
important to Lula that Garcia is well received by the left in 
Brazil and the region, which "insulates" Lula.  Along with 
Chief of Staff Gilberto Carvalho, Garcia stands as one of 
Lula's most trusted advisors.  Jobim added that Lula "uses" 
Foreign Minister Amorim, but has no strong personal 
relationship with him, and "dislikes" Deputy Foreign Minister 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes.  Strategic Planning Minister Unger 
has locked horns with both Amorim and Garcia, Jobim said.  He 
noted that Unger cannot take more than two years of leave 
from Harvard if he wants to keep his tenure, so will likely 
leave within the next six months unless he is offered a 
"bigger opportunity" in Brazil. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Jobim's assessments confirm what we are 
hearing elsewhere on all three counts: that although the F-18 
is widely seen as offering the best technology, the Rafale 
currently enjoys a political edge because of perceived 
foreign policy and tech transfer advantages; that Brazil is 
serious about developing its nuclear technologies further; 
and that Lula is eager to engage the new U.S. Administration. 
 In light of Jobim's comments regarding Garcia, it does not 
appear that the fact Garcia ceded management of the recent 
spate of regional disputes to the more nationalist Foreign 
Ministry reflects any loss of confidence by President Lula in 
Garcia, or a lessening of Garcia's influence in shaping 
Lula's foreign policy views. 
 
SOBEL