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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000035 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019 
TAGS: BR PREL MARR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S DEFENSE STRATEGY -- MILITARY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 34 
     ¶B. 08 BRASILIA 93 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason: 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Ref a reported on the strategic aspects of 
Brazil,s new Defense Strategy document, signed by President 
Lula on December 18.  While the main purpose of the strategy 
as written by the Minister for Strategic Planning, was to 
place Brazil,s military and defense sector in the framework 
of a broader vision of national development (reported in ref 
a), the document also contains policy guidance for the 
Defense Ministry and the three services that give a clearer 
view of how Defense Minister Jobim and senior military 
leaders see these institutions developing over the next 
generation -- into a more flexible, modern force with joint 
operational capabilities.  The restructuring of the Brazilian 
military can be seen as a compromise between setting 
conditions for a its role in a broader plan for national 
development and the goal of having a modern, effective 
military.  After more than twenty years outside the political 
mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the 
Brazilian military is now making a case for its 
modernization.  As it does so, opportunities will exist for 
improving the U.S.-Brazil security partnership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU)  In its nine-year history, the Brazilian Ministry 
of Defense has been under resourced and has had difficulty in 
providing effective civilian control over the armed forces. 
The Defense Strategy seeks to ameliorate this situation by 
calling for the employment of better-prepared civilian 
Ministry officials in place of some of the military personnel 
who now predominate.  The Ministry will have the lead on 
developing implementing arrangements for the Defense Strategy 
and is tasked with issuing instructions for the activities of 
the Armed Forces during peacetime.  The Strategy also 
recognizes the importance of the Armed Forces becoming more 
"joint" in their operational capabilities and tasks the 
Ministry with encouraging more inter-service cooperation.  As 
noted in ref a, sources in the Defense Ministry and Ministry 
for External Affairs told Embassy personnel that a principal 
reason for the delay in final approval of the strategy was to 
ensure inclusion of the services, comments.  As the section 
on each service differs markedly in terms of focus and style 
from the others, it is likely that the interagency agreement 
reached to allow the strategy document to go forward was to 
add in services, submissions to the document.  The chapters 
on the services all seek to make a case for increased 
resources and modernized equipment but are not always 
successful at spelling out the strategic vision for the 
potential security threats or contingencies to which many of 
the desired upgrades would respond. 
 
NAVY 
---- 
¶3.  (C)  The Navy is tasked with control of the seas and 
rivers and denying their use to potential adversaries.  Its 
main tasks will be defense of oil facilities and ports and 
assistance against transnational criminals.  COMMENT:  There 
is, however, no information as to what possible threats to 
oil facilities the Navy may be asked to counter, making it 
difficult, for example to evaluate the strategy,s assertion 
that a nuclear submarine would be necessary to meet the goal 
of protecting such facilities.  END COMMENT.  The strategy 
does recommend increased Navy capabilities in two key areas: 
control of the rivers and power projection in support of 
peacekeeping.  Noting that lack of effective control of the 
Amazon and Parana river systems undermines stability, the 
Navy will seek more brown water assets, including patrol 
vessels and better reconnaissance capability.  While 
Brazil,s current peacekeeping effort is focused on Haiti, 
there is an acknowledgement that Brazil will have to take a 
great share of the global burden and should be able to deploy 
and support peacekeepers out of its immediate region. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Navy,s wish list for equipment includes the 
expected nuclear powered submarines.  (See ref b for 
discussion.)  The Navy also seeks patrol craft and air patrol 
capabilities that will be important to effective monitoring 
of coasts and river systems.  Naval aviation is set to 
 
BRASILIA 00000035  002 OF 003 
 
 
improve through acquisition of aircraft and aircraft 
carriers, although the strategy specifies that any naval 
aircraft should be produced in Brazil.  Finally, the Navy is 
charged with improving its search and rescue capabilities, 
including the potential for international cooperation. 
 
ARMY 
---- 
¶5.  (C)  The Army,s strategic instructions focus on 
restructuring to make the force more mobile and able to 
engage in non-traditional conflicts.  To this end, the Army 
plans to shift to a brigade model in order to have more 
deployable units available.  These "rapid action forces" are 
intended to give commanders the ability to react to crises in 
remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be 
tailored to the situation.  In support of such missions, the 
Army,s acquisition priorities will be improved 
reconnaissance and communications, helicopters, night vision 
and fire control technology. 
 
¶6.  (C)  While mentioned prominently elsewhere in the Defense 
Strategy, the Army chapter does not, unlike the other 
services, raise the possibility of additional peacekeeping 
operations as a future mission, possibly a reflection of the 
Army,s frustration with the lack of an exit strategy in 
Haiti.  The Army,s planning is also silent on the major new 
task it will have in training up to three million potential 
reservists per year should the strategy,s national service 
provisions be fully implemented. 
 
AIR FORCE 
--------- 
¶7.  (C)  Apart from the highly prescriptive section on 
fighter procurement discussed in ref a, the Air Force chapter 
focuses on how to meet challenges in joint operations, 
reconnaissance and communications.  The Air Force,s highest 
priority, aside from new fighters, will be on acquiring more 
airlift capability so that one of the Army,s new brigades 
can be deployed rapidly at any time.  Other priorities 
include UAVs and improved satellite capability, particularly 
through indigenous space launch.  These priorities are 
underlined by a clear directive to favor domestic industry 
where possible.  The capability to build aircraft (including 
UAVs and space launch vehicles) in Brazil is considered "so 
important as to transcend discussions of equipment," a policy 
of sacrificing capability in favor of domestic production. 
 
COMMENTS 
-------- 
¶8.  (C)  As with the rest of the Defense Strategy, the 
sections on restructuring of the Brazilian military are a 
compromise between setting conditions for a military role in 
a broader plan for national development and the goal of 
having a modern, effective military.  After more than twenty 
years outside the political mainstream, and twenty years of 
minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now making a 
case for its modernization.  Making the case, however, means 
that the Defense Strategy must observe the conventional 
wisdom of Brazilian politics.  There is no threat, for 
example, to Brazil,s maritime oil deposits, but Brazilian 
leaders and media have routinely cited oil discoveries off 
the coast as an urgent reason for better maritime security. 
This concern has been merged with Brazil,s twenty year quest 
to develop a nuclear submarine to give new impetus to 
research on a small reactor for naval propulsion.  While the 
Army chapter of the strategy includes the seemingly mandatory 
caution about being prepared to protect Brazil,s sovereignty 
against a country or group of countries acting "on pretext of 
the supposed interests of humanity," it remains primarily 
focused on more realistic security challenges.  The political 
preoccupation with imagined threats to sovereignty in the 
Amazon, however, serves the practical purpose of tasking the 
military with developing greater capabilities to project 
power into the region most likely to be affected by 
instability in neighboring countries. 
 
¶9.  (C)  A Brazilian military that is more capable and 
deployable can support U.S. interests by exporting stability 
in Latin America and be available for peacekeeping elsewhere. 
 The plans by the Brazilian services, as evidenced in those 
parts of the defense strategy likely contributed by the 
services, are consistent with this interest, and, if 
 
BRASILIA 00000035  003 OF 003 
 
 
implemented, will lead to Brazil becoming a more effective 
security partner.  There are however, serious questions as to 
how much of these plans will see follow through, particularly 
with other supposed strategic priorities, including national 
service, nuclear submarines and government support to 
non-competitive defense industries, providing black holes to 
suck in all available resources. 
SOBEL