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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY--STRATEGY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
REF: A. 08 SAO PAULO 268 
     ¶B. 08 BRASILIA 175 
 
BRASILIA 00000034  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason: 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.  On December 18, President 
Lula signed the National Defense Strategy, concluding a 
fifteen month drafting exercise.  The document was 
principally drafted by Minister for Strategic Planning 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and it provides a security policy 
framework that places defense in the context of the 
government,s broader goal of national development.  The 
strategy is built on the presumption that it is in Brazil,s 
interest to be "independent," that is able to project its 
military power as it wishes, able to produce its own military 
hardware and able to control strategic economic sectors, 
including space, cybernetics and nuclear power.  Much of the 
document focuses on the future roles and structures for 
Brazil,s armed forces -- including updating equipment, 
promoting deployability and enhancing peacekeeping 
capabilities.  It also devotes considerable space to issues 
such as nuclear energy, reducing imports and national 
civilian service that are only indirectly related to how 
Brazil,s armed forces will defend the country, but are 
crucial when defense is viewed in the context of a vision of 
a broader strategy for Brazil,s development into a world 
power.  By linking reform of the security sector with the 
government,s broader development vision, the strategy places 
the military, for the first time since the end of military 
rule in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda 
and strengthens its case for increased resources.  Comments 
on the strategy,s provisions for the Brazilian military will 
be reported septel. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On September 7 (Brazilian Independence Day) 2007, 
President Lula tasked  Minister for Strategic Planning 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger to produce a National Defense 
Strategy paper within one year.  Although Unger announced he 
had completed work on September 7, 2008, the new strategy was 
not signed by President Lula and published until December 18, 
reportedly because of concerns from the armed services that 
their inputs were not incorporated.  The resulting document 
clearly includes many service priorities, especially in the 
area of equipment modernization, but the main focus of the 
document is less to outline future roles and structures for 
the military than to provide a context for the role of the 
defense sector in the Brazilian state. The Defense Strategy 
is available online via the MOD website: 
www.defesa.gov.br/eventos temporarios/2008 
/estrategia defesa nacional.pdf in Portuguese.  An English 
version will be transmitted to Washington agencies when 
available. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Defense Strategy as approved by the government 
and signed by the President reflects the government,s 
overall priority: Brazil,s "development" into a modern world 
power and sets conditions for the Defense sector,s role in 
this development.  In creating this strategy for the defense 
sector to contribute to development, Unger goes beyond a 
normal plan for restructuring the security sector to meet 
anticipated challenges and cites two other "axes" for work: 
strengthening defense industry and maintaining required 
military service in the context of a national service 
obligation.  In the three main areas of the strategy 
(military reform, defense industry and national service), the 
document underlines the importance of acquiring control of 
the latest technology and of enhancing the role of the 
central government. 
 
INDEPENDENCE 
------------ 
¶4.  (C)  The strategy for defense and development is built 
around the concept of "independence."  In the government,s 
vision, Brazil should be able to control its own security and 
not have to go outside its own borders in order to equip its 
security forces.  The strategy allows for "strategic 
partners," but these are seen as countries willing to 
transfer to Brazil technologies that will make Brazil more 
independent, not as collaborators in security operations. 
Similarly, where Brazil currently does not have the 
capability to produce defense equipment, it should, according 
 
BRASILIA 00000034  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
the document, seek to purchase the appropriate articles from 
foreign suppliers, but with the aim of allowing for domestic 
production.  This point is clearly illustrated by the 
prescriptive language on acquisition of modern fighter 
aircraft which rejects the "extreme solution" of simply 
buying foreign-made planes and calls for the Air Force to 
either 1) purchase aircraft of which Brazil can then produce 
its own upgraded variant, or 2) purchase a minimal number of 
foreign planes which then can be augmented by domestic 
production of the same model.  COMMENT: Given the relatively 
small number of aircraft to be ultimately acquired by the Air 
Force, neither option makes economic sense, but Unger places 
a greater importance on "independence" than military 
capability or efficient use of resources.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The strategy also repeatedly cites three sectors as 
being of critical importance for the independent development 
of the Brazilian state: space, cybernetics and nuclear, 
calling for Brazil to "control" these technologies.  The 
strategy calls for enhanced Brazilian space launch capacity, 
satellite monitoring and surveillance and for Brazil to 
deploy its own GPS-type system.  Cybernetics is listed as 
important for communications and information processing. 
Although, the strategy document acknowledges that as a member 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil will not have 
nuclear weapons, it then states that for this reason, Brazil 
must therefore pursue nuclear power development as an element 
of security that is important for Brazil,s development. 
This stated connection to defense of the country serves as 
justification for inclusion of nuclear power as a strategic 
industry, albeit one whose importance is more relevant to 
development than security.  (NOTE:  Nuclear energy is, in 
fact, one of the strategic industries enumerated in GOB,s 
latest Industrial Policy, published in May - see ref c.  The 
other Industrial Policy strategic sectors are defense 
industry, information technology, nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, and healthcare industry.) 
 
MILITARY RESTRUCTURING 
---------------------- 
¶6.  (C)  The heart of the defense strategy is its plan for 
the restructuring of the Brazilian military.  Specific 
comments on plans for each service and the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) will be reported septel.  Much of the 
restructuring strategy was contributed by the services and 
provides practical answers to key strategic questions about 
how Brazil will see to its own security over the next 
generation.  Among the conclusions are that Brazil must focus 
on the three key areas of monitoring/controlling large areas, 
strategic mobility and military presence to provide security. 
 These areas contribute to the services, requirements for 
airlift, better communications, satellite reconnaissance and 
maritime domain awareness.  The strategy notes the necessity 
of developing better joint service cooperation and the 
capabilities to conduct joint operations and the need for a 
professional civil service component in the Defense Ministry. 
 There is also a clear understanding that a country with 
pretensions to world power status will be asked to make 
greater contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.  (Brazil currently ranks just below Uruguay in 
regional UNPKO participation.) The strategy therefore 
recognizes that as Brazilian capabilities increase, so should 
peacekeeping deployments. 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
---------------- 
¶7.  (SBU)  The strategy paper,s most important goal for 
defense industry is to use the need to modernize the armed 
forces to acquire new technologies with applications for 
national development.  To do so, the Government of Brazil is 
encouraged to offer tax incentives and legal benefits to 
these industries (tax and financing benefits are already 
provided under the May 2008 Industrial Policy).  Unger also 
clearly states that commercial considerations, i.e. increased 
trade, must be considered subordinate to the country,s 
"strategic interest."  Therefore, efficient use of resources 
and deployment of effective military capabilities are less 
important than stimulating domestic defense industries which 
are optimistically viewed as having future export potential. 
According to the strategy, industrial partnerships with 
non-Brazilian entities are advantageous as a means to reduce 
 
BRASILIA 00000034  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
dependence on foreign purchase -- when the main role in the 
partnership is played by the Brazilian side. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In exchange for support for the growth of defense 
industries, the strategy proposes that the central government 
gain "special powers" over such industries, including through 
so-called "golden share" arrangements - government vetoes 
over designated corporate actions.  Several press reports 
carried the story that the MOD would be seeking special taxes 
on private businesses that are perceived as benefiting from 
security (e.g. Petrobras) to pay the costs of their defense, 
but such a proposal is not included in the final document. 
 
NATIONAL SERVICE 
---------------- 
¶9.  (C)  The strategy states that "the basis of national 
defense is the identification of the nation with the armed 
forces and the armed forces with the nation."  For this 
reason, mandatory military service is viewed as essential for 
the future.  The strategy states explicitly that the armed 
forces must "limit and reverse the tendency to lower the 
proportion of draftees and raise the proportion of 
professionals."  Consistent with the overall goal of 
encouraging the Brazilian government,s vision of national 
development, military service is viewed primarily as a means 
of unifying the population and fostering greater social 
equality.  The strategy document states specifically that its 
objectives include forcing higher socio-economic classes to 
provide a larger proportion of military draftees and opening 
more places in military academies to students from more 
diverse backgrounds. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The means by which the strategy plans to 
democratize the armed forces will be a new form of national 
service.  All young people will have to be available to the 
military which would be able to select the best qualified as 
its recruits.  Everyone else would go into a "civil service" 
which would receive basic military training and be available 
for mobilization in the case of a national emergency of some 
sort.  The strategy does not, however, provide any 
information as to what sort of national emergency would 
require the mobilization of potentially millions of poorly 
trained young Brazilians or how the basic training of about 
three million civil service members per year will be managed 
by the limited number of military professionals available. 
 
REGIONAL FOCUS 
-------------- 
¶11.  (C)  One of the most notable elements of the strategy 
has been the focus on the defense of the Amazon region. 
While the document notes that this region faces ongoing 
security challenges from uncontrolled borders and potential 
instability in neighboring states, it also indulges in the 
traditional Brazilian paranoia concerning the activities of 
non-governmental organizations and other shadowy foreign 
forces that are popularly perceived as potential threats to 
Brazil,s sovereignty.  The strategy calls for greater use of 
mobility and monitoring technology to improve security in the 
Amazon region and for the shifting of forces north as needed 
to improve security there. 
 
¶12.  (C)  The strategy also calls for improved defense 
relations with other South American states, especially 
through the development of the South American Defense 
Council, although it notes that a main purpose of the council 
will be to enhance Brazil,s defense industrial base through 
exports to its neighbors.  The strategy concedes that Brazil 
will require greater capacity for participation in 
international peacekeeping, although increasing Brazil,s 
deployments should be linked to restructuring of 
international organizations to give developing countries more 
important roles in their leadership. 
 
COMMENTS 
-------- 
¶13.  (C)  The first sentence of the strategy portion of the 
document reads: "National defense strategy is inseparable 
from national development strategy."  This point is key for 
understanding the document,s purpose and why it was tasked 
to the Ministry of Strategic Planning and not the Defense 
Ministry.  Not a defense strategy per se,  the strategy is a 
 
BRASILIA 00000034  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
set of ideas for how Brazil,s military, defense industry and 
national service can contribute to the goal of development. 
Nowhere in the strategy is the goal of development defined, 
but it seems to point toward a generally understood vision of 
Brazil as a major world power (with a UN Security Council 
seat), with strong state institutions and without threats to 
its security -- a situation described as "Brazil,s proper 
place."  By linking reform of the security sector with the 
government,s broader development vision, the strategy places 
the military, for the first time since the end of military 
rule in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda 
and strengthens its case for increased resources. 
 
¶14.  (C)  While the restructuring plans generally are 
consistent with the goal of a modern, more capable military, 
(leaving aside such politically popular white elephants as a 
nuclear powered submarine), the strategy document is silent 
on how resources will be found to cover the costs of 
expensive new hardware including aircraft carriers, satellite 
constellations and fighter production.  Even ballpark 
estimates by embassy staff of possible modernization costs 
are far in excess of current defense budgets.  The defense 
strategy as a whole is in some measure designed to address 
this question by linking defense to overall development 
goals, but it is likely that defense expenditures will not be 
increased to the degree required to fulfill the shorter term 
goal of equipping the armed forces with cutting edge 
technology produced in Brazil. 
 
¶15.  (C)  The other two "axes," defense industry and national 
service, have less to do with improving the military than 
with integrating national security with national development. 
 Some of the specific proposals in these areas (e.g., 
propping up inefficient industries, increasing conscription) 
actually could reduce the effectiveness of the military and 
divert resources from modernization.  The emphasis on 
societal benefits over professionalism in military service is 
consistent with the views of a President and other government 
leaders who started in politics under the military government 
of the 1970s and 80s and want to ensure that the military,s 
capacity to become involved in politics remains 
circumscribed.  The socialist background of Lula,s Workers, 
Party is clearly evident in the efforts at social engineering 
through mandatory national service at the cost of more 
effective defense. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Perhaps the most significant Brazilian comment on 
the defense strategy has been the lack of comment.  Most of 
the coverage in the Brazilian press relied on official press 
releases, in some cases, for example reporting inaccurately 
that the strategy would include the possible taxing of 
private business to pay for defense.  Other coverage focused 
on a few headlines, including the construction of a nuclear 
submarine, possible redeployments of forces to the Amazon and 
protection of maritime oil fields.  This may have been, in 
part, a reflection of the timing of the release as most 
Brazilians were heading away for the holidays.  Embassy 
contacts do not seem to have read the document and regard it 
as a summation of already-known government views on defense. 
The document,s legal status is also unclear.  By signing, 
President Lula seems to have adopted it as national policy, 
but as many of the recommendations are non-concrete and would 
require further action to develop, it remains to be seen how 
much will be implemented.  While Lula seems to pay attention 
to what Unger has to say, the degree to which the strategy,s 
recommendations are implemented will be a good barometer of 
the Minister for Strategic Planning,s real influence. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Even if some of the more grandiose plans (nuclear 
submarines, universal military service) are never realized, 
there remains a great deal that Brazil can do consistent with 
the new defense strategy that will help it develop a more 
capable modern military.  Focusing on deployability and using 
technology to help monitor the northern regions of the 
country are the optimal solutions to Brazil,s strategic 
problem of controlling a vast, unpopulated territory.  These 
plans create opportunities for U.S. business to partner with 
Brazilian counterparts and for the U.S. armed forces to 
engage in increased cooperation as Brazil,s military seeks 
to modernize (See ref b).  We should, however, expect that 
engagement with Brazil will increase only gradually, 
 
BRASILIA 00000034  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
particularly while the current government is in power.  The 
strategy document looks at strategic partnerships primarily 
in terms of defense trade and technology transfer, but we 
should seek to open up the concept to include real security 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest.  Such cooperation, 
however, must be gauged to be consistent with the Brazilian 
government,s vision of defense as a means of national 
development. 
 
SOBEL