VZCZCXRO5332
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0034/01 0130813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130813Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0861
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000034 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA NOT FANNING INSTABILITY IN BOSNIA 
 
REF: A. 08 SARAJEVO 1913 
     ¶B. 08 SARAJEVO 1728 
     ¶C. 08 BELGRADE 1234 
     ¶D. 08 BELGRADE 1189 
 
Classified By: Deborah Mennuti, Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This cable was drafted jointly by Embassies Belgrade 
and Sarajevo. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite close relations between Belgrade and Banja 
Luka, in recent months President Boris Tadic has been 
publicly taking a strong stand to encourage all parties to 
respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and uphold the Dayton Agreement.  When it comes to 
engagement, however, Serbia has focused more on its 
relationship with the entity of Republika Srpska (RS) than on 
engaging with or supporting state-level institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Serbias special relations with the 
RS and inflammatory rhetoric from Bosniak member of the 
Tri-Presidency Silajdzic will keep Serbia wary of state-level 
Bosnian leadership, but Belgrade will continue to be a 
responsible neighbor as along as it sees the preservation of 
Dayton as necessary for regional stability and EU membership. 
End Summary. 
 
Tadic Publicly Backs Territorial Integrity of BiH 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.     (SBU) The December 10 visit of High Representative 
Miroslav Lajcak to Belgrade showcased the most recent 
attempts by President Tadic to underscore his governments 
opposition to Republika Srpska secession and uphold the 
Dayton Agreement.  A statement from Tadics office announced 
Serbias undiminished support for the territorial integrity of 
BiH, supported a principled approach to constitutional reform 
based on consensus of all three parties, and called for EU 
membership for BiH.   This statement repeated Tadics comments 
in early November, in which he stressed that cooperation 
between Serbia and Republika Srpska should not be construed 
as jeopardizing the integrity of BiH, and called on all 
Bosnian officials to consistently implement the Dayton 
Agreement as a guarantee of stability. 
 
¶4.     (C) Tadics comments mark a significant contrast from a 
year ago when Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica was 
RS Premier Milorad Dodik,s most reliable Serbian supporter. 
Speaking privately to us on December 10, Lajcak said that 
while Dodik and Tadic maintained a close personal friendship, 
Kostunica was a more reliable source of unconditional 
political support to the RS.  Lajcak had asked various 
European capitals to press Tadic to contain Dodik, and Tadic 
had accepted the message.  According to recent intelligence 
reports, Lajcak said, Dodik returned from his November visits 
to Belgrade disappointed with the lack of support Tadic was 
willing to offer.  An upbeat Lajcak was reassured by Tadics 
promise to be a stabilizing force in the region and welcomed 
the news that Foreign Minister Jeremic would be sent to 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka before the end of the year to repeat 
Tadics statements supporting Bosnias territorial integrity 
and constitutional reform through consensus. (Jeremic visited 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka on December 25-26 (Ref A).)  Lajcak 
also argued that the real problem was Silajdzic, but that 
Dodik makes things worse because he cannot shut up and 
instead responds to every Silajdzic provocation. 
 
Limited Contact with State-Level Institutions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.     (SBU) Despite Tadics comments supporting Dayton, 
Belgrade could do more to develop ties with state-level 
institutions in Sarajevo rather than pursuing lopsided 
engagement with Republika Srpska at the expense of state 
institutions.  Our Serbian interlocutors frequently point to 
good relations with the RS and tepid but improving ties with 
the Federation, seemingly ignoring that their natural 
counterparts should be neither entity but the state-level 
institutions in Sarajevo.  One exception is bilateral 
cooperation on refugee issues, in which Belgrades 
Commissariat for Refugees works closely with the Bosnian 
Ministry for Refugees to implement the 2005 Sarajevo 
Declaration on resettlement of refugees.  Both sides 
frequently share data and have cooperated without major 
complaint. (There are currently 27,000 Serbian refugees in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.) 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000034  002 OF 004 
 
 
Emphasis on Entity-Level Contact 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although Bosnias state-level ministries have some 
necessary contacts with Serbias, the fact that Belgrade has 
continued to develop close ties with the RS via the 2006 
bilateral Framework for Special Parallel Relations between 
Serbia and the Republika Srpska may help the RS undermine 
Bosnias state institutions legitimate efforts to exclusively 
exercise state-level competencies --not least foreign policy. 
 Since formal ratification of the agreement last year, a 
joint Council on Cooperation has met twice and included prime 
ministers and presidents of both Serbia and the RS to discuss 
areas of cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural, 
tourist, and social realms.  On the occasion of the Councils 
second meeting in November, Tadic publicly noted that the 
agreement had led to successful joint projects in the fields 
of energy, education, health care, infrastructure, and dual 
citizenship.  Serbian MFA Neighboring Countries Directorate 
officer Vladimir Odavic told us in mid-November that the 
Parallel Relations framework was largely restricted to 
providing cultural support from Belgrade to the RS because 
Banja Lukas economic successes had largely rendered moot the 
need to provide extensive economic assistance.  Both the RS 
and Serbian economies would severely suffer if Dayton 
unraveled, Odavic added. 
 
¶7.     (SBU) Citing the special parallel relations framework, 
the Serbian government in November permitted the opening of 
an RS representative office in Belgrade, officially titled 
The Agency for the Advancement of Economic, Scientific, 
Technical, Cultural, and Sports Cooperation with the Republic 
of Serbia. (The RS has similar representative offices in 
Brussels and Podgorica.)  Tadic, RS President Kuzmanovac, 
Dodik, and Serbian PM Cvetkovic attended the November 7 
opening ceremony in Belgrade.  Headed by former PKB bank 
director Mladjen Cicovic, the RS Representative office in 
Belgrade consists of four experts who broker contacts between 
RS and Serbian organizations in areas of economic, cultural, 
scientific, and sports.  Cicovic emphatically told us in 
December that his office provided only technical assistance 
and sought to downplay his knowledge of RS political matters 
by stating that he was apolitical and unaware of dealings 
between Dodik and the Serbian government.  Cicovic was 
willing to comment, however, that while the administrative 
system created by Dayton was fraught with inefficiencies, 
Serbs had to realize that it was the system in which they had 
to live and that there will always be a border between the RS 
and Serbia. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Serbian government also sees cultivating ties 
with the Federation, Bosnias other entity, as desirable but 
has not launched similar efforts to promote cooperation with 
state-level entities.  Tadic in November said that Serbia was 
starting an initiative to develop ties with the Federation 
similar to the special parallel relations framework that 
existed with the RS, though Federation Vice President Mirsad 
Kebo denied the Federation sought such an arrangement 
following Jeremics December visit to Sarajevo (Ref A). 
Odavic said that he expected an agreement on cultural 
cooperation to be signed between Serbia and the Federation in 
spring 2009 that would demonstrate an improved atmosphere of 
cooperation between Belgrade and Sarajevo.  In both cases, 
there was no mention of fostering greater state-to-state 
contacts.  Accordingly to our diplomatic contacts, Jeremic 
likes to mention on trips to BiH that he is half-Bosniak, and 
seems to have a personal interest, stemming from his family 
background, to improve bilateral ties. 
 
Pampering Dodik, Excoriating Silajdzic 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Belgrades focus on cultivating entity-level ties will 
impede the development of constructive, state-level relations 
with Sarajevo.  Our diplomatic contacts indicate that close 
relations between Tadic and Dodik have sidelined the Bosnian 
Embassy and led to the impression that Tadic is conferring de 
facto recognition of RS independence.  Our Bosnian Embassy 
contacts have complained that Tadic and Dodik have appeared 
in public events in Belgrade as equals *- such as at the 
opening of the Republika Srpska Park in New Belgrade on April 
30 -- and that Belgrade has sent ministers to visit Banja 
Luka without informing Sarajevo.  Dodik travels frequently to 
Belgrade without informing the Bosnian Embassy or using the 
embassys services, according to the Bosnian Embassy, which 
was not invited to participate in the opening of the RS 
Representative office in November.  Serbian MFA officials 
have claimed that such treatment is only due to the 
difficulty of coordinating with Sarajevo, but it continues to 
 
BELGRADE 00000034  003 OF 004 
 
 
be a constant point of grievance. 
 
¶10.  (C) Serbian officials cite the continued inflammatory 
rhetoric by Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris 
Silajdzic as an excuse to continue special ties with the RS. 
Each of our interlocutors mentioned Silajdzic as the key 
obstacle to strengthening ties with the Federation and 
state-level institutions.  MOD State Secretary and Tadic 
confidante Dusan Spasojevic told visiting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Stuart Jones in November that he considered 
Silajdzic to be similar to Hague-indicted war criminal and 
Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Seselj, because both 
employed a backward-looking political framework.  Odavic said 
that Silajdzic had intentionally sought to impede Belgrades 
overtures to Sarajevo and that his efforts since 2006 to 
erode Serbian identity in the RS had increased the Serbian 
sense of insecurity in the RS.  Dodik skillfully exploited 
Silajdzics comments for political gain and continues to push 
back when he sees the RS has no international allies to 
condemn Silajdzics rhetoric, Odavic said.  Belgrade did not 
consider recent statements by Silajdzic to be representative 
of the authorities in Sarajevo, Odavic continued, saying that 
the Odzuk Agreement (Ref B) showed that all entities could 
constructively work together with Silajdzic out of the 
picture. 
 
Lingering Issues: Border and Yugoslav Property Disputes 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11.  (C) A lack of engagement between Belgrade and Sarajevo 
has precluded the resolution of ongoing border disputes and 
the distribution of Yugoslav state property.  Bosnian Charge 
Amira Arifovic told us on December 30 that border 
negotiations had reached a stalemate due to a lack of 
high-level political will on both sides.  Arifovic described 
the Serbian position as seeking to exchange territory before 
signing an agreement while the Bosnian side believes a signed 
statement is a prerequisite to an exchange.  She estimated 
that the situation could not be resolved without high-level 
pressure from political leadership on both sides. 
 
¶12.  (C) Arifovic noted Yugoslavia state property restitution 
as the second key sticking point in the bilateral 
relationship.  The absence of efforts on both sides since 
2006 to define and renegotiate details in the Agreement on 
Succession Issues forestalled progress on restitution.  She 
added that the stalemate was exacerbated by Serbian efforts 
to effectively seize control of socially-owned Bosnian 
property in Serbia through claiming authority under Annex G 
of the Agreement, most recently in December 2008.  She 
lamented the absence of property rights protections for 
Yugoslav-registered Bosnian property and mentioned Unix 
Genex, BNT, Unis Promex, Zrak, and Bosnalink as among the 
most significant Bosnian companies still in Serbia.  These 
companies, and others, as of December were involved in 
roughly 20 property rights cases in Serbian courts. 
 
How Strongly Will Tadic Support Dayton? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Tadics recent combative comments toward Croatia (Ref 
C) indicate that he is not immune to playing the nationalist 
card when politically expedient.  However, most observers 
agree that he is unlikely to support RS secession through the 
next year for several reasons.  First, economic difficulties 
at home ) exacerbated by the financial crisis - will 
constrict opportunities for offering economic support abroad. 
 Second, Tadic is boxed in by his position on Kosovo: 
recognition of RS secession would give the appearance of de 
facto legitimacy to Kosovo independence, an outcome Tadic 
cannot accept.  Finally, Tadic has very little political 
advantage to gain at home for supporting Dodik as the 
treatment of Serbs in any part of Bosnia is not the 
hot-button issue it is with regard to Croatia, Kosovo, or 
even Montenegro.  Even ex-Radical leadership of the Serbian 
Progressive Party has denounced efforts to separate the RS 
from BiH (Ref D).  Accordingly, Tadic is likely to hold the 
line in support of Dayton unless a rapid deterioration in 
living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that severely 
disadvantages Serbs is coupled with signals from Brussels 
that Serbias EU prospects are significantly dimmed. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Serbias policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
strongly colored by its European aspirations and fears of 
regional instability that could hurt Serbian interests. 
Calculating that RS secession would lead to instability and 
 
BELGRADE 00000034  004 OF 004 
 
 
negative economic consequences, Tadic is prepared to use 
personal and diplomatic leverage to contain Dodik, up to a 
point.  Belgrades perspective that the real problem is 
Silajdzic, a point reiterated by Lajcak, makes no secret of 
where their sympathies lie, but the fact of the matter is 
that Dodiks statements and actions over the last two years 
have undermined the state more than the most egregious 
statements made by Silajdzic.  Regardless, Belgrades 
continued cultivation of entity-level ties impedes the 
development of constructive relations with state-level 
institutions, which in turn prevents the resolution of 
lingering bilateral disputes.  Tadics policy represents an 
important improvement over that of Kostunica, but 
institutionally Serbia is trying to have it both ways: 
supporting Dayton and Bosnias territorial integrity while 
lending credibility, even if indirectly, to Dodiks dangerous 
rhetoric.  Belgrades response to Bosnian requests to restart 
the BiH-Serbia Inter-State Cooperation Council (which has not 
met since 2005) will demonstrate the degree to which Belgrade 
is willing to exercise the regional leadership it claims to 
be seeking and move toward resolving more complicated 
bilateral irritants involving borders and property. 
MUNTER