VZCZCXYZ0012 
RR RUEHWEB 

DE RUEHLB #0024/01 0071547 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
R 071547Z JAN 09 
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3926

UNCLAS BEIRUT 000024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, S/CT RHONDA SHORE, 
NCTC: RUEILB, NCTC WASHINGTON DC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: 08 STATE 120019 
 
¶1. Since 2005 there have been numerous assassinations and 
assassination attempts of prominent Lebanese figures, 
including former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The attacks 
targeted Lebanese political and military figures and 
journalists, many of whom were critical of Syrian 
interference in Lebanon. All of these attacks remain 
unsolved. The UN International Independent Investigation 
Commission (UNIIIC) was appointed to investigate the Hariri 
assassination, and subsequently has also been involved in 
investigating some 20 other attacks. UNIIIC,s mandate was 
extended through February 2009 and is scheduled to transition 
to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague on 
March 1, 2009. 
 
¶2. Terrorist violence continued in 2008. On January 15, a US 
Embassy fully armored vehicle was hit by a road side vehicle 
bomb north of Beirut, injuring two embassy body guards and 
killing three Lebanese bystanders, along with injuring 20 
others, including one non-official American. On January 25, a 
car bomb in the Hazmieh suburb of Beirut killed an Internal 
Security Force (ISF) Intelligence officer, his driver and 
four others. A road side bomb detonated on August 13 in 
Tripoli, killing 12 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers, six 
civilians and wounding more than fifty. On September 29, a 
road side car bomb in Tripoli detonated, killing four LAF 
soldiers and two civilians. There was speculation both 
Tripoli bombings were the work of militant Islamic group, 
Fatah al-Islam (FAI). A car bomb attack killed Sheikh Saleh 
al-Aridi, a senior member of the Lebanese Democratic Party 
led by Druze leader Talal Arslan. While previous 
assassinations and assassination attempts targeted 
anti-Syrian figures, the Aridi assassination was the first to 
target a pro-Syrian politician. None of the attacks have been 
solved. 
 
¶3. The end of former President Emile Lahoud's term in 
November 2007 and subsequent vacuum in the presidency left 
Lebanon in a state of political turmoil. The political 
deadlock lasted until May 2008, when the government,s 
decision to dismantle Hizballah-controlled fiber optic 
communication systems and remove the chief of airport 
security sparked armed clashes between Hizballah and other 
groups in Beirut and other areas. The clashes ended a few 
days later with the help of Arab League intervention which 
led to the Qatari-brokered Doha Agreement of May 21. The 
agreement ended the months-long political impasse and paved 
the way for the May 25 election of consensus candidate, and 
former LAF Commander, Michel Sleiman as president. A 
national unity government was officially formed on July 11, 
including three cabinet ministers appointed by the President, 
16 ministers appointed by the majority March 14 coalition, 
and 11 ministers appointed by the March 8 opposition 
(including one minister from Hizballah), as agreed in Doha. 
 
¶4. The new government selected General Jean Kahwagi as the 
new LAF Commander in September 2008. Kahwagi is a respected 
battle hardened commander with command experience in Nahr 
al-Barid fighting Fatah aI-Islam terrorists in an urban 
setting. The U.S. government has an active, expanding program 
of assistance with the LAF, including both training and 
equipment. By confronting and defeating FAI in the Nahr 
el-Barid camp, the government and the LAF took a strong step 
in combating terrorist activities. The battle against FAI 
marked the first time in 40 years that the LAF fought a major 
conflict, and it was the first time the army entered a 
Palestinian refugee camp to eliminate an Islamic militant 
terrorist group. 
 
¶5. While the Lebanese government has made progress, there are 
concerns about its ability to combat terrorism, especially in 
Lebanon,s 12 Palestinian refugee camps. A porous border with 
Syria, weak internal camp security by Palestinian 
authorities, and Lebanese security authorities, reticence to 
enter the camps all contributed to a concern that there would 
be another confrontation against an armed group in one of the 
camps. The most widely predicted venue for such a clash is 
in Lebanon,s most populous refugee camp, Ain al Hilweh near 
the southern city of Sidon. The camp is well known for 
intra-Palestinian violence and is a safe haven for fugitives. 
As of December 2008, the Lebanese authorities were reportedly 
making efforts to capture Abdel al-Rahman Awad, believed to 
be the successor of FAI leader Shaker al-Abssi. (Abssi is a 
fugitive, and there is speculation that he is in Syria or 
that he has been killed by Syrian security authorities.) 
 
¶6. Ain al Hilweh internal security relies largely on 
Palestinian group Fatah forces. Cooperation among the 
Palestinians and the government led to the establishment in 
2005 of a Palestinian-Lebanese Dialogue Committee. The 
committee works towards establishing cooperative security 
arrangements and reducing the poor conditions in the camps 
that create a fertile environment for extremist ideology. 
 
¶7. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 called for 
respect for the sovereignty and political independence of 
Lebanon, the end of foreign interference in Lebanon, and the 
disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias. Hizballah, which the U.S. has designated as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization, is a political party 
represented in Lebanon's cabinet and parliament. Political 
leaders have agreed that the role of Hizballah,s arms should 
be determined through "national dialogue" rather than by 
force. President Sleiman launched a new round of the 
National Dialogue talks in September. (The last National 
Dialogue, begun in 2006, never resumed after the start of the 
2006 war.) The 14 participants in the dialogue represent the 
major political parties which participated in the negotiation 
of the May 2008 Doha Agreement. After the third round of 
talks in December, participants agreed to form a committee to 
evaluate participants, proposals for a "National Defense 
Strategy," which is intended to include how to deal with 
Hizballah's weapons. 
 
¶8. Border security remains problematic. It is quite likely 
that smuggling of weapons into from Syria to 
Hizballah-controlled territory in Lebanon continues. Reports 
from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF 
said there was no conclusive evidence of arms smuggling to 
Hizballah in the area of southern Lebanon patrolled by UNIFIL 
(south of the Litani river). This is despite Hizballah 
officials' comments to the press that the organization is now 
more heavily armed than before the 2006 war with Israel. 
 
¶9. Even with LAF troop deployments after the 2006 war, the 
government of Lebanon still does not exercise control over 
areas in the Hizballah-dominated areas in southern Lebanon, 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, and parts of the Bekaa Valley. 

¶10. UNSCR 1701 called upon Lebanon to secure its borders at 
all entry points to prevent entry of arms, weapons of mass 
destruction or related material without its consent. In May 
2007, the UN Secretary General dispatched a border security 
team to Lebanon (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment 
Team or LIBAT) to assess the monitoring of Lebanon,s border 
with Syria. In July 2008, a second assessment team (LIBAT 
II), responsible for assessing the implementation of the 
recommendations of LIBAT I, was sent to Lebanon. 
 
¶11. The overall assessment of LIBAT II was that the borders 
are as penetrable and unsecure as they were in 2007 and 
concluded that the rate of implementation of LIBAT I,s 
recommendations was insufficient. Lebanon achieved 
"disconnected islands" of progress without a decisive impact 
on overall border security, the report said. At the border 
crossing points and particularly along the eastern border 
with Syria, little progress was observed stemming the tide of 
smuggling and human trafficking. Some positive steps like the 
installation of security equipment such as scanners and 
computerization of passport control were mentioned. 
 
¶12. Drug smuggling across Lebanese borders remained 
problematic in 2008. ISF authorities said they saw no 
relationship between terror groups in Lebanon and narcotics 
cultivation or trafficking. 
 
¶13. Two international conventions supported by the USG 
remained pending approval: The International Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing was sent back to the 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee for further study in 
2008, and the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, which the Foreign Ministry has 
not submitted for Cabinet approval because of a dispute with 
the Finance Ministry over some wording. 
 
¶14. Lebanese officials played an active leadership role in 
2008 in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force (MENA/FATF) and the US-MENA Private Sector 
Dialogue. Lebanon's Financial Intelligence Unit is the 
Special Investigation Commission (SIC), an independent legal 
entity empowered to investigate suspicious financial 
transactions. It investigated 186 cases involving allegations 
of money laundering, terrorism, and terrorist financing 
activities from January to mid-December 2008. The SIC refers 
requests for designation or asset freeze regarding Hizballah 
and groups affiliated with Hizballah to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, but does not require banks to freeze these 
assets, because the GOL does not consider Hizballah a 
terrorist organization 
 
¶15. Lebanese authorities maintained that the amnesty for 
Lebanese individuals involved in acts of violence during the 
1975-90 civil war prevented the government from prosecuting 
terrorist cases of concern to the United States. These cases 
included individuals involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered; the 
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983; and the 
abduction, torture, and murder of U.S. hostages in Lebanon 
from 1984 to 1991. A Hizballah official suspected in several 
bombings against U.S. citizens, Imad Mughniyeh, was killed in 
Damascus, Syria in February 2008. No one has taken 
responsibly for his death. Mohammad Ali Hamadi, who spent 18 
years in a German prison for his role in the TWA hijacking, 
was released in December 2005 and was believed to be in 
Lebanon. The United States continued its efforts to bring him 
to trial before a U.S. court and has formally requested his 
extradition, although the U.S. does not currently have an 
extradition treaty with Lebanon. 
 
 
GRANT