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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD22, VOICES FROM BAGHDAD-AREA STREETS PRE-ELECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD22 2009-01-06 07:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
P 060749Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1112
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000022 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: VOICES FROM BAGHDAD-AREA STREETS PRE-ELECTION 
 
REF: 08 BAGHDAD 4018 
 
1.  This is an ePRT Baghdad-5 reporting cable. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  Following our previous report on local 
leaders, perceptions of the upcoming January 31 provincial 
council (PC) elections (reftel), we have recently focused on 
gauging the pulse of Iraqi voters throughout Abu Ghraib, Taji 
and Tarmiyah, three of Baghdad's rural districts (qadas) to 
the north and west of the capital.  Evincing opinions similar 
to those of candidates, sheikhs and other persons of 
influence, ordinary voters are optimistic and looking forward 
to the PC elections at the end of the month.  The 
overwhelming majority of shopkeepers, market-goers, barbers, 
tea-shop owners and fruit vendors with whom we met plan to 
vote, even if they are not clear on the mechanics of the open 
list/closed list ballot.  Residents tended to identify mostly 
with prominent national figures (Saleh al-Mutlaq, PM Nuri 
al-Maliki, former PM Ayad Allawi, and others); very few could 
name specific candidates and most tended not to align 
themselves with political parties or coalitions. 
Surprisingly, many voters remain undecided.  Residents 
overwhelmingly said they favored secular candidates and 
parties.  Jobs, essential services and security are the 
issues of concern to voters in the region, and despite 
general optimism about Iraq,s future, many people were 
skeptical that the elections would affect their lives.  Few 
believed that the process would be completely free and fair, 
though it does not appear that the potential for fraud will 
deter people from casting their vote.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
EAGER TO VOTE, BUT LACK INFORMATION 
 
3.  Voters throughout Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah qadas are 
eager for the January 31 Baghdad PC election. Turnout is 
expected to be high; virtually all the local residents with 
whom we spoke told us that they, their families, their 
tribes, their friends and almost everyone they know plan to 
vote.  Throughout the three qadas, electoral posters have 
suddenly appeared on all manner of walls, buildings and 
bridges in support of a wide variety of candidates and 
political lists.  Despite this profusion of campaign 
literature in the area, most residents have learned about the 
elections through word-of-mouth and other informal networks 
of information (generally, tribal or familial); frequently, 
shopkeepers were not familiar with the candidates whose 
posters adorned their storefronts and neighborhood.  No one 
had received any official information from the GOI or the 
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC, the body charged 
with overseeing elections in Iraq), and few expected to 
obtain their information through these channels. (Note:  the 
IHEC only recently began its voter education efforts in 
print.  End note).  Additionally, very few residents were 
aware of the open-list/closed-list system through which they 
will be able to vote for either a party or a specific 
candidate.  When informed of this, most people were pleased, 
and some who had expressed doubts about voting said that the 
ability to vote for an individual candidate might convince 
them to head to the polls. 
 
 
MORE SUPPORT FOR SECULAR CANDIDATES? 
 
4.  Whether Sunni or Shi'a, shopkeeper or teacher, rich or 
poor, few people in Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah qadas are 
planning to support "religious" parties such as Abdul Aziz 
al-Hakim's Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI), PM Nuri 
al-Maliki's Islamic Da,wa Party or the Iraqi Islamic Party. 
 Regardless of sect, residents overwhelmingly view the 2005 
election, which was boycotted by most Sunnis and dominated by 
the religious parties, as one of the primary reasons for the 
sectarian bias in the GOI and for the violence which wracked 
the country during 2005-2007.  Most voters emphasized the 
need to elect "educated", secular candidates who put the 
needs of Iraq and its citizens ahead of all else.  Yet many 
people are unfamiliar with the candidates running for Baghdad 
PC.  Rather, they identify primarily with prominent national 
figures such as Saleh al-Mutlaq, Dr. Jamal Karbuli, or former 
PM Ayad Allawi, to name a few.  This is reflected in many of 
the campaign posters littering the region's streets, which 
often show a candidate next to the well known head of his or 
her party.  Indeed, many voters were unable to name a single 
candidate for PC even if they expressed strong support for 
one of the national leaders.  A surprising number of people 
informed us that they remain undecided, and are waiting until 
the campaign unfolds to throw their support behind a 
candidate or party.  Voters said they would weigh election 
information from diverse sources -- community leaders and 
media received equal mention -- but many lamented the lack of 
direct contact with the candidates.  When asked about public 
debates among the candidates, a local media center director 
stated, "We haven't reached that point yet." 
 
SERVICES, JOBS, SECURITY 
 
5.  Not surprisingly, voters pointed to three issues -- 
improvements to essential services, an increase in job 
availability and the maintenance of the improved security 
situation -- as the subjects of most importance to them. 
While residents viewed the elections in a generally favorable 
light, few thought their everyday lives would improve greatly 
after January 31.  Voters in each district agreed on the need 
to elect a candidate from their region in order that their 
"voice" be heard on the council, particularly on the 
allocation of funding for essential services projects. 
 
 
SKEPTICISM ABOUT ELECTION FAIRNESS 
 
6.  Despite optimism regarding the elections and the changes 
in the structure of provincial governance they will bring, 
voters across the board expressed doubts that the process 
will be completely free and fair.  Few were aware of the 
IHEC,s role, and many requested direct monitoring by 
coalition forces or USG observers in the polling places. 
Skeptical that the ruling parties would permit a transparent 
and open election, some residents appeared resigned to what 
they termed &a foregone conclusion.8  During our visits, we 
noticed numerous instances of campaign posters having been 
ripped from walls. (Note:  It did not appear that any 
particular parties or candidates had been singled out; 
posters from many parties, representing a wide range of 
factions, both secular and religious, looked to have been 
defaced.  End note.)  In addition, one of our local contacts 
running for the PC recently told us that he had been targeted 
and had his house ransacked by Iraqi Security Forces, 
alleging that such treatment was a direct result of his 
candidacy.  He vowed to continue his campaign despite his 
"certainty" that the harassment will continue as the 
election draws near. 
 
 
CROCKER