VZCZCXRO4485
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0181/01 0250942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250942Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1370
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000181 
 
JUSTICE PASS TO JOHN EULER, ANDREW NORMAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SOCI IZ
SUBJECT:   HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CRITIQUE OF IRAQ COURT 
IGNORES CONTEXT 
 
Reference: A.  08 Baghdad 2980 
                 ¶B.  08 Baghdad 3486 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  As the primary tribunal handling terrorism and 
other serious criminal cases, the Central Criminal Courts of Iraq 
(CCCI), with courthouses in Karkh and Rusafa, play a key role in 
promoting Rule of Law in Iraq.  A recent report by Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) on the CCCI alleges a number of shortcomings, including 
undue delay, coerced confessions, flimsy evidence, and inadequate 
defense counsel.  While some criticisms leveled at the CCCI in the 
report are valid, HRW's investigation was incomplete and failed to 
take into account the environment in which the Iraqi criminal 
justice system operates.  Moreover, several USG initiatives are 
underway that address some of the issues raised by HRW.  These 
initiatives were not taken into account by HRW.   END SUMMARY. 
 
Historic Background 
 
¶2.  (U) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established the 
Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) in July 2003 to hear cases 
involving serious criminal offenses, including terrorism, organized 
crime, government corruption, acts of sabotage and sectarian or 
ethnic violence. While the primary purpose of the CCCI was to try 
terrorism cases, particularly attacks against Coalition Forces, the 
court has much broader jurisdiction and now adjudicates a variety of 
criminal cases from all corners of Iraq. 
¶3.  (U) The CCCI has nationwide jurisdiction and can pre-empt local 
jurisdiction to hear serious cases that require a secure judicial 
environment.  Other Iraqi courts can refer cases to the CCCI.  In 
addition, CCCI judges travel outside Baghdad to handle cases where 
local judges have been unable or unwilling to investigate or try 
cases. 
 
Karkh CCCI 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Karkh CCCI, formed in 2003, employs 10 trial judges, 
32 investigative judges and 18 prosecutors for its three trial 
panels and juvenile court.  Coalition Forces have worked closely 
with the court, providing technical assistance and guidance on 
prosecution of cases involving individuals detained under the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions.  The 2008 statistics for the 
Karkh CCCI document the large volume of cases handled by the court: 
1,866 investigative hearings were conducted, 1,034 cases were 
referred to trial, and 636 of the cases resulted in conviction. 
 
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT:  Once the U.S. withdraws, some functions at Karkh 
may suffer.  Specifically, the U.S. plays a large role in the 
security of the Karkh courthouse.  Although the U.S. provides 
training to Iraqi security, there are still concerns that the Iraqis 
will not provide the same level of security when the U.S. leaves. 
END COMMENT. 
 
Rusafa CCCI 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Rusafa CCCI, founded in 2007, focuses on complex 
investigations of serious Iraqi crimes.  With three trial panels and 
50 judges, the court receives assistance with security, witness 
transportation and evidence collection from Multi National 
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) through the Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) and 
the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).  In 2008, the 
Rusafa CCCI moved into the new "Palace of Justice at Rusafa" that 
was constructed with U.S. funds. 
 
¶7. (SBU) LAOTF and the Baghdad PRT have focused on improving the 
availability and quality of defense attorneys for criminal 
defendants before the Rusafa CCCI.  They established the Rusafa 
Legal Defense Center, which employs 24 Iraqi attorneys to provide 
legal counsel to thousands of detainees.  Since its inception in May 
2008, the center has averaged 83 detainee consultations per day and 
Q2008, the center has averaged 83 detainee consultations per day and 
has conducted more than 4,200 detainee consultations overall.  Due 
to the center's work, there have been 2,176 releases or transfers of 
inmates. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  LAOTF's pimary mission is to increase the efficiency of 
CCCI Rusafa to reduce the large backlog of criminal cases.  They 
mentor judges, work closely with the CCCI Rusafa administrative 
office, and provide training to Rusafa's defense attorneys on a 
myriad of topics, to include the use of forensic evidence.  As a 
result of this training, defense lawyers at the Rusafa CCCI are 
better prepared than their counterparts at the Karkh CCCI.  The 
Rusafa clinic provides far better defense services for indigent 
defendants than is the norm in Iraq.  At Rusafa, the legal clinic's 
attorneys are required to develop a client file and represent the 
detainee through both the investigative and trial phases.  This 
process helps to ensure professional representation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) While the Rusafa defense clinic has been successful in 
 
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providing counsel to those who otherwise would not have seen an 
attorney prior to trial, there are problems.  Rusafa CCCI officials 
cite corruption as pervasive.  Reportedly, bribes are routinely 
required for prisoner releases, even where release orders have been 
issued.   For the longer term, the Rusafa defense clinic does not 
appear to be sustainable.  There is no indication the Iraqis will 
financially support the clinic after U.S. funding dries up at the 
end of 2009 (see reftel A). 
 
Response to Human Rights Watch Report on CCCI 
 
¶10. (U) The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of December 14, 2008 
entitled "The Quality of Justice: Failings of Iraq's Central 
Criminal Court" was critical of the CCCI.  HRW alleged a number of 
shortcomings of the CCCI, including undue delay, coerced 
confessions, flimsy evidence, and inadequate defense counsel. 
 
¶11. (SBU) HRW found that the CCCI trial "relied almost exclusively 
on confessions and summarized testimony of witnesses and 
informants."   However, under the Iraqi civil law system, the 
critical phase of the Iraqi criminal case is not the trial hearing, 
but the investigative phase before the investigative judge. 
Contrary to the U.S. system, confessions made to police carry little 
weight and are set aside if recanted before the investigative judge. 
 This is key because confessions relied upon by trial panels were 
either made or adopted by the defendant while in court, a 
non-coercive environment.  Justice in Iraq is far more deliberate 
than Human Rights Watch credits. 
 
¶12. (SBU) HRW also claimed that Iraqis do not rely on physical 
evidence and recounted a case in which an arrest for bomb-making was 
made without an explosives residue test.  Iraqi courts have 
historically relied on testimonial evidence and are hesitant to 
consider forensic evidence.  They are however making progress in 
this area and often dismiss cases based upon insufficient evidence 
or unsubstantiated confessions that have been recanted. 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU)   The U.S. and its Coalition partners have sought to 
build capacity by offering training in crime scene investigation, 
investigative techniques, and forensic evidence.  The British 
Government has funded three separate trips to the Judicial Institute 
in Jordan to train judges and police on forensics.   Moreover, a 
forensic conference is being planned for April of this year and will 
take place in Iraq.  Generally speaking, there is an increasing 
acceptance of forensic evidence by Iraqi judges (see reftel B). 
 
¶14. (SBU) HRW called defense counsel in Iraq "perfunctory at best" 
and cited the example of one court-appointed lawyer who received the 
case file immediately before the hearing began.  It is true that 
increased efforts should be directed toward appointing defense 
counsel earlier in the legal process and referral files should be 
made available in time to permit effective representation.   The HRW 
report paid little attention to the robust efforts made to set up 
the Rusafa CCCI defense counsel clinic, and also ignored the fact 
that most defense lawyers at Rusafa are brought into the process 
much earlier, often accompanying Investigative Judges to interviews 
of suspects. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) HRW also charged that the CCCI failed to provide judicial 
hearings within a reasonable period of time. This too is a valid 
criticism, and cases before the CCCI need to be moved more 
expeditiously.  However, HRW failed to take into account the obvious 
wartime setting of the court which continues to flood the Iraqi 
judicial system with individuals captured in operations.  The 
Qjudicial system with individuals captured in operations.  The 
inability of the judiciary to reduce the caseload despite the large 
number of cases processed by the CCCI is indicative of the difficult 
environment in which the court operates. 
 
Comment 
 
¶16.  (U) The CCCI courts are functioning courts that handle some of 
the most serious and complex crimes.   The U.S. and Coalition 
partners are continuing to provide training and mentoring to Iraqi 
judges and police to ensure detainees are treated humanely.  We are 
encouraging the implementation of systems that are sustainable. 
Although limited progress has been made we recognize that the 
criminal justice system is not perfect.  The path ahead must include 
technical training for judges, lawyers, law enforcement and 
detention personnel that inculcates respect for human rights. 
 
CROCKER 
 
 
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