Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD11, NAJAF CLERICAL LEADERS FEAR IRANIAN IDEOLOGICAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BAGHDAD11.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD11 2009-01-05 11:59 2010-12-05 12:00 SECRET Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO9693
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0011/01 0051159
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051159Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1100
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000011 

SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2028 
TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: NAJAF CLERICAL LEADERS FEAR IRANIAN IDEOLOGICAL 
DOMINANCE 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (S) SUMMARY.  Three well-placed contacts in the Shia 
holy city of Najaf told us December 27 that Iranian influence 
there is strong and that Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, 
whose family has ties to Iran, likely will succeed the aging 
Ayatollah Sistani.  They each opined al-Hakim could begin 
changing the Najaf clerical establishment's long-time 
opposition to the concept of clerical rule (velayat-e faqih). 
One contact stated that the Najaf clerics have secured 
permission from the Iraqi government to start refusing to 
extend student visas for Iranians studying in Najaf in order 
to limit Iranian influence.  Like many clerics here, these 
contacts were keenly political and they obviously dislike and 
fear the ISCI political party.  They asked the U.S. to do 
more in Najaf to help limit the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq (ISCI) and Iran but xxxxxxxxxxxxx was insistent this be done indirectly and 
with extreme caution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Iran, ISCI Spreading Velayat-e Faqih in Najaf 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (S) PMIN and Poloffs on December 27, 2008 discussed with 
contacts close to the Najaf hawza (seminary), Iranian 
influence in Najaf and hopes for U.S. assistance in combating 
those exposing velayat-e faqih (clerical rule).  XXXXXXXXXXXX
 
3.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX decried the Iranian government's attempt to 
directly and indirectly spread its influence in Najaf. 
During the debate in the Iraqi parliament about the U.S.-Iraq 
Security Agreement, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force commander 
Qasem Soleimani sent separate envoys to convince the 
marja'iya to speak against the agreement.  XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed 
that the marja'iya responded that it would be inappropriate 
for them to comment on a security/political issue as a way of 
dodging Iranian pressure.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also said Iran is giving 
money to Iranian students in the hawza, primarily through 
Supreme Leader Khamenei's office located in Najaf.  Iran 
generally disperses small amounts -- money for furniture or 
books, for example -- but recently gave a large sum to help a 
hawza student with his medical treatment, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that through financing Shahid 
al-Mihrab (Martyrs of the Pulpit) -- the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq's (ISCI) social and educational organization 
-- Iran aims to spread the popularity of velayat-e faqih. 
(Note.  Shahid al-Mihrab is led by Ammar al-Hakim, ISCI's 
heir apparent.  It is also the name ISCI is using nationwide 
for its provincial election coalition.  End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX
said Shahid al-Mihrab must be receiving Iranian funding to be 
able to finance its wide network of offices in Iraq and 
abroad.  (Comment:  While driving through Najaf, PMIN noticed 
the construction of a large Shahid al-Mihrab complex at the 
1920 Revolution Square along the city's main East-West 
boulevard on property owned in 2003 by the now ISCI-dominated 
provincial government.) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
"Moderates" Unable to Compete With Iranian Money 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (S)  XXXXXXXXXXXX said in response to alleged infiltration by 
Iranian intelligence, the hawza secured permission from the 

Iraqi government to stand up a committee to review residence 
permits of non-Iraqi students at Najaf's religious schools. 
  They have, he stated, allowed only the 
few Iranian students who were present before the U.S. 
invasion to continue their studies in Najaf.  Other Iranian 
students are not receiving renewals on their student 
residence permits and are being asked to leave Najaf when 
their permits expire. 
 
5.  (S)  XXXXXXXXXXXX did not make a particular pitch on 
politics aside from warning about Iranian influence.  By 
contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXxx -- who also favor the 
"quietist" clerical tradition of Sistani and Fayad -- were 
pessimistic about the chances of "moderates" in the upcoming 
elections because ISCI and Da'wa have been able to disperse 
government jobs and contracts to boost their support.  (Note. 
 XXXXXXXXXXXxx is a parliamentarian from former Prime Minister Ayad 
Allawi's party and Kalantar, given the alternatives, probably 
also supports Allawi.  End note.) 
 
BAGHDAD 00000011  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXxx joked about ISCI's campaign slogan "With you, 
with you," by rhetorically asking "with who? Iran?"  When 
asked about ISCI's history in Najaf, XXXXXXXXXXXxx pointedly said 
ISCI had zero support prior to 2003 but were able to use its 
Iranian-origin militia, the Badr Corps (now Badr 
Organization), to gain power.  Despite switching its 
religious source of emulation to Sistani, XXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed 
his Badr Organization contacts still refer to the Iranian 
Supreme Leader as "Sayyid al-Wali" (the Master). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Fears of Grand Ayatollah Hakim Succeeding Sistani 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (S) Our three hawza contacts fear that Iran's push in 
Najaf coupled with ISCI's political dominance in the province 
are increasing the likelihood that Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 
Said al-Hakim will succeed Sistani as Iraq's lead cleric. 
Hakim -- a nephew to ISCI chairman Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim -- 
favors Iranian velayat-e faqih, all three contacts said. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed it was telling that Hakim last year told his 
followers to celebrate the festival marking the end of 
Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr) on the day announced by Iran's 
Khamenei, not Sistani.  XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain Hakim was now the 
probable replacement.  Rubai highlighted that fellow Najaf 
Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi al-Pakistani has begun speaking in 
favor of Hakim, something he was not doing only a couple of 
years ago. XXXXXXXXXXXX  each claimed that al-Hakim 
and Sistani each give out relatively generous gifts of money 
to needy students and professors -- this is how one helps 
build influence, they observed.  By contrast, al-Najafi and 
Fayad have few resources for such gifts, they noted. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Seeking U.S. Support, But Carefully Done 
------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX  bluntly told PMIN the U.S. should, with a 
hidden hand, fund moderate hawza groups to counter ISCI and 
Iran.  However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the United States regularly 
irritates the marja'iya by, for example, clumsily -- if only 
briefly -- detaining important clerical figures.  Perceived 
American protection of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) also 
raises questions about American judgment and intent, he 
claimed.  (He didn't argue when PMIN reviewed our policy on 
MEK but he said our position was not at all clear in Najaf.) 
XXXXXXXXXXXX added that U.S. officials releasing to the media the 
contents of private discussions between the Coalition 
Provisional Authority and top Najaf clerics had led the 
clerics to decide not to speak to the U.S. directly.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx
advised that the U.S. should not associate itself with ISCI 
cleric Jalal ad-Din al-Saghir because he is hostile to the 
Najaf hawza.  When asked how "moderate" groups planned to 
compete in the provincial and national elections in 2009, 
XXXXXXXXXXXxx clearly were defeatist and lacked a 
practical vision.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx fatalistically repeated that 
"there must be a (political) explosion" before Iraq rids 
itself of the religious parties. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
9.  (S) Our meetings with XXXXXXXXXXXxx 
reflect a broad trend in Iraq: the disenchantment and 
disorganization of those Shia leaders who feel locked out of 
the political process and who feel ISCI and Da'wa have used 
their positions in government to write rules favorable to 
themselves.  Many Shia still believe ISCI is controlled by 
the Iranian government and that the Badr Organization wields 
power covertly in Iraq.  These Shia dismiss evidence that 
ISCI is becoming increasingly responsive to its Iraqi 
QISCI is becoming increasingly responsive to its Iraqi 
constituents and over the past few years have explicitly 
acted against Iranian interest -- for example, by supporting 
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. 
 
10.  (S) Comment continued.  The looming passing of Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani makes Najaf pivotal for Iraq's ideological 
future.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx is a long-time contact of ours and, XXXXXXXXXXXXX is well-placed to give us insights 
into the top clerics' thinking.  He was extremely nervous 
about being seen with PMIN and other American diplomats, 
insisting on doing the meeting in XXXXXXXXXXxx not Najaf.  His 
skittishness reminds of how cautious Sistani and the other 
ayatollahs are about being seen to meet with or collaborate 
with the Americans.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx was adamant that we should help 
contain Iranian influence in Najaf but that it had to be done 
indirectly by helping Iraqi organizations who themselves want 
to limit Iranian influence.  Overaggressive or direct U.S. 
involvement in Najaf's religious scene would, according to 
 
BAGHDAD 00000011  003 OF 003 
 
 
his analysis, backfire, undercutting those pro-American 
Iraqis walking a fine between religious purity and earthly 
power that could be derived from U.S. support.  If XXXXXXXXXXXxx 
analysis is correct, Iraqis (and to a lesser extent Iranians) 
will always be better placed than the U.S. to understand and 
work within the nuances of Najaf's religious society.  END 
COMMENT. 
CROCKER