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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8481
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO GR TU
SUBJECT: KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN 
 
REF: A. 08 ATHENS 966 
     ¶B. 08 ANKARA 2075 
     ¶C. 08 ATHENS DAO 161642Z DEC 08 IIR 6-837-0184-09 
     ¶D. ATHENS 18 
     ¶E. ATHENS 19 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The list of potential flashpoints between 
Turkey and Greece is long, and both sides have tried to drag 
the U.S. or NATO into these disputes, particularly on the 
status of demilitarization of islands in the eastern Aegean. 
To help ensure Greece -Turkey relations do not go off track, 
it is imperative that NATO stay out of Greece-Turkey 
bilateral disputes, and as in the past, apply vigorously the 
Luns Doctrine.  This should include avoiding NATO 
participation in national exercises involving islands whose 
militarization status is in dispute.  NATO's participation in 
Noble Archer by the overflight of Agios Efstratios, an island 
which Turkey argues is demilitarized, has increased 
Turkey-Greece tensions.  A repeat of Noble Archer or a 
similar exercise scenario will exacerbate already elevated 
tension between Turkey and Greece, potentially to a dangerous 
level.  We are cautioning Turkey against taking provocative 
steps in the Aegean that challenge the sovereignty of Greek 
islets in the Dodecanese. 
 
¶2. (C)  We disagree with two key Greek arguments in this 
regard: 
 
--  That Turkey could apply "demilitarization" to a 
never-ending list of Aegean islands (See Para 8 "1914"), and 
 
--  that a "dispute" that triggers NATO's Luns Doctrine 
requires ICJ involvement (particularly since a bilateral 
mechanism exists - see para 7). 
 
Turkish retaliation for Noble Archer by overflight of two 
populated Dodecanese islets implicitly questions Greek 
sovereignty, and we have raised this problem with the Turks 
(para 9 and septel).  END SUMMARY 
 
State of Affairs in the Aegean Post "Noble Archer" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Rapprochement between Turkey and Greece has been one 
of the policy successes of the last decade, and we have a 
keen interest in strengthening it.  The list of potential 
Turkey-Greece flashpoints (and on-going disputes) is long -- 
including minorities in both countries, Balkan issues, and 
Cyprus -- the one area of direct potential conflict is the 
Aegean.  Both sides have tried to drag us or NATO into their 
disputes over militarization of the islands.  In the past few 
months we have seen an up-tick in tensions, including NATO 
inclusion of Agios Efstratios in a recent exercise, 
allegations of Turkish overflights in "retaliation," Russian 
exercises in the Aegean which apparently included FIR 
notification to Athens (a redline for Turkey), and recent 
Greek allegations of an increase in Turkish provocations in 
the Aegean (refs C and D). 
 
¶4.  (C)  Our goal should be, first, to keep both sides from 
provoking the other.  This may require specifically taking 
both sides to task when they do things that are politically 
foolish or legally or historically questionable.  But, in 
addition, we need to ensure that neither we nor NATO 
(identified closely here with the U.S.) become involved in 
these bilateral disputes.  Thus, our admonition that NATO and 
the U.S. need to apply vigorously the Luns Doctrine. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We were not happy that NATO took its decision to 
participate in Noble Archer, although we did our best to 
dampen the initial Turkish response.  The subsequent Greek 
media (Ref B) emphasis on the GoG's successful diplomacy and 
the lack of an immediate Turkish reaction, and the possible 
Turkish reaction to this reaction, however, illustrate how 
Aegean issues can spiral down even when both sides say they 
want to maintain calm. 
 
¶6.  (C)  MFA Under Secretary Apakan made starkly clear to 
Ambassador on January 8 that Turkey views with real alarm 
NATO's moving forward with the Noble Archer exercise, 
violating a long tradition of neutrality in these disputes. 
A formal letter from the Turkish military representative to 
the NATO Military Committee Chairman in November should have 
indicated to NATO that this was a disputed issue.  This would 
have a deleterious effect on the overall rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey, he went on, and thus he just could 
not understand NATO's action. 
¶7.  (C)  COMMENT:  We do not believe the standard applied to 
the definition of a "dispute" between Turkey and Greece that 
triggers the Luns Doctrine should be as formal as submission 
to the ICJ.  This has not been the standard in Greece-Turkey 
disputes for the last 20 years, and, as U/S Apakan made clear 
to Ambassador, the two countries have a bilateral mechanism 
to address such disputes formally recognized by the EU.  When 
there is an openly stated dispute, NATO thus must apply the 
Luns Doctrine to avoid exacerbating tensions.  The following 
paragraphs provide the legal and political underpinning of 
our conclusions.  END COMMENT 
 
Aegean Islands Demilitarization Background 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) A look at the basic issues between Greece and Turkey 
in the Aegean, especially demilitarized islands, may help in 
reviewing actions and options.  The demilitarization 
provisions of various agreements are open to interpretation, 
but to the best of our knowledge, the following are the facts: 
 
1914: Six Party Decision: The "Great Powers" at the time, 
following agreements between Greece and Turkey after the 1913 
Balkan War, awarded the "islands occupied by Greece" without 
naming them to Greece, on the understanding that they would 
be demilitarized, specifically, "shall not be fortified or 
used for any naval or military purposes."  These islands 
include six subsequently named in the Lausanne Treaty and the 
Straits Agreement (see below), two that went back to Turkey 
(Imbros and Tenedos), and three more, including Agios 
Efstratios, the subject of last month's tension, as well as 
Thassos and Psara. 
 
1923: Endorsement of Six Party Decision in Lausanne:  Article 
12 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, regulating the peace 
between Turkey and the Allied parties, including Greece, 
endorsed specifically the Six Party Decision.  There is 
nothing in this language, or in the subsequent actions since 
then to confirm a frequent Greek assertion that Article 12 
only confirms Greek sovereignty over the islands, not the 
condition of demilitarization. 
 
1923: Lausanne Demilitarization Provisions: Article 13 of the 
Treaty specifically demilitarized four of the larger 
"Decision" islands -- Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria -- 
allowing only limited local military and police forces, and 
no fortification or naval base. 
 
1923: Lausanne Straits Agreement: This agreement, appended to 
the Lausanne Treaty, demilitarized both the straits and a 
number of islands close to the mouth of the Bosporus, 
including the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and the 
Greek islands of Limnos and Samothrace.  This 
demilitarization was more radical than that in the Lausanne 
Treaty or the Decision, specifically prohibiting any military 
forces whatsoever, and establishing specific small arms 
limits on police and gendarmerie. 
 
1936: The Montreux Straits Agreement of 1936 replaced the 
Lausanne Straits Agreement.  In the Protocol, the Agreement 
declared that Turkey had the right to militarize the straits, 
to include Imbros and Tenedos.  Nowhere does the Agreement 
address the Greek islands.  Supporters of the Greek view 
point out that, as the Preface to the Agreement notes that as 
this agreement replaces the Lausanne Straits Agreement, the 
demilitarization of the two Greek islands in Lausanne was 
thereby lifted.  Here, they cite a statement by the 
then-Turkish foreign minister in the Turkish parliament 
supporting the Greek right to militarize the islands.  The 
Turks, while understandably embarrassed by that statement, 
point out that if the various states parties had meant to 
lift the demilitarization of the Greek islands, they would 
have said so, as they did with the demilitarization 
provisions of Lausanne in reference to the Turkish islands 
(i.e. in the Protocol).  Turks further argue that general 
statements in a preface carry less weight, that the 1914 
original disarmament decision in any case still remains in 
effect, and that the logic of international agreements from 
1914 through 1947 is to demilitarize Greeks islands close to 
Turkey (see below). 
 
1947: The Paris Treaty, between the Allied powers including 
Greece (but not Turkey) and Italy, granted sovereignty of the 
Dodecanese islands (seized from the Ottoman Empire by Italy 
in 1912) to Greece, but on condition that they be 
demilitarized. 
 
¶9. (C) One problem which the Turks appear to be exploiting 
with overflights is the status of small inhabited islets in 
the Dodecanese.  These islets, including Agathonisi and 
Farmakonisi, were named neither in the 1914 agreements nor in 
Lausanne, which turned the Dodecanese over to Italy from the 
Ottoman Empire, nor in the Treaty of Paris of 1947.  Lausanne 
listed the major Dodecanese islands and then added "the 
dependent islets."  The Paris Treaty continued things by 
referring to "adjacent islets."  Given that the islands are 
inhabited, their status and Greek sovereignty over them seems 
quite clear, and implicit Turkish raising of their 
sovereignty a highly questionable response. 
 
The Political/Strategic Dimension 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Turks make three linked arguments on 
demilitarization.  First, the geography of the Aegean is such 
that the string of Greek islands right off the coast of 
Turkey's largest ports, Istanbul and Izmir, and the entrance 
to the Bosporus, creates an unusual situation affecting 
Turkish security and world trade between the Black Sea and 
the Mediterranean.  Second, in recognition of this fact, on 
each occasion (1914, 1923, 1936, 1947) that the international 
community addressed these islands by mention or omission 
(1936), it supported their demilitarization.  Third, Turkey 
sees this issue through the focus of other Greek actions 
which, in Turkish eyes, have the cumulative effect of 
creating out of the Aegean a "Greek lake" and calling into 
question Turkey's rights of navigation, military operations, 
and exploitation of the seabed in "international waters and 
airspace" of the Aegean. 
 
¶11. (SBU) These Greek actions include: 
 
--  demanding that military operations within the Athens FIR 
request permission, although the ICAO states specifically 
that the FIR is for civilian aircraft; 
 
--  the declaration of a 10-mile airspace around Greek 
territory including islands, when common international 
practice is to have national air and sea space contiguous 
(i.e., in the Aegean, six miles); 
--  the claim to the right to declare a 12-mile national 
waters; 
 
--  a vague claim that various agreements in the 1930,s and 
in the Paris Treaty divided the Aegean between Greece and 
Turkey; and (from the Turkish point of view) 
 
--  exaggerated claims of continental shelf arising from the 
Law of the Sea Treaty. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Each of the Turkish assertions can be and has been 
challenged.  The Turks (and Greeks) are on more solid ground 
on some than on others.  But the key point is that these are 
true international disputes. 
 
Why Aegean Demilitarization Dispute Matters to Turkey 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Turks today do not fear a stranglehold on the 
Turkish coast, sea trade, and key cities by Greek bases, nor 
do they fear an invasion like the British landing at 
Canakkale from Limnos in 1915.  Nevertheless, the disputes 
remain important from several standpoints: 
 
-- They represent an issue of "borders," albeit mainly sea, 
continental shelf, and airspace.  Borders are of fundamental 
importance to the Turkish state's sense of self, from 
defending them in the 1920s against the Greeks, Italians, 
French, Russians, and English, to post-independence border 
issues, beginning with the Mosul Vilayet surrender decision, 
the 50-year dispute with Syria over Hatay province, and the 
(still latent) border "dispute" with Armenia.  Turks fear 
that Greek assertions of rights not justified in 
international agreements could encourage others to advance 
their own claims. 
 
-- The Continental Shelf dispute, particularly active in the 
1980s, represents to the extent oil or gas is ever discovered 
there, a pragmatic reason for Turkey,s asserting its rights 
in the Aegean. 
 
-- Finally, as we saw in U.S.-brokered discussions on the 
Aegean in the late 1990s, Turkey's yielding eventually on the 
island demilitarization question - on the assumption that 
this is the most sensitive for Greece and its sovereign 
interests - is about the only Aegean "quid" Turkey could 
easily deploy in return for the Greek "quo" of yielding on 
its various other claims noted above.  If the international 
community  starts taking the "Greek side" on these 
demilitarization issues (e.g. Noble Archer), the Turkish quid 
soon becomes worthless. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey