Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ANKARA128, EXBS: GOT INTERAGENCY RESPONSE TO EXBS SEMINAR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ANKARA128.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA128 2009-01-27 05:25 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0128/01 0270525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270525Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8584
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNEXC/EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
UNCLAS ANKARA 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NP/ECC- YWONG, ACHURCH, BGOLDEN, JBALDWIN 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE- KFITZPATRICK, BHUNT, PMALIK 
DOE/NNSA- TPERRY, LPARKER, EDESCHLER 
CBP/INA- TBAILEY, BPICKETT 
DOC FOR DCREED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: EXBS: GOT INTERAGENCY RESPONSE TO EXBS SEMINAR 
PROPOSAL 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please handle appropriately. 
 
1. SUMMARY:  MFA Nonproliferation and Disarmament Department 
provided us an official response to U.S. proposals for 
practical nonproliferation cooperation originally put forward 
during the September 2008 EXBS and Nonproliferation Seminar 
(ref a).   MFA indicated GOT is interested in pursuing 
limited training and equipment programs and desires to expand 
of professional peer exchanges concerning nonproliferation. 
End Summary. 
 
2. We met MFA Nonproliferation and Disarmament Department 
Head Elif Ulgen and Section Head Mustafa Yurdakul, to discuss 
interagency results from the EXBS/Nonproliferation Seminar 
which was held in September 2008 (ref a).  Ulgen reiterated 
that the Turkish interagency was very satisfied with the 
seminar as a whole and that each Turkish agency believed 
meeting their US counterparts and hearing about U.S. 
nonproliferation programs helped build trust within the 
Turkish interagency of U.S. offers to cooperate in 
nonproliferation.  While the interagency saw value with all 
proposed activities offered during the seminar, they where 
interested in four specific proposals and requested further 
information on three others. 
 
Green Light for Some Activities 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Ulgen told us, based on an extensive interagency 
review, that the GOT is ready to proceed with the following 
activities: 
 
--  Workshop on the Analysis of Strategic Commodity Transfers 
(ASCOT).  Both Turkish National Police (TNP) and 
Undersecretariet of Customs are interested in receiving this 
training in Ankara, pending availability of US trainers from 
DOE/INECP. 
 
--  Targeting and Risk Management (TRM) Training.  TNP and 
Customs Enforcement are interested in receiving this training 
in Ankara and advisor recommends this training take place 
late spring, if possible.  This should include Custom 
Enforcement and TNP anti-smuggling officers. 
 
--  Professional Exchange visits in U.S. and Turkey.  Ulgen 
noted the recent VIP visit of senior Customs Enforcement 
officials to US training and border sights was a great 
success.  Both TNP and Customs Undersecretariet (Enforcement 
and Inspections) would like to participate in additional 
professional exchange visits at all levels to include 
working, technical and senior level visits, both in the US 
and here in Turkey. 
 
--  Government to Industry Outreach programs. 
Undersecretariet for Foreign Trade (UFT) and MFA are 
interested in learning more about US industry outreach 
programs, but do not want direct US involvement in Turkish 
government outreach to industry.  They would like to have a 
team of US experts on Industry Outreach visit Ankara and meet 
with UFT and Custom Officials to exchange information.  Ulgen 
stated clearly that Turkey does not desire US representatives 
to attend any Turkish industry outreach programs, as they are 
concerned Turkish industry may misinterpret a US presence as 
a sign that the Turkish government is only pursuing industry 
outreach because the US demanded it.  UFT intends to hold 
approximately ten industry outreach activities in 2009. 
 
... Questions Regarding Others... 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Ulgen said the Turkish interagency wanted to clarify 
some of the proposals made during the EXBS Seminar, including 
the following: 
 
--  Portable X-Ray Florescence (XRF) Metal Analyzer Delivery 
and Training Program.  The interagency would like additional 
information on the analyzers and the associated training 
program so that they can compare this program and equipment 
 
with existing equipment.  The EXBS advisor has provided MFA 
and Customs with detailed data on this equipment and the 
target audience recently and will meet with Customs 
Enforcement and MFA again and provide additional details. 
The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TEAK) currently hold all 
analyzers and provides technicians when suspect metals 
require analysis. 
 
Action Request:  Request DHS/CBP and DOE provide additional 
information on how this equipment is used by both agencies in 
relation to nonproliferation detection and identification and 
how this equipment may differ from Turkeys metal Analyzer 
systems that are currently maintained by TAEK. 
 
--    Undercover/Controlled Delivery training.  Ulgen noted 
the interagency asked for more information on why 
Undercover/Controlled delivery was being offered under EXBS 
program.  They would like additional details on what it 
entails and who the target audience would be.  Again, EXBS 
has shared detailed info in the past with both Customs 
Enforcement and TNP on this course and noted the target 
audience as anti-smuggling officers in TNP, Customs and 
possibly Jandarma.  Both Customs and TNP have expressed 
strong interest in this training program to be held this 
spring and it appears that the interagency representatives 
for each agency may not be aware of senior level interest in 
this program.  Advisor will meet with both TNP and Customs to 
clarify moving forward with the delivery of this course this 
spring by DHS/ICE. 
 
--  Seaport Security/Anti-Terrorism course.  The interagency 
wanted more information on why EXBS is offering the Seaport 
Security/Anti-Terrorism course.  Interagency requests 
specific information on course content and duration and 
target audience.  EXBS has briefly discussed this type of 
training with Customs Enforcement, but plan to expand on this 
when in the maritime ports with Customs, port authorities, 
and Coast Guard. 
 
.. And Shelving the Rest 
 
------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Ulgen said the remaining proposals "are not viewed 
as priorities for the Turkish interagency" and should be 
shelved, at least for the near future.  These included: 
 
--  DOE's SLD Portal Monitor programs.  Ulgen noted that TAEK 
discussed at length with the interagency their current 
radiation detection capacity and development of indigenous 
Portal Radiation Detection Monitors.  TAEK noted that their 
systems afford Turkey with the required level of radiation 
detection and response capabilities and that U.S. assistance 
or cooperation is not required at this time.  According to 
Ulgen, TAEK was also concerned that additional engagement 
with the SLD program will distract from a mandate it has 
received to produce and deploy the indigenously produced 
monitors.  We reiterated US desires to be cooperative 
partners in support of Turkey,s effort to increase its 
radiation detection and identification capability and that 
our goal was to ensure that the state-of-the art equipment we 
use to protect our borders are made available to close Allies 
such as Turkey, and pointed to the lack of portal radiation 
detection capability on both the Greek and Turkish sides of 
the western border gate at Ipsala as a good example of the 
potential benefit of increased US/Turkish corporation.  Ulgen 
reiterated Turkey,s appreciation for the US offer, but said 
the interagency was comfortable with Turkey,s current 
radiation detection capability.   Ulgen agreed that the 
recent hand-held equipment delivery and training was well 
received ant that we should continue this type of limited 
cooperative detection program. She also indicated that the 
MFA is still awaiting a formal TAEK response to DOE/NNSA,s 
invitation for TAEK Presidency Cakiroglu to visit the US (ref 
b). 
 
--  International Border and Rail Interdiction Training 
Programs in Turkey.  Ulgen stated that Customs and TNP were 
 
very satisfied with the U.S. IBIT, IACIT, ISIT and IRIT 
training programs over the past few years, but would like to 
cancel the two courses scheduled for spring 2009 in Turkey. 
The interagency noted that Turkey learned a lot from their US 
visits and have incorporated many lessons learned at their 
border crossings, but do not believe it is necessary to 
conduct follow-on training in Turkey. (Note:  This change in 
position in Undercover/Controlled Delivery and IBIT/IRIT II 
courses may be driven by security concerns by both TAEK and 
Turkish Intelligence.  Director General of Customs 
Enforcement Neset Akkoc and his staff have been eager to have 
this training take place this spring.  Advisor will meet with 
Akkoc to confirm GOT desires to cancel the training.  If 
canceled, Turkish Customs will likely be interested in 
additional stateside IBIT, IACIT, or ISIT. End Note.) 
 
6.  Comments:  Turkey,s ability to detect and deter the 
movement and transit of illicit materiel through its borders 
continues to improve as it seeks to harmonize its legal, 
regulatory and enforcement practices with EU standards, in 
line with their EU accession bid.  Turkey increasingly views 
itself as a mature, responsible and respected player in the 
region on nonproliferation related matters and will continue 
to expect to be treated as such in any engagement with US 
agency peers.  The cooperative activities with which Turkey 
seemed least comfortable were ones that they considered most 
intrusive on their sovereignty (e.g. SLD portal monitors) or 
ones based on a donor-recipient/trainer-trainee model.  We 
will continue to look for opportunities to develop 
cooperative programs with Turkish government agencies.   We 
will emphasize that: Our offers for engagement are offers, 
not demands; the programs we have proposed will serve our 
shared interests in countering proliferation; and working 
with Turkey will offer USG officials an opportunity to learn 
from experienced Turkish counterparts.  In light of the 
continuation of GOT,s cautious and deliberate approach in 
working with the US on nonproliferation cooperation programs, 
we believe the USG must take a measured approach and limit 
expectations of Turkey accepting significant volume of 
equipment and in-country training. 
 
7.  Contact information for EXBS Program Ankara is:  Robert 
Cieslinski, EXBS Advisor, Email: CieslinskiRL@state.gov, 
Office (90) (312) 457-7210, Cell (90) (533) 716-4808 and 
Erhan Mert, EXBS Coordinator, Email: MertE2@state.gov, 
Office(90)312 457-7059, Cell (90) (533) 264-8407. EXBS 
Program Office Fax (90) (312) 468-4775. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey