VZCZCXRO3892
RR RUEHAG RUEHKW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0123/01 0231731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231731Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8572
INFO RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5285
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY REFOCUSES ON EU ACCESSION AHEAD 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Launching what many believe to be a make or 
break year for Turkey's EU accession bid, PM Erdogan 
reinvigorated Turkey's efforts by naming Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) Vice Chairman Egemen Bagis as State 
Minister for EU Affairs and by visiting Brussels for the 
first time in nearly five years, January 18-20.  Bagis, 
selection, the December 31 approval of the Turkish national 
program for the adoption of the Acquis, and recent progress 
on several prominent human rights issues paved the way for 
what GOT officials and European diplomats here have 
characterized as a successful start to a critical year. 
Although Erdogan's brusque manner and harsh political 
rhetoric did little to win over the European public, a more 
statesman-like performance during meetings with European 
officials reassured them of Turkey's commitment to the 
accession process.  While critics contend that Bagis has more 
experience with the U.S. than the EU, European diplomats have 
told us they consider him an apt choice given his ready 
access to Prime Minister Erdogan, political ambition, and 
smooth manner in dealing with foreigners.   With only the EU 
account to occupy him, Bagis will also have to time to be in 
Brussels often, which his predecessor FM Babacan did not. 
Still, many question whether he has the political heft to 
push EU-related reforms through a skeptical bureaucracy. End 
Summary. 
 
An "American" in Brussels 
------------------------- 
¶2. (C) After months of speculation, PM Erdogan named ruling 
AKP Vice Chairman for Foreign Affairs and Istanbul MP Egemen 
Bagis as State Minister for EU Affairs January 8, replacing 
FM Babacan as lead negotiator for Turkey's accession process. 
 European Commission Political Counselor Diego Mellado told 
us the EU had pushed Turkey for several months to name 
someone else to the position due to slow progress in the 
accession effort and increasing demands on FM Babacan posed 
by Turkey's ambitious foreign policy agenda.  With only the 
accession task to occupy his time, Bagis can employ better 
time management and focus on the complicated technical 
aspects, he added.  GOT officials emphasized to us that 
Bagis, who earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees in 
the U.S., has extensive foreign policy experience and, in 
their view, is up to handling the demands of the job. 
 
¶3. (C) European diplomats in Ankara have also expressed 
support for Bagis' selection, noting it provides desperately 
needed momentum to Turkey's EU bid.  Calling Bagis "an 
American in Brussels," French Political Officer Bertrand 
Buchwalter highlighted that the AKP MP has a U.S., not 
European background.  (Both Buchwalter and Mellado admitted 
that the AKP is short on qualified EU experts.)  He added 
that Bagis, however, was the best choice from the cadre of 
other top contenders.  Chairman of the Turkey-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Committee Aydin Dumanoglu lacked the necessary 
charisma to succeed in Brussels and MP Suat Kiniklioglu does 
not have access to the party's inner circle.  In the end, 
Buchwalter opined that Bagis was the right man for the job 
because he has the ear of the Prime Minister (unlike Babacan, 
who is President Gul's protg) and the political ambition to 
succeed. 
 
Mr. Erdogan Goes to Brussels 
---------------------------- 

¶4. (C) Having not visited Brussels since 2004, Erdogan met 
with European Commission President Barroso, the Commission's 
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Solana, 
European Parliament President Pottering, and all European 
Parliament party heads during his January 18-20 trip.  He 
also addressed audiences at several different venues.  MFA EU 
Political Affairs Section Head Yaprak Alp told us Erdogan's 
visit was designed to underscore Turkey's enduring intention 
to join the EU, to solicit support of Turkish expectations 
that the Czech Presidency will open two additional chapters 
of the Acquis for negotiation, and to highlight Turkey's 
efforts to support Middle East initiatives.  UK Embassy 
Political Officer Claire Phillpotts noted EU officials' main 
objectives were to simply get Erdogan to Brussels and have 
him publicly reiterate Turkey's dedication to the EU process. 
 
¶5. (C) Both MFA officials and European diplomats in Ankara 
characterized Erdogan's visit as a success.  Pottering 
reportedly said Erdogan came with a "silver tray of gifts," 
which included the December 31 adoption of the long awaited 
national program for adoption of the Acquis, Bagis, 
selection, the launch of state-run Turkish Television and 
Television's (TRT) Kurdish language channel, outreach to 
Turkey's minority Alevi community, and the restoration of 
author Nazim Hikmet's Turkish citizenship. 
 
¶6. (C) In closed door meetings with EU officials, Erdogan 
reportedly was engaging, diplomatically answering questions 
on contentious issues (Armenian genocide, freedom of 
expression, and Kurdish rights) and emphasizing Turkey's 
desire to join the EU, according to Phillpotts.  Erdogan also 
presented draft reports on the two chapters that Turkey hopes 
to be opened during the Czech Presidency ("taxation" and 
"social policy and empowerment").  He promised that after the 
nationwide local elections in March, Turkey will fulfill the 
criteria for opening those chapters, principally through 
increasing taxes on raki, Turkey's national anice-based 
alcoholic drink of choice.  Following a public statement made 
early in his visit to Brussels that Turkey may not pursue a 
deal on the Nabucco pipeline as long as negotiations on the 
energy chapters remain blocked, Erdogan reportedly assumed a 
more conciliatory tone and repeatedly underscored that Turkey 
and the EU are energy partners. In his joint press conference 
with Barroso, Erdogan stated that Turkey is aware of its 
energy responsibilities and "won't let Europe down."  Still, 
European Ambassadors in Ankara, commented Phillpotts, were 
disappointed that Erdogan failed to discuss domestic 
political reform in any of his meetings. 
 
¶7. (C) Alp and her European colleagues noted, however, there 
seemed to be two Erdogans in Brussels.  Although he said the 
right things behind closed doors, Erdogan in public harshly 
criticized Israeli actions in Gaza and gave little lip 
service to Turkey's desire to join the EU.  Erdogan had the 
opportunity to be charming and plead Turkey's case to the 
European audience, argued Buchwalter, but chose instead to 
use the "same old bitter discourse."  During his speech to 
the European Policy Center, for example, Erdogan only stated 
that EU membership was a priority for Turkey after a thirty 
minute diatribe on GOT accomplishments in the Middle East and 
a condemnation of Israeli actions in Gaza.  While seemingly 
aiming for the Turkish voter, Erdogan's tone struck a 
negative chord with Europeans. 
 
A Year of Living Dangerously? 
----------------------------- 

¶8. (C) With ten EU accession chapters open, eight frozen in 
2006 for Turkey's refusal to open Turkish ports and airports 
to EU member Cyprus and an additional five related to core 
criteria linked to eventual full EU membership blocked by 
France and Cyprus, EU officials tell us only six chapters 
remain feasible for opening in the near future.  Having 
eliminated most of the low hanging fruit, Turkey's ability to 
open additional chapters for negotiations is contingent on 
implementing complex technical requirements and instituting 
contentious political reform, which GOT officials have 
repeatedly stated will not occur until after the March local 
elections, at the earliest.  The EU is slated to review 
before the end of 2009 its position on the frozen chapters, 
as well as the GOT's progress in fulfilling its commitments 
made in the Ankara Protocol to open its ports to Cypriot 
vessels.  Accordingly, the success of the ongoing Cyprus 
negotiations will play a crucial, if not determining, role in 
Turkey's ability to ensure its accession bid stays on track. 
If a Cyprus solution is reached, it could lead to the opening 
of the 8 frozen chapters and possibly another three or four. 
More importantly, Turkey might also be able to close chapters 
that have been successfully negotiated, which currently 
remain blocked by Nicosia. 
 
¶9. (C) In addition to Cyprus, rhetoric surrounding the April 
European Parliamentary elections and September German 
national elections is likely to draw Turkey into various 
intra-European political frays.  Locally based and visiting 
European officials have repeatedly tried to prepare the GOT 
for the this, encouraging the Turks to look beyond the 
potentially ugly discourse.  Alp commented that while the 
Turkish bureaucracy will understand the situation, it will be 
hard for the Turkish public to ignore.  Although 2009 is full 
of landmines, underscored Mellado, it also has an abundance 
of opportunities.  Istanbul is the 2009 European Cultural 
Capital.  The French Cultural Season of Turkey begins in July 
and other Turkish festivals are planned through Europe.  Alp 
added that former Finnish President Marti Ahtissaari and the 
Independent Commission on Turkey plans to publish a second 
report this year. As the first report issued in October 2004 
helped push the EU to offer Turkey a start date for formal 
negotiations, the Turks view this as a positive sign. 
 
The EU Great Train Robbery 
-------------------------- 

¶10. (C) Despite the relative success of Erdogan's visit and 
apparent renewed commitment of the GOT to its EU vocation, 
some European diplomats have expressed concern that Turkey 
believes it can manipulate the accession process.  Mellado 
underscored that Turkey must get over its zero-sum attitude 
and understand that requirements for membership are universal 
and non-negotiable.  If Turkey wants to join, it must comply 
with the same standards as other candidates.  Buchwalter 
bemoaned that Turkey refuses to see compliance with the 1995 
Customs Agreement as anything more than a ploy by Cyprus. He 
highlighted a December 18 MFA statement where the GOT "called 
on the EU to honor its commitments and to adopt an approach 
free from political consideration with regards to our 
accession negotiations."  Furthermore, many GOT officials, he 
asserted, believe that the EU will not jeopardize Cyprus 
reunification talks by refusing to unfreeze chapters. 
Phillpotts added that Turkey is coming to see energy as 
another trump card.  Nevertheless, Turkey will not deviate 
far from its EU path while AKP is in sole power, argued 
Mellado.  In Turkey, being anti-EU accession will not get you 
votes.  The prospect of EU membership is also an "insurance 
policy" for the AKP against ardently secularist enemies, said 
Mellado. 
 
Comment 
------- 

¶11.  After two years of virtual atrophy, Erdogan's visit and 
his selection of Bagis started a watershed year on the right 
track.  With only one task at hand, Bagis will have the 
necessary time to spend in Brussels to smooth ruffled 
European feathers and to engage on many of the technical 
aspects neglected by FM Babacan over the last year.  Still, 
some experts doubt that Bagis will have the necessary 
patience to review hundreds of pages of technical 
regulations.  In Ankara, it is an untested premise that Bagis 
will have the political clout to influence the internal 
process.  Although he has access to PM Erdogan, many question 
whether he has the political heft to push EU-related reforms 
through a skeptical bureaucracy.  Some also wonder whether FM 
Babacan, who reportedly did not gladly surrender his EU 
Negotiator position, will throw the full support of the 
Foreign Ministry behind him.  Already, Babacan has invited 
undersecretaries from all relevant ministries to the MFA to 
discuss how to increase the momentum Turkey's EU bid, an 
initiative that properly belongs with Bagis.  For him to make 
progress, Bagis will simultaneously need to develop a strong 
support base in both Brussels and Ankara.  Even so, his 
efforts may be overshadowed by developments in the Cyprus 
talks. 
 
 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey