Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ANKARA118, TURKEY - NO AUTOMOTIVE PACKAGE YET, BUT EXPECTED

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ANKARA118.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA118 2009-01-23 13:51 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO3653
PP RUEHDA RUEHVK
DE RUEHAK #0118/01 0231351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231351Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8559
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0364
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4293
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0121
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0077
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 1112
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0054
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0300
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0134
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0096
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3277
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0452
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0079
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5650
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0493
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0276
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5466
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0162
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0125
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0659
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6718
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0228
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1004
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0265
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 3556
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 5280
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 0102
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1594
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0104
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3515
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EEB/TPP/MTAA BNAFZIGER AND EUR/SE DMARSH 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR RMALMROSE AND MMOWREY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD PREL WTO TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY - NO AUTOMOTIVE PACKAGE YET, BUT EXPECTED 
SOON 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 4753 
     B. B) ANKARA 85 
     C. C) ANKARA 117 
 
1. Summary. Turkey has not yet implemented a formal program 
to stimulate its automotive industry, but the sector has been 
publicly clamoring for support and action is expected soon. 
The automotive sector is one of Turkey's most important 
growth engines and it has been hit especially hard by the 
crisis.  A GOT working group was only recently established to 
devise an automotive sector package.  Based on press reports, 
such a program will likely be focused on tax incentives for 
both producers and consumers.  There has not yet been any 
mention of an explicit linkage to exports or to local content 
requirements. As 80 percent of Turkey's automotive production 
is exported, however, any program will obviously have the 
effect of supporting exports.  End summary. 
 
2. As has been the case with most of its crisis response, the 
GOT has been dilatory in formulating a rescue package for its 
automotive sector.  Calls for government support began late 
in 2008 when automotive exports began to nosedive, plummeting 
35.4 percent in the fourth quarter from the same period in 
2007 (and 45.4 percent in December alone).  In early January 
2009, press reports began to describe a potential GOT rescue 
package focused mostly on tax incentives.  Among the ideas 
discussed were: 
 
-- reductions in taxes for producers who maintain a certain 
level of employment or who work on developing 
environmentally-friendly vehicles; 
 
-- temporarily reduced social security taxes for automotive 
workers; 
 
-- lower energy prices for automotive production facilities; 
 
-- tax discounts to consumers who buy 
environmentally-friendly vehicles; and 
 
-- restarting a defunct program where consumers who trade in 
high-emission older vehicles receive a Special Consumption 
Tax exemption on a new vehicle purchase (Comment: The program 
was shut down because enterprising Turks established a 
secondary market in cheap, polluting vehicles to help get the 
tax exemption, defeating the purpose of the program. End 
Comment.) 
 
3. Several GOT ministers, including Industry Minister 
Caglayan and Finance Minister Unakitan, have spoken about the 
need for a rescue package, but it was only on January 19 that 
the Economic Coordination Board established a working group 
to devise sectoral stimulus packages (with a focus on 
automobiles and textiles).  This undersecretary-level group 
will include the State Planning Organization and the 
 
ANKARA 00000118  002 OF 002 
 
 
Ministries of Treasury and Finance.  No date has been set for 
the group to present its proposals.  The potential size and 
content of sectoral support packages is also an issue in 
ongoing GOT negotiations with the IMF (ref B).  The GOT has 
yet to give the IMF the details of its proposed packages or 
to define how much they will cost.  This is a further 
indication of how undefined the GOT program is at this point. 
 
4. The automotive sector is one of the pillars of Turkey's 
economy and of its recent export-led growth.  According to 
Foreign Trade Undersecretariat statistics, automotive 
manufacturing directly employs 46,000 people and the related 
parts and service industries employ an additional 1.25 
million.  Automotive goods are the second largest category of 
export goods (behind steel but ahead of textiles) and in 2008 
exports reached USD 17.5 billion.  The sector is highly 
dependent on exports, with over 80 percent of its production 
going overseas, mostly to Europe (much of the production 
comes from factories owned by European automakers).  As a 
result, it has proven especially vulnerable to the downturn 
in Europe and exports have fallen dramatically. 
 
5. Comment:  While none of the measures described in para 2 
have been explicitly linked to export promotion, any stimulus 
package that reduces producer costs will have the effect of 
making Turkey's automobiles more competitive both at home and 
abroad.  Turkey can be expected to make some effort to ensure 
that any package meets WTO rules.  At the U.S.-Turkey Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement meeting on January 13, the 
GOT raised the U.S. automaker bailout and expressed its 
concern over whether the program violates the WTO.  They 
seemed to take to heart AUSTR Christopher Wilson's point that 
a program that is crafted to avoid linkage to exports or to 
local content should be WTO-compliant (see ref C).  End 
comment. 
 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey