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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI7, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI7 2009-01-05 08:44 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0007 0050844
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050844Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0648
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8831
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0291
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
January 3-5 news coverage on the ongoing probe into former President 
Chen Shui-bian's legal cases, and on the economic challenges facing 
the Ma Ying-jeou administration in the coming year.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, a column in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" discussed the six-point speech recently delivered by 
Chinese President Hu Jintao toward Taiwan.  The article said it 
appears that the Ma administration is ready to accept Hu's letter 
summoning Ma's surrender.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times," however, said Taiwan will not bite 
at Hu's bait.  End summary. 
 
A) "Hu's Six-Point Speech Is a Letter Summoning Ma to Surrender" 
 
Dr. Lo Chih-cheng, associate professor at Soochow University's 
Political Science Department, wrote in the "Weekly Commentary" 
column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 
700,000] (1/4): 
 
"Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech on the last day of 
2008, marking the 30th anniversary of China's [January 1, 1979] 
'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,' in which he laid out the 
framework for future interactions and negotiations between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait. ...  To summarize Hu's speech, 'one 
China' will serve as a principle in terms of the future development 
of cross-Strait relations, with 'unification across the Taiwan 
Strait' as its final outcome and the 'one country, two systems' as 
its keynote.  Also, China will push for the goal of making Taiwan a 
'de facto' part of China on the basis of ensuring that Taiwan is a 
'de jure' part of China. ... 
 
"What is worrisome for Taiwan is that Hu's six-point speech reveals 
a very high degree of confidence on the part of the Beijing 
authorities in dealing with cross-Strait issues now, and such 
confidence is obviously based on its judgment of the [cross-Strait] 
situation since the Ma Ying-jeou administration took office. ... 
Evidently, Beijing believes that changes in Taiwan and in the 
international community have further consolidated the one China 
principle and rendered the prospect of cross-Strait unification all 
the more plausible. ... 
 
"It seems worrisome that the Ma administration has been using its 
initial agenda of 'no unification, no independence and no use of 
force' as a tool to cover up - or even to package - the Beijing 
authorities' goal of 'ultimate unification.'  The result of close 
collaboration between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party is to 
allow China to fulfill its strategic goal of achieving Taiwan's 
submission without having to go to war.  It is very clear that in 
the foreseeable future, be it the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement or a peace accord, both will be included in the agenda for 
cross-Strait talks.  It appears that the Ma administration is ready 
to accept Hu's six-point letter summoning his surrender.  But what 
about the views of the Taiwan people?  Are they ready to accept that 
as well? ..." 
 
B) "Taiwan Won't Bite at Hu's Bait" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (1/5): 
 
"... Although Hu says the CCP is willing to have contact with 
different Taiwanese parties, the premise for such contact is that 
the parties must stop working for Taiwanese independence. This is 
tantamount to requesting surrender and it is unlikely that Taiwan's 
democratic parties would accept such a condition.  Hu may have given 
his own 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,' but it was surely 
directed at CCP cadres, not the Taiwanese public. While the premise 
and content of the speech may have held some novelty value, it was 
but a rehash of old clichs for Taiwan.  Hu may also have offered 
Taiwan a few more tidbits in the shape of participation in 
international organizations, a peace agreement and economic 
cooperation, but this does not change the fact that these offers are 
mere bait.  If Taiwan bites rather than shows caution and restraint, 
the consequences will be dire." 
 
YOUNG