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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI31, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI31 2009-01-09 09:23 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0031/01 0090923
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090923Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0681
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8840
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0300
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
January 9 news coverage on Legislator Diane Lee, who announced her 
resignation from the Legislative Yuan Thursday over the controversy 
arising from her dual U.S. and Taiwan citizenship; and on the Taiwan 
government's deliberations over whether to send military frigates to 
the Gulf of Aden to protect Taiwan's fishing boats in the 
piracy-plagued waters.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, an 
editorial in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" analyzed Chinese 
President Hu Jintao's recent speech on Taiwan policy and concluded 
that Hu's strategy is to rope in KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan to 
restrict President Ma Ying-jeou, to restrain the Green camp via the 
Green, and to divide Taiwan.  A separate "Liberty Times" op-ed piece 
said that Hu's six-point speech clearly rules out a U.S. role in 
cross-Strait relations and any decision on Taiwan's future.  An 
editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
said that "[w]hile the U.S. is quite right in wanting a peaceful 
settlement to the Taiwan issue, it is hard to believe that the 
country that for so long served as Taiwan's protector is prepared to 
turn its back on one of Asia's freest societies as it is slowly 
swallowed by its giant, authoritarian neighbor."  A separate "Taipei 
Times" op-ed said Hu's speech is just more of the same as the 
previous "Messages to Compatriots in Taiwan."  Another "Taipei 
Times" op-ed, however, said that Hu's remarks signal new approach to 
cross-Strait relations.  End summary. 
 
A) "Hu's Strategy: Roping in Lien Chan to Restrict Ma Ying-jeou, 
Restraining the Green Camp via the Green and Dividing Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (1/9): 
 
"Following Hu Jintao's six-point policy speech toward Taiwan, the 
Chinese State Department's Taiwan Affairs Office was calling out to 
the DPP.  Such a move by China is evidently a planned, purposeful 
new united front attack against Taiwan, a step that should keep the 
Taiwan people on their toes.  Judging from China's separate 
strategies toward the KMT and the DPP, it appears that one can 
summarize the new united front attack currently being launched by 
China against Taiwan in the following words: 'roping in Lien Chan to 
restrict Ma Ying-jeou, restraining the Green Camp via the Green, and 
dividing Taiwan.' ... 
 
"In Taiwan, with the Blue camp as the ruling party and the Green 
camp the opposition party, they can at least work to restrain Ma's 
[push for] ultimate unification [with China].  Also, even though the 
KMT has returned to power again and the Ma Administration is 
proactively tilting toward China, the Taiwan people's determination 
to safeguard Taiwan's sovereign status remains.  As long as the Ma 
Administration attempts to deviate from its campaign commitment to 
'Taiwan first' and to usher in China, the Taiwan people will likely 
support the DPP to become the ruling party at any time, thereby 
nullifying all the previous efforts by Lien and Ma to 'facilitate 
unification.' ..." 
 
B) "From Co-Management to Gaining Control over the Taiwan Strait" 
 
Dr. Lin Cheng-yi, a research fellow at the Institute of European and 
American Studies, Academia Sinica, opined in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] (1/9): 
 
"Hu's six-point proposal has clearly excluded a United States role 
in cross-Strait relations and in [decisions on] Taiwan's future. ... 
 In Beijing's latest policy toward Taiwan, there is no longer any 
need for the United States and China to 'co-manage the Taiwan 
Strait'; instead, both sides of the Taiwan Strait can manage the 
Taiwan Strait by themselves, or it can even be dictated by the 
Chinese Communist Party alone. ... 
 
"When compared with Hu's modification in his Taiwan policy, U.S. 
President-elect Barack Obama will demonstrate clear changes in his 
theory about Taiwan policy. ... In comparison with Hu's six-point 
speech, in which China will dictate cross-Strait relations, the 
Obama Administration will reiterate the Taiwan people's free right 
to choose, particularly, the consent of the Taiwan people [to the 
future direction of cross-Strait relations]. ..." 
 
C) "Is the US Just a Little too Optimistic?" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (1/9): 
 
"... Over the last few weeks, a steady succession of US 
establishment figures and academics - most notably former US 
ambassador to the UN John Bolton - have landed in Taipei to file 
through the Presidential Office turnstiles and slap President Ma 
Ying-jeou on the back while commending him for the recent 
cross-strait detente. Ma, meanwhile, has taken every opportunity to 
detail how happy the world is with his management of relations with 
China.  The reason, no doubt, for the US' glee is that the warming 
 
of cross-strait relations means it is less likely that war will 
break out in the Taiwan Strait, in which case US soldiers would 
likely have to put their lives on the line to defend Taiwan.  In 
fact, the only dissenting voice of late has come from Pentagon 
officials, who have expressed worries that Taiwan's headlong tilt 
toward China could eventually see advanced US weapons technology 
falling into the 'wrong hands.' ... 
 
"Another consideration for those praising the new atmosphere in the 
Strait is that the closer democratic Taiwan gets to authoritarian 
Beijing, the bigger the threat China poses to the nation's 
democratic system and the rights of Taiwanese to determine their 
future.  Washington must understand that the two are not mutually 
exclusive.  Although the Taiwan Relations Act - the guiding 
principle on US-Taiwan relations - states that the future of Taiwan 
should be settled by peaceful means, any 'peace deal' between Taipei 
and Beijing, despite Beijing's best guarantees, would inevitably 
result in a deterioration in human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy in the same manner witnessed in Hong Kong since 1997. 
While the US is quite right in wanting a peaceful settlement to the 
Taiwan issue, it is hard to believe that the country that for so 
long served as Taiwan's protector is prepared to turn its back on 
one of Asia's freest societies as it is slowly swallowed by its 
giant, authoritarian neighbor." 
 
D) "Hu's Speech Just More of the Same" 
 
Paul Lin, a political commentator based in Taiwan, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (1/9): 
 
"On Dec. 31, Chinese President Hu Jintao gave a speech in Beijing to 
commemorate the 30th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan.'  The basic spirit of the speech was the same as 30 years 
ago and was aimed at getting Taiwan to surrender to China. ...  Hu 
is at his lying best again, using more despotic rhetoric than ever 
before. President Ma Ying-jeou, however, sees it as 'new thinking,' 
as if he were willing to convince the people of Taiwan into 
surrendering.  Ma's behavior is more shameless than that of former 
dictator Chiang Kai-shek and former presidents Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian." 
 
E) Hu Remarks Signal New Approach to Taiwan Ties" 
 
Shaw Chong-hai, a professor and director of the Institute of 
Mainland China Studies at Chinese Cultural University, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (1/9): 
 
"In his speech on Dec. 31 marking the 30th anniversary of China's 
'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan' of Jan. 1, 1979, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao offered six proposals to promote the peaceful 
development of cross-strait relations and revitalize the Chinese 
people.  These proposals are indicative of the direction that 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies will take toward Taiwan in 
the next few years and differ slightly from the party's past Taiwan 
policies.  Although consistent with the overall direction of the 
Chinese government's previous Taiwan policies, the proposals suggest 
several breakthroughs and goodwill gestures that we have not seen, 
before from the CCP.  First, China's discourse on the 'one China' 
principle has changed. ...  Second there will be a new cross-strait 
discourse on the political status of Taiwan. ...  Third, the CCP 
relaxed its conditions for communicating with the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). ...  Fourth, Beijing set a clear line on 
Taiwan participating in international organizations. ...  Fifth, 
exchange mechanisms would be constructive. ..." 
 
YOUNG