Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI25, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09AITTAIPEI25.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI25 2009-01-08 08:18 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0025 0080818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080818Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0668
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8838
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0298
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
January 8 news coverage on the ongoing probe into former President 
Chen Shui-bian's legal case and on Taiwan's sagging economy.  In 
terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the Taiwan policy speech 
recently delivered by Chinese President Hu Jintao.  The article said 
Hu has vigorously embarked on another level of political attack, 
with the goals of breaking the bottom line of two noes, which the 
United States set for Taiwan in last August, and paving the way for 
its ultimate reunification.  End summary. 
 
"Mona Lisa Smile of Hu Jintao" 
 
Dr. Emerson Chang, Director of Nan Hua University's Department of 
International Studies, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 520,000] (1/8): 
 
"...This article maintains that now that [Chinese President] Hu 
[Jintao] has achieved the three cross-Strait links and peace talks 
between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, and dealt a heavy 
blow against [the campaign for] Taiwan independence, he has 
vigorously embarked on another level of political attack with the 
goals of breaking the bottom line of the two noes that the United 
States set for Taiwan and paving the way for ultimate reunification. 
 The reasons are listed below: 
 
"First, in terms of the barriers to [China's] peaceful 
reunification, given that the Taiwan independence force has now 
suffered a setback, how to deal with its relations with big nations 
has become Beijing's top priority.  In order to solve this problem, 
Beijing must first break through the two noes bottom line that the 
United States has set for Ma Ying-jeou in dealing with cross-Strait 
relations -- namely, 'there should be no hint that China has 
sovereignty over Taiwan, and that Beijing cannot have the final say 
regarding any of Taiwan's activities in the international 
community.'  To do that, in his latest definition of cross-Strait 
relations, Hu asserted that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are of a 
status of separate, rather than split governance (referring to 
governing power rather than sovereignty).  Hu has further advocated 
that 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait will return to unification, 
which is not to restructure sovereignty or territory but to end the 
political confrontation.'  His reason for doing so is to rule out 
[the possibility of] dealing with cross-Strait relations using the 
German or Korean models.  Namely, when it comes to the ultimate 
resolution of the Taiwan issue, he wants to eliminate interference 
from external forces, that is, the model of 'restraining Taiwan via 
the United States.'  Through direct negotiations between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, he wants to exclude the need for 
interference from Washington so as to achieve his so-called 'new 
starting point in history.' ... 
 
"In other words, Hu may say yes to Ma's various essential requests, 
but for form's sake, they have to go through formal negotiations 
between the two sides, and formal statements must be issued so as to 
confirm to the international community the principal and subordinate 
relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  His goal 
is to not only pave the way for peaceful unification but also 
prevent Taiwan from joining hands with the United States to push for 
Taiwan independence after the island has succeeded in expanding its 
international space and acquired a peace agreement [with Beijing]. 
... 
 
"Given such requests, Ma is now facing a dilemma:  Namely, he will 
surely have to face a backlash from the United States and the Green 
camp should it proactively begin formal negotiations [with China]. 
But he will definitely be criticized by China and the Blue camp if 
he decides to wait passively.  Since Hu has already acquired 
bargaining chips such as the three links, and since the U.S. 
government is now facing a transfer of power and the financial 
tsunami, Ma's card of tilting toward the United States and [being] 
pro-China has not generated the outcome of winning advantages from 
both sides as he originally expected.  Instead, he is now caught in 
acrossfire and an awkward situation of no substance. ..." [Ed. Note: 
 The "two noes," defined above, were an invention that the "Liberty 
Times" attributed to AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt.  Chairman 
Burghardt never actually articulated the so-called "two noes," and 
the State Department has officially characterized the "Liberty 
Times" report on the subject as "false." 
 
YOUNG