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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI12, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI12 2009-01-07 09:51 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0015
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0012/01 0070951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070951Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0654
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8835
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0295
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000012 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies continued to 
focus their January 7 news coverage on the ongoing probe into former 
President Chen Shui-bian's legal case, on the dual citizenship 
controversy surrounding legislator Diane Lee, and on cross-Strait 
relations.  The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" ran a banner 
headline on page eleven reading "Richard Bush is Reportedly to 
Become U.S. Representative to Taiwan."  The pro-unification "United 
Daily News" also ran an exclusive news story on page two, citing 
Bonnie Glaser, a senior associate at the U.S.-based Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, as saying that the next U.S. 
President Barack Obama will promote a "positive-sum" rather than 
"zero-sum game" among the U.S., China and Taiwan in the future. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "United Daily News" 
op-ed piece discussed the Taiwan policy speech recently delivered by 
Chinese President Hu Jintao.  The article said Hu's six-point 
proposal has restricted the Ma Ying-jeou Administration's options 
for cross-Strait relations while reaching out to the DPP.  An op-ed 
in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," written by 
a Canadian freelance journalist, said one of the indicators showing 
the new U.S. administration's approach toward Taiwan will be to see 
whether Washington will approve Taiwan's arms procurement request. 
A separate "Taipei Times" op-ed, written by former AIT Chairman Nat 
Bellocchi, urged the KMT and the DPP to work out their differences 
before Taiwan decides on how to deal with China.  An editorial in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" discussed the 
incoming Obama Administration's policy toward the cross-Strait 
situation.  The article urged Washington "to refrain from providing 
uncritical support to the KMT's excessive intimacy" with the Chinese 
Communist Party.  End summary. 
 
A) "Hu [Jintao's] Six-Point Speech Restricts Ma Ying-jeou's 
[Options] While Reaching out to the DPP] 
 
Associate Professor Tung Li-wen from the Department of Public 
Security, Central Police University, opined in the pro-unification 
"United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (1/7): 
 
"Chinese Communist Party [CCP] General Secretary Hu Jintao talked 
about the 'Six Points' on an occasion marking the 30th anniversary 
of [China's January 1, 1979] 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.' 
China has officially made its first move toward Taiwan, whereas Hu 
has shown his sense of urgency regarding [cross-Strait] talks over 
reunification.  No longer will Hu allow the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration to just take and not give or to stall for new 
changes.  Neither will the CCP tolerate infighting in Taiwan between 
the Blue and the Green camps; instead, it simply went ahead to 
demand a dialogue between the Red [i.e. the CCP itself] and the 
Green.  The time for a turn of events in the cross-Strait relations 
has already commenced. ... 
 
"There are two goals behind Hu's six-point proposal toward Taiwan: 
First, [he] wants to put an end to the various controversies in 
China caused by the rapid development of cross-Strait relations 
since May 20, 2008, and set the tone for its new and future course 
of Taiwan policy.  That way he can also gain control of the power to 
dictate the political talks across the Taiwan Strait for the next 
stage.  Second, he wants to give clear responses to the Ma 
Administration's fundamental position toward cross-Strait relations. 
 Judging from this perspective, Hu's Six Points are [tantamount to] 
a request by China to Taiwan for, as well as a position paper on, 
political talks on peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait. 
The six-point proposal has the following three characteristics: 
First, it restricts future [options] and affirms the goal of 
reunification. ...  The first red line drawn by Hu for Ma here is 
that 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait will return to unification, 
which is not to restructure sovereignty or territory but to end the 
political confrontation.'  It means that the unification of China 
must not touch on the remolding of the forms of state and 
government.  In other words, for China's reunification, [Beijing] 
has excluded the possibilities of [forming] a federation or 
confederation. 
 
"Second, [the six-point proposal] restricts the status quo and 
includes the 1992 Consensus in the one-China framework.  The second 
red line drawn by Hu for Ma is that 'even though both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have yet to reunify with each other, it does not 
represent a split in China's territory and sovereignty.  Instead, it 
is a political confrontation -- a legacy of China's civil wars.' 
Here [Hu] has officially eliminated the fact that there are two 
sovereignties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait as implied in Ma's 
advocacy of 'mutual non-denial' [between the two sides].  He has 
also turned down the call by the KMT to 'face reality.'' ...  Third, 
[the proposal] restricts international [efforts] and removes U.S. 
influence in cross-Strait relations.  Hu's six-point proposal 
mentioned again the long-forgotten statement that 'unification is an 
internal affair of China, which will not allow any external 
interference.'  Also, [Hu] has altered China's strategy of 
'restraining Taiwan via the United States,' which it has adopted 
 
since 1997, and he has further called to international society that 
'China's reunification will not endanger any other countries' 
interests but will merely facilitate prosperity and stability in 
Asia-Pacific and in the world.'  As a result, according to Hu's 
planning, Beijing does have its international concerns when it comes 
to China's reunification, and he has picked the perfect timing -- a 
time of transfer of power between the old U.S. administration to a 
new one -- to say it. ..." 
 
B) "Taiwan: Falling into China's Orbit?" 
 
Stephen Nelson, a Canadian freelance journalist based in Toronto, 
opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
[circulation: 30,000] (1/7): 
 
"... Clearly, this year will prove to be a critical year for Taiwan. 
Either it will continue on course with the great Asian experiment in 
democracy, or it will become just another subservient satellite of 
China. ...  To find out which way the solar wind is blowing, we need 
to look no further than President Ma himself, someone critics have 
called 'a windsock' and 'a chameleon on a weather vane.'  An early 
indicator will be how Ma intends to proceed against his old 
political foes. ... 
 
"Another indicator will be how the new Democratic government in 
Washington's approach to Taiwan. If the US goes ahead with its 
proposed weapons sales to Taipei, it means Washington feels that 
Taiwan still has a future as a de facto independent democracy: a 
moon in Chinese space, but not necessarily a Chinese moon.  But if 
the US decides to deep-freeze these weapons sales, it means that 
Washington believes Taiwan has already moved too close to China and 
that Taiwan cannot be trusted as an ally.  In that case, if the 
Taiwanese want to be pulled out of China's orbit, they'll have to do 
it themselves. ..." 
 
C) "Responding as One to Beijing's Soft Talks" 
 
Nat Bellocchi, former AIT chairman and now a special adviser to the 
Liberty Times Group, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (1/7): 
"This year will see a continuation of talks between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait, with an increasing number of agreements on 
economic and cultural issues being reached. China will continue its 
soft dialogue with Taiwan - talks that will not change the 
fundamental political equation. Taiwan might find it more difficult 
to respond given the negative appraisal about the government's 
performance in a recent survey by a major local newspaper. ...  The 
KMT and the DPP's reaction to Hu's statement shows that aside from 
cross-strait differences, there appears to be an even larger gap 
between the two main parties. As a democracy, these two parties need 
to discuss issues more openly to strengthen the nation's view and 
voice on dealing with China." 
D) "Taiwan Strait Will Stay 'Hot' Issue for Obama" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (1/7): 
 
"In less than two weeks, Democrat Barack Obama will take office as 
the 44th president of the United States of America amid a worldwide 
economic and financial meltdown, festering wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan left by his rightist Republican predecessor George W. 
Bush and a host of other severe and multifaceted global challenges. 
It is therefore widely assumed that the incoming Obama will put East 
Asian affairs on the backburner of its priority agenda, especially 
since, with the exception of uncertainties over North Korea and its 
nuclear program, Asia seems to be less crisis fraught than other 
regions.  We believe this superficial impression will prove 
illusionary since there are actually numerous and worrisome sources 
of political uncertainty embedded in the Asia-Pacific region, 
including in the Taiwan Strait, that merit closer attention from the 
new occupant in the White House. ... 
 
"While most Washington pundits may not accept charges that the Ma 
administration is 'selling out' Taiwan, the continued high rate of 
dissatisfaction over his government`s performance in credible 
opinion polls, including deep division over its cross-strait 
policies, indicate that Ma is now walking on a political tightrope. 
At the same time, it is becoming increasing evident that Beijing has 
been feeding Ma and his KMT regime sugar-coated political poison, as 
reflected by the December 31 'offer' of PRC State Chairman and CCP 
General Secretary Hu Jintao to make 'reasonable arrangements' for 
Taiwan's international participation, perhaps including the World 
Heath Assembly, in accord with Beijing's 'one China principle' which 
posits that 'Taiwan is part of China.'  Hu's explicit exclusion from 
consideration any 'arrangement' that would even hint at 'two Chinas 
or one China, one Taiwan' exposed as a fantasy Ma's claim to the 
Taiwan electorate that the cross-strait 'reconciliation' was taking 
place under the umbrella of the KMT`s notion of 'one China with 
separate interpretations' or, even more absurdly, 'the Republic of 
 
China constitutional framework.' ... 
 
"Instead, Beijing has taken full advantage of the Ma 
administration's urgency to secure a breakthrough in cross-strait 
relations by portraying an international image that both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait are moving unification when what is actually 
happening can be more accurately described as a reconciliation of 
two authoritarian parties.  If decision-makers in the future Obama 
administration believe that this course is inevitably leading to 
'stability,' they would be risking a grave political 'blowback,' 
especially if Taiwan - centric political and social forces unite 
against the resurfacing KMT party - state for its excessive tilting 
toward Beijing and its regression in domestic civic, human and 
judicial rights. 
 
"Washington's foreign policy establishment may have disliked Chen's 
brash assertion of Taiwan's identity, but they should keep in mind 
the dangers involved in the fact that Ma's KMT administration has 
adopted radical measures based on partisan ideology without careful 
and integrated calculation of external and internal risks and 
without any serious effort to gain domestic consent or consensus. In 
sum, ensuring lasting reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
will require Washington to refrain from providing uncritical support 
to the KMT`s excessive intimacy with the CCP, remain alert against a 
regression in Taiwan`s hard-won democracy and human rights 
standards, and keep a close watch to prevent the emergence of any 
military or security imbalance in the PRC's favor due to the KMT's 
embrace of Beijing's 'great China' umbrella." 
 
YOUNG