R 200951Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3441

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000140 
 
 
M FOR PKENNEDY; M/DGHR FOR DG, AF/FO FOR PCARTER, AF/RSA 
FOR PBARLERIN AND LMAZEL, AF/EX FOR MKEETON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT APER AU EAID PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: TWO YEARS ON: STRUCTURING USAU TO MEET THE 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE FUTURE 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: The United States Mission to the African Union 
(USAU) has the opportunity to play a much more influential 
role in the deliberations and actions of the African Union 
(AU) in 2009 and beyond than it has had since its 
establishment as an observer mission in 2006.  Both the AU 
Commission (AUC) and its donor partners see the US as a 
critical player in building AU capacity and supporting AU 
objectives.  To live up to the part, USAU requires staffing 
and program funding appropriate to engage the AUC across a 
broad range of issues and on a long-term, sustained basis. 
Following is an assessment from the outgoing Ambassador of 
the immediate and mid-range staffing and resource needs of 
the USAU in the current environment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
An Opportunity for USAU 
 
¶2. The United States Government established the USAU in 
December 2006.  Its staffing called for just two reporting 
officers, including the Ambassador, with the thought that the 
Mission would largely replicate observation activities 
previously conducted by the bilateral mission.  The Mission 
structure did not envisage program management or intensive 
diplomatic engagement with the many players ) AUC officials, 
AU members, donor partners, the many disparate organs of the 
AU ) intrinsic to AU policymaking. 
 
¶3. As the AU has become an increasingly indispensable 
institution in the political, social, and economic affairs of 
the continent, its need to upgrade its institutional 
capabilities has increased dramatically.  Moreover, with the 
AU at the center of most major issues on the Continent, it 
requires critical political support both within Africa and on 
the international stage. 
 
¶4. To address these issues, many donors have stepped up with 
significant investment programs for the AU, including the EU, 
which has pledged 55 million Euros to develop the AU,s 
management capacity and 300 million Euros to support a peace 
and security facility.  To manage these programs, the EU has 
a dedicated mission with 25 staff, growing to 40 by 2010. 
Other donors focus on specific aspects of the AU,s 
institutional building plan, as the UK has done with the 
Africa Stand-by Force (ASF).  Many, including China and 
Turkey, have sought to establish strategic partnerships with 
the AU, with regularly scheduled annual high-level dialogues. 
 
¶5. The US does not offer the AU resources of a similar scale, 
given our penchant for bilateral funding.  The USAU Mission 
is small.  Yet both the AU and the donor community see the US 
as a critical player in developing AU capacity.  As the major 
investor on the continent in development, security, and 
social affairs, US support for AU positions can dramatically 
impact their implementation in the field.  The broad US 
presence on the continent offers the AU and donor community 
access to unique sources of information and influence.  US 
leverage with international institutions can enhance the 
AU,s stature globally.  Last, but not least, the US 
reputation on the continent, burnished by respect for US 
democracy and free markets, the strong financial and 
political commitment of the USG to Africa in recent years, 
the education and training of many AU staff and permanent 
representatives at US institutions, and the recent election 
of President Obama, gives the US an unparalleled standing 
with the AU leadership and members.  The establishment of the 
USAU, one of only two observer missions dedicated solely to 
the AU (the EU is the other), capitalized on these strengths 
and reinforced the US stature within the organization and 
with the donor community. 
 
 
Short-term Response and Long-term Engagement 
 
¶6. Taking advantage of this role requires a fundamental 
change in how USAU does business.  At this time much of the 
work of the USAU is in response to crises on the Continent at 
the expense of long term engagement in systemic issues. 
Today, these are Somalia, Eastern Congo, Guinea, Mauritania, 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe.  Tomorrow they could be six different 
countries.  USAU recognizes it must put a high priority on 
influencing AU response to these crisis situations.  However, 
to realize the opportunity USAU has to help the AU fulfill 
its vision for a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous 
continent, USAU must balance the need to address short-term 
crises with a plan for long-term engagement and must have the 
resources and personnel for the task.  Not only is such 
engagement necessary for the AU to have the capability it 
requires, but only through such engagement will USAU build 
the relationships it needs to have influence on a day-to-day 
basis.  This engagement must be cognizant of both the 
priorities of the AU leadership and the comparative 
advantages the US has to offer.  USAU,s main asset is its 
ability to leverage in a multilateral forum the large US 
bilateral investment and presence on the continent. 
 
 
Key Priorities for the AU and USAU 
 
¶7. The AUC leadership has clearly stated its areas of focus: 
institution strengthening, peace and security, shared 
values (i.e., democracy and governance), and development, 
cooperation, and regional integration (i.e., socio-economic 
development).  These areas align closely with US strategic 
objectives for the continent as articulated in the NSC 
approved Africa Strategy (NSPD-50).  Within these areas, USAU 
has identified a defined set of priorities that leverage USG 
strengths and are most likely to advance US foreign policy 
goals.  The key priorities identified by the USAU are: 
 
 
Institutional Strengthening 
- Financial Management and Procurement 
- Staff Training and Education 
- Communications and Information Management 
 
Peace and Security 
- Peace Operations 
- Engagement with the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
- Maritime Security 
- Peace and Security Architecture/ Africa Stand-by Force 
 
Shared Values - Democracy and Governance 
- Election Assistance and Monitoring (e.g. Support for the 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) 
- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
- Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance 
 
Development, Cooperation, and Regional Integration ) 
Socio-Economic Development 
- HIV/AIDS Action Plan 
- Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP) 
- Trade and Investment 
- Education Action Plan/ Gender Action Plan 
 
 
Planning for Success: Staffing 
 
¶8. To address these priorities, USAU staff needs to have the 
time to regularly interface with other missions and programs 
on the continent to understand their activities.  At the same 
time, USAU staff needs to work consistently with the 
different AUC departments to demonstrate US commitment to the 
broad array of challenges on the continent.  As it is now, 
given personnel constraints, neither of these occurs at 
sufficient levels. 
 
¶9. Current staffing at USAU stands at seven US and four local 
personnel.  It includes an Ambassador, a Political/ Economic 
Officer, Public Affairs Officer, an Office Management 
Specialist, a USAID Development Liaison, an AFRICOM Military 
Liaison (supported by an EFM administrative assistant), a 
CJTF-HOA Military Liaison, an FSN Protocol Assistant, an FSN 
receptionist, and two FSN drivers.  USAU also benefits from 
two contractors the USG has placed at the AU ) one in the 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) and one with 
the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU).  These 
contractors provide double value to the US: they help build 
the capacity of the AU areas critical to US objectives and 
they provide USAU with key insights into the deliberations 
and dynamics of the AUC. 
 
¶10. With respect to the priorities identified above, the 
Political/ Economic Officer must focus almost all his 
attention on engagement with the PSC and Peace and Security 
Department (PSD) with regard to the many political crises the 
AU is addressing.  As the only State Foreign Service Officer, 
he also backstops the Ambassador on management issues.  Aside 
from necessary public diplomacy activities, the Public 
Affairs Officer works with the AU on communications, 
including a project to digitalize the AU's Archives, and 
staff development through the international visitors and 
speakers programs.  She also provides support on 
macro-economic and economic growth issues.  The USAID 
Development Liaison Officer must manage projects (i.e., 
Continental Early Warning System, the DEAU contract, and 
Preventive Diplomacy) and relationships across several 
departments, including Political Affairs, Social Affairs, 
Conflict Management, and Rural Economy and Agriculture.  She 
also is responsible for advising the Ambassador on Social and 
Development issues and identifying possible important windows 
of opportunities for USAID funding.  The AFRICOM Military 
Liaison, aside from being the Ambassador's senior military 
advisor, has lead on our support for AU field operations and 
the development of the AU Peace and Security Architecture. 
The CJTF-HOA Military Liaison has the lead on Maritime 
Security and Title XXII program management, which includes 
projects like High Frequency and Satellite Communications 
that support the ASF.  Both officers must also work actively 
to identify opportunities for US military security 
cooperation with the AU and its subordinate Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs).  The Office Management Specialist manages 
the administrative functions of the office, with support from 
the FSNs.  The protocol assistant is key to facilitating 
engagement with the AU Commission and wider diplomatic 
community. 
 
¶11.   This staffing plan leaves out several key priorities. 
In terms of Institutional Strengthening, USAU can do little 
on the critical financial management and procurement gap at 
the AU.  On Peace and Security, where the vast majority of 
our focus is, our efforts still tend towards the short-term 
crises versus the long-term capacity building.  In the area 
of Shared Values, we are not active in supporting the APRM or 
implementation of many of the political protocols and 
conventions the AU has sponsored, such as the Charter on 
Democracy, Elections, and Governance.  In Development, 
Cooperation, and Regional Integration, USAU can only provide 
cursory coverage.  In-depth engagement in areas where the US 
has large investments on the continent - including health, 
rural development, education, gender, infrastructure, and 
trade and investment - does not occur. 
 
¶12. To address these shortfalls, USAU proposes adding one 
experienced mid-level Foreign Service Officer, preferably 
from the economic cone, and one junior Foreign Service 
Officer.   This would allow the senior political officer to 
become a Deputy Chief of Mission in name, as well as in 
practice.  This officer would continue to focus most of 
his/her energy on engagement with the PSC, but also be 
responsible for coordinating the activities of the other 
agencies and staff in the Mission.  The second mid-level 
Foreign Service officer would be responsible for engagement 
with the other seven AU departments aside from Peace and 
Security.  In particular, this officer would support the AU 
as it addresses economic development issues on the continent, 
including infrastructure, trade, and investment.  Given the 
breadth of this range of responsibilities, and the urgency of 
the issues the DCM would be dealing with in the area of Peace 
and Security, both would require part-time support from a 
junior officer.  The junior officer would give the DCM the 
opportunity to address long-term structural issues as well as 
current crises and give the USAU the opportunity to engage on 
the APRM and implementation of AU protocols and conventions. 
 
¶13. In addition, to buttress the efforts of the current USAID 
Liaison Officer, USAU would seek support from CDC or USAID 
for a Health Attache/Liaison, a position that was envisioned 
in the 2006 planning for USAU but never funded.  Such a 
person could work with the AU on implementing its HIV/AIDS 
Action Plan, as well as its work to develop systems to fight 
pandemics and it overall efforts to promote the modernization 
of Africa,s health systems.  A key responsibility of this 
position would be to seek to ensure AU health policy 
complements the massive investment the USG is making in this 
sector, and vice versa.  Once the health sector and much of 
the economic areas are covered, the USAID Development Liaison 
would be able to address the financial and procurement system 
capacity building so desperately needed at the AU, as well as 
non-health related social issues such as gender, education 
and rural development. 
 
¶14. With these three additional positions, the USAU will no 
longer need to sacrifice the important for the urgent.  This 
does not mean USAU will cover every item of interest to the 
USG, but much less will fall through the cracks. 
Understanding that budget and space constraints in both the 
current USAU office and in the New Embassy Compound may limit 
the ability of USAU to obtain all of the staffing requested 
above, USAU could accept a potential reduction in the PAO 
position implied by the current freeze on that position. 
This is by no means ideal, but with the economic issues being 
covered by a new mid-level foreign service officer, the 
public diplomacy work could, if absolutely necessary, be 
supported by a dedicated foreign service national in the 
bilateral public affairs office.  This assumes significant 
support from the bilateral PAO so that areas that have been 
high-profile successes for USAU in 2008 ) International 
Visitors, Speaker Programs, and Communications Training ) 
are not put at risk.  Despite space constraints, shoe-horning 
this level of staffing into the NEC is in the realm of the 
possible. 
 
 
Planning for Success: Program and Administrative Budget 
 
¶15. The USAU currently has no program funding of its own.  It 
has managed some program funds provided through it from State 
and USAID Africa Bureaus regional funds.  In the Secretary's 
proposed FY2010 budget, USAU would receive its own line item 
of $1.5 million to support DEAU, CMD, the Panel of the Wise, 
and the Continental Early Warning System.  While a major 
positive step, this pales in comparison to the direct 
financial support provided by other missions.  USAU does not 
expect to approach such levels, but it does require some 
additional funding flexible enough to be applied 
opportunistically.  For instance, if USAU could invest small 
amounts to upgrade the AU Financial Management System, this 
could unlock tens of millions of dollars from other donors 
who have allocated funding to the AU, but not expended it due 
to the AU,s lack of financial accountability systems.   In 
addition, the USAU could make very good use of IMET and FMF 
funding.  In particular, the AU would view access to the IMET 
program for its staff as a major benefit that both builds 
current capacity and can enhance its potential to recruit 
high quality military personnel to staff its Peace and 
Security Commission and its Missions Administration. 
 
¶16.  With regard to administrative and representational 
funds, USAU does not have dedicated funding for these 
expenses either, but must rely on the bilateral mission's 
limited resources.  The result shortchanges both missions and 
is inefficient, as neither has full responsibility for its 
own spending.  USAU needs dedicated administrative and 
representational funds. 
 
 
Challenges and Opportunity 
 
¶17. Achieving the above goals will not be easy.  As a 
non-member, USAU has to proactively work to ensure it has 
access to the information necessary to inform US foreign 
policy.  The AU,s own thin capacity is a major impediment. 
USAU often finds key AU staff unavailable, the 
decision-making cycle inordinately long, and the process for 
implementing a decision agonizing.  When one Commissioner was 
asked how he avoided having his department become 
over-committed, he said this was not an issue since &we have 
outstripped our capacity a long time ago.8 
 
¶18. Despite these obstacles, USAU is confident that with the 
right support it can take advantage of the window of 
opportunity that exists for the United States to help the 
AU,s capacity catch up with its commitments.  If it does, 
the AU will be a viable multilateral institution even more in 
demand, helping not only resolve the continent's crises of 
today, but setting the course for the Africa of tomorrow. 
This will require even more robust engagement by the USG, 
with technical expertise in the many areas where the AU will 
be increasingly active, including environment, education, and 
law enforcement, as well conflict resolution, security, and 
the many sub-regions of the continent.  While this may be 
several years in the future, the USG should plan a USAU equal 
to the task supporting US interests within the premier 
multilateral organization of the continent, the 53-member 
African Union. END TEXT. 
 
 
YAMAMOTO