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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHHM RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMA RUEHNP RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
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DE RUEHWR #1394/01 3440705
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090705Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7469
INFO RUEHZN/EST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001394 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
OES FOR U/S DOBRIANSKY, TERESA HOBGOOD 
EUR/CE FOR DAVID MORRIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV PGOV PREL ETRD KIPR PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE UN CONFERENCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
REF: WARSAW 1271 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary.  Poland's government recognizes that the 
on-going Fourteenth United Nations Conference on Climate 
Change in Poznan (due to enter its High Level segment later 
this week) is largely a waypoint on the road to next year's 
Fifteenth UN Conference in Copenhagen.  It nonetheless views 
Poznan as an opportunity to showcase Poland on a global stage 
while drawing business and technology more closely into the 
UN Climate Change process.  Even as it stages the conference, 
the GoP is struggling within the European Union to reduce the 
cost the EU's own climate change package could impose on 
Poland's heavily coal-dependent power sector.  That endgame 
may well play itself out over the final days in Poznan. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The Poznan Conference comes on the heels of several 
high-profile bilateral successes: the August signing of the 
Missile Defense Agreement; the successful conclusion of a 
five-year Polish deployment in Iraq; and the simultaneous 
strengthening of support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. 
 These achievements reflect the changing nature of our 
relationship with Poland, which increasingly has become a 
proactive, collaborative partner on regional and global 
issues.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Poland on Climate Change/Emissions Caps 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Poland's views on climate change are not deeply held 
nor broadly developed.  Interest in climate change is 
measurably lower than almost anywhere else in the EU, a fact 
reflected in polling numbers and the limited media attention 
given to related events.  Poles in general don't feel deeply 
responsible for this global problem, nor do they feel that 
they will have a particularly important role in solving it. 
The GoP's policy response is driven by an expectation that 
mandatory reductions of CO2 emissions would have a crippling 
cost for Poland's coal-based power sector and would make 
Poland even more dependent on gas and oil imports from a 
single source - Russia.  Climate change policy is thus 
tightly tied to national security policy. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  On the global stage, Poland has reached out as far 
as China in search of potential partners among countries 
concerned about the impact of emissions reductions on 
domestic coal industries and prospects for economic 
development.  As hosts of the Poznan Conference, Poland has 
sought a higher profile for industry representation in the 
discussions and has advocated, with seemingly limited 
success, for a sectoral approach to emissions targets which 
they feel would be beneficial to their carbon-intensive 
industries.  The bulk of Poland's recent robust efforts on 
climate diplomacy have centered around blocking a deal on the 
European Climate Package, which would impose particularly 
stringent and costly caps on coal-based power generators. 
Poland has drawn attention to itself (both positive and 
negative) by pulling together a blocking minority in Brussels 
to stall the package in an effort to force their interests 
onto the table. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
The Bilateral Relationship: A Global Partner 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Poland increasingly sees itself as a regional and 
global player.  Poland's commitment and active engagement in 
Iraq began in the first days of Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
continued with distinction until its last troops returned on 
October 28.  Poles were among the first members of the 
coalition to commit troops to Iraq.  Their deployment lasted 
five years and as they withdrew from Iraq, the Poles plussed 
up their mission in Afghanistan.  They currently have about 
1600 troops in Afghanistan and are working to increase 
political and economic engagement.  We appreciate their 
support and recognize the losses they suffered during the 
Iraq mission - twenty-two Polish soldiers died and seventy 
were wounded over the course of their deployment. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The country has also tried to take the lead in 
shaping major EU policies like emissions control, energy 
security and Eastern Policy, particularly relations with 
 
WARSAW 00001394  002 OF 002 
 
 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus region.  Poland 
has transitioned from an aid recipient to an assistance 
provider targeting countries of strategic interest such as 
Afghanistan, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.  Together 
with the US, Poland was a strong voice in support of Georgia 
during the August crisis.  During the recent financial 
crisis, Poland pledged $200 million to support the IMF 
bailout of Iceland - a dramatic turnaround. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Secretary Rice traveled to Warsaw in August to sign 
an agreement to station ten missile interceptors on Polish 
territory in Redzikowo, near the northwest city of Slupsk 
(pronounced Swoopsk).  The signing marked the conclusion of 
18 months of tough but cordial negotiations.  The 
interceptors have no warheads as they are designed to destroy 
ICBMs through kinetic energy, and pose no offensive threat. 
We are currently negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement and 
the necessary Implementing Agreements that would allow us to 
begin actual deployment by 2012, subject to a planned review 
by the incoming U.S. administration.  Public support for the 
system ticked up in August, when the popular Tusk government 
communicated that it had driven a hard bargain and struck a 
good deal with the U.S.  The disproportionate use of Russian 
force in Georgia also served to convince Polish public 
opinion of the benefits of an enhanced security relationship 
with the U.S. at a time when Russia is flexing its muscles. 
 
¶8. (U) Poland is not a major U.S. trading partner, but 
American companies are an important source of investment - 
over $15 billion since the fall of communism in 1989. 
Household names like GM, Dell, and Whirlpool make goods and 
services here - for the domestic market and for export 
elsewhere in the EU - and are broadly very positive about 
their experience.  Poland's economy continues to perform well 
despite the current global economic storm.  Recent years' 
strong GDP growth between 6-7 percent has cooled to 4.8 
percent in the third quarter, with low unemployment (6.4 
percent) and moderate inflation (4.3 percent).  Poland's 
financial system has felt only ripples of the crisis 
consuming financial markets elsewhere, though economists 
expect growth to continue slowing together with weakness 
among Poland's trade and investment partners. 
 
-------- 
The Mood 
-------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) There is great interest in the U.S. transition along 
with some uncertainty about what it might mean for missile 
defense - which for Poles is more about US engagement than 
about global concerns.  Besides these prominent issues, there 
are persistent frictions surrounding U.S. visa policy and the 
Visa Waiver Program.  We regularly hear the message that 
Poland is a loyal strategic partner, who committed and 
engaged early in Iraq; in Afghanistan the Poles have fought 
with no restrictive caveats like other ISAF partners.  In the 
same breath, Poles will voice their disappointment that its 
citizens still require visas to visit the U.S.  (Poland's 
failure to qualify for the Visa Waiver Program this year was 
particularly painful, since neighbors such as the Czech 
Republic started traveling visa-free on November 21.)  The 
undercurrent is: "We've done all these things for the benefit 
of the U.S. - Iraq, Afghanistan, buying F-16s and now 
agreeing to missile defense...but what have you done for us?" 
 Despite these frictions, we are still seen as their 
strongest single ally. 
 
¶10. (SBU) You are visiting a dynamic Poland that has 
undergone dramatic changes since its return to full 
independence in 1989.  Poland is increasingly confident in 
the EU as well as on the regional and global stage.  Despite 
crosswinds from the financial crisis, it is an economy that 
has flourished by rapidly adopting free-market economic 
principles and fostering democratic values.  Our partnership 
has rapidly transformed from one of bilateral assistance and 
cooperation to one based on broadly shared values and mutual 
interest in multilateral fora.  While the Poles increasingly 
see themselves as an EU member and a regional leader, they 
continue to value their relationship with the U.S. 
ASHE