VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1183/01 3532212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 182212Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5547

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR IO/MPR - G. ABRAHAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT AORC APER PREL UNGA UNGA
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS ON HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT REFORM 
COMING TO A HEAD 
 
REF: STATE 129988 
 
¶1.  BEGIN SUMMARY:  After more than a dozen negotiating 
sessions, the Fifth Committee has reached an impasse on 
streamlining of contracts and harmonization of conditions of 
service for UN staff.  In an effort to reach a compromise, 
the U.S. submitted revised proposals (see para 4 below). 
Those proposals met with continuing resistance. At the 
conclusion of the last marathon session on Monday evening, 
December 15, it was agreed that all participants would review 
their positions, seeking guidance from capital as may be 
necessary, and resume discussion later in the week in an 
effort to reach agreement.  There is little time left in the 
session and if agreement cannot be reached the matter will 
once again be deferred, possibly until the next General 
Assembly in the Fall of 2009.  This is an action cable.  See 
paragraph 10. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. BACKGROUND:  The Fifth Committee discussed measures to 
streamline contracts and harmonize conditions of service 
during the first resumed session of the 62nd UNGA last March 
and was on the verge of accepting a package. The U.S., along 
with Japan (with tacit support from Mexico and Russia) could 
not agree to that proposal and the U.S. said it would develop 
an alternative proposal for consideration in the 63rd UNGA. 
Our proposal (see Reftel) was developed during the summer and 
we have been meeting since, individually and collectively, 
with other member states and Secretariat officials in an 
effort to explain the proposal and build support. 
 
¶3. Our proposal has consistently met with resistance from the 
Secretariat, EU, CANZ, and the Group of 77, all of whom 
demonstrate a reluctance to depart from the March proposal. 
We believe their reluctance is driven by an aversion to 
getting into the difficult and complex matters associated 
with this issue. Note: the estimated annual cost for the 
March proposal has risen from an estimated $90 million to 
$107 million, based on projected increases in the number of 
peacekeeping personnel. END NOTE.  Given the initial 
rejection of our new proposals, we do not believe the G-77, 
EU, or CANZ are prepared to compromise unless forced to do 
so. Japan, on the other hand, strongly supports our approach 
 
¶4. There are three principal objections to the USG proposal: 
1) use of temporary contracts for staff of peacekeeping and 
other missions; 2) the failure to provide an assured avenue 
into the Organization after completing the temporary 
contract; and 3) the low level of compensation/benefits for 
temporary contracts. Attention was initially focused on 
compensation/benefits and expanded as the discussion 
progressed to include the other objections. Our recent 
proposals (see para 5) sought to address all three concerns, 
but initially have failed to impress other member states 
which seemed to reject them out of hand. 
 
¶5. We have submitted revised language that a) provides 
temporary contracts with the same level of compensation and 
benefits as currently exists for 300 Series appointments; b) 
provides for an interim fixed-term mission-specific contract 
for those who have served satisfactorily for at least two 
years on temporary contracts but who have not received a 
regular fixed-term contract, provided there is a demonstrated 
need for continuation of the function they are performing; c) 
removes our proposal for a two-tier system of fixed-term 
contracts; and d) extends the exemption from temporary 
contracts to P-5 level appointments . 
 
¶6. The USG views temporary contracts as applying broadly to 
functions of a limited duration that would include 
peacekeeping and special political missions (approximately 
4,000 positions at present). However, other member states 
insist it should be limited to functions of an extremely 
brief nature such as election monitoring and translation 
services for particular conferences (approximately 400 
positions). 
 
¶7. The USG and Japan view using temporary contracts as a 
portal for entering the Organization for individuals serving 
in such missions. However, other member states disagreed with 
this view and insisted that they immediately be offered 
fixed-term contracts, as with any other individuals seeking 
to become a regular member of the organization. 
 
¶8. We and Japan (and Russia) object to the entry of 
individuals joining such missions being given fixed term 
contracts or being automatically converted from temporary 300 
Series contracts to 100 Series contracts, which are 
considered as regular positions in the Organization, because 
of the large financial and policy implications.  However, 
other member states discount or disagree with these concerns 
and insist that these individuals cannot be left in temporary 
 
 
contracts more than a year or two. 
 
¶9. JUSKCANZ representatives met on December 17 to discuss the 
revised US proposal.  The US noted the lack of response from 
the other members to our revised language despite the 
agreement last week to find something acceptable between the 
March proposal and our latest proposal, and stressed the need 
to find some compromise. CANZ offered language that they cast 
as a compromise, but was extremely modest and in effect only 
tinkered with the March proposal. The US expressed concern 
that their proposal, while welcome, did not address the 
fundamental issues. The US then suggested that one solution 
might be 'sequencing', starting out with our proposal, but 
implementing the March proposal if the US proposal was not 
achieving the objectives. Essentially rejecting the 
sequencing proposal, CANZ suggested that US concern about 
wholesale automatic conversion to fixed-term contracts could 
be addressed by dealing directly with the issue of 
expectation of renewal. We then brought up the UK's 
suggestion to us and the CANZ of having a probationary period 
at the start of a fixed-term contract, with reduced benefits. 
CANZ also criticized this proposal. The US exhorted all to 
find a way to bridge the gap in the few remaining days. The 
meeting ended with no significant change on the part of CANZ, 
who subsequently reaffirmed that they would not change their 
position and would only propose their language on temporary 
contracts. 
 
¶10. OPTIONS:  We will be resuming Thursday evening, December 
18, the negotiations on this matter, with the Fifth Committee 
winding up all the many issues confronting it by December 22. 
 We request guidance on how to proceed.  We have identified 
three possible options. 
 
OPTION 1: We can continue to press our proposal without 
further compromise.  Such a position would undoubtedly 
engender a strong negative reaction from other member states. 
Given the opposition of the EU, CANZ, and G-77, and expected 
Government of Japan support, this could result in deferral of 
action on this matter.  The discussion in the Fifth Committee 
indicates that failure to take action will not lead to a vote 
but simply deferral of the proposal. There has been some 
speculation, especially by Western supporters of the March 
proposal, that failure to take action could lead to 
termination of the special allowances for UNAMI and UNAMA. 
However, as recognized in the JUSKCANZ meeting, it is 
unlikely that the G-77 would terminate such allowances. 
Rather, it is more likely they would seek special allowances 
for other missions, e.g. MONUC. 
 
OPTION 2: Simply abandon our proposal and agree to support 
the March proposal.  This option would leave unresolved our 
serious objections to the use of 100 Series fixed-term 
contracts for new hires as well as any automatic conversion 
of many current 300 Series contracts, with very significant 
policy and financial implications. 
 
OPTION 3: 
(a) Pursue the idea of fixed-term contracts with an initial 
probationary period and reduced benefits, along with the 
following conditions: 
  (i) our language on temporary contracts, as revised by 
CANZ, stays; 
 (ii) special allowances for UNAMA and UNAMI remain in effect 
until July 1, 2009, leaving open the option to implement 
special allowances thereafter, if warranted; 
(iii) there must be legally binding language explicitly 
stating that fixed-term contracts carry no obligation or 
expectation of extension or renewal; 
(iv) all staff currently on a 300 Series appointment with 
four or more years of satisfactory service will be converted 
to a 100 series fixed-term contract; staff with less than 
four years service on a 300 Series appointment would have to 
compete for an available fixed-term contract 
 
(b) If there's no traction on the probationary period for 
fixed-term contracts in (a) above, agree to support the March 
proposal,  provided the agreement includes (i) through (iv). 
 
¶11.  The conditions in (i) through (iv) above would only help 
to address some of our concerns regarding cost and the use of 
100 Series contracts for peacekeeping and special political 
missions. While (i) or (ii) of OPTION 3 might be acceptable 
to other member states, there could be resistance to points 
(iii) and (iv) above.  These latter two conditions are 
critical, although there may be other approaches to 
satisfying our concern on (iv). 
 
¶12. Post recommends OPTION 3. 
Khalilzad