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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003435 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: DPJ SECURITY POLICY STILL MUDDLED, AS ELECTION 
APPROACHES 
 
REF: A. 07 TOKYO 3102 
     ¶B. TOKYO 3387 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The possible shift from an LDP-led 
administration to one led by the DPJ has potentially serious 
implications for Japan's security policy, as well as for the 
future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  The leading 
opposition party has opposed the war in Iraq and used its 
majority in the Upper House to slow the passage of 
legislation authorizing anti-terror refueling support in the 
Indian Ocean.  Campaign literature outlines the need to 
obtain a UN mandate for all security-related deployments 
overseas.  Party leaders routinely castigate U.S. policies 
and call for a more equal security alliance.  With an 
ideological range that runs from left to right and little 
cohesion between the party's assembly of former ruling LDP 
members and refugees from several small defunct parties, the 
DPJ has done little to lay out a clear framework for foreign 
policy decision-making.  In advance of Lower House elections 
sometime next year, the party has mostly deferred to its 
leader, Ichiro Ozawa, to set the parameters for the debate, 
but he has been much more focused on the elections than on 
what comes next.  Ultimately, the contours of DPJ security 
policy in the event it wins a majority may depend most on the 
ability of the leadership to maintain a sense of unity and 
cohesion among members  at the two ends of the political 
spectrum.  Whatever happens, it is clear at this point, based 
on numerous conversations with DPJ Diet members, that a new 
government will continue to maintain a strong alliance 
relationship with the United States, but will likely oppose 
the OEF refueling mission and certain aspects of U.S. force 
realignment.  End Summary. 
 
DPJ Poised to Take Power 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) For the first time in its history, the ruling  Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) faces the very real  possibility that 
it will emerge from the next Lower House  election as the 
second-largest political party in the Diet,  behind the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  If polling is any guide, 
the DPJ could take an outright majority, if not merely a 
plurality of the 480 seats.  The LDP has held power, either 
alone or in coalition, for most of the last 50 years, 
ensuring a fair degree of continuity in Japan's foreign 
policy.  The current Lower House term ends on September 10 
and the Prime Minister must call an election by no later than 
that date (with an automatic extension into October if the 
Diet is in session).  Embassy contacts are nearly unanimous 
that the most likely time frames for an earlier snap election 
are January/February or April/May.   The LDP has been girding 
itself to lose seats in the next Lower House race ever since 
its landslide victory under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
in the ""postal privatization"" election of 2005.  The outlook 
has become steadily worse through the subsequent 
administrations of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, 
and Taro Aso.  Even some senior LDP members, such as former 
Secretary General Koichi Kato, believe the clock may have run 
out on the LDP.  He told the Embassy recently that the LDP 
has lost the meaning of its existence, which was to stop the 
spread of communism and grow the economy. 
 
¶3. (C) Should power shift to the DPJ in the next election, 
security policy is likely to be less predictable than it has 
been for most of the last half-century under a steady stream 
of LDP governments, according to a wide range of Embassy 
contacts and other political observers.  Lower House Vice 
Speaker Takahiro Yokomichi, a former Socialist Party member, 
told the Embassy recently that the DPJ has a ""100-day plan in 
three steps"" for the transition.  He notes, however, that 
because the focus will be mostly on domestic issues in the 
early stages of a DPJ administration, there are not likely to 
be many immediate changes to foreign or security policy. 

Diversity Hinders Unified Policy 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The DPJ, founded in 1998, is an amalgam of lawmakers 
who have migrated from other parties over the past ten years, 
supplemented by a relatively young cadre of members who 
entered national politics for the first time on the party's 
own ticket (Ref A).  The leadership, starting with the three 
top executives, Chief Representative Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary 
General Yukio Hatoyama, and President Naoto Kan, is drawn 
almost entirely from the first category.  Those three, along 
with fellow transplants Seiji Maehara, Katsuya Okada, and 
Yoshihiko Noda, form the axis for six of the eight main 
groups that comprise the DPJ.   All but Noda have served as 
party leader at one time, and all six are cited frequently by 
Embassy contacts and the media as the most likely successors 
to Ozawa in the future.  Most of their followers trace their 
lineage to the LDP, the Liberal Party, Sakigake, or the New 
Frontier Party.  Remnants of the now-defunct Socialist Party 
(SP) and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) comprise the 
remaining two groups, and help extend the ideological 
parameters of the party from far-left to far-right. 
 
¶5. (C) Policy differences among the groups clustered around 
the ideological center of the DPJ can indeed be vague and 
difficult to articulate.  Generally speaking, the Hatoyama, 
Maehara, Noda, and former DSP groups tend mostly toward the 
conservative side of the spectrum, particularly on security 
policy, meaning they are supportive of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance, take a firm position with regard to China 
and the DPRK, and are comfortable with the idea of lifting 
some of the constitutional constraints that prevent Japan 
from playing a more active role overseas.  The Kan, Okada, 
and former SP groups generally take a more dovish stance, 
placing greater emphasis on relations with Asian neighbors 
and looking for ways to take on a more substantive 
international role outside of the Alliance and within the 
existing constraints.  While many in the latter category are 
still supportive of the alliance at some level, they tend to 
favor a more equal partnership and can often be quite 
critical of U.S. foreign policy.  Ozawa's group is probably 
the most diverse ideologically, followed by Okada's, and is 
therefore more difficult to categorize. 
 
¶6. (C) Some academics have argued that while the DPJ 
membership itself has become more conservative over the 
years, in keeping with the general decline of the left in 
Japanese politics, the party has actually moved further to 
the left ideologically as a means of distinguishing itself 
from the LDP.   A primary focus of the DPJ's attacks on the 
LDP over security policy for the past two years has been 
Japan's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Internal DPJ debates over 
the constitutionality of the mission in the absence of a UN 
mandate and the best role for Japan to play in assisting 
Afghanistan have threatened at times to split the party along 
ideological lines.  Ozawa was criticized heavily by both 
wings of his party in 2007 for suggesting that it might be 
more appropriate to send ground forces than to provide 
maritime refueling support, and quickly drew back to his 
original position that the SDF cannot be legally deployed 
overseas without UN mandate.  Maehara sided with Ozawa in 
opposing SDF deployments to Iraq, but opposed him strenuously 
on the OEF deployment.  The party remains divided over 
whether the current OEF refueling mission, which was just 
extended for another year on December 12, violates the 
constitution or not, but critics of the official line have 
maintained discipline to avoid airing the party's dirty 
laundry before an election.  DPJ Lower House member Mitsuo 
Mitani cautioned the Embassy recently against reading too 
much into the Diet debates, noting that ""it is easier to 
oppose government bills related to foreign policy."" 
 
¶7. (C) Ozawa is widely acknowledged as the key to holding the 
party together, but there is no unanimity as to what will 
happen if the party gains power, or if Ozawa steps down. 
Some contacts conjecture that the DPJ will implode within 
some relatively brief period of time, leading either to a 
return of the LDP or some sort of political realignment.  A 
few Embassy contacts have even posited the theory that the 
former Socialist Party elements within the DPJ might seek to 
take advantage of the political capital they have earned over 
the past several years for keeping a low profile by claiming 
the spoils of an electoral victory.  DPJ Lower House member 
Keiro Kitagami told the Embassy recently, however, that ""the 
DPJ is currently more unified than the LDP, because the DPJ 
is close to achieving its goal.""  Some DPJ lawmakers, 
including Maehara, have registered their disappointment that 
Ozawa ran unopposed in the party's September 2008 leadership 
race, eliminating the possibility of open debate.  Discontent 
remains, Kitagami acknowledged, but the members are committed 
to staying with Ozawa, at least until the election. 
 
Manifesto Provides Basic Policy Plank 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The DPJ Manifesto, revised for the 2007 Upper House 
election, provides a quick snapshot of what might be expected 
from a future DPJ administration, although deep divisions 
remain over even some of the party's most fundamental 
policies.  The Manifesto lists ""Seven Proposals,"" the last of 
which is ""to build proactive foreign relations.""  The term 
proactive, according to DPJ contacts, is intended to signify 
a shift away from the ""reactive"" policies of the LDP, bred of 
an over-dependence on the United States.  As DPJ 
International Bureau head Tetsundo Iwakuni told the DCM 
recently, ""the United States takes for granted that Japan 
will always say 'yes' when asked for something.""  Specific 
goals listed under the heading ""Foreign Affairs and Defense"" 
include the immediate withdrawal of the SDF from Iraq 
(already overtaken by events), increased public engagement in 
U.S. force realignment, proactive diplomacy toward the DPRK, 
and a more Asia-centered foreign policy.  Not clearly 
outlined in the Manifesto, but mentioned often by Embassy DPJ 
contacts, is a plan to dispatch 100 lawmakers and some 
unspecified number of political appointees to the various 
ministries to exert control over the bureaucrats, a proposal 
with potentially serious repercussions for policy formulation 
and implementation. 
 
¶9. (C) In the broadest context, the DPJ promises in its 
Manifesto ""to re-examine the role of the U.S. military in the 
security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of 
U.S. military bases in Japan...from the perspective of 
taxpayers and in consideration of the principle of civilian 
control and the need to reduce the burden on specific regions 
and communities.""  At the same time, the party pledges ""to 
make the greatest possible effort to develop relations of 
mutual trust...and to strengthen the bonds of solidarity with 
Asian countries within the framework of the international 
community.""   Current plans for U.S. force realignment are 
criticized for the ""massive costs"" imposed on Japan based 
solely on agreements between the two governments, without 
regard to the understanding of the affected communities. 
""Unresolved problems"" include total costs of the realignment 
and the use of subsidies to obtain buy-in at the local level. 
 
 
¶10. (C) The Manifesto also blasts Japan for supporting the 
war in Iraq based on ""arbitrary and inaccurate information,"" 
and calls for a full accounting before Japan considers how to 
assist in Iraqi reconstruction ""within the framework of 
international cooperation.""  The document notes the 
importance of retaining sanctions on the DPRK and describes 
resolution of the abductions issue ""essential.""   DPJ Lower 
House member Hiroshi Nakai has clarified for the Embassy that 
the DPJ is currently studying ways to impose additional 
sanctions against the DPRK, but is not considering any sort 
of independent designation of North Korea as a terrorist 
state.  He was not certain that Japan would remain in the 
Six-Party Talks under a DPJ-led government. 

Ozawa's Policy is the DPJ's Policy, for Now 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) For now, understanding Ozawa may be the key to 
divining the direction of security policy under a future DPJ 
administration, assuming he is willing and able to take on 
the post of Prime Minister, or continues to wield power 
behind the scenes.  Ozawa has argued for greater ""autonomy"" 
within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, particularly with 
regard to decision-making.  In the past, he has expressed 
support for close consultations, but he has also accused the 
LDP of failing to consider Japan's national interests when 
pressured by the United States.  Lately, his rhetoric has 
become more stridently anti-U.S., a move intended solely to 
position the DPJ for the looming Lower House elections, DPJ 
contacts tell the Embassy.  He continues to argue for 
wrapping the national security of Japan in the broad mantle 
of the UN, and limiting Japan's overseas activities to those 
covered by a UN mandate.  He has stated his opposition to 
revising the current interpretation of the Constitution to 
allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, 
although other voices within the DPJ support constitutional 
revision of some kind. 
 
¶12. (C)   Unfortunately, some Embassy DPJ contacts admit that 
Ozawa has grown increasingly difficult to read in recent 
years, isolating himself from daily contact with party 
lawmakers and relying more and more on a very small inner 
circle of advisors.  A number of Embassy contacts, citing 
Ozawa's strong support for the Alliance during his years as 
an LDP power broker, question whether his current positions 
on security issues represent a true change in thinking, or 
are merely a matter of political expediency for tactical 
advantage.  Countless DPJ lawmakers and staffers have assured 
the Embassy and official visitors from Washington over the 
past year that Ozawa has not really changed his stripes, but 
is focused on achieving a change in government at any price. 
In response to those who question his intellectual integrity 
for straying so seemingly far from the rather more hawkish 
and nationalist positions laid down in his LDP days, or in 
his 1993 book, ""Blueprint for a New Japan,"" Ozawa supporters 
assert that his view of Japan as a more ""normal country"" has 
always presumed a more equal partnership with the United 
States. 
 
¶13. (C) Known as ""the Destroyer"" for his pivotal role in the 
creation and subsequent break-up of a number of small 
political parties on his journey from the LDP to the DPJ, 
Ozawa helped form the first non-LDP administration in 1993 
before leaving the party.  Many Embassy contacts have cited 
his decision to forgo the top job at that time as evidence 
that he prefers to wield power behind the scenes.  His health 
also continues to be a cause of concern, with some DPJ 
members hinting to the Embassy that his heart condition could 
actually limit his ability to lead.  The Embassy has heard 
from numerous sources that Ozawa has had to make serious 
adjustments to his daily schedule and diet, and a recent 
article in one of Japan's weekly magazines noted his frequent 
absences from the Lower House during afternoon deliberations. 
 Allegations of financial scandals involving his sizeable 
real estate holdings are often mentioned by the press as 
another possible roadblock to his election as Prime Minister. 
 
 
Successors Waiting in the Wings 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) DPJ contacts stress that Okada, DPJ leader during the 
party's lop-sided loss in the ""postal privatization"" election 
of 2005, has worked hard to repair his image as a leader by 
staying above the fray of internal party politics.  Young and 
telegenic by comparison to Ozawa, he is seen as a 
bridge-builder within the party, and the only potential 
leader who can fill Ozawa's role of keeping the peace between 
the ideological wings of the party.  The relatively dovish 
Okada has faulted the LDP for relying on ""a very small number 
of Japan experts"" in managing relations, and recently 
traveled to the United States to lay the groundwork for 
broader exchanges with the incoming U.S. administration. 
Returning from his trip, Okada has proposed playing a 
""mediating role"" in negotiating with the Taliban, in lieu of 
dispatching the SDF. 
 
¶15. (C) The generally more conservative Hatoyama has also 
criticized the LDP for being ""overly dependent on the United 
States,"" asserting that a DPJ administration ""will strike the 
right balance"" in relations with the United States and with 
Asian neighbors, ""but with slightly more emphasis on the 
latter.""  Speaking to the Embassy recently, he claimed there 
is little difference between the LDP and DPJ on foreign 
policy.  Like the LDP, he said, ""the DPJ positions the 
U.S.-Japan alliance as the axis of its foreign policy.""  He 
acknowledged, however, that a review of U.S. force 
realignment will be the first security issue that the DPJ 
will deal with once it gains power.  What the DPJ wants to 
do, he continued, is ""to build equal relations with the 
United States in which Japan can say what it wants to say as 
a friend.""  He cited Germany and its disagreement with the 
United States over the war in Iraq as an example.   While 
Hatoyama believes it is important to focus on UN-based 
civilian cooperation, and has pledged publicly ""to place UN 
decisions ahead of U.S. decisions,"" he has told the Embassy 
that he regards a totally UN-centered approach as ""too much."" 
 
 
¶16. (C) Maehara, regarded as one of the more hawkish 
lawmakers in the DPJ, told the Embassy recently he views the 
bilateral alliance as a ""public asset"" for Japan and the 
region and as the ""underlying framework"" of DPJ security 
policy.  That doesn't mean he is entirely supportive of 
existing U.S. policies.  He has defined the first order of 
business for a new DPJ government as reviewing the OEF 
refueling mission and elements of U.S. force  realignment -- 
halting the former, in favor of some other form of 
contribution to Afghanistan, and looking for  alternatives 
that would be more ""acceptable to the people  of Okinawa"" for 
the latter.  At the same time, Maehara has called openly for 
increasing Japan's defense capabilities to protect national 
interests and safeguard the sea lanes, amending the 
Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right to 
collective self-defense, and taking a harsher stance against 
China and the DPRK.  He has also promoted the view that Japan 
needs to make its own efforts to improve relations with China 
and the DPRK outside of the alliance, while still preserving 
capabilities for deterrence.  Notably, Maehara recently 
expressed concern to the Embassy about the ideological divide 
within his party, warning that should current shadow foreign 
minister (and former Socialist Party member) Yoshio Hachiro 
actually become foreign minister in a DPJ government, Japan's 
foreign policy and security framework ""would cease to 
function"" (Ref B). 
ZUMWALT