VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1025/01 3521307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171307Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2343
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001025 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: INDUSTRY SPECIFIC MEETINGS ON THE  MARGINS OF 
THE CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1015 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 1021 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 977 
 
This is CWC-62-08. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Before and during the Conference of the 
States Parties (CSP 13), Doug Brown, visiting 
Director of the Treaty Compliance Division of the 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of 
Commerce, met with a number of officials on industry- 
specific issues.  This cable follows the wrap up 
report for the Conference (ref A) and other sidebar 
meetings on a variety of topics (ref B). 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Meeting with Bill Kane, Industry Verification 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 27, Commerce Director Doug Brown 
and Delrep met with Bill Kane (Head, Industry 
Verification Branch of the Technical Secretariat) to 
discuss issues related to industry inspections in the 
U.S.  Kane asked whether the U.S. might entertain the 
idea of sequential inspections to sites more than 150 
miles apart; Brown said that this would be evaluated 
on a case by case basis and would be dependent on 
location, terrain, and other factors.  Brown noted 
that the U.S. has received an unusually high number 
of Schedule 3 inspections this year.  Kane explained 
that, given the overall number and location of 
Schedule 3 plant sites, soon only the U.S. and China 
will have Schedule 3 sites that have not yet been 
inspected.  Brown noted that the number of Other 
Chemical Production Facility (OCPF) inspections in 
the U.S. has also risen this year; Kane pointed out 
that China, Japan, and others with sizeable chemical 
industries have also seen an increase.  There was 
some discussion of the fact that the U.S. and others 
could reach their OCPF/Schedule 3 inspection cap in 
the coming years. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On OCPF site selection, Kane pointed out 
that previous consultations had failed to reach 
agreement and that the Director-General (DG) -- 
partly at U.S. urging -- had then implemented a new 
methodology, based on factors that were within the 
Secretariat's purview to change.  Kane and Brown 
discussed the possibility of member states revisiting 
the third selection factor (States Parties' 
proposals) after the Technical Secretariat (TS) has 
presented its analysis of the first year using the 
new methodology, and agreed that it is important that 
all States Parties with relevant chemical industries 
experience an increase. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Brown raised the U.S. experience with 
sampling and analysis on Schedule 2 inspections, and 
recommended that the inspection teams move beyond 
simply citing the treaty as justification for 
sampling, and begin presenting a sound rationale for 
why/where they have decided to take a sample.  He 
noted that industry representatives are far more 
receptive to OPCW inspections when they see 
thoughtful analysis and justification from the 
inspection teams.  Brown also pointed to the benefit 
the Secretariat could experience in engaging in such 
a dialogue, as they would be pressed for such 
reasoning on Schedule 3 or challenge inspections. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Kane replied that the purpose of the "start- 
up" phase of sampling and analysis was to give the 
Qup" phase of sampling and analysis was to give the 
Secretariat practical experience, and that a major TS 
 
concern with discussing the rationale for sampling 
was that it would then be seen as negotiable, which 
contradicts the Secretariat's interpretation of the 
treaty.  Brown suggested that it might be useful to 
consider an agreement between the TS and the U.S. 
National Authority that justification would be 
provided on U.S. inspections for the benefit of both 
parties. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On the issue of "false positives" on 
sampling and analysis inspections, Kane noted that 
the Secretariat does its best to simulate possible 
chemistry at the site (through both a literature 
search and lab work) to prepare inspection teams for 
possible results.  Brown said that, despite the U.S. 
site having been pressured into running the OPCW 
software in "open mode" on the last inspection, the 
Department of Commerce expects to insist upon 
"blinded mode" next time.  He also shared the 
concerns Commerce has with the possibility that the 
OPCW will begin taking a "semi-quantitative" approach 
to sampling and analysis, a suggestion Kane said came 
from Germany in an attempt to address the issue of 
false positives.  Kane suggested that perhaps someone 
from Commerce could explore this further with the TS 
before it is deployed. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Brown also raised the U.S. proposal to use 
one "catch all" product group code for chemicals of 
lower relevance, as introduced during the November 
Industry Cluster consultations (ref C).  Kane said 
that the TS concern was that this moves in the 
direction of providing less information on the sites, 
and that these chemicals are common enough that their 
identification is unlikely to reveal confidential 
business information.  Finally, Brown noted that the 
Secretariat should, in general, be looking at and 
evaluating features of sites more carefully on 
industry inspections. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Meetings with Gary Mallard, Head of the OPCW 
Laboratory 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) On December 2, Brown and Delreps met with Gary 
Mallard (Head, OPCW Lab) to follow up on an earlier 
discussion of "false positives" in OPCW analysis of 
samples taken on Schedule 2 inspections.  Mallard 
demonstrated the analytical software on a laptop, and 
said that the TS hopes to have new software by mid- 
January that will allow access to an extended 
spectral library from "blinded mode".  He clarified 
that with the new software, the TS will conduct all 
sampling and analysis in "blinded mode" with recourse 
to the database.  Mallard also explained that the 
point of a quantitative analysis of undeclared 
scheduled chemicals would be to confirm that these 
chemicals were only present in trace amounts as 
impurities and did not exceed the declaration 
threshold.  He admitted that the uncertainty on 
concentration measurement would be quite high (plus 
or minus 10%), but thought that a valid distinction 
could still be made between impurities and chemicals 
that should have been declared. 
 
¶9. (U) Mallard reiterated that most false positives 
are due to the presence of routine degradation 
products, and commented that the Policy-making Organs 
Qproducts, and commented that the Policy-making Organs 
lacked the political will to include spectra for 
these chemicals.  Delrep noted that the U.S. Del was 
only aware of one State Party (India) currently 
blocking these spectra from being added; Mallard 
replied that there was likely to be resistance even 
within the Western Group (WEOG). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Meeting with Giuseppe Cornacchia on Low 
Concentrations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) On December 4, Brown and Delrep were 
approached by Italian delegate Giuseppe Cornacchia, 
the new facilitator for Low Concentrations. 
Cornacchia implied that the U.S. was almost isolated 
on this issue, and noted that even Iran favors a 
lower concentration limit (1%), which seemed to him 
to belie Iran's non-proliferation stance at the OPCW. 
Cornacchia also indicated his exasperation with the 
Japanese position on the issue.  Brown reiterated the 
rationale for the U.S. position and the difficulty 
the U.S. would have in implementing anything other 
than its proposed solution of 10%.  In reply, 
Cornacchia questioned how U.S. regulations could be 
considered to be compliant with the Convention.  He 
noted that the issue of low concentrations had 
implications for other issues, and pressed the U.S. 
to consider moving to a limit of 5%.  In closing, he 
said that, following his first round of 
consultations, he sensed flexibility from a number of 
interested States Parties, but no commitment yet. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Bilateral Meeting with the Indian Delegation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) On December 5, Brown, ISN/CB Office 
Director Mikulak, and Delreps met with the Indian 
delegation to discuss industry-related issues. 
Indian participants were Mr. V.S. Sampath (Secretary, 
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Ministry 
of Chemicals and Fertilizers), Ms. Ajanta Dayalan 
(Joint Secretary of the National Authority), and Dr. 
Pankaj Sharma (Indian delegation in The Hague).  The 
Indian delegation expressed its willingness to 
broaden the dialogue on chemical industry, and not 
limit discussions simply to treaty obligations.  (DEL 
COMMENT:  U.S. Del initiated these bilaterals to gain 
a better understanding of Indian reluctance on a 
number of issues and in the hope of moderating these 
positions over time.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) Sampath explained that in the Indian 
government, the National Authority (NA) is attached 
to the Cabinet Office, rather than to a specific 
ministry.  In response to a question regarding NA 
communication with chemical industry, he said that 
the NA outreach is similar to that used by the U.S., 
but explained that India has a number of different 
chemical associations for different types of 
chemicals, as well as at the federal and state 
levels.  The main association, however, is the Indian 
Chemistry Council.  Because conflicts can occur 
between smaller associations, the Indian NA cannot 
confine its outreach to one umbrella association. 
Outreach is also conducted through state-level 
workshops, which can be particularly effective in 
states where a greater percentage of industry is 
concentrated. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Mikulak asked what industry issues were of 
particular importance to India.  Dayalan listed the 
enhancement of OCPF declarations, the OPCW Central 
Analytical Database, and OCPF site selection as the 
main topics of interest, adding that principled 
issues related to risk assessment and the number and 
Qissues related to risk assessment and the number and 
frequency of inspections were important as well. 
Mikulak noted that global chemical industry has 
undergone significant changes since the treaty was 
signed, as has the global security environment, and 
that the future non-proliferation role of the 
Organization was very important.  Dayalan pointed to 
the continuing application of the original treaty 
provisions regardless of changes or completion of 
 
chemical weapons destruction, and listed Articles X 
and XI as areas of the Convention that could use 
further development. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Mikulak explained that an area of 
increasing/future importance for the U.S. is the idea 
of using the OPCW as a forum for discussion of issues 
related to chemical safety and security.  He noted 
the importance and utility of exchanging information 
and benefiting from others' experience.  Delrep 
Weekman added that these issues are important to all 
regional groups, and that the time seems right to 
expand this discussion, and to this end perhaps even 
to use the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism more 
effectively.  He outlined the U.S. redlines on the 
role of the OPCW in this respect, offering assurance 
that the U.S. does not see the OPCW Technical 
Secretariat taking on an increased role or 
responsibility in this area.  Weekman also noted that 
there could be opportunities for work within an 
Article X or XI framework, and that the OPCW Office 
of Special Projects was also exploring this. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Dayalan stated that this issue would 
require careful consideration, as safety and security 
is a State Party responsibility.  She also cautioned 
that issues tend to gain their own momentum and that, 
while the goal was laudable, it might prove very 
difficult to keep the Technical Secretariat from 
assuming a more independent role.  She suggested 
working bilaterally instead. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On the subject of the inclusion of 
additional spectra (for analytical derivatives and 
degradation products of scheduled chemicals) in the 
OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD), Dayalan 
stated India's view that the OCAD should only contain 
scheduled chemicals.  She noted that the OCAD 
currently contains only 5,000 of the estimated 
100,000 possible scheduled chemicals, and that the 
OPCW should focus on filling this gap before 
attempting to add chemicals not covered in the 
Convention.  She also explained India's "compromise 
solution" to use only scheduled chemicals on Article 
VI inspections and develop a separate database for 
use on challenge inspections or investigations of 
alleged use that could contain other chemicals. 
Mikulak asked what the Secretariat's reaction to this 
had been; Dayalan said the TS was still considering 
the proposal.  (DEL NOTE:  Prior to EC-54, OPCW Head 
of Laboratory Gary Mallard shared a copy of a TS 
proposal based on this suggestion with the U.S. Del. 
Del expressed U.S. concerns, shared by the UK, at 
this approach and worked to ensure the TS did not 
circulate the document.  END NOTE) 
 
¶17. (SBU) Mikulak noted that the U.S. has concerns 
with TS sampling and analysis procedures, but 
believes it is essential for the OCAD to include 
analytical derivatives for scheduled chemicals.  He 
noted that, in fact, the OCAD already contains some 
analytical derivatives that are not scheduled 
chemicals themselves.  He noted the Technical 
Secretariat's desire to introduce additional 
analytical derivatives that would improve their 
analytical capabilities for scheduled chemicals. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Dayalan responded that the CWC Schedules of 
Q18. (SBU) Dayalan responded that the CWC Schedules of 
Chemicals already contain precursors and "marker 
chemicals."  She explained that, as opposed to 
analytical derivatives, these marker chemicals 
indicate the presence of specific toxic substances. 
Mikulak suggested that India and the U.S. exchange 
papers on this topic, and that it would be helpful if 
India was willing to identify these chemicals for the 
U.S.  (DEL COMMENT:  U.S. experts do not understand 
what the Indians mean by "marker chemicals" on the 
 
schedules that are neither agents nor precursors. 
END COMMENT) 
 
¶19. (SBU) On current attempts to focus OCPF 
inspections on more relevant facilities, Sampath 
noted that one view is that OCPFs themselves are not 
relevant, as the focus of OCPF inspections is the 
facility as opposed to the chemical being produced. 
Dayalan added that the Secretariat paper on this 
topic was confusing and had nothing to do with the 
issue at hand. 
 
¶20. (U) Javits sends. 
CULBERTSON