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DE RUEHC #3691/01 3572124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 222114Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4802

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 133691 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EAID UN AORC
SUBJECT: FFD CONFERENCE REAFFIRMS MONTERREY CONSENSUS - 
DEBATE FOCUSED ON ODA COMMITMENTS 
 
REF: A. A.STATE 122053 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. B. STATE 102765 
     ¶C. C. STATE 015117 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The November 29 - December 2 United 
Nations "International Conference to review implementation 
of the Monterrey Consensus" adopted the "Doha Declaration 
on Financing for Development" (FfD) that reaffirms the 
path breaking 2002 Monterrey Consensus.  The economic 
uncertainty caused by the financial market crisis and 
global economic downturn cast a shadow over the conference 
proceedings and contributed to a tilt in the outcome 
declaration away from private sources of financing toward 
ODA.  Nonetheless, the U.S. delegation largely achieved 
our objectives of maintaining U.S. leadership in promoting 
the Monterrey Consensus as a framework that works, 
advocating the total economic engagement approach to 
development, highlighting the importance of country 
ownership and responsibility in the development process, 
and showcasing U.S. assistance, particularly its focus on 
partnership and engaging the private sector. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The toughest issue to solve at the conference 
was defining the UN's role in the ongoing reforms to the 
global financial system.  The G77 and the President of the 
General Assembly pressed to establish a specific and 
authoritative role for the General Assembly, with several 
ministers joining in negotiations.  However, delegations 
agreed only that the UN would provide a forum for 
discussion by hosting a high-level conference "on the 
world financial and economic crisis and its impact on 
development."  We will need to work to ensure that this 
conference remains focused on that topic and does not 
become a repeat of the difficulties we experienced at the 
Doha Conference.  Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID 
Administrator Henrietta Fore led the U.S. delegation and 
hosted a well-attended side event on financing agriculture 
in a global financial crisis.  Washington welcomes post 
reporting on host country views on the Conference, FfD 
follow-up, and the planned high-level conference.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶3.  (U) The four-day UN International Conference to review 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development ended on December 2 with the consensus 
adoption of the "Doha Declaration."  The product of 
intense negotiations over three months leading up to and 
through the last day of the conference (ref A), the 
outcome document captured the widely shared, if not 
unanimous, view that the integrated approach for 
marshaling development financing set out in the Monterrey 
Consensus remains an effective framework of action. 
Conference participants offered impassioned arguments that 
additional efforts and follow through on commitments made 
by both developed and developing countries are needed to 
realize the full promise of the Monterrey Consensus.  The 
levels and importance of official development assistance 
(ODA) dominated the debate, particularly in the 
many presentations and discussions organized by NGOs and 
civil society organizations on the margins of the official 
proceedings. 
 
¶4.  (U) Most countries were represented at the 
ministerial or sub-ministerial level (appropriate for a 
review conference), while the heads of state or government 
of only a quarter of the 160 participating countries made 
brief appearances to deliver remarks in the plenary 
sessions that continued throughout the conference.  French 
President Sarkozy, speaking on behalf of the EU, was the 
only head of a major donor country to attend.  Unlike the 
U.S. multi-agency delegation (led by Director of Foreign 
Assistance and USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore with 
State, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, USTR, and MCC), most 
other developed country delegations, particularly from the 
EU, were dominated by development ministry officials. 
This had an impact on the focus of the discussions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The economic uncertainty caused by the financial 
crisis and global economic downturn cast a shadow over the 
proceedings and also contributed to the tilt towards ODA. 
This backdrop helped to embolden some participants, 
including President of the UN General Assembly (PGA) 
Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, who tried to radicalize the 
dialogue and called for revolutionary changes to the 
development paradigm and international financial 
architecture.  Several countries and accredited 
 
STATE 00133691  002 OF 005 
 
 
organizations also used the conference to push pet issues 
not directly linked to the Financing for Development (FfD) 
review, diverting the discussion to questions of 
development spending rather than financing.  Weak 
conference planning by the UN and a messy negotiating 
process for the outcome document also made it difficult to 
keep the dialogue focused, balanced, and constructive. 
The terrorist siege in Mumbai, India dominated the news 
during the conference and reminded participants of the 
national security implications of economic development 
policies. 
 
------------------------------- 
Key Messages from Doha 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The U.S. delegation largely achieved the 
objectives we set out at the beginning of the review 
process (ref C) and pursued since expert meetings began in 
January 2008.  In our official statement delivered by 
Administrator Fore, which included a message from 
President Bush, we sought to maintain U.S. leadership in 
promoting the Monterrey Consensus as a framework that 
works and the necessity of a total economic engagement 
approach to development.  We also highlighted the 
importance of countries' ownership and responsibility for 
their own development and showcased U.S. assistance, 
particularly its focus on partnership and engaging the 
private sector.  Following are the key messages we 
promoted during the conference and which are reflected in 
the Doha Declaration: 
 
¶7.  (U) Recommitment to the Monterrey Consensus:  The Doha 
Declaration explicitly reaffirms the Monterrey Consensus 
"in its entirety, in its integrity and holistic 
approach."  Calls for a new alternative found little 
resonance and no practical articulation.  A broad spectrum 
of participants acknowledged and supported clear 
statements in the outcome document that states must use 
all sources of financing in pursuing their development 
goals, including domestic resources, foreign investment, 
trade, ODA and debt.  Despite the current global economic 
crisis, states also generally recognized the unparalleled 
period of global economic prosperity since they set out 
the Consensus at Monterrey, as well as its effectiveness 
as an integrated approach to development through economic 
growth.  The conference recognized that "private 
international capital flows, particularly foreign direct 
investment (FDI), ... are vital," and "international trade 
is an engine for development and sustained economic 
growth."  The conference also recognized the "catalytic 
role" that ODA can play "as a complement to other sources 
of financing for development." 
 
¶8.  (U) Country ownership and responsibility, together 
with partnership are key:  The Doha Declaration 
underscores that "each country has primary responsibility 
for its own economic and social development."  At the same 
time participants recognized that "domestic economies are 
now interwoven with the global economic system," and we 
have a shared interest in each country's success and the 
need for "an enabling international economic 
environment."  The necessity of strong public-private 
partnerships and the role of the state in creating an 
enabling environment for the private sector were also 
dominant themes in Doha and sprinkled throughout the 
outcome document. 
 
¶9.  (U) The U.S. stands by its commitments:  With 
developing countries present in much larger numbers than 
donors, public remarks and media reporting during the 
conference overwhelmingly focused on whether developed 
countries were meeting and increasing their ODA commitments, 
especially in light of the global economic downturn and its 
potentially negative impact on developing countries. 
While the U.S. has already fulfilled and gone beyond its 
Monterrey commitments, we reiterated the President's 
pledge that "the U.S. will not abandon its commitments to 
people in the developing world in the midst of this 
financial crisis." 
 
¶10.  (U) Developing countries have important commitments 
too:  At the same time we emphasized that developing 
country commitments to good governance, sound economic 
policies, and rule of law are even more important today 
and must be fully realized.  In the Doha Declaration we 
recognized the progress made and developing countries 
still pledged "to build upon this progress ... by ensuring 
the necessary enabling environment for mobilizing public 
and private resources and expanding productive 
investments."  A strong push by developing countries to 
 
STATE 00133691  003 OF 005 
 
 
advance the concept of "policy space" as a donor-financed 
entitlement and license to escape any international 
commitments to accountability, transparency, or funding 
conditionality did not take root.  The Doha Declaration 
simply states that, "[i]t is for each Government to 
evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accepting 
international rules and commitments, and the constraints 
posed by the loss of policy space." 
 
¶11.  (U) Developing countries have a voice that must be 
heard:  The Doha Declaration acknowledges the need to 
"strengthen the voice and participation of developing 
countries ... in international decision-making and 
norm-setting."  However, despite a number of press 
statements by PGA D'Escoto, participants did not endorse 
the view that the purpose of the conference was to 
convince the "haves" to pay attention to the "have-nots," 
and that the UN should host a summit of the entire 
membership (i.e., the G-192) to review and revamp the 
international financial architecture.  UN Secretary 
General Ban received greater support for his more 
pragmatic call for a new flexible multilateralism that can 
"accommodate different fora with various mixtures of 
participation" and balances "the legitimacy that comes 
from universal involvement ... with the efficiency that 
results when we delegate deliberations to a few key 
players."  With several ministers joining in negotiations, 
delegations agreed that rather than the summit proposed by 
the PGA, the UN would host a high-level conference "on the 
world financial and economic crisis and its impact on 
development," with the details are supposed to be worked 
out in the UNGA by March 2009. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Messy Negotiations and Lengthy Outcome Document 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The question of a UN summit on the 
international financial and monetary architecture was one 
of many contentious outcome document issues that remained 
outstanding after three months of negotiations in New 
York.  Negotiating as country blocks, both the EU and the 
G-77 showed little flexibility in their positions before 
arriving in Doha.  The Egyptian and Norwegian facilitators 
encouraged open debate but did little to force serious 
negotiation on specific issues requiring compromise or 
concerted efforts to find common ground.  They also did 
not clearly define and stick to a negotiating process. 
The unexpected issuance of a new facilitator's text on the 
first day of the conference, for example, left delegations 
scrambling to digest changes and identify unacceptable 
text in the 70 paragraph document.  The EU, led by France, 
then surprised negotiators with a proposal that the 
conference accept the new document "as is."  This brought 
deliberations to a grinding halt and effectively 
eliminated a full day of negotiations. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Several delegations, including Japan, Russia, 
and the CANZ group (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), 
joined us in rejecting the text absent some essential 
modifications, although our list of must-have changes was 
the longest.  EU member state delegates admitted in 
private they expected and in fact welcomed U.S. opposition 
to their take-it-or-leave-it proposal, which reflected 
internal EU discord more than well reasoned negotiating 
tactics.  Although the move did provoke the beginning of 
serious negotiations, it also positioned the U.S. as the 
spoiler if a consensus agreement could not be reached. 
After all-night negotiations narrowed the differences 
significantly, EU ministers disrupted negotiations again 
the next afternoon by demanding a senior-level session to 
resolve the summit issue and then, for the second time, 
tried to force closure on any further debate.  Although 
enough delegations resisted to allow negotiations to 
continue late into the third night of the conference, the 
EU negotiators refused to engage and reserved judgment 
on any further material changes until they could consult 
again with their ministers.  A surprising and positive 
result of this tactic was a demonstration of greater 
flexibility by other key delegations, particularly the 
G-77, in finding common ground on the remaining most 
contentious issues.  This allowed the U.S. to win 
agreement on removing our three remaining redlines 
(language on international tax cooperation, future 
debt initiatives, and climate change). 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The result of this erratic negotiating process 
was an outcome document that ballooned by 20 paragraphs 
from the initial draft, is longer than the original 
lengthy Monterrey Consensus document, and contains some 
unnecessary repetition, unpolished language, inaccuracies, 
 
STATE 00133691  004 OF 005 
 
 
and some minor internal inconsistencies.  While we were 
able to remove attempts to pre-judge negotiations taking 
place in other fora, such as on trade and climate change, 
with time running out the Secretariat cut off debate after 
our redlines were addressed and left us no opportunity to 
clean up the text. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Side Events on a Wide Range of FfD Topics 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶15. (U) Donor countries, international financial 
institutions, and NGOs hosted more than 50 official side 
events during the conference touching on a wide range of 
FfD themes.  These included aid for trade, inclusive 
financial sectors, gender, the impact of tax evasion, and 
the ILO's decent work agenda.  Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon attended at least four side events, including a 
UNDP event entitled "A Time of Crisis and Opportunity: 
Responding with Renewed Multilateralism," a high-level 
event on financing education, and a luncheon on the 
economics of gender. 
 
¶16. (U) USAID Administrator Fore hosted a well-attended 
side event on financing agriculture in a global financial 
crisis that brought together a panel of private sector, 
public sector, and civil society organizations engaged in 
providing credit along the agricultural value chain.  The 
event included participants from civil society, business, 
donors, African governments, and the press, as well as 
seven development ministers, the leader of the World Bank 
delegation, and senior African leaders.  The session 
established broad donor endorsement of the African Union's 
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program 
(CAADP).  It also demonstrated broad acceptance of a 
"value chain" framework for the agricultural sector that 
embodies public and private participants within a market 
context that stretches from inputs and production to 
processing and consumption.  The panelists also identified 
a number of opportunities for public-private cooperation 
to better manage risks, improve the efficiency of 
agricultural markets, and illustrated a diversity of 
institutional approaches adapted to the diverse African 
conditions. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Public Diplomacy and Outreach 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The U.S. Delegation focused its Doha media and 
public outreach activities on defining core U.S. FfD 
messages and providing constant updates and media 
backgrounders to available press during and after the 
conference.  A lackluster global media attendance (due to 
few heads of state attending) did not affect significantly 
our efforts at getting out our messages to global wire and 
regional broadcast audiences.  Overall conference media 
reporting was fairly balanced in representing key U.S. 
views and significant post-conference media outreach 
helped to clarify the key role the U.S. delegation played 
in reaching a successful conference declaration.  In 
addition, following similar activities at the Accra High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the U.S. delegation was 
again confronted by hostile non-U.S. civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and advocacy groups who attempted to 
undermine U.S. positions and provided disinformation 
support to G-77 and West European delegations during 
negotiation of the outcome document.  The radicalization 
of this community was evidenced by the refusal of the 
lead U.S. NGO member, Interaction (a consortium of more 
than 150 U.S.-based humanitarian organizations) to 
sign the final draft of the CSO Doha Communique. 
 
¶18. (U) DFA and USAID Administrator Fore took the 
initiative to request Interaction to arrange a meeting 
with NGOs attending the conference.  The meeting, with 
about fifteen U.S. and international NGOs, provided an 
opportunity to exchange views on issues and expectations 
for the Conference.  This effort to engage the NGOs on 
their views was welcomed by the group and engendered 
favorable feedback, even though differences of perspective 
remained. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Next Steps - Towards a Better FfD Review Process 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Beyond a commitment to stay fully engaged in 
implementing the Monterrey Consensus and the need for 
participation across all economic ministries and with 
civil society organizations and the private sector, the 
 
STATE 00133691  005 OF 005 
 
 
Conference could not reach agreement on how that follow-up 
should be structured.  We opposed the proposal that 
participants commit to another review conference in 2013, 
but accepted further consideration of the need for one. 
Having consistently been one of the most prepared 
delegations for the long series of experts meetings and 
outcome document negotiations, our call for a thorough 
re-think of the FfD follow-up process had credibility and 
gained traction with others.  We successfully pushed back 
calls for creating a new mechanism, arguing instead for 
more effective use of existing fora and a decentralized 
dialogue that might bring greater focus and expertise to 
the different pillars of the Monterrey Consensus.  The UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) will take up the 
issue during its spring 2009 meeting with the IMF, World 
Bank, WTO, and UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
as well as its regular substantive session during the 
month of July. 
 
¶20. (U) Washington welcomes reporting on host country 
views on the Doha Conference and preferences on FfD 
follow-up and the UN hosted high-level conference on the 
global economic situation and its impact on development. 
Department contacts are Katherine (Kemy) Monahan in 
EEB/IFD/ODF and Andrew Haviland in IO/EDA. 
 
¶21. (U) Minimize considered. 
RICE