O P 151749Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 
INFO USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 131277 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S DECEMBER 8 MEETING 
WITH TURKISH UNDERSECRETARY APAKAN 
 
Classified By: EUR A/S FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: EUR Assistant Secretary Fried met December 8, 
2008 with Turkish Undersecretary Apakan and a delegation from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a two-hour discussion on 
European issues as part of the Shared Vision strategic 
dialogue.  They covered U.S.-Turkish cooperation and shared 
interests and policies in the European Union, NATO, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.  (The Turkish delegation also held a 
bilateral meeting and working lunch with Under Secretary 
Burns and a meeting on energy, which will be reported 
septel.)  U/S Apakan emphasized his interest in working 
closely with the new U.S. administration, and A/S Fried 
undertook to advise the new team on the strategic importance 
of the U.S.-Turkey relationship.  End summary. 
 
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INTRODUCTIONS 
------------- 
 
¶2. (S) A/S Fried welcomed U/S Apakan and the Turkish 
delegation, emphasizing the importance of our exchange with 
Turkey on crucial issues.  Turkey is a major player in our 
foreign policy priorities, and the United States looks to 
Turkey for collaboration, wisdom, and advice.  Though the 
last several years have not always been easy, Turkey and the 
United States have ended up in a place of strength and 
partnership.  A/S Fried recognized the challenges to our 
bilateral relationship in the immediate wake of the October 
2007 House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on H.Res. 106, the 
"Armenian genocide" resolution.  Avoiding the floor vote was 
the right thing to do for American interests, and he was 
pleased that the bilateral relationship had since improved. 
He was particularly pleased with the success of U.S.-Turkish 
cooperation in the fight against Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) terrorism.  The United States and Turkey work together 
closely in NATO and will continue to work together in the 
years ahead. 
 
¶3. (S) Apakan thanked A/S Fried and his team for their 
contributions to the bilateral relationship.  He agreed that 
ties had been strained in the past, but they had improved 
because of the good working relationships between our 
embassies and our offices.  He had been pleased to welcome 
Jim Jeffrey as the new U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and was sure 
our close cooperation would continue.  Turkey would like to 
continue to expand this partnership with the new 
administration on the basis of the Shared Vision document. 
The United States should know that Turkey is a reliable 
partner that places importance on its relationship with the 
West -- the United States, NATO, and the European Union. 
Turkey and the United States have a shared vision and a 
shared responsibility for defense and security in the region, 
including Iraq, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, the Black 
Sea, and the Caucasus.  Countering terrorism has been a major 
issue, and Turkey would like to expand its cooperation in 
this area.  Turkey also looks forward to cooperating with the 
United States and the international community in the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and will send a delegation to 
Washington December 12 for UNSC consultations.  Energy is also 
an issue on which Turkey and the United States are strategic 
partners.  Turkey wants to work closely with the United States 
to ensure a strategy that balances global and regional energy 
needs.  Turkey also understands its responsibilities as a G-20 
country and wants to cooperate on economic matters.  Though 
there may be occasional differences of interpretation and 
approach, the United States and Turkey share the same goals 
of peace and stability.  Apakan repeated that he would like this 
close cooperation to continue with the new administration on the 
basis of a shared philosophy of friendship, solidarity, and 
partnership. 
 
-------------------------- 
EUROPEAN UNION AND REFORMS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) A/S Fried recognized as critical Turkey's path to 
deepening its democracy and the evolution of its secular 
democracy over the last generation as he opened a discussion 
of Turkey's European Union accession.  Turkey's being a 
democracy lent great weight to our partnership.  Apakan 
stressed that Turkey has always been oriented to the West and 
that the EU accession is an important element of Turkey's 
transformation to a modern society.  Turkey may be involved 
in the Middle East, but Apakan said Turkey has no other 
option than the EU and the United States.  Turkey will not 
identify with Russia or Iran, so its objective remains the EU. 
 
¶5. (S) Apakan said Turkey wants to move more quickly on its 
accession but internal politics with some EU members, such as 
France, are hindering Turkey's progress.  Other countries -- 
like Sweden, Italy, the Czech Republic, United Kingdom, and 
Finland -- are doing their best to be openly supportive of 
Turkey's accession.  Turkey is working with the Czech 
Republic in advance of it taking the EU presidency in January 
¶2009.  Apakan saw the EU process not just as opening and 
closing chapter, but as a "way of life."  While Apakan 
acknowledged Turkey must do more on reforms, including human 
rights, the Europeans should not allow the process to be left 
"in limbo."  The Europeans should be mindful of Turkish 
public opinion and how it is negatively affected by European 
attitudes and actions, including not allowing the word 
"accession" to be used in EU documents or freezing certain 
chapters.  France's insistence on dropping the word 
"accession" appeared to Apakan to be "antidiplomacy" because 
France blocks Turkey in the  EU, yet wants to work with Turkey 
in the Middle East. Turkey appreciates U.S. support for Turkey's 
EU membership. 
 
¶6. (S) A/S Fried agreed that internal politics in Europe, and 
Europe's own identity problems were creating disadvantages 
for Turkey.  The United States has supported Turkey's 
membership and insisted on no backward movement.  Fried 
encouraged Turkey to prepare now for future changes in the 
European political climate.  The more Turkey does to 
accelerate its reforms, the more it can undercut Europe's 
existential concerns.  Turkey's record of reform in 2003 was 
impressive.  A second wave of reforms now, including on the 
status of the Ecumenical Patriarch and freedom of expression, 
would force Europeans to look again and overcome their 
hesitation.  Movement on the Cyprus negotiations would also 
help Turkey's prospects for EU membership.  Turkey should 
think about the timing of its efforts, and can work with its 
advocates in the EU like the UK or people like EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Ollie Rehn and EU Council Secretariat Director 
General Robert Cooper to determine when best to push its 
candidacy.  DAS Bryza also noted that if Europe were to close 
its door to Turkey, it would send the wrong signal to Europe's 
Muslim population. Europe should focus on its big, strategic 
interests. 
 
¶7. (S) Apakan said that Europe had to prepare itself for 
eventual Turkish membership. However, the Turks are also 
becoming discouraged because of the difficulty in movement on 
the acquis chapters.  Berk pointed out that eight chapters 
are frozen because of the Cyprus issue, and France has 
suspended four Chapters (those that imply Turkish membership 
in the EU, and Cyprus is blocking the energy Chapter). 
Turkey wants to see the energy chapter opened and sees only 
one state (Cyprus) blocking progress on it.  Deputy U/S Berk 
observed that the EU commission is often encouraging and 
motivating other countries, but its rhetoric is the reverse 
with Turkey.  It is serving to diminish the Turkish public's 
excitement about the EU, which makes it more difficult for 
the Turkish government to use the EU process as an incentive 
to implement difficult and costly reforms.  Turkey is 
concerned there may be no chapters opened during the Swedish 
presidency of the EU in 2009.  DAS Bryza expressed support 
for the opening the energy chapter, saying that we had to 
find a way to do so. 
 
¶8. (S) Apakan stressed the importance of Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries as a center of political and economic 
gravity in the region.  Turkey places great importance on the 
transatlantic alliance and the need for a strong NATO.  When 
there is a strong NATO, there is a strong EU.  EU partners 
need to think strategically about the realities of the 21st 
century.  Turkey sees the UK as thinking strategically but 
believes other EU countries need to think more broadly.  A/S 
Fried agreed on the importance of NATO, noting the increase 
in U.S. support for the EU has been predicated on a strong 
NATO. 
 
---- 
CSCP 
---- 
 
¶9. (S) Apakan briefed on the expert-level meetings Turkey 
held on the margins of the OSCE meeting in Helsinki with 
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as part of its 
Caucasus Security and Cooperation Platform (CSCP).  Deputy 
U/S Cevikoz represented Turkey in the meeting, which Apakan 
characterized as useful.  The participants worked on a paper 
to develop CSCP modalities and implementation.  Georgia had 
expressed some initial hesitations about CSCP that appear to 
be resolved.  Turkey expects to hold another meeting at the 
deputy under secretary level and is pleased that there has 
been some "modest" progress.  Turkey is telling Russia and 
the other participants that, at the right time, it would like 
the United States and the EU to participate as observers. 
A/S Fried asked when that might be and whether Russia had 
objected.  Apakan did not give a specific timeframe, 
explaining that it may be six weeks before the group meets 
again.  He clarified that the involvement of third parties is 
specifically mentioned in the current draft paper and Russia 
had not raised concerns about that to date.  Fried and Bryza 
indicated U.S. support for CSCP, after initial confusion when 
the proposal was broached to Russia and Georgia without 
consultation with the United States. 
 
---------------- 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Turkey has heard from the Azeri and Armenian foreign 
ministers, as well as Azeri President Aliyev, that the 
Azeri-Armenian discussions about Nagorno-Karabakh have been 
going well and that there is a good chance they will find a 
settlement.  DAS Bryza agreed that progress had been good, 
though noted it may take more time than everyone would like 
to get to a final agreement.  He reviewed that the 
Azeri-Armenian talks had been improving steadily since June 
6, particularly given the better dynamics between Armenian 
President Sargsian and Aliyev.  Sargsian is more of a risk 
taker and a problem solver who has been willing to tackle 
this process head on, and Aliyev has recognized and welcomed 
this engagement.  During the November 2, 2008, meetings in 
Moscow, both sides said they were ready and instructed their 
foreign ministers to finalize a deal.  They are now thinking 
through the modalities of the corridor connecting the two 
sides.  It is positive that both sides have started to 
prepare their publics for a settlement and the trade offs, 
but bad journalism continues to hinder the presidents.  It 
looks like mid-2009 is the likely timeframe for an agreement, 
though everyone would like one as soon as possible.  Turkey 
could be helpful in pushing Aliyev to finalize the agreement. 
 
¶11. (S) Apakan said Turkey had been speaking to Aliyev, who 
appreciated Sargsian's constructive attitude and has a 
positive image of Sargsian.  Turkey sees the good dynamics 
between the two leaders as a rare opportunity that needs to 
be realized and has encouraged acceleration of the 
negotiations.  Turkey does not see a linkage between the 
Azeri-Armenian track and the Turkish-Armenian track, but 
acknowledges that progress between Turkey and Armenia could 
have a positive effect on the Azeri-Armenian talks.  He 
repeated there was no link and said Turkey was working on 
each track on its own merits. 
 
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GEORGIA 
------- 
 
¶12. (S) A/S Fried turned to the subject of Georgia and said 
the U.S. strategic assessment is that South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia are lost to Tbilisi for a long time.  Though the 
regions may never receive full independence, Tbilisi will not 
govern them.  The Georgians need to think about the 
long-term, not the short-term, on territorial integrity, and 
the United States has told Saakashvili this bluntly.  The 
good news is that Russia failed to overthrow the Georgian 
government, and Georgia did not lose much.  Russia's 
recognition of the regions may have been a blow, but Russia 
did not gain much and was only joined by Nicaragua and Hamas. 
 The strategy now for Georgia is to help it survive, recover, 
and consolidate as an independent nation even though it has 
been deprived of its territories.  In principle, Russia 
cannot be a barrier for Georgia's accession to NATO.  The 
United States was satisfied with the NATO ministerial because 
it left the door open for Georgia, but in reality, Georgia is 
years away from qualifyi 
ng for NATO membership. 
 
¶13. (S) A/S Fried reiterated that being provoked was not 
sufficient cause for foolishness, but now it is important to 
focus on strengthening Georgian democracy and institutions. 
It is not necessary to hurry Georgia's NATO aspirations, but 
we can all help Georgia do the work required to qualify for 
membership.  The situation on the ground is not encouraging, 
which A/S Fried saw first hand when he visited South Ossetia 
several weeks ago.  Ambassador Tefft has also reported 
shootings, attacks on police, mining the border, and Russian 
violations of Georgia's maritime boundaries.  Georgia must 
live with Russia's illegal recognition, and the international 
community must use the Geneva process to consolidate Georgia 
and stabilize the situation on the ground.  A/S Fried has 
urged Georgia to remain calm and patient and to focus on 
rebuilding the country, not being sucked into a war it cannot 
win.  Georgia needs enough confidence and support from the 
international community so it does not feel panicked and 
abandoned, but not so much that it is emboldened.  In the long 
run, Georgia needs to have strong institutions, not just one 
charismatic leader.  Georgian democracy will benefit from a 
healthy opposition, and Georgia may need two peaceful changes 
of government before it is ready for NATO. 
 
¶14. (S) Apakan said Turkey views Georgia similarly and has 
repeatedly stressed respect for Georgia's territorial 
integrity, which is a matter of principle for Turkey.  Turkey 
looks to the Georgians as cousins so will maintain good ties 
and will assist Georgia's recovery.  Turkey had asked to be 
involved in the Geneva process, but will support that process 
even though it has not been invited.  Apakan said the CSCP 
should reinforce the efforts of the Geneva process, helping 
with political reconciliation in the region.  Apakan said 
Turkey would like to consult more frequently and closely with 
the United States on Georgia and the Caucasus more broadly. 
A/S Fried advised that we all continue to watch the situation 
in Georgia closely, and he and DAS Bryza welcomed the 
opportunity to consult more closely on the Caucasus.  Bryza 
also stressed that the United States was supportive of the 
CSCP and looked forward to working with Turkey on these 
issues. 
 
¶15. (U) Participants: 
 
United States 
EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried 
EUR DAS Matthew Bryza 
EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick 
EUR/SE Deputy Bridget Brink 
EUR/SE Turkey Desk Officer Danielle Garbe (notetaker) 
 
Turkey 
Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan 
Ambassador to the U.S. Nabi Sensoy 
Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Affairs Haydar Berk 
Director General for Policy Planning Dicle Kopuz 
Deputy Director General for the Americas Ersin Ercin 
Deputy Director General for the Middle East Omer Onhon 
Deputy Chief of Mission Ali Murat Ersoy 
Special Assistant to the Undersecretary Deniz Eke 
First Counselor Ihsan Kiziltan (notetaker) 
 
 
RICE