VZCZCXRO5030
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHSQ #0752/01 3471616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121616Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 1860
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0019
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 4457
RUEHIK/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI PRIORITY 0085
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7899

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000752 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE; H PLEASE PASS TO CODEL POE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE DECEMBER 17-19 
VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN TED POE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Post warmly welcomes you to Macedonia.  To follow 
is an overview of the current political and economic 
situation in Macedonia as well as logistical information for 
your visit.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Macedonia faces an uncertain international future, 
quiet but deep-seated domestic divisions, and an already 
transitional economy now facing significantly lower growth. 
The government and people,s appreciation for U.S. support 
and friendship remains strong.  We have concerns about recent 
GoM steps in rule of law, responsible government, and defense 
funding and are engaging in concert with the international 
community here on these issues and on ensuring elections in 
March 2009 that meet international standards.  Settling the 
name dispute with Greece is crucial for Macedonia,s NATO and 
EU aspirations.  However, the GoM has made a number of moves 
which irritate Greece and make resolution more difficult. 
Interethnic relations are more stable following the election, 
but there are tensions between the ruling party and its 
ethnic Albanian partner.  Macedonia,s commitment to 
international security remains strong; we are working to 
seamlessly transfer its contingent from OIF to NTM-I and 
ISAF.  End summary. 
 
¶3.   (SBU) Macedonia is still trying to cope with not being 
invited to join the Alliance as a result of the Greek block 
at the Bucharest summit in April.  Subsequently PM Gruevski 
failed to heed international advice to strive -- with strong 
U.S. support -- for an immediate agreement with Athens on the 
name issue.  Instead, Gruevski called snap elections in an 
effort to boost his majority in parliament.  This succeeded, 
but election-related violence (predominantly in ethnic 
Albanian areas) and irregularities compelled the 
international community to conclude that the polls failed to 
meet standards.  Worse, the campaign and government-formation 
process delayed any serious work on the name issue for 
months, placing a NATO invitation in 2008  beyond reach. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On November 17, Macedonia filed legal proceedings 
against Greece in the International Court of Justice, 
claiming that Greece had violated the 1995 Interim Accord on 
the name issue by blocking Macedonia,s NATO membership. 
Both Macedonia and Greece pledged to continue UN-mediated 
negotiations on the name even as the case moves forward, 
which will likely take at least three years.  But even a 
finding in Macedonia,s favor would do little to help the 
situation. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Macedonia,s EU prospects are also distant.  As 
expected, the European Commission,s Nov. 5 progress report 
did not recommend a starting date for membership 
negotiations, due to Macedonia,s failure to make sufficient 
progress on key benchmarks in political and legal reforms. 
(The June elections were also a major factor in the EU,s 
negative evaluation.)  While the GoM formally accepted the 
EU,s criticism, frustration with the lack of progress toward 
Euro-Atlantic integration has demoralized the Macedonian 
leadership and likely made it less amenable to pushing hard 
on reforms. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Macedonia will hold presidential and municipal 
elections in March 2009, and we and our partners in the 
international community are working to focus the GoM on 
implementing OSCE recommendations to ensure the flawed 
elections of last June are not repeated.  We have noted for 
PM Gruevski and others that the next NATO summit comes only 
one week after these elections, and a repeat of problems from 
June may give some in the Alliance ) not just Greece ) 
reason to reconsider their evaluation that Macedonia is still 
qualified for membership in the Alliance. 
 
Kosovo: Good News and Bad News 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Macedonia recognized Kosovo on Oct. 9, but has yet 
to establish formal diplomatic relations because the border 
demarcation between the two is not yet 100% complete. Despite 
a dispute over only a few remaining hectares (in which 
international observers in Kosovo suggest Macedonia is likely 
in the right), cooperation between the Kosovars and 
Macedonians on demarcation has been good beyond expectations, 
and the GoM has been transparent with us while seeking to 
minimize the fallout with Belgrade.  The Macedonians had at 
 
SKOPJE 00000752  002 OF 003 
 
 
first been nervous about Kosovo's independence, but now 
understand it as a stability multiplier in the region and a 
way to maintain a positive dynamic with its own ethnic 
Albanian population.  Indeed, PM Gruevski used the 100th 
anniversary of the Albanian alphabet to hold a Nov. 22 
mini-summit (PMs from Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo) and 
demonstrate outreach to the Albanian community in the region 
as well as in Macedonia. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Recently, however, the Macedonian leadership has 
been nervous about the potential for unrest within Kosovo 
surrounding the recent deployment of the European Union Rule 
of Law Mission (EULEX) throughout the country.  The GoM is 
concerned that any potential violence could spill over into 
Macedonia, just as fallout from the Kosovo crisis in 1999 
helped to precipitate Macedonia,s brief interethnic conflict 
in 2001.  Along with our EU colleagues, we have worked hard 
to assure the GoM that this is an unlikely scenario, and to 
counter the popular notion here that somehow the EULEX 
deployment means the partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines, 
always a concern in this interethnic society. 
 
Domestic Politics: A Mixed Bag 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.   (SBU) The Gruevski government has misstepped on issues 
of rule of law and political dialogue.  During the summer the 
parliament rushed through over 150 laws using an emergency 
procedure, snuffing out any chance for debate.  At the same 
time, the authorities arrested the main opposition party's 
Vice President, Zoran Zaev, on corruption charges, alerting 
the media in order to subject him to a high-profile "perp 
walk," then manipulating the judicial process to ensure he 
remained in preventive detention even when the presiding 
judge ordered him released.  The main opposition party, SDSM, 
walked out of parliament, only agreeing to return after 
President Crvenkovski, who himself hailed from SDSM, pardoned 
Zaev and refused to sign most of the laws passed under 
emergency procedure.  (This last move was symbolic, as these 
vetoes were easily overridden in parliament.)  Needless to 
say, poor relations between Gruevski and Crvenkovski have led 
to both sides showing more interest in personal politics than 
in governing.  The relationship, if anything, has only grown 
worse. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) More positively, Gruevski's ruling VMRO took the 
largest ethnic Albanian party, DUI, on as its coalition 
partner, and this partnership has been proceeding relatively 
well.  Gruevski finally accepted DUI's long-standing demand 
for a law permitting greater use of Albanian in official 
contexts; it passed on July 25 (albeit under the emergency 
procedures noted above).  Macedonian recognition of Kosovo -- 
another key DUI item ) also helped.  There are tensions 
under the surface, however.  Currently chief among them is 
the government's decision to proceed with four cases against 
ethnic Albanians stemming from the 2001 conflict that the 
ICTY recently decided not to pursue further.  Most in the 
Albanian community argue that under the 2002 amnesty law, the 
government is not permitted to proceed with these cases, some 
of which implicate the most senior leadership in DUI.  Should 
these cases proceed further, it could tear the coalition 
apart and, more significantly, spark inter-ethnic tensions. 
Prolonged exclusion from NATO and the EU will only exacerbate 
these problems. 
 
Economy 
---------- 
 
¶11.  (U) NATO and EU membership prospects remain distant, 
which in turn will not help an economy that is still in 
transition and is already showing signs of stress due to the 
global financial crisis and the economic slowdown.  While 
Macedonian banks luckily escaped the banking crunch, reduced 
international demand for key Macedonian exports, such as 
metals, will help drive down GDP growth (which recently had 
been running at approximately 6% but could well shrink by 
half or more in 2009).  Additionally, the GoM is planning to 
significantly increase spending for 2009 (just in time for 
March 29 municipal and presidential elections), likely 
putting a further strain on fiscal policy even as the tax 
base is likely to go down.  With no prospects for 
significantly increased FDI, prospects for the economy are 
not promising. 
 
Redeployment from OIF 
------------------------- 
 
SKOPJE 00000752  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12.   (SBU) The Macedonian leadership responded calmly to the 
news that their forces in OIF (75 soldiers, mostly Special 
Forces) will not be needed in Iraq after Dec 31.  The last 
Macedonian troops returned home this week.  Washington has 
encouraged Macedonia to consider folding some of its OIF 
contribution into the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, and 
Macedonia is positively disposed and actively considering 
this, indicating that they have 5-10 qualified trainers who 
could serve there.  Macedonian leadership will likely be 
receptive to U.S. requests for increasing their troop 
contribution in Afghanistan.  While Macedonia has domestic 
problems, its desire to contribute to peace and security side 
by side with us remains undiminished.  This policy has 
enjoyed support across the political spectrum. 
 
Logistical Information for your Visit 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  CONTROL OFFICER:  The control officer for your 
visit is Political Officer Jennifer Bosworth.  Office phone 
 389 (2) 311 6180 ext 2125; mobile phone  389 (0) 70 327 629; 
BosworthJF@state.gov 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  HOTEL:  Hotel reservations have been made at the 
Holiday Inn Hotel for the nights of December 17 and 18.  The 
hotel address is Vasil Agilarski 2, telephone number  389 (2) 
32920929, fax number:  389 (2) 3115-503. Congressman Poe has 
received an upgrade to a suite within per diem. 
 
¶15.  (U)  VISAS:  American citizens do not need visas to 
enter Macedonia.  Residence permits or long term visas are 
required only for stays over 90 days. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) CRIME AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT:  The security 
situation is stable.  There are no specific terrorist threats 
against Americans.  Skopje is rated "medium" for crime. 
While criminal activity does exist, it does not appear to be 
directed toward Americans, and the city is considered safe by 
U.S. standards.  However, petty crimes and crimes of 
opportunity, such as pickpocketing, do take place.  Travelers 
should avoid carrying large sums of cash or other valuables 
in purses and wallets.  ATMs may be used safely in Skopje as 
long as standard security precautions are taken. 
NAVRATIL