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Viewing cable 08RABAT1180, MOROCCO: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RABAT1180 2008-12-22 16:30 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO2607
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1180/01 3571630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221630Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9467
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0391
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 RABAT 001180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT RHONDA SHORE AND NEA/MAG 
STATE PLS PASS NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 124815 
     B. STATE 124033 
     C. STATE 120019 
 
RABAT 00001180  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1.  (SBU) In response to Ref C request, this cable 
constitutes Embassy Morocco's draft submission for the 2008 
Country Reports on Terrorism (see paragraphs below).  The 
report is also being uploaded to Diplopedia.  The Embassy 
Morocco point of contact for this report is David O'Connor 
(O'ConnorDR@State.gov). 
 
2.  (U) Summary:  There were no terrorist attacks in Morocco 
in 2008, and no large-scale damages since the Casablanca 
bombings of 2003.  The disruption of relatively small and 
isolated Salafi Jihadist-inspired groups this year points to 
the need for continued vigilance, but the GOM's CT efforts 
have done a good job of minimizing the threat.  Morocco 
pursues a comprehensive CT approach that emphasizes vigilant 
security measures, including international cooperation, and 
counter-radicalization policies.  The disruptions of 
terrorist cells in Morocco are testament to the rejection of 
them by the Moroccan public and to the competence of 
Morocco,s security services.  The main external terrorism 
threat to Morocco is the Algeria and Mali-based al-Qa,ida in 
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb terrorist group, along with 
concerns about Moroccan emigres radicalized in Europe.  The 
Government of Morocco (GOM) has been stalwart in its 
partnership with the U.S. to combat terrorism since the 9/11 
attacks.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (U) Internal Threat:  There were no terrorist attacks in 
Morocco in 2008, and no large-scale damages since the 
Casablanca bombings of 2003.  Characteristics of groups 
disrupted by Moroccan authorities, however, support previous 
analysis that Morocco,s threat of terrorist attack continues 
to stem from the existence of numerous small "grassroots" 
Salafi Jihadist-inspired groups.  These groups, sometimes 
referred collectively as adherents to Moroccan Salafia 
Jihadia ideology (a catch-all term used by Moroccan 
authorities to describe fundamentalist teachings originally 
emanating from the eastern Arab world), remain, isolated from 
one another, small in size -- less than 50 individuals -- and 
tactically limited.  Morocco has no known safe haven areas 
within its borders for terrorism and there has been no known 
effort by Moroccan terrorist groups to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction. 
 
4.  (U) External Threat:  In terms of Moroccan terrorists 
receiving external support, the Algeria and Mali-based 
al-Qa,ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
terrorist group represents the principle threat, according to 
Moroccan authorities, although others exist.  There are 
reports of considerable numbers of Moroccans going to 
northern Mali and Algeria to receive training from AQIM 
elements with some returning to Morocco and others traveling 
to Iraq to conduct terrorist attacks.  Although AQIM has been 
unable to support a successful terrorist attack in Morocco to 
date, Moroccan authorities remain concerned about the 
inspiration and knowledge transfer that AQIM may be providing 
to Moroccan Salafi Jihadists.  In 2008, AQIM repeatedly tried 
to incite Moroccans to commit violence against their 
government through website propaganda.  Similar propaganda 
efforts by the Pakistan-based al-Qa,ida network also 
continued in 2008.  Foreign terrorist websites have singled 
out for criticism royal rule itself, and have also complained 
about the Spanish enclaves, a position which, however, is 
similar to GOM,s.  The GOM also remains concerned about 
numbers of veteran Moroccan jihadists returning from Iraq to 
propagate and conduct terrorist attacks at home.  While 
overall numbers of Moroccans fighting in Iraq are difficult 
to confirm, some press reporting puts the number at several 
hundred.  A further cause of concern is Moroccans who were 
radicalized during their stays in Western Europe, such as 
those connected with the 2004 Madrid train bombings. 
 
5.  (SBU) Morocco,s Counterterrorism Efforts:  The GOM is 
pursuing a comprehensive CT approach that, building on 
popular rejection of terrorism, emphasizes neutralizing 
existing terrorist cells, through traditional law enforcement 
and pre-emptive security measures, and preventing terrorist 
recruitment through comprehensive counter-radicalization 
policies.   In 2008, Rabat continued to aggressively target 
and dismantle terrorist cells within the Kingdom by 
leveraging policing techniques, coordinating and focusing the 
security services, and expanding and bolstering regional CT 
partnerships.  These efforts resulted in the neutralization 
of numerous Salafia Jihadia-inspired terrorist groups the 
most prominent of which are as follows. 
 
RABAT 00001180  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
-- In February 2008, Moroccan authorities arrested a 
36-person strong terrorist network in the cities of Nador, 
Rabat, Marakesh and Casablanca.  In addition to attack 
plotting against Moroccan and Western targets, group leader 
and de facto double-agent Moroccan-Belgium Abdelkader 
Belliraj, now in Moroccan custody, is suspected of 
participating in a bank robbery and half a dozen 
assassinations in Europe and smuggling arms into Morocco. 
 
-- In May, an 11-member terrorist group plotting attacks in 
Morocco and Belgium was dismantled in Belgium. 
 
-- In July, the security services arrested, in various 
cities, 35 members of a terrorist network specializing in the 
recruitment of volunteers for Iraq. 
 
-- In August, another 15-person network calling itself Fath 
al-Andalus was reportedly disbanded in Laayoune, Western 
Sahara and various cities in Morocco.  The group was 
allegedly planning bombing attacks against United Nations 
peacekeeping forces in Western Sahara and tourists sites in 
Morocco. 
 
-- In December, authorities reportedly arrested five members 
of a terrorist cell in the northeastern Moroccan city of 
Berkane, along with nine other group members in other cities, 
who were allegedly preparing to rob banks in order to acquire 
arms for terrorist acts. 
 
6.  (U) In addition to traditional security measures, 
Morocco's King Mohammed VI has promoted significant efforts 
to reduce extremism and dissuade individuals from becoming 
radicalized.  The vast majority of Moroccans are devout Sunni 
Muslims who practice the Malikite rite, a school of Islam 
that emphasizes moderation, tolerance, and mediation.  Their 
popular practice has proven to be resistant to the spread of 
radical ideology and terrorism in Morocco.  Ordinary citizens 
providing tips to Moroccan security authorities have been 
instrumental in detecting many terrorist groups in Morocco, 
according to Interior Ministry sources. 
 
7.  (U) The King, as head of state and as the country's 
foremost religious leader (holding the title of "Commander of 
the Faithful"), has led the preventative aspects of 
Morocco,s CT effort by unambiguously condemning terrorism 
and those who espouse it.  Under the king's guidance, Morocco 
has undertaken two phases of reform to "restructure the 
religious sector" to preserve Morocco,s spiritual security. 
After the 2003 Casablanca bombings, Morocco steadily 
increased attention to and focused on upgrading places of 
worship, modernization of the teaching of Islam, and 
strengthening the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. 
 In September 2008, a radical cleric issued a highly 
inflammatory fatwa (religious opinion) that asserted the 
validity of marriage of girls, as young as nine-years old. 
Moroccan authorities responded aggressively by discrediting 
Sheikh Mohamed Ben Abderrahman Al Maghraoui, previously known 
for his fundamentalist and eastern-inspired views, closing 
down approximately 60 Koranic schools under his supervision, 
and initiating an official inquiry into his competence.  In 
addition, the public prosecutor's office initiated a criminal 
case against him for encouraging pedophilia.  The Council of 
Ulemas, Morocco,s highest religious body, was charged by the 
King, who is its leader, to "combat the hoaxes peddled by 
proponents of extremism," and to ensure the safeguarding of 
Morocco,s tolerant Sunni Islam identity. 
 
8.  (U) After this event and in a speech to the Higher 
Council of Ulema in late September, the King announced his 
"proximity strategy," calling for the rehabilitation of 3,180 
mosques, the training of 33,000 imams, and the creation of 
additional local Councils of Ulema, increasing the number of 
regional councils from 30 to 70 across Morocco, to help 
propagate a culture of religious tolerance and confront 
extremism.  The pioneering experiment, begun in 2007, of 
training and using women as spiritual guides continued this 
year.  The GOM has also continued efforts this year to revive 
the once widespread practice of Sufi Islam, a practice 
focused on the mystical and spiritual aspects of Islam, and 
traditional practices in Morocco to counter the growing 
influence of "eastern Islam," among marginalized poor, though 
this effort has been criticized, according to press reports, 
by some religious commentators. 
 
9.  (U) As an external part of the king,s new religious 
policy, in October the GOM invited Moroccan-born imams from 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden for religious 
 
RABAT 00001180  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
instruction in Morocco aimed at reinforcing the precepts of 
moderate Islam in local mosques in order to combat extremism, 
particularly among youth.  The GOM also sent 167 Moroccan 
imams to Europe, 31 to Belgium alone, during Ramadan this 
year to deliver the same message to Moroccan expatriates. 
Although the GOM has been sending preachers to Europe for 
years, this latest batch were specifically selected to 
address extremism and fanaticism.  In addition, the Moroccan 
Council of Ulemas will soon create a department that will 
watch over the more than 3 million Moroccans, i.e., 10% of 
the total population of Morocco, whose situation as 
immigrants in Europe is seen as making them particularly 
vulnerable to extremism. 
 
-- The GOM, and frequently the King himself, regularly and 
strongly condemns terrorist acts, wherever they occur.  The 
King has been particularly articulate in the wake of attacks 
in neighboring Algeria, in expressions of sympathy for, and 
solidarity with, foreign governments and with the victims. 
 
10.  (U) Political Developments:  The King and his government 
continue to be strong supporters of Middle East peace.  In 
addition to being a leading advocate of inter-religious 
tolerance, the King has also been a vocal supporter of the 
Palestinian people.  (Note:  The perceived injustice faced by 
the Palestinian people is cited by Moroccan officials as the 
single greatest radicalizing element among Moroccan 
extremists.)  Although the Parliament continues to remain in 
need of strengthening and reform, it has nonetheless provided 
a forum for airing moderate Islamist-inspired views in a 
political setting, offering a counter-example to Salafi 
Jihadist rhetoric.  The conservative Party of Justice and 
Development is the second largest political party in the 
Moroccan Parliament. 
 
11.  (U) Economic Developments:  In 2008, the GOM continued 
to implement internal reforms aimed at ameliorating 
socio-economic factors that create conditions which can 
contribute to individuals being attracted to extremism.  The 
National Initiative for Human Development, launched by the 
King in 2005, is a $1.2 billion program designed to generate 
employment, combat poverty, and improve infrastructure, with 
a special focus on rural areas.  The king,s continuous 
personal attention to development efforts received prominent 
coverage throughout the year.  The GOM also recognizes that 
its economic development and reform efforts depend on a 
sufficiently educated and trained work force and has adopted 
several high-priority efforts to overhaul primary, secondary, 
and university curricula to better prepare Morocco,s youth 
for the future. 
 
12.  (U) Legal Reforms:  Moroccan efforts to combat terrorism 
were overhauled after the coordinated suicide bombings in 
Casablanca in May 2003.  Following the attacks, Morocco 
passed laws to broaden the definition of terrorism, proposed 
heavy sentences for inciting terrorism, and increased 
investigative authorities, powers against suspected 
terrorists.  (Note: Some human rights groups say the measures 
infringe on human rights, according to the media.) 
 
13.  (U) In 2008, Morocco implemented elements of a 
comprehensive anti-money-laundering bill passed in May of 
last year that provides the legal basis for the monitoring, 
investigation, and prosecution of illegal financial 
activities.  The new laws also allow for freezing suspect 
accounts and permit the prosecution of terrorist finance 
related crimes.  The law also calls for the establishment of 
a Financial Intelligence Unit, which may become operational 
in 2009.  Both U.S. and EU programs are providing Moroccan 
police, customs, central bank, and government financial 
officials with training to recognize money-laundering 
methodologies.  Morocco has a relatively effective system for 
disseminating U.S. Government and UN Security Council 
Resolution terrorist freeze lists to its financial sector and 
legal authorities.  Morocco has provided timely reports 
requested by the UN Sanctions Committee and, as a result, has 
frozen some terrorist-related accounts. 
 
14.  (U) Human Rights and Transparency:  The GOM has 
emphasized adherence to human rights standards and increased 
law enforcement transparency as part of its CT approach.  The 
GOM grants non-governmental organizations unprecedented 
access to prisons where individuals convicted of 
terrorism-related crimes were being held.  CT investigations 
and arrests appeared to be better targeted and legal 
proceedings more transparent throughout the year.  The GOM 
has made firm public commitments that the struggle against 
terrorism will not be used to deprive individuals of their 
 
RABAT 00001180  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
rights.  Terrorist suspects, and even convicts, like others, 
appear to be generally accorded rights and due process of law. 
 
15.  (U) Legal Prosecutions:  Moroccan laws have been 
effective in leading to numerous convictions and the 
upholding of convictions of multiple terrorism-related cases 
in 2008.  For example, in January, 50 defendants in the 
sensational 2007 Answar al-Mehdi terror conspiracy trial were 
convicted and sentenced to prison.  Alleged mastermind Hassan 
al-Khattab received a 25-year sentence.  Forty-nine others, 
including four women and several members of the security 
forces, received sentences of two to ten years.  In November, 
the appeals court in Sale upheld the life sentence handed 
down last October of would-be suicide bomber Hicham Doukkali, 
who was wounded in August 2007 when his booby-trapped butane 
canister exploded in the central city of Meknes.  In June, a 
court convicted 29 men belonging to a terrorist group known 
as the "Tetouan Cell," after its northern Moroccan town of 
origin, for plotting terrorist attacks.  An appeals court 
also upheld the prison sentences, ranging from two to six 
years, of members of the terrorist group "Jamaat al 
Mouslimoun al Joudoud," who were arrested in 2005 on 
terrorism-related charges. 
 
16.  (U) Prison Conditions:  Following the mass escape in 
March of eight Salafist prisoners, and concerned the Moroccan 
prisons were serving as a place of radical fundamentalist 
networking and plotting, the GOM in April 2008 created a new 
ministerial-level Directorate General of Prison Affairs, 
separating it from the Ministry of Justice.  By the end of 
the year, all but one of the escapees had been recaptured. 
One was arrested in and returned from Algeria, according to 
press.  In mid-November, the government announced the 
authorization of a $27.5 million emergency program, on top of 
an existing $81.5 million investment budget, designed to 
improve prison conditions and alleviate overcrowding.  In 
addition to providing for the construction of six new 
penitentiaries, the program dedicates funds toward the 
government strategy of making new and existing penitentiaries 
spaces for reeducation and social reintegration into society. 
 In addition, in November 2008, Moroccan law enforcement 
entities initiated an unprecedented series of meetings with 
Salafist detainees with the goal of decreasing prison 
conflicts and violent recidivism, and improving prisoner 
treatment. 
 
17.  (U) Counterterrorism Cooperation:  Another key to 
Morocco,s CT success has been its emphasis on international 
cooperation.  The U.S. and Morocco built a valuable 
relationship based on cooperation, an ongoing exchange of 
information, and training.  Moroccan authorities continue to 
disrupt plots to attack Moroccan, U.S. and other 
Western-affiliated targets, and aggressively investigate 
numerous individuals associated with international terrorist 
groups.  The GOM has also continued to accept returnees from 
the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) and 
prosecute them under Moroccan law.  In mid-November, for 
example, a Moroccan appeals court sentenced former GITMO 
detainee Said Boujaidia to ten years in prison on charges of 
conspiracy, sabotage, financing and participating in a 
criminal gang, among others, according to the press. 
 
18.  (U) Morocco has also forged solid cooperative 
relationships with European and African partners such as 
Spain, France, and the United Kingdom with which it shares 
information and conducts joint operations.  Morocco is 
considered a Mediterranean Partner of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.  Morocco also works closely with 
African partners such as Mauritania and Senegal and is 
striving to improve its less robust relationship with 
Algeria, a dynamic sometimes complicated by political 
differences, according the Moroccan authorities.  The GOM 
uses army and Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces to 
secure its borders as best it can but faces resource 
constraints and a vast border area.  The GOM removed and 
prosecuted several corrupt border officers suspected this 
year of accepting bribes to allow AQIM members to infiltrate 
Morocco, according to the press. 
 
-- In the wake of an AQIM attack that killed 12 Mauritanian 
soldiers in the region of Tourine in mid-September, the GOM 
sent military advisors to Mauritania to provide the 
government with training and advice on the protection of 
military bases and patrolling techniques, according to the 
press. 
 
19.  (U) Outlook:  In the coming year, there are several 
 
RABAT 00001180  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the overall 
amelioration of the terrorism threat in Morocco but dangers 
remain.  In addition to the GOM,s continued prosecution of 
its CT and counter-radicalization efforts, the population 
remains highly sensitized to the danger and remains the 
greatest bulwark against terrorism, as evidenced by the rapid 
denunciation and recapture of most Kenitra prison escapees. 
The anticipated draw down of U.S. forces in Iraq may 
discourage radicalization among Moroccans, but amelioration 
of tensions in Iraq may also result in the return of Moroccan 
jihadists from Iraq to Morocco with possibly violent results. 
 The anticipated world economic downturn is also likely to 
make for more difficult economic times in Morocco, increasing 
desperation.  Diminished tourism and remittance income may 
present the GOM with confronting increased poverty and 
unemployment, conditions that appear to have aided 
fundamentalist recruitment in the past. 
 
20.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
***************************************** 
 
Riley