VZCZCXRO5120
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #1709/01 3471725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121725Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9290
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 2144
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1899
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1735

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001709 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/EX, WHA/CAR, S/CRS, AND INR/IAA 
H PLEASE PASS TO SEN. DURBIN'S OFFICE 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DURBIN'S DECEMBER 16-19 
VISIT TO HAITI 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit comes as the recently installed 
government of Prime Minister Michele Pierre-Louis is 
overseeing disaster relief efforts amidst growing criticism 
that government assistance is not reaching all who need it. 
Parliament is becoming increasingly critical of the 
government.  Your meetings will be an opportunity to showcase 
U.S. support for the government and the new Prime Minister, 
whose priorities for Haiti coincide with our own, and to 
assess our assistance efforts firsthand. End summary. 
 
Modest Progress Interrupted by Riots, Floods 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Haiti made slow but measurable progress in 
consolidating political stability and economic growth in the 
two years following presidential and legislative elections in 
¶2006.  However, the food riots in April brought political 
progress to a halt, and the hurricanes and floods of August 
and September dealt the economy a hard blow.  Increases in 
food and fuel prices that accelerated in late 2007 brought 
out the worst instincts in Haiti's political actors. 
Although there was genuine social grievance behind the April 
protests, many observers believe that much of the associated 
violence was organized by political forces seeking to oust 
then-PM Jacques-Edouard Alexis and profit from the resulting 
instability.  The Senate voted to dismiss PM Alexis on April 
¶12. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the five months following Alexis's dismissal, the 
Haitian government was paralyzed by political gridlock. 
Parliament rejected two Prime Ministerial candidates on 
flimsy grounds, in no small part because President Preval 
refused to bargain with parties and parliamentarians seeking 
lucrative positions in government.  Preval finally lobbied 
hard for his third nominee, Michele Pierre-Louis, and made 
promises of party representation in the cabinet and in 
ministries.  In the face of strong public pressure to confirm 
a government able to respond to the hurricane damage, 
Parliament confirmed Pierre-Louis on September 5. 
 
New Prime Minister Faces Significant Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although Pierre-Louis lacks the political experience 
of her predecessor, she seems sincere in her determination to 
reform Haiti's institutions, bring investment to create jobs, 
fight corruption, have elections according to the 
constitution's calendar, organize post-hurricane assistance 
and reconstruction, and establish overall development 
priorities.  Her policy goals align closely with our own for 
Haiti.  However, she took office just as the staggering 
dimensions of damage caused by four tropical storms and 
hurricanes became clear.  While previous natural disasters 
have affected a limited area of the country, these storms 
caused serious damage in eight of Haiti's ten departments. 
The flooding killed almost 800 people and affected nearly 
800,000, crippled the country's transportation 
infrastructure, devastated livestock and crops, and reduced 
economic growth for 2008 to a projected 1-1.5 percent.  A 
school collapse in Port-au-Prince November 7 that killed over 
100 students and teachers only added to Haiti's woes. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The unprecedented storm damage created a temporary 
climate of political good will toward the Prime Minister and 
her government.  She acted decisively in her first weeks in 
office.  She and the President jointly declared a state of 
emergency and allocated nearly USD 200 million, the entire 
proceeds to date of Haiti's sales of petroleum products 
provided under Venezuela's Petrocaraibe initiative, for 
emergency relief and reconstruction. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The security situation in Haiti remains a source of 
concern, although the current level of crime and instability 
represents a marked improvement over recent years, thanks in 
large part to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH).  MINUSTAH, which comprises nearly 9,000 
soldiers and police officers and over 500 international 
civilians, has bought the Haitian government time to 
strengthen the Haitian National Police, make progress on 
 
PORT AU PR 00001709  002 OF 004 
 
 
judicial reform, and improve the ability of the state to 
provide basic services to its citizens. 
 
Growing Tensions with Parliament 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Pierre-Louis's brief honeymoon with Parliament 
following her confirmation in September is already over. 
Members of Parliament, under intense pressure from their 
constituents to bring needed aid and projects to their home 
districts, are frustrated by the limited visibility of the 
government's disaster relief efforts to date.  Accusations 
are mounting that aid is not reaching intended recipients. 
Mayors and other local officials are accused of directing 
GOH-funded disaster aid for political purposes or diverting 
it into their own pockets.  (Note:  Foreign disaster relief 
is often channeled through independent NGO implementers, not 
the GOH, primarily due to the lack of government capacity. 
End note.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) As a result, Preval and Pierre-Louis have faced 
criticism from across the political spectrum over the 
government's handling of emergency funds.  Although President 
Preval's Lespwa coalition is the Parliament's largest party, 
support for the government in the legislature is slowly 
eroding.  The Senate and Chamber of Deputies summoned 
Pierre-Louis to Parliament December 2, and the Senate 
announced the upcoming interpellation of Finance Minister 
Daniel Dorsainvil.  While Pierre-Louis performed ably before 
the Parliament, she did not entirely diffuse the frustration 
of Senators and Deputies, some of whom may sense political 
opportunity in the government's difficulties.  Although the 
interpellation of Dorsainvil has been postponed, there is 
little sign that pressure from Parliament will relent. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Pierre-Louis also shares an uneasy cohabitation 
with President Preval; the Haitian constitution does not 
clearly delineate how the responsibilities of the two 
executive offices are divided.  Most of the new 
government's ministers are longtime Preval associates, 
and press reports surfaced in November that Pierre-Louis 
had to beat back the President's initiative to replace 
certain ministers in her cabinet. 
 
A Few Bright Spots 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) The government has a few talented people.  Minister 
of Economy and Finance Daniel Dorsainvil is a solid economic 
policy-maker, although he does not always coordinate with the 
Prime Minister.  Newly appointed Minister of Justice and 
Public Security Jean Joseph Exume appears determined to 
pursue judicial reform, prosecute corruption cases, and 
enforce work discipline on malingering judges.  Minister of 
Planning Jean Max Bellerive is an able administrator.  Yet 
even the best ministers lack the staff and the financing to 
implement good policies. 
 
Uncertainty Lingers Around Parliamentary Elections 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Amidst the disaster recovery efforts, the Haitian 
government is making halting efforts to hold long-overdue 
Senatorial elections to fill 12 vacant seats in the 30-member 
body.  The elections should have been held in late 2007, and 
the absence of the Senators has hobbled the Senate, where 16 
of the 18 members must be present to achieve a quorum.  The 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) recently set April 19, 
2009 as the date for the elections, although the date has yet 
to be finalized by a presidential decree.  There are still no 
plans to organize or finance the next set of elections, for 
the entire Chamber of Deputies and a second third of the 
Senate, in late 2009.  Indirect elections to fill a number of 
local government posts are also long overdue. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Prime Minister strongly supports the April 2009 
elections, although she and many others are aware of the 
CEP's weak institutional capacity and its need for robust 
technical assistance from the international community.  The 
 
PORT AU PR 00001709  003 OF 004 
 
 
elections are estimated to cost around USD 16.5 million, of 
which USD 11 million will be provided by the USG and other 
international donors.  Some observers have expressed doubts, 
however, about President Preval's commitment to the election 
process, and his failure thus far to sign the decree formally 
fixing the election date has only encouraged speculation. 
Preval's critics, as well as some of his allies, have noted 
his longstanding criticism of Haiti's current constitution as 
a source of instability and have speculated that Preval wants 
a pause in the elections process to build consensus for 
dramatic constitutional reform. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Your visit will be an opportunity to show our 
support for the government and for U.S. assistance in Haiti. 
So would a Pierre-Louis visit to Washington, which we 
continue to encourage her to undertake at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 
The Assistance Picture: Rule of Law/Governance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶14. (U) Your visit will also allow you to review our 
assistance priorities in Haiti.  Our assistance efforts in 
Haiti -- financed by USAID, CDC, the State Department,s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(INL/NAS), and the U.S. Coast Guard -- seek to implement 
reforms, build public institutions, improve law enforcement 
and corrections capability, and help deliver basic services. 
Rule of Law programs target Haiti's justice system by helping 
increasing judicial authorities' administrative, management 
and technical capacity.  Good Governance programs provide 
technical assistance and training to Haiti's Parliament in 
the areas of legislative drafting, legal and judicial reform, 
and rules of procedure.  Programs aimed at conflict 
mitigation address poverty and gang-related violence through 
creation of short- and long-term employment and transfer of 
job skills trough labor-intensive reconstruction of social 
and productive infrastructure.  Another program targets the 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to help it solidify its 
organization and modernize the voter registration process. 
Civil society programs assist a variety of local media, 
regional journalist associations, and public service 
associations, including those that monitor corruption. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The steep rise in food prices in 2008 followed by the 
four hurricanes sharply exacerbated Haiti's chronic food 
insecurity, to which approximately 3 million Haitians are now 
exposed.  USAID contributed USD 45 million in emergency food 
aid and another USD 14 million for post-hurricane recovery. 
USAID is continuing its programs to build disaster early 
warning, response and mitigation capacity.  The Ambassador 
officiated in November at the ground-breaking ceremony for an 
Emergency Operations Center for Haiti's disaster response 
agencies.  Following the hurricanes, Congress appropriated an 
additional USD 96 million over three years for the 
restoration of public services, repairs to public use 
infrastructure, provision of income-generating activities, 
asset restoration, and support to affected families. 
 
Health and Education/Economic Growth 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (U) Basic health programs help increase access to 
essential health services in 72 public sector clinics and 80 
NGO clinics.  Nearly 50 percent of Haiti's population 
receives at least some health services financed by the USG. 
USAID-financed education programs include a new basic 
education project to strengthen the Ministry of Education's 
management and supervisory system, help it extend supervision 
over the vast private-sector education system, and provide 
scholarships.  Social assistance programs support Haiti's 
most vulnerable citizens.  Economic growth programs target 
trade and investment, financial sector programs for small and 
medium enterprises, and programs for agricultural 
productivity and marketing.  Reducing environmental 
degradation is the goal of USD 7 million in programs that 
 
PORT AU PR 00001709  004 OF 004 
 
 
focus on restoring watersheds that are the source of periodic 
flooding. 
 
HIV/AIDS Relief 
--------------- 
 
¶17. (U) The President,s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) will provide just short of USD 100 million in FY 
2009 to prevent infections and put HIV-positive persons into 
treatment.  Implemented by USAID and CDC, PEPFAR programs 
target HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but also benefit large 
parts of Haiti's health care system.  Haiti has the highest 
rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Police Reform/Corrections 
------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The U.S. is the lead donor in implementing the 
MINUSTAH police reform plan, which foresees building up the 
Haitian National Police (HNP) from its current strength of 
9,000 to 14,000 officers by 2011.  In concert with MINUSTAH's 
mandate to enhance Haiti's border security, the U.S. Coast 
Guard provides training for the Haitian Coast Guard, financed 
by INL/NAS.  The U.S. made a commitment in 2007 to assist in 
improving the conditions and respect for human rights in 
Haiti's prison system, and remains the lead donor to Haiti. 
SANDERSON