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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH968, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO UMM AL-QURA?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH968 2008-12-08 10:45 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO0697
PP RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDT RUEHGI RUEHHM RUEHJS RUEHKUK
RUEHLH RUEHNH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHPF #0968/01 3431045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081045Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0174
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0137
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000968 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, EAP/MLS, P, D 
NSC FOR L.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CB
SUBJECT: WHATEVER HAPPENED TO UMM AL-QURA? 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Cambodia is home to approximately 320,000 
Cham Muslims, the majority of whom belong to the Sunni 
Shafi,i school of Islam.  From 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge 
ruthlessly targeted the Cham, annihilating all but a few of 
the Islamic leaders, teachers, and scholars.  In an effort to 
rebuild, Muslim communities eagerly accepted outside 
assistance.  Cambodia is currently home to several non-profit 
Islamic organizations which receive tens of millions of 
dollars of support from Saudi, Kuwaiti, and other donors.  In 
May 2004, the Saudi-supported Umm al-Qura Islamic school was 
shut down due to alleged ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader 
and 2002 Bali bombing mastermind, Hambali, who lived in 
Cambodia for approximately six months in 2002-2003. 
Subsequent to the forced closure of the school, 28 foreign 
Muslim teachers were deported by the Cambodian government. 
The school has since reopened and is home to over 670 Cham 
Muslim students who are taught both religious and secular 
subjects.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DECIMATION 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Khmer Rouge targeted the Cham Muslims due to 
their religion, perceived difference from "pure" Khmer, and 
collective resistance to the regime.  It is estimated that 
anywhere from thirty to fifty percent of the Cham population 
was murdered over the four year period from 1975-1979. 
According to research compiled by the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia (DC-Cam), there were 300 Islamic religious teachers 
and 113 mosques in Cambodia in 1974.  By 1980, those numbers 
were radically reduced to 38 and 5 respectively.  In an 
effort to rebuild, Muslim communities readily accepted 
foreign assistance, making them more susceptible to outside 
influences. 
 
BAD COMPANY 
------------ 
 
3. (SBU) These outside influences shot into the spotlight in 
May 2003 when the al Qaeda linked Jemaah Islmiyah operations 
chief, Riduan Isamuddin (better known as Hambali) was 
arrested in Thailand.  After it was revealed that he had 
spent time in Cambodia from September 2002 to February 2003, 
RGC police closed the Umm al-Qura school in the outskirts of 
Phnom Penh on suspicion of involvement with Hambali,s 
terrorist group.  Additionally 28 foreign teachers and staff 
members were deported by the government and three teachers 
(two of whom were from the Umm al-Qura school) where accused 
of plotting terrorist attacks against foreign diplomatic and 
other targets in Cambodia.  In March 2008, the Cambodian 
Supreme Court upheld the December 2004 life sentences of the 
three men - one Cambodian and two Thai nationals.  Hambali, 
who was sentenced in absentia along with two others, remains 
in extrajudicial detention in Guantanamo Bay where he was 
taken after his 2003 arrest. 
 
A NEW BEGINNING 
---------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Under the close supervision of the mufti, Oknha Sos 
Kamry, and scrutiny of the Prime Minister, the Umm al-Qura 
school was reopened in September 2004 as the "Cambodian 
Islamic Center" (CIC).  In Cambodia, the mufti, who is 
appointed for life by the Prime Minister, serves as a legal 
and religious advisor and is the Muslim community,s supreme 
leader.  The CIC is part of the Sjil Meunaga Ugama Annikmah 
Al Islamia (SMU) network, which consists of approximately 16 
schools modeled after those run by the Malaysian Yayasan 
Islam Kelantan organization.  The mufti informed Poloff in a 
December 1 meeting that the CIC is now home to approximately 
600 male students hailing from all parts of Cambodia who both 
live and study at the school.  An additional 70 female 
students study and live separately in the village.  A low 
percentage of girls actually finish the four years of the SMU 
education at CIC due to familial obligations, and fewer still 
pass the final exam.  However, a recent announcement by the 
government allowing Muslim students to wear traditional 
clothing, including headscarves, is expected to have a 
positive effect on female school attendance and completion. 
 
5. (SBU) According to the mufti, the school accepts 
approximately 80-100 new students a year regardless of 
political affiliation.  However, he estimates the majority of 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000968  002 OF 002 
 
 
the students and families to be Cambodian People's Party 
supporters due to the reportedly high approval the Cham have 
for the ruling party.  In an agreement made with the Prime 
Minister, in addition to religious studies CIC provides a 
secular education based on the national curriculum.  Courses 
are taught in Khmer, however, many students speak Bahasa 
Malay and several also speak Arabic.  All of the teachers can 
speak Malay, with 70% able to also read and write in the 
Malay language.  Additionally, it is a requirement for 
teachers to know Arabic in order to teach the Koran.  Arabic 
language classes are part of the curriculum.  The majority of 
the current teachers received their training in Malaysia, 
with some trained in southern Thailand, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
6. (SBU) CIC relies heavily on donor support, including rice 
and monetary donations, from Cambodian Islamic communities. 
A yearly tuition of $100 per student helps to offset the cost 
of running the school.  According to the mufti, CIC does not 
receive any direct foreign assistance, nor does it employ 
foreign teachers.  However, among the Cambodian foundations 
providing support to CIC is the Cambodian Muslim Development 
Foundation, run by Osman Hassan, Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of Labor, which reportedly receives substantial 
support from foreign donors including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Kuwait.  (NOTE: It is not clear if foreign private donors are 
being tapped to support the CIC.  END NOTE.) 
 
A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 
--------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) After completing the four year program at CIC, 
approximately 25% of the students continue their education 
abroad, typically in Malaysia, Thailand or UAE.  Domestic 
Muslim organizations such as the Cambodian Islamic Youth 
Association (CIYA) and the Cambodian Muslim Students 
Association (CAMSA) routinely provide or help facilitate 
scholarships for study abroad.  Private colleges, such as the 
Al-Manar Islamic college in Malaysia, as well as the Islamic 
Development Bank also provide scholarships to Muslim students 
in Cambodia.  Upon returning to Cambodia, the mufti stated 
that the majority of the Cham Muslims open small businesses 
rather than become religious teachers due to low salaries. 
In this sense, they are contributing to the community by 
providing potential jobs and development, but do not directly 
contribute to the education of the Cham.  The lack of 
experienced teachers and inability to provide decent salaries 
has resulted in a lower quality of education for those who 
only attend Islamic schools as compared to those attending 
national schools, which receive government funding. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  Although the CIC has a difficult history 
linked to terrorism, the reopening and calculated distancing 
from this past under the tutelage of Oknha Sos Kamry has 
resulted in one of the only Islamic high schools in Cambodia 
which also provides a secular education based on the national 
curriculum.  Students must take both Islamic and national 
standard tests, providing them with a broader vision and more 
opportunities upon graduation.  The Cambodian government has 
shown its willingness to recognize, accept and integrate its 
Muslim minority by overtures such as issuing a directive to 
allow Muslims to wear traditional clothing in schools. 
Furthermore, there are approximately 17 high-ranking Muslim 
politicians within the Cambodian government.  Based on the 
CIC example, government funding of Islamic schools with the 
understanding that the school also provide a secular 
education could go a long way toward improving education 
levels among this historically marginalized Muslim community. 
 However, despite providing a buffer between donors and the 
schools, government-controlled Islamic foundations which 
provide needed funds receive monetary donations from Middle 
Eastern sources, some with questionable intentions, a 
potential source of concern.  END COMMENT. 
RODLEY