P 151444Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5057

UNCLAS PARIS 002266 
 
 
FOR IO/UNESCO Q K. SIEKMAN 
 
PLEASE PASS TO HHS BILL STEIGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNESCO TBIO
SUBJECT:  IBC MEETING ON HUMAN CLONING 
 
REF:  STATE 114207 
 
¶1. The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO 
met October 28-29, 2008, followed, October 30-31, by a 
joint meeting of the IBC and the Intergovernmental 
Bioethics Committee (IGBC), to discuss what the IBC 
should recommend to the Director General on possible 
action by UNESCO with respect to human cloning and to 
discuss IBC reports on certain principles of the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(2005).  The meeting evidenced an absence of consensus 
for further work toward a normative instrument on human 
cloning and disagreement on the draft report on Social 
Responsibility.  Final action on these items will be 
taken by the IBC at its next meeting, in Mexico in May, 
¶2009.  The IGBC will meet next in Paris in July. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. The IBC mandate is to encourage the exchange of ideas, 
and to heighten awareness.  Carter Snead, Professor at 
Notre Dame Law School, is a newly appointed member.  The 
IGBC is composed of 36 Member States, including the U.S. 
Member States that are not members of the IGBC and NGOs 
attended the IBC and IGBC meetings as observers. 
 
¶3. The DG had asked the IBC, an independent advisory 
committee composed of 36 experts, to consider whether 
there had been changes since the Declaration on Human 
Cloning adopted by the UN General Assembly (2005) that 
warranted further action on this issue by UNESCO.  A 
working group of the IBC prepared a report that 
recommended development of a binding instrument banning 
reproductive cloning and development of guidelines for 
regulation of "research" cloning in countries that permit 
it. 
 
¶4. At the Direction of the Department (Reftel) Ambassador 
Oliver met with the Director General on October 27 to 
discuss the involvement of UNESCO in the cloning issue. 
The Ambassador conveyed the U.S.' strong objection to any 
action by UNESCO with respect to human cloning.   She 
pointed out that continuing to pursue this matter would 
be divisive and would adversely affect the DGQs 
leadership in his last year in the post.   She hoped 
that, regardless of the nature of the recommendation of 
the IBC, the DG would not recommend that UNESCO pursue 
efforts to develop an instrument banning reproductive 
cloning. 
 
¶5. There was no consensus among the IBC experts at the 
October 2008 meeting to adopt the report of the working 
group or to recommend that UNESCO proceed to develop an 
instrument banning reproductive cloning.  They noted 
there is confusion about the science (in particular, the 
implications of induced plenipotent stem cell technology 
(IPS)) and the terms used.  The chairman of the working 
group heard a "healthy skepticism" concerning the working 
groupQs report.  The chairman of the overall IBC said 
that the working group needed more time to reflect. 
 
¶6. The interventions of Member States at the joint 
meeting with the IGBC that followed on the heels of the 
IBC meeting reinforced the absence of a consensus for 
further work toward an instrument. 
 
¶7. The United States made a statement opposing further 
work by UNESCO to develop an instrument.  It pointed to 
the 2005 UNGA Declaration, which urged Member States "to 
prohibit all forms of cloning in as much as they are 
incompatible with human dignity and the protection of 
human life."   The U.S. said there has been no new 
development to warrant reopening the UNGA Declaration; 
the Declaration was based on beliefs about human life 
that are universal and fundamental and have not changed 
over the last three years; the U.S., like many others, 
believes that any human cloning is unethical and an 
assault on human dignity, and transforms humans into 
commodities, devaluing human life and the relationship of 
human beings to each other.  An effort to ban 
reproductive human cloning, while being silent on 
"research" cloning, would suggest something less than 
total condemnation of all cloning and thus be 
inconsistent with the UNGA declaration.  There can be no 
exception for "research" cloning, which would require the 
destruction of all cloned embryos; to attempt to justify 
it on the basis of potential benefits would take the 
ethically untenable position that human life can be 
created and destroyed for the convenience of others.  And 
any effort to regulate "research" cloning would similarly 
be unacceptable since it would facilitate what the UNGA 
has already said should be banned. 
 
¶8. The interventions of a number of other Member States 
implied opposition to UNESCO work on an instrument, 
either by not supporting UNESCO action or by making a 
variety of essentially negative points.  They said there 
was no consensus for action; any action would take a long 
time; the effort might be counterproductive if it failed 
and led to negative inferences; it is too early to decide 
if a convention would be possible; and/or UNESCO should 
move slowly and cautiously in this area.  With varying 
degrees of clarity, countries taking one or more of these 
approaches included: Switzerland, Jamaica, Germany, 
France, U.K., Saudi Arabia, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
Madagascar preferred a ban on reproductive cloning and a 
moratorium on research cloning but explicitly said that 
nevertheless it supported the U.S. and France and Germany 
(which it understood to be negative).  Canada also 
explicitly supported the U.S., saying this is not the 
time to develop a convention.  The World Health 
Organization said that efforts to agree on a convention 
would take too long and would "undermine the credibility" 
of UNESCO and WHO.   On the other side of the coin, 
Japan, Indonesia, and South Korea supported the working 
group report and wanted a convention banning reproductive 
cloning with regulation of "research" cloning; the 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, and Kenya supported such 
action by UNESCO because they said they need UNESCOQs 
guidance.  The interventions of Russia, Libya, and India 
were so muddled as to verge on being incomprehensible, 
but they did not express clear support for an instrument. 
 
¶9. Further comments on the working group's report can be 
filed in writing.  The IBC plans to adopt its final 
recommendation to the DG at its next meeting. 
 
¶10. The meetings also considered IBC reports on certain 
principles of the Bioethics Declaration. 
 
¶11. One of these principles is the importance of 
obtaining a patient's consent for a medical intervention 
(Articles 6 and 7).  The IBC reported at the meeting on 
how it had responded to suggestions made by the members 
of the IGBC at its meeting in July 19-20, 2007.  The 
report on consent is now published in final form. 
 
¶12. The meeting also discussed a draft of a report on 
"Social Responsibility," a term included in the title of 
Article 14 of the Bioethics Declaration ("Social 
responsibility and health").   The draft weaves together 
different strands of the Declaration to create new 
"rights": it says, for example, that Article 14 is 
normative, not descriptive, and, as combined with Article 
15 (benefit sharing) and Article 21.1 (transnational 
practices), creates a transnational obligation (p. 18). 
The meeting discussed international social 
responsibility, social determinants of health, the 
combination of human rights and bioethics, the right to 
health, solidarity, etc.  A few countries endorsed the 
draft; most criticized it, with diverse viewpoints. 
 
¶13. Colombia, on behalf of the Latin American group that 
had pushed for the inclusion of Article 14 in the 
Bioethics Declaration, said the draft was contrary to the 
spirit of the Declaration and that the report should not 
be forwarded to the DG.  Cuba supported Colombia, and 
complained that the draft was founded in "liberal 
capitalism."  Joining the Colombian intervention were 
Philippines, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.   The 
Chairman of the IBC said they would consider the draft 
further.  He welcomed the joint action by the Latin 
American countries, but specifically disputed their 
contention that the draft report reflects an "ideology": 
this is "totally false."  He asked who was behind their 
effort so he could communicate with them and consider 
their views for the next IBC meeting. 
 
¶14. The U.S. intervened on several points, in particular, 
that the effort to squeeze the complex issues of 
improving health care into the language of rights 
generally, and that of the Bioethics Declaration 
specifically, is misplaced.  The IBC should not attempt 
to interpret or apply the Declaration; as evident from 
the discussion, there are divergent views about its 
meaning.   It should be recalled, moreover, that two 
conditions were essential to reaching a consensus on the 
Bioethics Declaration: a) Member States understood the 
Declaration had to be written on the basis of broad 
principles and that they could not reach agreement on 
particular applications. The IBC walks into quicksand if 
it tries to supply the specificity that the Member States 
themselves avoided in order to reach consensus.  b) The 
wording (including Article 14, which was discussed at 
length by Member States) was precisely drafted and 
negotiated in order to reach this consensus; the 
understanding of the U.S., on the basis of which it 
joined consensus, was (and is) that Article 14 is 
descriptive, not normative.  The IBC is exceeding its 
mandate in issuing what appear to be authoritative 
statements about the Declaration and in doing so to 
attempt to create new rights and obligations. Whatever is 
finally published should contain a disclaimer that it 
does not represent the views of UNESCO or of Member 
States (the disclaimer in the consent report mentioned 
only the former), and this should be more readily 
observable than the very small-type disclaimer in that 
report. 
 
¶15. Comments on the draft report can be filed in writing. 
The IBC intends to agree on the final version at its next 
meeting. 
 
¶16. Comment: IBC's activities in connection with the 
Bioethics Declaration demonstrate a number of problems 
that arise from normative activities at UNESCO.  These 
relate to the IBC specifically, but also more generally 
to normative instruments. 
 
An advisory committee composed of independent experts 
acting in their personal capacity is a vehicle ripe for 
free-lancing; the committee members have a draw on Member 
States' resources and the ability to use the imprimatur 
of the Organization to advance their own personal agenda 
and ideological predilections, with no control by Member 
States.  They can do this by issuing reports and 
publications.  These are published by the UNESCO press 
with the UNESCO logo.  The standard disclaimer that the 
publication does not necessarily represent the views of 
the UNESCO is barely visible, except to those looking 
closely for it.  If it is noticed, its effectiveness in 
any event is undermined by the appearance and provenance 
of the publication. The committee is thus able to issue 
what appear to be official and authoritative statements. 
These can be used to support efforts to have UNESCO act 
in an area by preparing a normative instrument, or as 
fodder for efforts to influence the broader political and 
intellectual climate.  For instance, the report on Social 
Responsibility that is in process declaims on the role of 
the State (e.g., the rationale for its sovereignty must 
be found in the need to protect people from untreated 
disease) and international solidarity, and finds an 
international obligation of social responsibility.   It 
also opines that the profit motive of the pharmaceutical 
industry "no doubtQconflicts' with the Bioethics 
Declaration.  Statements like this can be expected to be 
picked up and used by governments and private sector 
organizations who seek to find a rights-based pressure 
point to achieve resource transfers (money or 
intellectual property) within countries and from the 
"rich" to the "poor" countries. 
 
While advisory committees of experts, and the IBC in 
particular, are themselves problematic, they also 
demonstrate the broader risks that arise from the 
development of normative instruments at UNESCO.  The 
danger arises first in the drafting of the instrument; 
the drafting process itself becomes a vehicle for trying 
to achieve policy goals that one would not think would be 
included in the subject matter of the instrument under 
consideration.  Thus the drafting of what was billed as a 
bioethics declaration enabled various member states and 
academics working through the IBC and through member 
states to introduce a bevy of economic, social, and 
political matters:  technology transfer, protection of 
all forms of life and the environment, the value and use 
of intellectual property and traditional knowledge, 
support for developing countries, etc.  It is difficult 
enough in the negotiation to limit the instrument to the 
agreed upon subject matter.  But the document that is the 
product of this negotiation and agreed to by Member 
States can then be used as a launching pad by academics, 
advisory committees, and member states to push the very 
notions that were opposed by some of the member States 
and discarded in the negotiation of the instrument in 
order to reach a consensus.  Creative academics and 
members of an advisory committee, in addition, can use 
the words of the instrument as a foundation on which to 
hook various other agendas and to find (really to create) 
new "rights" not even thought of at the time. 
UNESCO is not, therefore, a reliable forum for 
international agreements.  The United States should be 
vigilant to efforts to develop normative instruments at 
UNESCO.  It should be prudential and cautious about 
joining any that are adopted.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
OLIVER