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DE RUEHZP #0933/01 3571539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221539Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
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INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2726
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1952
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: GOP "PROFOUNDLY SATISFIED" WITH RESULTS OF 
SALAS-BECKER BILATERAL MEETING 
 
REF: A. A: PANAMA 000623 
     ¶B. B: PANAMA 00782 
     ¶C. C: STATE 126055 
     ¶D. D: PANAMA 00793 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C)  Vladimir Franco, Director General of Legal and 
Treaty Affairs at the Panamanian MFA, declared himself 
"profoundly satisfied" with the results of two days of 
bilateral meetings on the Salas-Becker Agreement (SBA) 
December 17. The agreement, a corner stone of U.S. 
counter-drug operations in the region, had become subject to 
domestic criticism following the seizure by U.S. authorities 
of eight Panamanian sailors off a Panamanian flagged ship in 
2006 (see ref A). Following on an earlier meeting in which 
the U.S. expressed regret for the seizure of the sailors and 
promised never again to request jurisdiction over Panamanian 
citizens under SBA (see ref B), the two days of sessions 
(Dec. 16-17) succeeded in developing common proceedures to 
implement SBA among the representatives of the numerous 
agencies involved in the agreement within both governments. 
In a side-bar meeting MFA Senior Advisor Adolfo Ahumada told 
Brad Kieserman, Chief of the U.S. Coast Guard Operations Law 
Group and NSC Director of Maritime Threat Reduction, that the 
Perseus V crew members in U.S. custody remained a "pebble in 
the shoe" of SBA, and that once they were back in Panama, 
"Salas Becker (will be) at no risk." Ahumada urged the USG to 
do everything possible to expedite their return to Panama 
under existing prisoner exchange mechanisms. Asked about 
Panama's willingness to prosecute pirates who attacked 
Panamanian flagged ships (see ref C), Ahumada said he 
sympathized with the problem, and said he would work to get 
approval for such cooperation within the GOP. End Summary. 
 
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Profoundly Satisfied 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  At the end of a two day bilateral meeting designed 
to develope Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the 
impelementation of the Salas-Becker Maritime Cooperation 
Agreement (SBA), Vladimir Franco, MFA Director General of 
Legal and Treaty Affairs, declared he was "profoundly 
satisfied" with the results, calling it a "great example of 
how we can work together respectfully." The creation of the 
SOPs is designed to minimize the possibility of future 
problems with regard to the implementation of SBA, one of the 
most important maritime counter-drug cooperation agreements 
the U.S. has in Latin America. Panama's cooperation with the 
U.S. under SBA became politically controversial in Panama 
after the U.S. seized eight Panamanian sailors off a 
Panamanian flagged ship in January 2006 (see ref A). While a 
legal detention under U.S. law, the seizures contravened SBA 
and the Panamanian constitution that forbids the extradition 
of Panamanian citizens. On September 12, 2008 Brad Kieserman, 
Chief of the U.S. Coast Guard Operations Law Group and NSC 
Director of Maritime Threat Reduction, and EMBOFFs met with 
MFA officials and conveyed an official expression of regret 
on behalf of the USG, and an official promise never to 
request jurisdiction over Panamanian citizens under SBA in 
the future (see ref B). 
 
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Broad Participation Key to Success 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Franco had begun the meeting by noting that SBA was 
vital to Panama and the U.S.'s fight against drug 
trafficking, and that the mistakes that had been made in the 
past by both sides needed to be overcome to save the 
agreement. He specifically noted the Perseus V incident, and 
said that the lesson for both sides was that SBA could not 
continue to be implemented in an uncoordinated manner. He 
noted that there had been meetings among different Panamanian 
government agencies over the preceding two weeks to work out 
their concerns over the implementation of SBA, possible 
solutions, and coordinating mechanisms.  He said they had 
reached agreement on 95% of the issues, and needed our 
agreement on only a few more to be able to complete a set of 
SOPs that would cover the entire agreement. Franco led a 
delegation that included representatives from MFA, the 
Panamanian Embassy in Washington, the Ministry of Government 
and Justice, the National Aero-Naval Service, Civil Aviation, 
the Panamanian Maritime Authority, and the Attorney General's 
office, including the two national drug prosecutors. Mr. 
Kieserman led a delegation from the U.S. which included CAPT 
Kevin O'Day, Chief of Law Enforcement for the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG) 11th District, CAPT Tom Crabbs, USCG Liaison to 
Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S), Mr. Lou 
Orsini, USCG Chief of Interdiction, CDR Harry Schmitt, Deputy 
Chief of Law Enforcement for USCG District 7, CDR Sheryl 
Dickinson, Staff Judge Advocate for JIATF-S, and LT Tamara 
Wallen, Legal Advisor to the USCG Chief of Law Enforcement. 
EmbOffs from DOS, DEA, TAT, and ODC represented the Embassy. 
 
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Jurisdiction Requests Major Issue 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Among the problems identified by the Panamanians was 
the SBA provision for declining jurisdiction over 
non-Panamanian citizens in criminal cases. SBA identified the 
Panamanian National Maritime Service (SMN) (now National 
Aero-Naval Service - SENAN) as the point of contact for such 
decisions. Franco explained that SMN/SENAN was never 
competent to take such decisions, and that this fact was the 
origin of the Perseus V case. As a result, he proposed that 
such requests only come through the diplomatic channel, from 
the U.S. Embassy in Panama to the Panamanian MFA. The U.S. 
delegation agreed, and this procedure will be written into a 
joint SOP that will be used by both sides to implement the 
agreement. At a subsequent meeting, MFA Senior Advisor Adolfo 
Ahumada agreed with a U.S. proposal that a diplomatic channel 
be set up to consider such requests over weekends and 
holidays to avoid long delays for the USCG at sea. The 
Panamanian side also announced that the SENAN operations 
center would be the 24/7 point of contact for all requests 
related to SBA, except for requests for jurisdiction. The two 
parties also discussed the future of the ship rider program, 
disposition of large ships seized in counter-drug operations, 
and what Panamanian prosecutors needed from the USCG in their 
evidence packets. 
 
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Resolving Perseus V 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  In a pull-aside meeting with MFA Vice Minister 
Ricardo "Dicky" Duran and Ahumada, Franco told Mr. Kieserman 
and PolOff that the GOP had convinced five of the Perseus V 
prisoners in various federal prisons in Texas to solicit 
prisoner transfer, and that they hoped that the successful 
execution of those transfers would convince the remaining 
prisoners to solicit transfer. Franco requested USG 
assistance in expediting the transfers. Ahumada described the 
Perseus V prisoners as a "pebble in the shoe" of SBA, and 
said that once they were all in Panama, "Salas-Becker (will 
be) at no risk." 
 
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Piracy Cooperation 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  Mr. Kieserman then noted the UN Security Council's 
recent approval of Resolution 1851 and inquired if Panama 
would be willing to prosecute acts of piracy against 
Panamanian flagged vessels in the Indian Ocean (see ref C). 
He said as more naval vessels were deployed in the area, the 
likelihood of pirates being captured would increase. Noting 
the jurisdictional difficulties involved in such 
prosecutions, Mr. Kieserman asked that Panama show support by 
taking on some of these prosecutions. He explained that there 
would probably not be more than one or two cases a year, and 
that the USG would provide logistical support for such 
prosecutions. He also noted that SBA could be used to 
authorize U.S. boarding of Panamanian flagged ships in piracy 
cases, as the agreement refers to maritime law enforcement, 
not just counter-drug operations. While noting there were 
serious logistical issues for Panama to prosecute such cases, 
including translation issues, and the availability of 
prosecutors and staff, Ahumada said he was sympathetic about 
the issue, and would push the issue within the GOP to secure 
agreement to prosecute a limited number of cases to support 
UN anti-piracy efforts. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (C)  This meeting was a major success, in large part due 
to the diligent preparatory work of the MFA, and especially 
Vladimir Franco. Post has raised the issue of Franco's 
uncooperativeness in the past (see ref D), due to his 
tendency to look for reasons why things could not happen, 
rather than for ways they could. SBA has been a major example 
of that, but Franco has worked very hard to bring the 
different elements of the GOP together to find ways to 
overcome the inherent defects in the way the GOP has been 
implementing SBA and has put the agreement on a sounder legal 
and procedural basis than it has ever been. As our previous 
cable suggested, Franco's legalistic nature has actually 
benefited the USG. Pending the final transfer of the Perseus 
V prisoners, Post believes the U.S. has finally put the SBA 
crisis behind it. The successful conclusion of this process 
would not have been possible without the leadership and 
diligence of Mr. Kieserman, and Post wishes to express its 
deep appreciation of his role throughout this process. 
STEPHENSON