VZCZCXRO7338
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #2790/01 3511112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161112Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7940
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6252
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3023
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2916
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL KDEM SOCI PHUM KE SO ET
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TRIP TO GARISSA ELICITS CANDID 
FEEDBACK FROM KENYAN SOMALI COMMUNITY 
 
REF: NAIROBI 2655 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. The Ambassador recently travelled to Garissa, the 
provincial center of Kenya's predominantly Muslim North 
Eastern Province, to talk to the community about a range of 
issues.  Feedback from the (mostly) Kenyan Somali community 
was generally positive toward the United States.  There was 
great appreciation for the support the United States is 
providing to the area.  Feedback was also candid: women, 
youth, religious, and other community leaders expressed 
concern over the deterioriating security situation in Somalia 
and what they termed problematic U.S. support for Ethiopia 
and alleged opposition to Islamic forms of government and 
Islamic groups with grassroots support.  Development and 
governance issues also loomed large on Garissa residents' 
radar screen: interlocutors felt squeezed by the influx of 
Somali refugees and neglected by their own government in 
terms of development fund distribution and the lack of 
attention by their own elected representatives.  Youth 
expressed frustration at a lack of employment prospects and 
political marginalization.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. On November 19, after a visit to Dadaab refugee camp 
(reftel), the Ambassador traveled south to Garissa, the 
provincial center of Kenya's predominantly Muslim North 
Eastern Province, to meet with women, youth, religious, and 
other community leaders. 
 
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Somalia's Instability A Key Concern 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. Security was the primary concern for many. 
Representatives from nearly every group mentioned the 
deteriorating security situation in Somalia and worried about 
the detrimental effect it is having on northeastern Kenya. 
Given the reality of a porous and poorly controlled border, 
interlocutors emphasized that there will not be security in 
Kenya until there is peace in Somalia, and that the increased 
influx of Somali refugees is a serious strain on local 
resources.  Participants did not support the Kenyan 
government policy that officially (but ineffectively) closed 
the Kenya/Somali border in January 2007, but rather argued 
that support for both refugees and host communities must be 
improved. 
 
¶4. Interlocutors expressed the belief that the presence of 
Ethiopian troops in Somalia acts as a hindrance to 
peacemaking efforts and that a comprehensive peace accord 
will be difficult if not impossible to achieve while they are 
present.  Ethiopians are viewed through the lens of historic 
grievances and are seen as having their own agenda that runs 
contrary to Somali national interests.  Women leaders 
criticized the peace process for not including women and 
youth.  (Note: Their criticism was voiced before the November 
26 unity government agreement to allot 75 seats in the 
transitional Somali parliament to civil society and business 
representatives.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. Religious leaders cautioned that Western countries would 
have to re-evaluate their "hostility" to moderate Islamic 
regimes if they wanted to encourage an effective peace 
process in Somalia.  The leaders credited the Islamic Courts 
Union with creating a semblance of order in Somalia and said 
their overthrow (that started in late 2006) had been a 
mistake.  The imposition of Sharia law will not necessarily 
lead to an intolerant regime, they said, and radicalism will 
only increase if non-credible leaders continue to run the 
government in Mogadishu.  While interlocutors appreciated the 
Ambassador's remarks regarding engagement with the Alliance 
for the Re-liberation of Somalia, several interlocutors 
expressed the belief that al Shabaab should be dealt with 
directly, as they are now in a position of power and enjoy 
the support of the local population.  The Ambassador 
disagreed that al Shabaab enjoyed any real grassroots support 
and cited the recent killings of aid workers as an example of 
al Shabaab's rule by terror rather than consent.  He also 
emphasized that the current policy of non-engagement with 
extremist elements is not up for discussion. 
 
¶6. Over the years, Garissa has all but lost its 
 
NAIROBI 00002790  002 OF 003 
 
 
traditionalist, moderate Islamic voice to an increasing 
number of Wahhabi clerics, as well as clerics from Somalia 
and Ethiopia with nationalist agendas.  While this trend has 
not created a hotbed of extremism in Garissa, it has created 
an environment amenable to inflammatory sermons, anti-U.S. 
rhetoric, and the promotion of foreign agendas, including 
potential recruitment by extremist groups like al Shabaab. 
Local residents who are willing to talk privately about the 
shift say that the new clerics have filled a vacuum left by 
weak governance and the Kenyan government's inability to 
deliver basic services and development. 
 
----------------------------- 
Development Help Insufficient 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. Although Garissa's population is primarily ethnic Somali 
and the region has always lagged behind other parts of Kenya 
in terms of development, interlocutors said that they 
self-identify as Kenyans first.  One religious leader 
emphasized that the safety and security of Kenya is the 
community's number one priority.  Women leaders discussed the 
rift between "Somali" Somalis and Kenyan Somalis: Somalis see 
themselves as superior and act as if they deserve our 
resources, one woman leader said. 
 
¶8. The bigger problem, other leaders said, was that 
development resources coming to the North Eastern Province 
are insufficient, poorly distributed, not in line with local 
development priorities, and at times impossible to use 
because of the poor security situation.  Refugee influxes 
from Somalia just make the situation worse: the refugees' 
need for resources is eating away at grazing land, depleting 
the underground water table, and creating serious sanitation 
problems in Garissa, they said. 
 
¶9. Interlocutors expressed their appreciation for the 
projects sponsored by Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of 
Africa (CJTF-HOA) civil affairs teams.  Women leaders asked 
that the United States provide even more direct assistance 
like that provided by the civil affairs teams, since the 
local community cannot trust the government to use aid money 
appropriately. 
 
---------------------- 
Youth Lack Jobs, Voice 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. An assembly of youth group leaders expressed frustration 
at high levels of youth unemployment and inadequate political 
representation.  Youth leaders wondered aloud why NGOs insist 
on bringing in outside employees when qualified youth are 
available in Garissa, and why local residents can have a 
private meeting with the U.S. Ambassador but not be able to 
call on their own member of parliament.  Youth 
representatives also explained that many youth hold negative 
opinions about the United States because they perceive U.S. 
policies to be anti-Muslim.  However, the U.S. image has 
improved, they said.  Five years ago, you could not mention 
the name of the United States in Garissa, but because of 
military civic action and other projects, the negative 
perception of the United States is changing positively day by 
day. (Note: During the Ambassador's trip, he attended the 
dedication ceremony of a kindergarten in Dadaab town recently 
refurbished by CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs teams; the project was 
intended to support a host community overwhelmed with the 
influx of refugees.  End Note.) 
 
¶11. However, the United States still has image problems.  One 
youth leader pointed out that when the United States forced a 
cutoff in the funding of Islamic nongovernmental 
organizations such as al Haramayn, no funding was available 
to continue the work underway.  The seemingly inexplicable 
funding cutoff fuels resentment.  Other U.S.-supported 
restrictions also limit donors' ability to fund religious 
education, he said.  In the end, such U.S. policies feed 
local perceptions of the United States, not the provision of 
a desk in a school (by a military civil affairs team), 
another concluded. 
 
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Comment 
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¶12. The Ambassador successfully corrected a number of 
 
NAIROBI 00002790  003 OF 003 
 
 
misconceptions about U.S. policy in Somalia while explaining 
the limits of U.S. development assistance.  He encouraged 
youth to develop a strategy for youth development and to hold 
their political representatives accountable for delivering 
results.  He repeated these messages during two radio 
interviews later in the evening, during which he took dozens 
of call-ins.  He challenged local members of parliament to 
join him in a baraza (public meeting) with their 
constituents.  We learned later that this plea reached the 
ears of at least one local member of parliament almost 
immediately, but none have yet accepted the challenge. 
 
¶13. The frustrations expressed by the youth highlight the 
risk to Garissa's stability in the face of rising refugee 
numbers and an increase in isolationist religious rhetoric. 
We are currently working with FY 2007 1207 funding to help 
productively harness the power and energy of Garissa's youth 
and make them less vulnerable to co-optation by militant 
organizations.  End Comment. 
RANNEBERGER