VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #2782/01 3510405
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160405Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7936
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7447

UNCLAS NAIROBI 002782 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
USUN PLEASE PASS A/S Frazer; AF/E - Nole Garey 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI PINR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - December 16 International Contact Group Meeting 
in New York 
 
REF: A) Nairobi 2776   B) Nairobi 2755 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The December 16 International Contact Group 
(ICG) session comes at a critical time in the history of the TFG.  A 
protracted fight between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Hussein 
took a further nosedive December 14, when Yusuf attempted to dismiss 
the Prime Minister.  The Parliament December 15 in turn rebuffed the 
President with an overwhelming vote of confidence for the Prime 
Minister, leaving the ball in the resourceful Yusuf's court.  There 
is a growing consensus that an exit strategy must be devised for 
Yusuf, who has become an obstacle to the Djibouti Process.  ARS 
Chairman Sheikh Sharif and more than twenty of his confederates put 
their thumb in the eye of ARS-Asmara and al-Shabaab by moving to 
Mogadishu --for good, they say-- in order to continue the work of 
the joint High-Level and Joint Security Committees.  The new unity 
government faces many obstacles, including steady al-Shabaab gains 
on the ground, too much debate about legalisms and parliamentary 
etiquette, and not enough about making it presence felt in Somalia. 
The international community wants a Somalia success story, but there 
is clear fatigue after years of failed reconciliation efforts.  The 
SRSG has injected much energy into the process, but does not always 
communicate well with international community colleagues, and has 
not offered a roadmap for the way forward. End summary. 
 
Yusuf - Nur Adde Feud 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The December 16 ICG session occurs against the background 
of continued rivalry between TFG President Yusuf and Prime Minister 
Hussein that led Yusuf, on December 14, to issue a decree removing 
Hussein.  On December 15, Yusuf's efforts ran aground in Parliament, 
which gave the Prime Minister a 143 - 20 vote of confidence (Ref A). 
 The ball is now in Yusuf's court, and rumors have it that he may 
retire to Garowe to lick his wounds and contemplate revenge. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Yusuf - Hussein feud has distracted the TFG from 
efforts to advance the Djibouti Process.  While the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) Chairman has brought a group of 
twenty ARS members permanently to Mogadishu in an effort to advance 
the work of the High-Level and Joint Security Committees, the TFG 
has watched its already negligible presence in Somalia dwindle 
further. At present, it holds sway over small pockets of Mogadishu 
and the parliamentary seat of Baidoa only. 
 
Exit Strategy for Yusuf 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Yusuf is an obstacle to the Djibouti Process, and debates 
about whether he should be in or out of the tent no longer seem 
relevant.  With the most recent episode with the Prime Minister, 
there is consensus among Somalis and the international community 
that Yusuf has become an impediment to any progress.  SRSG 
Ould-Abdallah, who several weeks ago appeared to be seeking an exit 
strategy for Yusuf, as of December 5 appeared to be making efforts 
to keep the President in the process.  Yusuf's effort to oust 
Hussein appears to have exasperated the SRSG, who appears prepared 
again to consider an exit strategy for the President. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Observers continue to caution that the President must be 
given an honorable exit.  They point out that many of his Darod clan 
parliamentarians sat out the December 15 vote in Baidoa; unable to 
join forces with the President, yet unable to cast a vote against 
him.  Any ouster that would too openly humiliate Yusuf would spark 
resistance from his clan. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although members of Yusuf's inner circle, and key members 
of his clan talk regularly of an endgame for Yusuf, they have to 
date been unwilling to confront him.  It would be useful to have the 
ICG consider an exit strategy for Yusuf under the ICG agenda's 
Overview of Somalia section. 
 
Creating a Unity Government 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The November 25 Djibouti communique called for the 
creation of a working group that was to have reported within thirty 
days on the communique's provisions for establishing a unity 
government.  To Embassy's knowledge, that committee has not been 
created.  Many Somalis believe that the recommendations of the High 
Level Committee (HLC) are be implemented as outlined in the November 
25 communique.  (Note: The HLC recommendations were designed as a 
basis for debate and eventual adoption within parliament and to 
date, they have not been formally discussed in that forum).  The 
recommendations include doubling the Parliament, extending the 
Transitional Federal Institution's mandate for two years, and 
considering the election of a new TFG leadership.  Doubling the 
Parliament to accommodate the ARS is unpopular even among those MPs 
 
who support a unity government.  The ARS appear to have signaled 
flexibility on the issue, but negotiations do not appear to be 
underway. 
 
Ceasefire:  No Movement 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The TFG - ARS October 26 cessation of armed confrontation 
agreement has been rendered largely irrelevant by advances that 
al-Shabaab and other armed groups continue to make (reftel B 
sketches the current disposition of forces).  Al-Shabaab's gains 
have left the ARS confined to parts of Hiraan, Gedo, and Galgaduud 
regions, while those TFG forces who have not defected are to be 
found in close proximity to ENDF forces in Mogadishu and Baidoa. 
 
ARS In Mogadishu 
---------------- 
¶9.  (SBU) ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif sees the Government of 
Ethiopia's departure as key to an enhancement of his credibility. 
He, and members of the TFG, are lobbying for international community 
help in creating and financing a unity government security force, in 
order to give them a footprint.  The Joint Security Committee 
convened in Kenya from November 20-24 to flesh out the modalities 
for a cessation of armed confrontation and developed a comprehensive 
proposal for this joint security force.  This force would have a 
unified command and integrate ARS loyalists into the Somali Police 
Force and prepare for an eventual national armed forces under the 
terms of a comprehensive peace agreement.  We are working with the 
AU and other key actors to develop a flexible financial management 
mechanism for non-traditional and international donor contributions 
to pay these unified forces. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Sheikh Sharif's December 11 arrival in Mogadishu, with 
more than twenty members of the ARS who relocated from Djibouti in 
tow, shows that he is willing to put his thumb in the eye of 
ARS-Asmara.  Sharif's Mogadishu presence has drawn a response, from 
statements to the press by ARS-A Chairman Hassan Dahir Aweys, to 
ARS-A attacks in Mogadishu they day after the ARS-D delegation's 
arrival.  The residents of Somalia's capital have offered an 
outpouring of support.  Still, the unity government's armed forces 
pose no threat to al-Shabaab's and others in Somalia, and absent a 
willingness by the international community to train and finance 
them, they 
 
The International Community 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Among the international community, there is an emerging 
consensus that Yusuf is an obstacle, but there has been no effort to 
forge a unified strategy.  The December 17 ICG might offer an 
opportunity to discuss that, and chart a way forward for the 
Djibouti Process.  The SRSG has contributed much energy to the 
process.  He is widely respected by Somalis across the spectrum, and 
has been at pains to repair his relations with the Government of 
Ethiopia.  SRSG Ould-Abdallah has had less time to convey his vision 
of the way forward to the international community; an oversight that 
can be addressed during the ICG. 
RANNEBERGER