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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7444
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
DEPT FOR H, PLEASE PASS CODEL FEINGOLD 
USUN PLEASE PASS A/S Frazer and AF/E-Garey 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI PINR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR FEINGOLD'S DECEMBER 18-20 
DJIBOUTI MEETINGS ON SOMALIA 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1.  Your December 18-20 meetings with Somalia and Somaliland 
politicians, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative as 
well as NGO and private sector representatives come at a time when 
some progress in the UN-led Djibouti Peace Process is being undercut 
by continued feuding among the Transitional Federal Government's 
(TFG) leadership and threatened by al-Shabaab's steady advances on 
the ground.  The United States is playing a leading role to promote 
unity and peace.  We are working closely with the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the International Contact Group 
(ICG) on Somalia to ensure that that the international community's 
efforts are optimized. 
 
Recent TFG Developments 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  The long-running feud among the TFG's top leadership took a 
dramatic turn for the worse on December 14, when TFG President 
Abdullahi Yusuf issued a decree dismissing Prime Minister Nur Hassan 
Hussein "Nur Adde."  The decree cited Hussein's failure to submit a 
new federal constitution in the year since he has been appointed 
prime minister, and the Prime Minister's failure to establish a 
functioning government as the reasons for his dismissal. 
 
¶3.  For his part, Hussein has told us he intends to proceed with 
plans to have Parliament approve his transitional cabinet, and begin 
work on the details of a unity government.  In the meantime, 
Parliament on December 15 passed a vote of confidence in Prime 
Minister Hussein by a reported 143 - 20 margin, effectively 
rejecting Yusuf's decree. 
 
ARS Moves Forward 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  The Yusuf - Nur Adde feud occurs against the background of 
measurable progress in the reconciliation process. On October 26, 
the moderate Islamist Djibouti-based wing of the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the TFG signed a declaration of 
their intent to form a unity government.  About one month later, the 
two parties in another declaration outlined what shape that unity 
government might take. 
 
¶5.  Unlike the TFG, ARS-Djibouti has maintained a united front. 
Chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, with whom you will meet, followed the 
October 26 agreement with a well-received trip to south-central 
Somalia.  The Chairman and more than twenty ARS leaders are 
currently in Mogadishu, this time they say to stay, in an effort to 
blunt by their presence some of al-Shabaab's momentum.  It was on 
Prime Minister Hussein's watch that the TFG successfully reached out 
to the ARS.  ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif and Prime Minister Hussein 
to all appearances have a cordial relationship. 
 
Al-Shabaab Advances 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  Moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif's heroic trip to Mogadishu is a 
lonely counterpoint to al-Shabaab's recent territorial gains.  Since 
September, the fundamentalist Islamic group has seized control of 
the key southern ports of Kismayo and Merka, and it reigns supreme 
in the central Bay, Bakool, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle regions, 
as well as controlling part of Gedo.  In the last several days, 
al-Shabaab has been attempting with some success to extend its reach 
north through Galgadud to the Mudug region.  Only the key government 
towns of Baidoa and Mogadishu remain tenuously in TFG hands. 
 
The al-Shabaab Threat 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  Although al-Shabaab has been on the march for some time, the 
combined ineffectiveness of the TFG and its preoccupation with 
personality conflicts has diminished its ability to counter the 
threat.  The TFG's lack of power on the ground has done little to 
blunt al-Shabaab's advance.  With the creation of a unity 
government, there is a new understanding of the urgency to provide a 
TFG-ARS joint military force with an ability to counter al-Shabaab 
advances.  Although al-Shabaab controls much territory, the picture 
is not as black and white as it seems.  In some places al-Shabaab's 
 
NAIROBI 00002781  002 OF 003 
 
 
presence is thin and in others it must contest territory with 
clan-based and other rival organizations. 
 
¶8.  Al-Shabaab's successes are occurring in tandem with Ethiopia's 
plans to withdraw its troops by the end of December.  Citing 
exasperation with the TFG's inability to exert control, the costs of 
occupation, and the failure of the international community to deploy 
a muscular peace-keeping mission, the Ethiopian government, after 
months of threatening, seems more serious about leaving this time. 
Some Somali and international observers fear that Ethiopia's 
departure will create a security vacuum which al-Shabaab could 
easily fill.  Others believe that the last several months of the 
Ethiopian occupation have aided al-Shabaab by providing a cause 
--the ouster of Somalia's historical enemy-- that all clans could 
readily rally around.  Ethiopia's withdrawal, they believe, would 
take with it the glue that has held Somalis together to al-Shabaab's 
benefit, and allow simmering resentments of al-Shabaab's harder-line 
Islamic rule to bubble to the surface.  Rather than bet on the 
outcome, Secretary Rice and members of her team have been pushing 
very hard for the authorization of a UN Peace-Keeping Operation that 
would prevent an al-Shabaab sweep of Somalia. 
 
Somaliland Suffers 
from Somalia's Chaos 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  Somalia's success story, the self-declared autonomous region of 
Somaliland, had its confidence severely shaken by the three 
near-simultaneous suicide bombings that rattled its capital Hargeisa 
on October 29.  The bombings, like the piracy plague and recent 
suspected al-Shabaab cross-border attacks into Kenya, serve as a 
reminder that sustained instability in south and central Somalia has 
consequences for areas on its periphery, and has triggered requests 
by the Somaliland administration to the U.S. and other governments 
for security assistance, which we are currently examining. 
 
¶10.  Even before the bombings, Somaliland had been struggling 
economically, as increased prices for basic commodities and the 
international economic downturn began to bite.  The independent 
Somaliland government has appealed for international assistance to 
support southern Somali "refugees" seeking protection from the 
conflict in south and central Somalia. 
 
¶11.  Efforts to register Somaliland's voters for the March 2009 
presidential elections were interrupted only briefly by the 
bombings.  Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin is seeking a 
second term in office and the two opposition parties have pushed 
hard for free and transparent elections.  All Somaliland's political 
parties have expressed confidence in and support for Somaliland's 
constitution and democratic progress. 
 
UN Rep Energetically 
Leads Peace Process 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  The Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) Ahmedou 
Ould-Abdallah has brought experience and energy to the Djibouti 
Peace Process, bringing former warring parties TFG and ARS to the 
cusp of a unity government.  The SRSG will travel to Djibouti almost 
immediately after a December 16 ICG meeting in New York that will be 
attended by Secretary Rice, and that is designed to turn the 
spotlight on Somalia at a time when the U.S. government is pushing 
for authorization of a PKO for Somalia. 
 
ICG and IGAD 
Focusing International Efforts 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  Two international organizations, the ICG and IGAD have helped 
focus the international community and regional players' attention on 
Somalia.  The ICG has met periodically and has helped to channel 
international support for ending the crisis.  There will be a 
meeting of the ICG, convened by SRSG Ould-Abdallah, in New York on 
December 16 at which time the group will chart a collective path 
forward.  With Ethiopia in the lead, IGAD has recently proved itself 
to be a more aggressive player on the Somalia question. 
 
The Humanitarian Picture 
------------------------ 
 
NAIROBI 00002781  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶14.  Seventeen years of turmoil continue to take their toll on 
Somalia.  An estimated 3.2 million people, representing 43 percent 
of the population, need humanitarian assistance.  This is an 
increase of 77 percent since January 2008.  About six thousand 
Somalis arrive at Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp each month, and the 
United States, the largest humanitarian donor, contributed over $250 
million to Somalia in fiscal year 2008.  Although the humanitarian 
crisis is worsening, due to improvements in Somalia's transportation 
and communication networks, it is not, nor will it likely become, a 
famine. 
 
¶15.  We have scheduled an opportunity for you to meet with 
humanitarian workers operating in Somalia.  They will describe how 
the deteriorating security situation is challenging humanitarian 
access.  Thirty-four aid workers have been killed in the line of 
duty this year, and al-Shabaab threats have forced some aid 
organizations to suspend or close their operations in Somalia. 
 
¶16.  A small group of vocal civil society leaders will travel to 
Djibouti from Nairobi and Hargeisa to meet with you and highlight 
the challenges they face.  In the absence of a legitimate 
government, the USG has supported civil society's and the private 
sector's efforts to foster peace, social and economic development, 
and democratic governance in Somalia.  In Somalia, civil society 
groups provide critical social services, such as education, health, 
water, and food distribution.  However, as with humanitarians, civil 
society's work in Somalia has been reduced by instability, and many 
of its representatives now work from Nairobi, or elsewhere. 
 
Business Community: 
Seeking Partnerships with U.S. 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17.  We've also scheduled a meeting for you with the Somali business 
community.  The Somalia Business and Investment Council (SBIC) was 
founded in 2007 by over 100 Somali business leaders in the 
livestock, shipping, telecommunications, money remittance, and 
transport sectors.  SBIC is chaired by Ahmed Nur Ali Jumale, the 
founder of Al-Barakaat investment and money transfer network whose 
assets (made up of thousands of ordinary Somalis' savings and 
investments) were frozen in 2001 under Executive Order 13224 to 
combat terrorist financing.  The U.S. Treasury Department recently 
convened an interagency meeting to discuss the prospect of 
de-listing.  The TFG, the Government of Djibouti, and SRSG 
Ould-Abdallah also have advocated for the UN Security Council to 
de-list Jumale and Al-Barakaat. 
 
¶18.  The resilient Somali business community, both at home and from 
regional country offices, provides vital public services, including 
food and fuel to Somalia.  For example, large, diversified Somali 
companies form the backbone of our in-country USG-funded 
humanitarian food distribution.  Business leaders have offered 
direct material support to the TFG and would like to see a stable 
government to enable large-scale reconstruction and development 
projects.  These business leaders work across clan divisions and 
with the authorities on the ground in all areas.  In Mogadishu's 
teeming Bakara market, businesses jointly fund a private security 
force considered a model for community-level policing.  We engage 
with SBIC and other key business leaders in Dubai, inside Somalia, 
and the Somali diaspora, and all are interested in exploring 
commercial partnerships and opportunities with U.S. businesses. 
 
RANNEBERGER