VZCZCXRO4189
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #2769/01 3462230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 112230Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7892
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 002769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER 
STATE PASS TO USAID/EA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Humanitarian Response 
 
REF:  A) Nairobi 2711   B) Nairobi 2564 and previous 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  As conditions in Somalia continue to 
deteriorate, aid agencies are grappling with fundamental 
humanitarian dilemmas.  Although the crisis has worsened it is not, 
nor will it likely become, a famine. Nevertheless, the latitude to 
operate in Somalia is shrinking, blurring the lines between 
political and humanitarian activity, and reducing the ability to 
respond to needs and use resources effectively.  The American NGO 
CARE is ending its operations in South/Central Somalia following 
threats and kidnappings from al-Shabaab.  A potential Ethiopian 
military pullout may cause greater volatility in the humanitarian 
arena, especially in Mogadishu.  The October 29 suicide bombings in 
Hargeisa and Bossaso have affected humanitarian operations in 
Somaliland and Puntland.  Increased difficulties in delivering aid 
could lead to significant out-migration.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Shrinking Humanitarian Space 
and Accountability 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Humanitarian conditions in Somalia continue to 
deteriorate.  The United Nations estimates that nearly half of the 
population will require humanitarian assistance, which will cost an 
estimated $900 million over the next year (ref a).  The operating 
environment for agencies conducting humanitarian operations is more 
complex than ever.  Agencies are grappling with the most fundamental 
humanitarian issues, including those of neutrality, impartiality, do 
no harm, and basic accountability.  This cable seeks to lay out some 
of the current challenges, issues, and debates facing the 
humanitarian community in Somalia. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The high level of general insecurity, compounded by 
assassinations, threats, and kidnapping of humanitarian relief 
workers has reduced the capacity of aid agencies to respond to 
on-going and new emergency needs.  Many agencies have withdrawn 
their international staff and now have national staff or local 
Somali non-governmental organizations (NGOs) run their programs. 
However, even national staff and agencies are finding it difficult 
at times to access areas.  Agencies freely acknowledge that many 
programs are being implemented via "remote control" and understand 
the increased risk this poses for misuse and diversion of aid. 
Individual agencies debate whether conditions have already 
deteriorated to the point that minimal levels of security and 
accountability have been exceeded. 
 
--------------------- 
Line Blurred Between 
Humanitarian and 
Political Actors 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Our partners tell us that some Somalis no longer 
distinguish between humanitarian and political actors.  Agencies, 
particularly U.S.-based ones, believe they are now being targeted 
because of their perceived associations with certain U.S. government 
activities, such as the missile strikes in Dhobley and Dhusamareb in 
¶2008.  The United Nations is also vulnerable to the same charges, 
when distinct UN agencies, like the U.N. Political Office for 
Somalia (UNPOS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
provide direct support to the political process while simultaneously 
responding to humanitarian needs through the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and UNICEF.  Discussion in political fora about humanitarian 
issues is also seen as controversial by some aid organizations, as 
it links humanitarian and political issues in a way that they 
believe compromises perceptions of their neutrality.  Aid agencies 
generally advocate for a de-linking of humanitarian and 
political/development activities. 
 
------------------------------ 
CARE: Targeted and Closing Out 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) CARE has publicly maintained that its Somalia program is 
only suspended following the kidnapping of two CARE staff and 
threats from al-Shabaab (ref b).  In fact, CARE is preparing to 
close its operation --its largest-- including shuttering offices and 
terminating the majority of its staff in South/Central Somalia and 
Nairobi. CARE had been one of the two major food aid response 
agencies in Somalia (along with WFP) and it implemented a wide-range 
of USAID-supported activities.  Some of CARE's programs will move to 
 
NAIROBI 00002769  002 OF 004 
 
 
Somaliland and Puntland, where CARE will maintain a presence, and 
CARE remains hopeful that the threat in the South and Central 
regions will recede, so that it can resume programming there.  In 
the meantime, WFP has agreed to take conduct food aid distributions 
in CARE's former operational areas. 
 
------------------ 
A No-Win Decision: 
Losing Leverage 
Against al-Shabaab 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) We have expressed concern over the humanitarian 
community's reluctance to protest threats against CARE (as well as 
against the U.S.-based NGO International Medical Corps).  The 
community's reluctance seemingly allows al-Shabaab to choose which 
organizations can work in a given area, regardless of the local 
community's opinion. CARE acknowledges that pulling out may empower 
al-Shabaab, but believes it has no choice.  It believes it cannot 
hold the local community hostage and supports the continued 
provision of life-saving assistance by other organizations if it 
itself cannot operate freely. (All CARE-serviced areas are labeled 
humanitarian emergencies by the UN's Food Security Analysis Unit 
(FSAU). The consequences of stopping aid would be mass out-migration 
(including into Kenya) and/or increased mortality rates.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) CARE has indicated that al-Shabaab may be seeking to 
increase it leverage by seeking to deny assistance to areas where 
CARE operates (all of Mudug and Hiran, as well as parts of Gedo, 
Middle Shabelle, and Galgaduud regions).  By complying, aid agencies 
could be unwittingly aiding al-Shabaab.  USAID has requested a 
thorough analysis of the dynamics in order to determine if such 
linkages in fact exist. 
 
-------------------------- 
Uncertainties in Mogadishu 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Ongoing fighting in Mogadishu and uncertainties in the 
wake of the Ethiopian government's announcement that it will 
withdraw its troops by year's end signal greater volatility in the 
humanitarian arena.  Humanitarian agencies are predicting a fight 
for Mogadishu which may leave Mogadishu port inaccessible for the 
transit of humanitarian goods.  USAID/OFDA is finalizing a USD 1 
million contribution to WFP's special operations, which is 
rehabilitating the road from El Ma'an beach port (north of 
Mogadishu) to ensure continued humanitarian access.  Work has begun 
and will take four to six weeks to complete.  If fighting in 
Mogadishu intensifies, ongoing feeding programs (a daily cooked meal 
for 80,000 of Mogadishu's poorest) could be jeopardized, which would 
force more Somalis from Mogadishu.  Current planning for this 
possible scenario, however, envisions that access will be halted for 
a matter of weeks rather than months into and within Mogadishu. 
 
---------------------- 
Hargeisa Bombing Impact 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The October 29 suicide bombings in Hargeisa and Bossasso 
have constrained humanitarian operations there.  With danger 
increasing in the South/Central regions, many agencies had moved 
staff to northern Somalia and in some cases temporarily relocated 
entire programs to Somaliland.  With the bombings, most expatriate 
staff in Hargeisa and Bossaso have been evacuated from Somalia and 
the UN has increased the security level to Phase IV in Hargeisa, 
which constricts the number and type of staff as well as the 
programming in these areas. 
 
------------------ 
We Remain Flexible 
in Programming: 
But Abuse is 
a Possibility 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (U) USAID has been very flexible in Somalia.  It provides 
no-cost extensions to programs slowed by the operating environment 
and allows organizations to re-locate activities to safer areas. In 
some cases, organizations are expanding into new sectors as 
activities elsewhere become constrained. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Humanitarian actors are being subject to competing 
 
NAIROBI 00002769  003 OF 004 
 
 
demands. On the one hand, there is the imperative to respond to a 
grave humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, the constrained 
operating environment means they must be prepared for the possible 
misuse and diversion of aid resources, especially to al-Shabaab, a 
USG-designated terrorist organization. USAID makes every effort to 
ensure that its partners exercise due diligence, in order to avoid 
resources flowing to al-Shabaab. We recognize, however, that the 
current operating environment complicates that task, and are 
proceeding to obtain the necessary waivers for some assistance on 
humanitarian grounds. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Nowhere is this potential for abuse higher than with food 
aid, as it represents one the most significant resources going into 
the country.  In the past, Somali actors have used this resource to 
further their political and military objectives.  Thus far, 
significant improvements in the logistics of food aid transport and 
distributions reduce opportunities for diversion.  Currently, USAID 
believes the biggest vulnerability for diversion is 
post-distribution, through such means as local groups "taxing" 
beneficiaries for a portion of their food. 
 
-------------------- 
Worst Case Scenario: 
But Famine Unlikely 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) A significant surge in fighting, leading to reduced 
access for our partners, could lead to greater misuse of food aid 
(and possibly denial of food aid by Somali groups for political or 
military reasons). In such a situation, it will be difficult to 
avoid politicizing humanitarian assistance, as continuation of aid 
when some of it is being diverted may feed the conflict. By the same 
token, stopping assistance in a given area may be perceived as 
favoring one party to the conflict over another, and could lead to 
aid staff being targeted in retaliation.  Should international staff 
be targeted in sufficient numbers, the entire humanitarian operation 
in Somalia or at least in certain regions may grind to a halt. 
 
¶14.  (U) USAID has had numerous conversations with Somalia food 
security analysts, including the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning 
Systems (FEWS) who continue to maintain that as bad as the situation 
is, it is not, nor will it likely become, a famine as defined by 
FSAU.  FSAU maintains a  food security classification system (an 
innovative scale based on multiple criteria impacting food security 
which are gathered twice annually following each rainy season and 
updated during the year with additional information on prices, 
malnutrition, displacement, and other statistics) that tracks these 
indicators and would raise an early alarm.  Further, FSAU and FEWS 
have a number of staff throughout Somalia monitoring nutrition, 
market prices, and other information in order to provide early 
warning of further rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation 
so that a timely response may be mounted. 
 
¶15.  (U) Significant differences exist between the current situation 
and the famine of the early '90s, and we are likely to witness mass 
out-migration to Kenya before we will see mass starvation. Normally, 
increased mortality would be the result of disease outbreaks in 
populations already weakened by malnutrition.  Despite the worsening 
situation, all indicators are still significantly below those that 
obtained during Somalia's last famine.  High levels of remittances, 
increased communications such as mobile phones and the Internet, 
good transport options, and the continued ability of clans to travel 
through other clan-controlled areas are all factors which should 
allow populations to better cope and if necessary, to migrate out 
before a famine begins. 
 
---------------- 
Uncertain Future 
---------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) If conditions in Somalia worsen and al-Shabaab continues 
to extend its reach, aid agencies may find it increasingly difficult 
to avoid the numerous political landmines which dot the landscape. 
Even in the current environment, it is difficult for them to not be 
seen as partisan by some Somali factions. Further complicating our 
partners' work are the high levels of insecurity. If more 
organizations close as a result of the increasingly difficult 
operating environment, the reduced number of providers may foster a 
perception that certain groups or clans are receiving preferential 
treatment, which could in turn lead to increased insecurity for 
humanitarian staff. In anticipation of such a possibility, we are 
having discussions with humanitarian organizations about tripwires 
 
NAIROBI 00002769  004 OF 004 
 
 
that could cause them to suspend or halt their activities. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) With the closure of CARE, the largest NGO in Somalia, our 
capacity to respond will shrink and a steadily worsening environment 
means it is in real jeopardy of shrinking further. As circumstances 
deteriorate, each organization will have to decide what level of 
risk it is willing to impose on its staff and what level of 
accountability it is able to tolerate.  USAID will continue to 
assist partners as they struggle with the enormous challenges posed 
by the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. 
RANNEBERGER