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Viewing cable 08MUMBAI572, ELECTION IN MADHYA PRADESH: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS DIM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MUMBAI572 2008-12-05 12:46 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO0578
RR RUEHCHI RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHBI #0572/01 3401246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051246Z DEC 08 ZDK RUEHGO #1429 3430206
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6804
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8045
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 1969
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1976
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1771
RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD 0008
RUCNIND/ALL INDO COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 000572 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF KDEM ECON IN
SUBJECT: ELECTION IN MADHYA PRADESH: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS DIM 
CONGRESS' HOPE 
 
REF: A. MUMBAI 386 
     B. MUMBAI 531 
 
MUMBAI 00000572  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  Voters went to the polls in Madhya Pradesh 
(MP) on November 27, just 12 hours after terrorists launched a 
series of coordinated attacks on Mumbai.  Though the Congress 
Party's internal calculations on the day prior to polls showed 
that both the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) and Congress 
were evenly pitted in this important state race,  by nightfall 
on election day, the Congress had concluded that the Mumbai 
attacks would have a serious impact on their electoral chances. 
Election turnout was high, usually a good sign of strong 
anti-incumbency, but the talk at polling places centered on the 
terrorist attacks, bringing home the BJP's campaign message that 
the Congress Party is ill-equipped to deal with terrorism. 
Development and women's programs likely also helped BJP. 
Nevertheless, interlocutors do not discount anti-incumbency 
sentiment against the BJP, or the impact of third parties, and 
project that the BJP will be returned with a smaller majority. 
End Summary. 
 
Terrorist Attacks Change the Equation 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On November 27, 12 hours into the terrorist attack on 
Mumbai, 35 million voters in Madhya Pradesh went to the polls to 
elect 230 state assembly representatives.  The BJP enjoyed a 
strong majority going into the elections, holding 173 out of 230 
seats.  By all accounts, the party ran a good campaign under its 
current Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan.  In the run up to 
the elections, Congress leaders were optimistic that the party 
could make electoral gains and erode the BJP's lead in the 
state, but could not achieve a majority on its own.  A day 
before the polls, an optimistic Maharashtra Congress party 
strategist working on the campaign in MP told Congenoffs that 
his calculations and constituency level surveys showed that 
neither party would get a clear majority, but that "friends of 
the Congress" would help the party form a governing coalition. 
"Uma Bharti [of the Bharatiya Jan Shakti Party] would help us 
form the government, one way or another," he exulted, counting 
on that party to take away votes from the BJP. 
 
3. (SBU) In the weeks before the polls, a BJP official in 
Maharashtra told Congenoffs that the BJP's criticisms of the 
Congress-led UPA government in New Delhi as being ineffective in 
tackling terrorism was finding traction in races at the state 
level.  The series of bombings in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi 
this year had made the people angry about the UPA's failure to 
ensure public safety.  Throughout the campaign, the BJP accused 
the Congress of being unprepared to deal with terrorism; as all 
India sat glued to their TV sets watching the Mumbai terrorist 
attacks unfold, the BJP's message was reinforced.  MP Congress 
leader L.S. Hardenia said "the attack was the topic of 
conversation at every polling place."  Before the elections, 
Hardenia was hopeful of Congress emerging as the coalition 
leader, but since the terrorist attacks on Mumbai, that 
possibility seems more remote, Hardenia said. 
 
BJP Out-Campaigns the Congress 
 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) For the Congress, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai are 
only one factor; the Congress was disadvantaged on several 
fronts during the campaign season.  Facing a financial crunch, 
the party decided to concentrate campaigning on 155 "winnable" 
seats where its chances were best, foregoing aggressive 
campaigns in 75 districts where the BJP was certain to win. 
Interlocutors also agreed that compared to the BJP, the 
Congress' campaign was not as well organized or vibrant.  The 
BJP and the media criticized the Congress' decision to not name 
a clear challenger to Chief Minister Chauhan.  There were six 
Congress aspirants for the Chief Minister's job, which political 
observers said harmed the party's prospects. 
 
5. (SBU) In contrast, the BJP capitalized on every opportunity, 
especially touting its development agenda.  Most business 
interlocutors, as well as even some Congress rivals, concede 
that the incumbent Chief Minister has a good, pro-development 
image.  According to observers, the BJP government showed 
significant progress in building road infrastructure during its 
tenure (though critics contend BJP has not done enough on other 
development fronts).  Observers also say that the BJP has been 
able to claim credit for the moderately successful 
implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
 
MUMBAI 00000572  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
program, which was launched by the UPA coalition.  A Congress 
leader from the Malwa region conceded, "Though most of the 
conceptualizing and the money for these schemes came from the 
Congress-led UPA government, the voter good-will will accrue to 
the state government (BJP), because states implement these 
programs." 
 
6. (U) Anil Dave BJP Secretary for MP was not at all confident, 
however, that BJP would sweep the elections. He indicated that 
as many as 50 of the 230 seats will be decided by margins 
narrower than 1000 votes because of the number of multi-party 
races on the ballot this year.  According to Dave, the BJP's 
strengths going into the election were its better organization 
and its ability to control the message, leaving Congress always 
responding to BJP criticisms and unable to lead on any issue. In 
contrast to other interlocutors, Dave told Congenoffs that the 
terrorist attacks would only have a limited impact on the 
electoral results in MP. 
 
Whatever Happens, Blame It on Anti-Incumbency 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Despite the BJP's strengths in the campaign, the BJP's 
Dave acknowledged that anti-incumbency was a significant factor 
in the elections.  Interlocutors told Congenoffs that the BJP's 
campaign theme focusing on anti-terrorism and public safety is a 
double-edged sword for the ruling BJP party: that in most urban 
centers (traditional BJP bastions), voters blame the BJP for a 
rising crime rate, and poor leadership of the ineffective and 
corrupt police.  Even the BJP's touted record on development was 
questioned by voters.  The BJP claimed development was its prime 
accomplishment, but detractors of MP's incumbent BJP government 
pointed out that the state capital, Bhopal, gets potable water 
only once every two days, and rural areas have power-shortages 
of 13 hours or more.  The turnover in leadership in MP -- three 
Chief Ministers since the BJP came to power in 2003 -- was also 
seen as a weakness for the BJP.  In an editorial in the Times of 
India discussing the MP elections, Swami Ayyar pointed out that 
almost all Indian states since the mid-nineties have been voting 
out incumbents, mainly because voters demand more progress on 
development issues than the crumbling state finances can 
deliver. 
 
BJP's Anti-Anti-Incumbency Moves Help Third Parties 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (U) Recognizing the threat of anti-incumbency sentiments, the 
BJP changed more than one-third of its incumbent MLAs, and 
dropped ministers who had serious corruption investigations 
underway against them.  This tactic was used in the concurrent 
Chhattisgarh polls, and with much success in the December 2007 
BJP victory in Gujarat.  However, in a number of constituencies, 
erstwhile BJP candidates denied a BJP ticket in this election 
defected to other third parties, fractionalizing the BJP vote 
base and causing headaches for the BJP. 
 
9. (U) The three parties that benefited from these moves the 
most were Uma Bharati's Bharatiya Jan Shakti Party (BJSP), 
Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party 
(SP).  Ousted former BJP Chief Minister Uma Bharati floated her 
own party, the BJSP, in March 2006 when she was thrown out of 
the BJP, and fielded candidates in over 200 seats.  Uttar 
Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati, who many believe has designs on 
national power in 2009, was also using MP as a testing ground 
for her national ambitions.  As it did in Gujarat, the BSP 
fielded candidates in almost all constituencies, though the 
party is only competitive in a few races.  The Samajwadi Party, 
loosely allied with UPA coalition since July 2008, fielded its 
own slate of candidates, contesting over 200 seats. 
 
10. (U) Journalists and political observers noted that in nearly 
100 out of the 230 seats, the contest was between four strong 
candidates -- BJP, Congress and two spoilers from either the 
BSP, BJSP, SP or a local tribal party, the Gondwana Ganatantra 
Party (GGP).  The SP and the GGP were important in the state's 
northern Gwalior, Rewa, Bundelkhand regions bordering Rajasthan 
and Uttar Pradesh, while the BSP and BJSP were putting pressure 
on the Congress and the BJP respectively all over the state. 
The BSP, in particular, fielded nearly 66 high-caste candidates, 
disgruntled aspirants from both the Congress and the BJP.  Known 
as a charismatic orator, Bharati drew large crowds for her 
rallies in Bhopal and other urban centers. 
 
 
MUMBAI 00000572  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
11. (SBU) Though observers believe that anti-incumbency 
sentiment will influence voting, it may not help the Congress. 
MP Congress leader L.S. Hardenia predicts that enough of that 
anger at corruption and inept government would go to third 
parties, leaving Congress again in the position of runner-up in 
many seats.  According to Hardenia, Mayawati's BSP party ran a 
strong campaign and he expects the BSP to win 10-15 seats.  Uma 
Bharati's BJSP stood to win 10-15 seats also, according to 
Hardenia.  While Hardenia did not see Bharati or Mayawati 
forming a coalition with BJP, he thought that either might 
authorize their candidates to negotiate independently to form a 
coalition government. 
 
Voter Turnout Strong, BJP Credits Pro-Woman Programs 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
12.  Dave told Congenoff that voter turnout was high, at close 
to 70 percent, with woman voting in equal percentages to men. 
(Note:  Per MP's chief election officer, voter percentage in 
2003 was 67.5 percent.  End Note.)  In rural areas, he said, 
voting was as high as 80 percent.  Dave and other political 
observers have noted that that voter turnout above 62 percent 
usually signals the need of the people to voice their 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent government.  Ever hopefully, 
Dave interprets the high turnout among women in this election as 
signaling the success of the BJP's program targeted at women. 
(One program offers cash payments for the birth of girl 
children, educational benefits for girls to reduce their burden 
on parents, and promises cash payments when the girl turns 18 to 
help defray marriage costs.) 
 
13.  (SBU) Comment:  The terrorist attacks on Mumbai will 
undoubtedly have an impact on voter sentiment in MP, but they 
will have been one of many issues on voter's minds on Election 
Day.  Going into the elections, the BJP has a formidable lead, 
and can argue, convincingly, that it governed at least as well 
as previous Congress administrations.  Nevertheless, 
anti-incumbency and new competition from third parties will make 
it difficult for both the Congress and BJP to gain seats, 
perhaps a preview to the national elections next year.  Always 
eager and opportunistic for power, it is not clear how third 
parties might align themselves after the elections, and 
surprising combinations are possible.  Polling results are due 
to be released on December 8.  End Comment. 
FOLMSBEE