VZCZCXRO2002
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3708/01 3570612
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220612Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1297
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003708 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS IR AF
SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR U.S. RELATIONS 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Senator Lugar heard a mixed, but mostly 
positive, message on Russian receptivity towards rebuilding 
U.S.-Russian relations, with a range of officials and respected 
observers calling for a return to the official diplomatic 
architecture that once governed bilateral dialogue.  There was broad 
agreement that arms control must return to its former pride of 
place, with the necessity of completing a post-START treaty by 
December 2009 adding an element of urgency to resuming 
presidentially endorsed negotiations.  While these interlocutors 
demurred from endorsing additional sanctions on Iran, they described 
the Middle East, Afghanistan, the international economic crisis (and 
its relationship to energy and food security), and European security 
(including a review of missile defense cooperation) as natural 
agenda items for renewed engagement.  Largely placing the onus on 
the U.S. to revitalize relations in the wake of Georgia, they 
pointed to "123," WTO, and Jackson-Vanik as near-term deliverables, 
while arguing the new administration should realize that Russia 
would not walk back its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
They argued that a dialogue on human rights and democracy would be 
more successful within the framework of a robust bilateral 
relationship, and readily agreed with our view that the draft 
amendments to the law on treason are "Stalinist" in tone.  End 
Summary 
 
Interest, but Trepidation, in Bilateral Relations 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  During his December 16-20 visit to Moscow, Senator Lugar 
heard a generally positive message on the degree of Russian 
willingness to reinvest in the U.S. relationship, with a range of 
views on the substantive components of the agenda.  Former PM 
Primakov argued the desire to rid the relationship of its current 
tension was "palpable," while Chairman of the Federation Council's 
International Relations Committee Margelov welcomed the positive 
signal that was being sent by the dispatch of three congressional 
delegations to Moscow in December.  "We've been waiting for this 
signal," Margelov commented, adding that the international community 
suffered when U.S.-Russian relations frayed.  Commenting that "hope 
was on the way" in our bilateral relations, Margelov rued the 
squandering of trust and confidence, which he blamed on 
decisionmakers that were wedded to a Cold War mentality.  However, 
former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and former Ambassador to the 
U.S. Vladimir Lukin struck a cautionary note, emphasizing the degree 
to which public opinion in Russia was jaundiced towards the U.S., as 
a result of dashed expectations over the last eight years and the 
rupture over Georgia, with the feeling widespread that the "onus" 
was on the U.S. to make amends. 
 
Rebuilding Diplomatic Architecture 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  A consistent message throughout Senator Lugar's 
consultations was the need to restore a formal architecture to the 
relationship.  Ivanov, Lukin, Primakov and Margelov were open to 
different proposals, but pointed to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission 
as one model of engagement that propelled the bureaucracy to be 
responsive.  Ivanov suggested the creation of a U.S.-Russian 
"transition team" that could lay the foundation for the first 
Medvedev-Obama meeting, and criticized the absence of summitry in 
the bilateral relations.  One-off meetings were not sufficient to 
achieve results, given the difficult issues that crowded the 
bilateral agenda, he argued.  Margelov agreed, citing a conversation 
he had with former SecDef Cohen on the need for a more "disciplined 
dialogue."  The original Camp David Checklist drawn up by Presidents 
Bush and Putin, Margelov complained, was never institutionalized. 
Margelov welcomed the Senator's suggestion of a resumption of 
in-depth conferences (e.g. the Aspen Institute congressional 
seminars), and noted his own interest in raising the profile of 
U.S.-Russian parliamentary exchanges, both committee-to-committee 
and the Senate-Federation Council Joint Working Group.  While 
Primakov and Lukin endorsed their respective track-two efforts 
(i.e., the Kissinger "wise men" dialogue, and Carnegie human rights 
dialogue), Eurasia Foundation's Andrey Kortunov made the general 
point that the bilateral relationship was too narrowly grounded. 
 
Back to the Past: Return of Arms Control 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Interlocutors were unanimous on the need for arms control 
to return to its pride of place in U.S.-Russian relations, noting 
that the December 2009 expiration of START provided a natural focal 
point for the new administration.  Margelov, citing a Russian 
proverb, said all good new things are simply old things that have 
been forgotten.  After 15 years of strategic neglect (with the 
exception of CTR, Margelov hastened to add), post-START provided an 
important and achievable deliverable to showcase a new U.S.-Russia 
partnership.  Primakov hailed the pragmatism that he thought 
characterized the Obama team's approach to arms control, and argued 
that achieving an agreement on post-START could be a centerpiece to 
the new administration's initial efforts with Russia.  Ivanov, 
Lukin, and Kortunov separately agreed, noting that even if an 
 
MOSCOW 00003708  002 OF 003 
 
 
agreement wasn't concluded by December 2009, the first meeting 
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev could kick-start intensive 
negotiations, and provide ballast to a new architecture in 
U.S.-Russian relations.  At a Carnegie Center conference marking the 
15th anniversary of the U.S.-Ukraine-Russia Trilateral Agreement, 
defense analyst Aleksandr Golts told the Senator that in the 
"complete absence of trust" between Russia and the U.S., the rigors 
of arms control verification could rebuild habits of cooperation and 
engagement. 
 
Iran: Little Appetite for Sanctions 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Pressed by the Senator and Ambassador to identify how 
Russia could be more helpful on Iran, interlocutors declined to 
endorse more sanctions as a means of persuading Tehran to meets its 
international obligations.  Noting that there were divisions within 
the Iranian leadership, with some opposing a further radicalization 
of Tehran's policy, Primakov warned against providing hardliners 
with a pretext to rally public opinion against the West.  While 
pushing hard for direct negotiations between the new Administration 
and Tehran, Primakov sidestepped the Ambassador's proposal that 
Russia match greater U.S. diplomatic carrots with support for 
additional sanctions.  Primakov argued that any toughening of the 
Russian line during a period of Iranian diplomatic engagement with 
the U.S. would send a perverse signal to Tehran that Russia opposed 
its dialogue with the West.  Only after all diplomatic means had 
been exhausted, Primakov maintained, could sanctions sequentially be 
taken up. 
 
Middle East: Building on Annapolis 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Russian interest in building on the Annapolis process was 
stressed by interlocutors as another area in which U.S.-Russian 
relations could deepen.  Primakov repeated Lavrov's message to 
Senator Lugar that Russia wanted to build responsibly on the 
Annapolis conference.  While the U.S. was indispensable to Middle 
East Peace, Primakov stressed that Russia brought to the table a set 
of relationships with Syria, Iran, and Hamas that complemented U.S. 
diplomacy in the region.  By redoubling joint efforts, the U.S. and 
Russia would be able to "divide and conquer" players in the Middle 
East peace process.  Separately, fellow Middle East hand Margelov 
agreed, seeing little difference in U.S. and Russia strategic goals 
in the region. 
 
Afghanistan: Missing Element 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Margelov and Kortunov separately stressed Afghanistan as 
an area where the U.S. and Russia had failed to coordinate efforts, 
despite overlapping interests.  Margelov welcomed the emphasis that 
the new administration intended to place on Afghanistan, and 
stressed that concern over the deteriorating situation had helped 
produce the Russian-German transit agreement.  Margelov marveled 
that the transit of German troops over Russian territory raised no 
eyebrows among a population still steeped in WW2 history and 
emotion; he attributed it to the "obvious fact" that NATO was 
defending Russia's southern flank.  While there were clear areas 
where Russia would not be helpful, such as in sending forces to 
Afghanistan, Margelov pushed for more expansive thinking on military 
transit (noting the weakness inherent in over-reliance on Pakistan), 
counter-narcotics, and border security.  Margelov floated the idea 
of a quintet session to explore cooperation on Afghanistan, 
consisting of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK and France.  While 
former FM Ivanov thought cooperation on Afghanistan was too 
ambitious given the current level of distrust, he urged the U.S. to 
set aside its phobia of CSTO; working with the organization would 
unlock Russian cooperation and send a welcome message that the U.S. 
did not dispute Russia's right to engage regionally with its 
neighbors, even as the U.S. sought to protect its strategic 
interests in the area. 
 
European Security/MD: Giving a Nod to Medvedev 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Kortunov expressed concern that the calendar would force 
the administration to take an early public line reaffirming support 
for Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO, which could further 
inflame Russian public opinion.  He urged that the U.S. "sweeten the 
pot" by according serious attention to Medvedev's proposal for a 
European Security Treaty (EST) and, representing the liberal wing of 
the Russian political spectrum, asserted that NATO did not have to 
be the beginning and end of European security.  Ivanov argued that 
NATO expansion begged the question of NATO's mission, and said that 
the U.S. was wrong to view EST as a Trojan horse designed to bring 
down the Euro-Atlantic alliance.  The fact remained, Ivanov 
stressed, that NATO enlargement did not stop terrorist bombings in 
Madrid or London.  Both Ivanov and Margelov urged a return to "old 
topics," but said dialogue had to take place "on a new level."  The 
lack of trust in the U.S., Ivanov commented, fed the Russian view 
 
MOSCOW 00003708  003 OF 003 
 
 
that NATO's enlargement was really about encirclement.  When missile 
defense was raised with the Senator, it was with the expectation of 
a comprehensive U.S. review, with Kortunov arguing that negotiating 
a new ABM treaty could answer Russian concerns over the scope of 
U.S. missile defense objectives. 
 
Financial Crisis: Weathering the Storm 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Senator Lugar heard consistent calls for deepening an 
economic dialogue, with energy and food security two desired 
components to bilateral conversations.  Primakov argued that a new 
system of international finance would need to evolve that better 
protected the average consumer.  While Russia had trumpeted itself 
as a safe economic harbor during the international economic storm, 
the assertion was proven false.  The lesson that Russia had drawn 
from the crisis, Primakov noted, was that foreign sources could no 
longer serve as the primary mechanism for investment and financing 
in Russia.  Margelov welcomed both bilateral and multilateral 
discussions of the crisis, commenting that the G20 was useful 
"transition format" until a broadening of the G8 and compromise on 
UNSC reform were reached.  A common critique of U.S.-Russian 
relations was that engagement was limited to a narrow elite; 
expanding business-to-business ties, in addition to other scientific 
and student exchanges, was touted to the Senator as a long-term 
corrective to the current crisis of confidence. 
 
Bellwethers: 123, WTO, and Jackson-Vanik 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Reflecting the widespread Russian view that the burden 
of proof is on the U.S. to demonstrate its sincerity in rebuilding 
relations with Russia, Senator Lugar's interlocutors honed in on the 
civil nuclear "123" agreement,  WTO, and Jackson-Vanik as  three 
important bellwethers of the new Administration.  Primakov welcomed 
the Senator's support for 123, and expressed hope that momentum 
would build in Congress for moving forward on the initiative, 
thereby unlocking civilian nuclear energy cooperation and 
reinforcing U.S. and Russian leadership in promoting the 
responsible, safe, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Mention of 
Jackson-Vanik elicited mostly groans and the view that this was a 
U.S. domestic issue; Russia would not accept any "linkage" on the 
antiquated Soviet-era legislation. 
 
Georgia: New Realities 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Georgia was touched on only lightly, with two points 
being underscored: first, the U.S. blame-Russia-first response to 
the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali had deeply alienated the Russian 
public; and, second, whatever the differences in analysis of the 
origins of the crisis, there should be no expectation that Russia 
will walk back its recognition of South Ossetia and Georgia. 
Primakov, who lingered longest on Russia's justification for 
military action, argued for a rejuvenated diplomatic architecture 
and agenda in the context of making every possible effort to 
overcome the legacy of Georgia. 
 
Human Rights: Dialogue, but no Dictation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  In response to the Ambassador's emphasis on the need for 
a frank dialogue on issues of concern, specifically with respect to 
trend lines in Russia's political development, Lukin told Senator 
Lugar that Russians were more conservative than their government and 
attributed Russia's last eight years of economic success to Putin's 
establishment of a political "vertical of power."  While this 
sparked a rise from Kortunov, who quoted polling data that 45 
percent of Russians were dissatisfied with the direction of Russian 
policy, there was broader agreement that the U.S. needed to broach 
its concerns mindful of its tone and the diminished authority of the 
U.S. among the Russian public.  When the Ambassador urged Ivanov and 
Lukin, as influential Russian voices, to speak up against the new 
draft law on treason, Lukin readily conceded that the legislation 
was "over the line" and Stalinist (with Ivanov joking darkly that he 
could conceivably be charged under the law just for coming to a 
Spaso lunch), but dismissed the impact of official U.S. statements. 
Instead, Lukin encouraged Americans who have special credibility in 
Russia to be in direct contact with Medvedev or Putin about it. 
There was broad agreement that U.S. concerns resonated when the 
relationship was on stronger footing.  Political pot-shots and 
grosser forms of anti-Americanism were easier when both sides were 
disengaged and not invested in building a positive agenda.  The 
Ambassador laid down a marker with Ivanov and Lukin that the release 
of imprisoned oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskiy would send a powerful 
and positive signal to the U.S. 
 
RUBIN