VZCZCXRO1997
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3707/01 3570611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220611Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1294
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003707 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ECON PARM OREP RS
SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR MEETS FM LAVROV: U.S. RELATIONS, POST-START, 
MD 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In a December 18 meeting, FM Lavrov welcomed 
the visit of Senator Lugar as recognition that the Senate 
appreciated the importance of relations with Russia.  Lavrov 
emphasized Russia's interest in concluding a post-START treaty by 
December 2009 and urged a "quick start" to the negotiating process. 
Criticizing an approach that did not have intrusive verification 
measures or count non-operationally deployed warheads, Lavrov argued 
that the U.S. and Russia needed to demonstrate leadership on arms 
control in advance of the 2010 NPT review.  Lavrov charged that U.S. 
missile defense TCBMs had been watered down since the November 2007 
2+2 meeting and expressed hope that the Obama administration would 
undertake a comprehensive review of its strategy to combat missile 
proliferation, allowing a return to a more "constructive path." 
Largely eschewing his trademark sarcasm, Lavrov added MEPP, 
combating piracy, dealing with the financial crisis, increasing 
energy security, and resolving the knot of European security issues 
to a bilateral agenda.  He noted the format of the 2+2 dialogue -- 
if not the results achieved to date -- was useful.  In one lapse, 
Lavrov acerbically thanked the U.S. for preventing Russia's WTO 
accession, arguing that membership would have intensified Russia's 
economic downturn.  End Summary 
 
U.S.-Russian Relations 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In a December 18 meeting with Senator Lugar, SFRC 
professional staff members, and the Ambassador, FM Lavrov stressed 
his appreciation for the visit, viewing it as a sign of the Senate's 
commitment to the continuity and importance of U.S.-Russian 
relations.  Lavrov noted President Medvedev's telephone call to 
President-elect Obama, where the importance of an early meeting was 
agreed upon, and commented that Russia hoped to see the approaches 
and principles enshrined in the April 2008 Sochi Declaration 
realized.  Lavrov emphasized the scope of the bilateral agenda, 
praised the Senator for his personal contribution to strengthening 
nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, and said Russia was ready for 
frank and open talks conducted on the basis of mutual respect and 
interest.  Senator Lugar thanked Lavrov for the spirit of his 
remarks, noted his role in bringing President-elect Obama to Russia 
in 2005, and explained that he would confer with the President-elect 
upon his return to Washington on his impressions of U.S.-Russian 
relations. 
 
Post-START Tops the Agenda 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Senator Lugar expressed hope that the new administration 
would get off to a strong start, and noted the important opportunity 
presented by the need to negotiate a post-START agreement by 
December 2009.  Senator Lugar said that he would make his views 
known on the need to set up quickly a new negotiating team. 
Achieving a post-START treaty would be a historic accomplishment, 
both for the bilateral relationship and the international community, 
and pledged to work closely with the new administration and with 
Russia to identify multiple venues by which to renew cooperation. 
Lavrov recalled the Duma's ratification of the six-year extension of 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to 2013 as an example of 
how "joint ventures" in U.S.-Russian foreign policy were both 
successful and critical to world peace. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Lavrov confirmed Russian interest in early negotiations 
on a post-START instrument, noting that Moscow had not ruled out 
reaching an agreement by December 2009.  Russia sought a quick 
start, but Lavrov said he appreciated the President-elect's 
discipline in not having his advisers engage on foreign policy prior 
to January 20, noting that his invitation to meet with 
Secretary-designate Clinton in New York on December 16 had been 
rebuffed.  Lavrov highlighted that it had taken almost a year for 
the U.S. to produce the post-START proposal first promised at the 
November 2+2 meeting in Moscow, despite the Presidents' instructions 
to their teams at Kennebunkport to move forward.  Noting U/S Rood's 
December 15 consultations with DFM Ryabkov, Lavrov said Russia did 
not see any cardinal change in U.S. position from the one presented 
a year ago, with the focus on placing limits on operationally 
deployed warheads. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Lavrov argued that the logic of making the Moscow Treaty 
legally binding was a "huge step backward," and criticized the U.S. 
refusal to count non-operational warheads or to limit deployments to 
national territories.  This posture was bad for prospects of 
reducing nuclear warheads further, and bad for sending a positive 
political message in advance of the 2010 NPT review conference. 
Lavrov maintained that a willingness by the Secretary during the 
July 2008 ASEAN ministerial to consider including strategic areas in 
a new treaty was not reflected in the document presented by U/S 
Rood.  Lavrov reiterated Russian concerns over non-nuclear strategic 
weapons, warning that Russia would have little time to distinguish a 
conventional missile launched at Osama bin Laden from a 
nuclear-tipped missile headed for Russian territory, and flagged 
disappointment over U.S. opposition to Russia's proposal to ban 
 
MOSCOW 00003707  002 OF 003 
 
 
strategic weapons from outer space.  Lavrov underscored that 
fundamental differences had not prevented Russia from engaging on 
post-START; Russia didn't expect a breakthrough under the Bush 
administration, but believed that all possibilities needed to be 
exhausted. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Senator Lugar responded that the Moscow Treaty was "not 
the last word" in arms control.  Lugar emphasized the importance of 
intrusive verification, attributing CTR's success to the confidence 
and transparency generated by the strict provisions of the 
verification regime.  Confidence building measures were critical 
both for the U.S. and Russia, as well as for the international 
community, which needed to be reassured that the nuclear superpowers 
were upholding their NPT commitments.  A cavalier approach to 
verification would be a mistake, with Lugar expressing confidence 
that the U.S. and Russia would be able to move forward.  Lavrov 
interjected that it would be important to expand the disarmament 
process over time.  Noting the mushrooming of nonproliferation 
initiatives - Global Zero, the Luxembourg Group, the 
Australian-Japanese Commission - Lavrov said the task was to reach 
out to the UK, France, and China and encourage them to think in 
terms of reducing stockpiles.  The next circle should include 
Pakistan, India, and Israel, followed by a policy of engaging 
threshold countries.  The U.S. and Russia should not repeat the 
mistake made when the NPT was signed, of failing to foresee the need 
to prohibit enrichment rights.  While pursuing the "very long-term" 
objective of a nuclear free world, it was necessary to ensure that 
other - equally destructive - weapons did not rise to take their 
place. 
 
Missile Defense: Need "Constructive Path" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  On missile defense, Lavrov complained that U.S. positions 
had hardened since the 2+2 November 2007 meeting.  Noting the 
SecDef's offer of a "permanent presence" at the Czech and Polish 
sites in his meeting with Putin, Lavrov maintained this step would 
have assuaged, if not removed, Russian concerns.  While Russia's 
preference was for a total re-conceptualization of missile defense, 
taking into account Moscow's offer of assistance at Qabala and in 
southern Russia, the offer of permanent presence had impressed 
Putin.  The current proposal of ad hoc visits on the basis of 
reciprocity was not a substitute. Lavrov reviewed the history of the 
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and Putin's warnings to the 
President that Russia would respond to the development of a U.S. 
missile defense system.  Russia hoped the new administration would 
adhere to its campaign statements on the need to review the 
technical and financial feasibility of missile defense, creating a 
pause in which to shape a new approach.  "Hopefully, we can continue 
on a more constructive path." 
 
U.S.-Russian Architecture 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In response to the Senator's question on whether 2+2 
served as an appropriate architecture for conducting U.S.-Russian 
relations, Lavrov said the format was useful, even if the substance 
had proved disappointing.  If the administration was ready to 
engage, Lavrov repeated, it would find a willing partner in Russia. 
Lavrov clarified that Russia did not want to limit relations to the 
strategic sphere, which would suggest a return to the Soviet-U.S. 
era that was inappropriate given current realities and the prospect 
for wider cooperation.  In addition to arms control, Lavrov 
identified the following areas for enhanced cooperation: 
 
Bilateral Agenda: MEPP, Piracy, Economy, Energy, Security 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Middle East:  Lavrov agreed with the Senator that the 
Middle East should remain an area of U.S.-Russian partnership. 
Noting his role in securing the December 16 UNSCR on the Middle East 
peace process - the first in five years - Lavrov suggested that the 
change in leadership in the U.S., Israel, and potentially Palestine 
would create a new catalyst for moving forward.  Russia was waiting 
for the results of the Israeli elections.  Assuming no radical 
change in U.S. position, Russia then would be ready to push for a 
continuation of the Annapolis process.  (Lavrov speculated whether 
Netanyahu's campaign rhetoric suggested a turn away from Annapolis, 
back to the incremental approach of the road map, and postponement 
of difficult final status issues.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Piracy: Lavrov praised the close cooperation that had 
been struck on Somalia, pointing to the unanimous resolution reached 
at the UNSC.  Addressing the root causes of piracy, and the legal 
tools to combat it, was an area of overlapping interest. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Economic Security:  Senator Lugar noted the uncertainty 
generated by the world economic crisis, which added a new overlay to 
the challenges facing world leaders.  The Senator recommended a 
dialogue that assessed what the crisis meant for the average citizen 
 
MOSCOW 00003707  003 OF 003 
 
 
in each country.  Expressing concern that the downturn could last 
longer than anticipated, the Senator said Russia and the U.S. needed 
to find a way back to a world of normal commerce, where Russia 
continued its progress of integrating into multilateral economic 
institutions.  Commenting that Russia had "jumped" into market 
mechanisms with little understanding or experience, borrowing from 
the West's history, Lavrov attributed some of Russia's economic 
crisis to the lack of development of Russian institutions.  In a 
jab, Lavrov thanked the U.S. for ensuring Russia had not entered the 
WTO, since membership would have intensified the economic pain 
caused by the current crisis. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Energy Dialogue:  Calling discussions on energy one of 
the achievements of the Bush-Putin period, Lavrov downplayed the 
benefits to Russia of last year's high oil prices.  Pricing needed 
to reflect the real economy, and the artificially high prices had 
reduced incentives to modernize the Russian economy.  Lavrov 
complained about the proliferation of "virtual instruments" that 
distorted the functioning of the oil market, which Russia had 
highlighted at the G20 conference.  It was not healthy to leave 
decisions on pricing to OPEC, with Russia falling in line, and 
Norway contemplating adoption, without a dialogue with the 
consumers.  Lavrov said Putin supported a broader dialogue, 
involving produces, consumers, and transit countries.  Both 
bilaterally and multilaterally, Russia would support efforts to 
produce more equitable arrangements. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  European Security:  Lavrov stressed that, as in the 
financial sector, the health of one country should not come at the 
cost of another nation's military and diplomatic well-being.  The 
thrust of Medvedev's European security treaty, he argued, was not to 
vitiate NATO or the EU, but to bring all parties together to 
reaffirm this basic principle.  Lavrov expressed concern over the 
conclusions Russia should draw from the U.S. rejection of language 
at the April NATO summit in Bucharest reaffirming this premise. 
While partners told Russia that they were satisfied with NATO, 
Russia did not agree.  If the indivisibility of security could not 
be affirmed, then Russian interests were at risk.  Multiple crises 
underscored the fragility of the system, including the standoff over 
CFE and the "problems with conflict in this space" (i.e., Georgia). 
Medvedev's initiative would capture overall security, and could 
include issues like counter-terrorism and nonproliferation. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  NATO Enlargement/Georgia:  If the NRC could not convene 
to discuss the conflict in Georgia, then what was its value?  Lavrov 
laid down a marker that the resumption of NRC activity would need to 
start with a discussion of what happened in August.  NATO would need 
to answer for why it sought to attract Georgia as a member, when it 
had over-armed and assaulted its own people.  Lavrov charged that a 
"serious situation" had emerged when a U.S. vessel delivering 
drinking water to Poti was armed with 52 cruise missiles.  With 
Medvedev only 150 kms away in Sochi, Lavrov questioned whether it 
was in U.S. and Russian interests to run the risk of even an 
accidental military escalation.  "These are not theoretical 
concerns."  Senator Lugar welcomed conferences where European 
security could be discussed, but without rehashing debates about 
Georgia.  The Georgia conflict had not been helpful to U.S.-Russia 
relations of Russian-NATO cooperation.  It made sense to look ahead. 
 For those in the U.S. who sought to build relations with Russia, 
the Georgia conflict had precluded movement on the 123, 
Jackson-Vanik, and WTO.  For those advocating a bipartisan approach 
to Russia, a positive agenda was essential, and post-START provided 
an opportunity to refocus forward.  The Senator reiterated that 
U.S.-Russian leadership on critical issues gave confidence to the 
international community, to which Lavrov concluded the meeting with 
a forceful "I agree." 
 
RUBIN