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DE RUEHMO #3615/01 3500653
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P 150653Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1165
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003615 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA AND U.S.  RELATIONS - MEETING 
WITH CODEL DELAHUNT 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In a December 6 meeting with 
Congressman Bill Delahunt and Congressman Dana 
Rohrabacher, Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin conceded 
Russia had lost the p.r. battle in the August conflict 
with Georgia, but reiterated why Russia had been 
compelled to respond militarily and then recognize South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.  He welcomed changing assessments 
of Saakashvili's role in the conflict and insisted Russia 
sought "friendly, normal" relations with Georgia. 
Karasin argued against "endless" discussions in Geneva, 
and urged direct engagement between the parties -- 
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- to resolve 
practical questions.  Emphasizing Russia's multiethnic 
nature, Karasin said the principle of self-determination 
was not "an idle question" for Russia.  Karasin welcomed 
more "realism" in U.S.-Russia relations, advocated the 
rescinding of Jackson-Vanik as a signal that relations 
would be based on mutual respect, flagged an end to NATO 
enlargement and missile defense plan in Poland and the 
Czech Republic as critical to future relations, and 
agreed on the need for greater civilian nuclear 
cooperation.  Karasin was receptive to greater 
cooperation on Afghanistan, but stressed that the U.S. 
and Russia needed to "pre-cook" initiatives.  End Summary 
 
Russia Falls Down on Hill 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In a 75-minute December 6 meeting with 
Congressman Delahunt (D, Mass), Congressman Rohrabacher 
(R, CA), and the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Karasin welcomed parliamentary exchanges and expressed 
appreciation for the work of the Ambassador, along with 
the hope that Russia's Ambassador to the U.S. Kislyak was 
accorded the same access.  Congressman Delahunt agreed on 
the need to reinvigorate parliamentary dialogues and, 
underscoring that the delegation did not speak for the 
Administration, encouraged the GOR to "work the Hill" 
more effectively.  Noting that the August events in 
Georgia had sparked his interest in traveling to Russia, 
Congressman Delahunt commented that many legislators were 
not familiar with the history of the dispute, 
particularly given an agenda crowded by Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Middle East, as well as the 
challenges posed by the international economic crisis. 
Congressman Delahunt noted that one positive side-effect 
of the August conflict would be greater interest in U.S.- 
Russian relations, and pointed to the upcoming delegation 
visits led by Congressman Tauscher and Senator Lugar, 
with Senator Kerry expected to travel to Russia in early 
¶2009.  As the allocators, the House of Representatives 
would play a particularly important role, with 
Congressman Rohrabacher noting that the Administration 
had to seek additional funding for its initiatives with 
Georgia.  In response to Congressman Rohrabacher's 
skepticism over the Administration's position towards 
Georgia, Karasin replied that "I have to join your 
ranks." 
 
Georgia: Saakashvili Tipped the Scales 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Karasin reviewed Russia's relations towards 
the Caucasus, characterizing the U.S. and Russian policy 
positions as "quite close" before the August conflict. 
Karasin stressed that the U.S. and Russia had been united 
in support of the peacekeeping process, in reaching long- 
term settlements to the Georgia-South Ossetia and 
Georgia-Abkhazia disputes, and in pushing the sides to 
adopt a no-use-of-force pledge.  Saakashvili's decision 
to take South Ossetia "by storm" was irresponsible. 
Noting that bloodshed in the Caucasus is a question "for 
the ages," Karasin concluded that Saakashvili had 
produced the "complete ruin" of Georgian aspirations for 
territorial integrity.  Russia, he said forcefully, had 
no choice but to beat back the Georgian aggression, 
preemptively destroy Georgian military infrastructure, 
and recognize the conflict territories.  Noting Russia's 
restraint in not undertaking tit-for-tat recognition 
post-Kosovo, Karasin blamed Saakashvili for upsetting the 
policy balance.  By spoiling relations with the U.S. and 
EU (sic), and in destroying relations with Russia, 
Karasin maintained that Saakashvili had ended Georgia's 
chances for territorial integrity.  Karasin termed the 
December 5 firing of the Georgian foreign and defense 
ministers as an effort to change the face of an 
administration that had failed.    At the same time, 
Karasin welcomed the appointment of FM Vashadze and the 
new Minister of Culture Abashidze, as "partners and 
 
MOSCOW 00003615  002 OF 004 
 
 
colleagues." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Karasin stressed that Russia sought "normal, 
friendly" relations with Georgia and would work to 
overcome the "irresponsibility and stupidity" of the 
Georgian government; however, the situation had changed 
"cardinally" after August.  Karasin called for greater 
realism in Washington on this count.  Congressman 
Delahunt acknowledged that most Americans and most 
members of Congress had paid insufficient attention to 
the U.S.-Russia relationship, and expressed regret that 
members did not fulfill their responsibility in that 
regard.  At the same time, he noted, Russia had failed to 
make its case to the American public and U.S. Congress. 
Congressman Delahunt contrasted Russia's performance to 
Saakashvili's adroit media management and congressional 
outreach.  Karasin agreed that Saakashvili was smart, and 
took Congressman Delahunt's point that the Georgian 
President had used his personal relations in Washington 
to effectively present Georgia's case, with Russia 
"losing" the PR battle.  Congressman Delahunt noted that, 
after initially supporting Georgia, some members were 
raising serious questions regarding Georgia's 
performance, its human rights record, its support for 
press freedom, and the temperament of Saakashvili.  Over 
time, Congressman Delahunt commented, a new view of 
Georgia had emerged among key members in both the House 
and Senate that was more skeptical of Saakashvili. 
Congressman Delahunt speculated over the potential 
consequences had Georgia been a member of NATO at the 
time of the clash. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In response to Congressman Delahunt's comment 
that Russia's decision to recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia could have been deferred, Karasin replied that 
practical politics dictated the policy shift.  Karasin 
said Russia had to demonstrate that a military attack by 
Georgia was no longer possible.  Before August 7, 
Medvedev, Putin and FM Lavrov had emphasized that Russia 
would pursue a "responsible and sober" line; after August 
7, absent an "immediate and forceful" response, Georgia 
would have been tempted to attack again.  Congressman 
Delahunt underscored that a resumption of military 
conflict by Georgia would spell the end of support for 
the Saakashvili government.  If Saakashvili ignored the 
Administration, as A/S Fried testified that Saakashvili 
had done in not heeding U.S. warnings against the use of 
military force in August, the U.S. would have to conclude 
that Georgia did not take American interests into 
account. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Karasin underscored the emotional element also 
at play in Caucasus politics.  The Causasus is "not 
Central Europe or Holland," but a collection of 
"emotional nations."  Russia had been under pressure for 
the last fifteen years by Russian political parties, 
domestic political opinion, and the North Caucasus 
republics, to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Successive Russian leaders had abstained, and Russia had 
been prepared for a long-term, peaceful process resulting 
in a unified Georgia.  Russia wanted a good neighbor, not 
a threat.  Expressing appreciation for the blunt views 
presented by the Congressmen on Saakashvili, Karasin 
argued that had those blunt assessments come into play 
two years earlier, "we would have had a different 
outcome." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Karasin said the U.S. should convince Georgia 
to focus on building responsible relations with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and reiterated his criticism of 
Saakashvili.  The Ambassador interjected that a focus on 
who started the conflict would be inconclusive, and that 
blame could be assigned to both sides, but that it was 
imperative to use the Geneva talks to move ahead. 
Keeping in mind the Russian warning over the nature of 
Caucasus blood feuds, the Ambassador stressed the 
importance of all parties sitting at the table and being 
encouraged to move forward on resolving the issues 
related to security and the internally displaced. 
Karasin rejected Russian culpability and responded that 
Geneva could not be "endless."  While Russia would 
participate in December, it wanted to work with the U.S. 
and EU to get the parties -- Georgia, Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia -- to work together directly on practical 
questions.  Karasin commented that the South Ossetians 
felt that they were being subjected to particular 
international scrutiny, while Georgia needed to be pushed 
to become more predictable.  Commenting that it was 
Russia's neighborhood and reiterating that he did not 
 
MOSCOW 00003615  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
represent the Administration nor the majority's view in 
Congress towards Russia, Congressman Rohrabacher called 
for Russia and Georgia to broker their differences 
bilaterally, without U.S. interference.  The Ambassador 
agreed that this was not the Administration's position, 
and said the Geneva talks showed the value of multilateral 
diplomacy. 
 
Kosovo, Self-Determination, and Georgia 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Congressman Rohrabacher stressed his support 
for the principle of self-determination and noted his 
record of supporting Georgia's emergence as an 
independent state under President Gamsakhurdia. 
Congressman Rohrabacher argued that Kosovo's independence 
-- which he had championed -- created a precedent that 
did apply to the two breakaway republics, with Russia 
acting in the right to recognize their aspirations. 
Reiterating that it was important to be upfront about the 
consequences of Kosovo, Congressman Rohrabacher commented 
that recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was 
reasonable.  On the principle of self-determination, 
Karasin said it was not an idle question for the Russian 
leadership, given Russia's multiethnic makeup.  Not only 
were there national republics within Russia, Russia's 
major cities all had multiethnic populations, with over 
one million Georgians comprising a significant portion of 
Russia's artistic and scientific elite.  There were 
compelling reasons not to recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, Karasin admitted, but Georgian actions had 
nullified them. 
 
U.S.-Russian Relations: NATO, MD, Jackson-Vanik, 123 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Congressman Delahunt stressed the importance 
of lowering the rhetoric and reestablishing mutual 
respect in U.S.-Russian relations.  Noting his view that 
Saakashvili was the aggressor in the August conflict, 
Congressman Rohrabacher characterized the subsequent 
U.S.-Russia confrontation as unfortunate and called for a 
more frank dialogue, in order to move forward under a new 
U.S. administration.  Karasin agreed on the need to think 
more expansively about the scope of U.S.-Russian 
engagement.  In response to Congressman Rohrabacher's 
comments that Georgian membership in NATO would be 
disastrous, Karasin stressed that it was a choice for 
NATO members to make, nor for Georgia to decide.  NATO 
members should not play a game, he warned, but have to 
take responsibility for what they set in motion for long- 
term security.  While NATO could absorb "one, then two, 
and three states" from Russia's "sphere-of-influence" in 
the short-term, in doing so it set in motion new problems 
and tensions. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Karasin commented that regardless of NATO- 
Russia Council efforts, the Russian political and 
military establishment still feared NATO and "no one can 
kill that fear."  When Gorbachev had proposed "new 
thinking" about European security, the chance had been 
lost.  Karasin argued that a new generation of Russian 
and U.S. military could arrive at a new understanding of 
security.  Congressman Rohrabacher added that the Georgia 
crisis would be a catalyst for new thinking on NATO, with 
his personal view that NATO was increasingly a Cold War 
relic.  Karasin clarified that Russia did not fear the 
EU's expansion, and viewed politics based on economics in 
a fundamentally different light.  Nevertheless, Karasin 
ruled out the possibility of Russia joining the EU, 
commenting that inviting Russia would be akin to 
swallowing an elephant; however, Russia sought 
partnership with the EU.  Congressman Rohrabacher 
observed that with many EU markets frozen to Russian 
companies, India and not China was the natural market. 
Karasin agreed that "China is another story." 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Asked for ideas on how to demonstrate a new 
U.S. approach to Russia, Karasin said that the most 
important symbol of the current dysfunctional 
relationship was Jackson-Vanik.  While some officials 
sought to "tease" Russia with new conditions for its 
removal, if the U.S. were to unilaterally rescind it 
without any negotiations, but as an "outright gesture," 
the Russian leadership and public would take notice. 
Reviewing U.S. missile defense plans in Europe was 
another issue that could transform U.S.-Russian 
relations.  "Is missile defense in Poland and the Czech 
Republic really necessary?  Who is the genius behind this 
 
MOSCOW 00003615  004 OF 004 
 
 
idea?"  Arguing that current plans did not make the U.S. 
safer, Karasin called for a return to the drawing board, 
with Congressman Rohrabacher noting then-President 
Reagan's vision of a joint U.S.-Russia missile defense 
shield. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Congressman Rohrabacher pointed to 
cooperation in civilian nuclear energy ("123") as one 
example where relations should be revitalized quickly and 
highlighted the possibility of U.S.-Russian nuclear 
cooperation in India.  Noting his advocacy of the high 
temperature-gas cooled reactor, which was developed by 
Russian scientists, Congressman Rohrabacher commented 
that the fact it did not produce weapons-grade waste made 
it a preferred export model, including to countries like 
Venezuela, where Russia had business interests. 
 
Afghanistan 
--------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Explaining that his portfolio covered Central 
Asia, Karasin queried the Congressmen on the "real 
intentions" of the new Administration, including in 
Afghanistan.  Congressman Delahunt said that he expected 
campaign promises to be honored, which would produce a 
withdrawal from Iraq, with the exception of a residual 
force, and a broadening of the dialogue on Iran.  While 
it would take time to reestablish diplomatic relations, 
Congressman Delahunt noted that contacts existed between 
Congress and the Iranian majlis that could be expanded. 
In response to Congressman Rohrabacher's assessment that 
the U.S. and Russia could do more together in 
Afghanistan, Karasin agreed but said that cooperation 
would need to be worked out in advance ("like they do in 
the EU").  Wrapping up the meeting, Karasin said that if 
the U.S. and Russia could "pre-agree" on initiatives, 
they would be easier to implement, including with Kabul. 
 
BEYRLE