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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001505 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, NSC FOR FISK AND GARCIA, STATE PASS USOAS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADJOURNS AFTER ELECTION FRAUD 
LEADS TO POLITICAL IMPASSE 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1240 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In the wake of the fraudulent November 9 
municipal elections, the National Assembly concluded its 
legislative year on December 15 at an impasse as both the 
governing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the 
united opposition parties were unable to gather a quorum to 
promote their competing political agendas.  Through 
parliamentary maneuvers, the opposition had placed 
legislation on the Assembly's agenda to annul the recent 
municipal elections, but lacked the required votes to move 
the legislation to committee and ultimately to a floor vote. 
The FSLN, likewise, on two separate occasions failed to 
garner sufficient votes for a quorum to allow for the removal 
of the legislation from the agenda, which would be an 
indirect endorsement of the election results.  While not a 
complete victory for the opposition, this stalemate has 
thrown a wrench into the FSLN's plans to simply endorse the 
election results and move ahead with the President's 
legislative agenda, including constitutional reform.  The 
legislative deadlock also affected other pending economic 
legislation ranging from the approval of the 2009 national 
budget to votes accepting the terms of several international 
assistance loans.  The inability of the opposition to convene 
a quorum also hints at strains on the internal power dynamics 
of the main opposition party.  While the Assembly did 
eventually conclude its annual session on December 15, 
negotiations to find a resolution to the political impasse 
surely will continue into the legislative recess.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
The Legislation That Paralyzed the Assembly 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On November 16, deputies from the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) and the Nicaraguan Democratic Bloc 
(BDN, those aligned with Eduardo Montealegre's political 
movement Vamos con Eduardo) introduced legislation in the 
National Assembly to annul the results of the November 9 
municipal elections.  The draft law also called for new 
elections 45 days after the legislation became law and 
required the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to accredit 
observers for the new elections.  The draft law raised many 
questions about separation of powers.  The CSE is an 
independent branch of government, and the FSLN-dominated 
Supreme Court already had indicated it would find such a 
legislative action unconstitutional.  For this reason many 
Nicaraguans doubted the legislation would ever take effect. 
However, as Deputy Javier Vallejos (BDN) (a key opposition 
official on the Assembly's executive committee) told PolOff, 
the objective was to raise an obstacle to the FSLN's attempt 
to legitimize the municipal elections.  The opposition's 
difficulty, however, was its inability to find enough 
deputies to support the legislation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Both the opposition parties and the governing FSLN 
sought to demonstrate their dominance of the Assembly by 
competing to be the first to gather the necessary 47 deputies 
for a quorum to support their respective positions.  For the 
opposition this meant moving the election nullification 
legislation to committee and ultimately to a floor vote.  For 
the FSLN this meant convening a quorum that would act on a 
pre-set legislative agenda that did not include the draft law 
and thereby implicitly endorsed the election results.  On 
December 4 the opposition parties tried to convene a quorum 
and refer the legislation to committee, but were only able to 
gather 44 deputies.  These included deputies from the 
following parties: 25 from the PLC, 15 from the BDN, three 
from the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), and one 
independent.  On December 9, the FSLN tried to convene a 
quorum to push through its agenda, but only gathered 45 
deputies, which included: 38 from the FSLN, five from the 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), and two independents.  On 
December 15, the FSLN tried a second time to convene a 
quorum, but to the surprise of nearly all observers, it 
failed.  It fared worse than the week before as it gathered 
only 41 deputies, losing ALN deputies that had been present 
during the FSLN's December 9 effort. 
 
----------------------- 
What the Deadlock Means 
 
MANAGUA 00001505  002 OF 003 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The legislation to annul the elections paralyzed the 
Assembly.  With neither the opposition nor the governing FSLN 
able to gather the required 47 deputies to convene a quorum, 
other matters pending before the National Assembly also 
stalled.  This included the approval of the 2009 national 
budget, the approval of a series of international development 
loans for Nicaragua, the confirmation of central bank 
appointees, and the extension of voter identification cards 
that expire December 31, 2008, but that are needed by voters 
in the Atlantic coast for local elections that are scheduled 
for January 18, 2009. 
 
¶5.  (C) The legislative deadlock also signifies that the FSLN 
will need to pursue constitutional reform on a different 
timeline.  Prior to the November municipal elections, 
deputies from all parties understood that the FSLN would 
attempt to pass constitutional reform once before the end of 
2008 (reftel).  (Constitutional amendments must be passed in 
two consecutive legislative sessions.)  Given the widespread 
anger with the fraudulent municipal elections, the FSLN found 
itself in a difficult position to find the necessary 56 votes 
to pass any constitutional reform this year.  The FSLN has 
publicly stated its intention to seek the reforms during the 
2009-2010 legislative period (which is composed of two 
sessions).  In a press interview, Supreme Court Magistrate 
and confident to President Ortega Rafael Solis stated that 
there was still time to pass the constitutional reforms prior 
to the 2011 national elections.  (A key element to the 
constitutional reform is the provision permitting consecutive 
re-election of the president, which would allow Ortega to run 
in 2011.) 
 
¶6.  (C) While the National Assembly concluded this year's 
session on December 15 and will not reconvene until January 
9, 2009, both the opposition parties and the FSLN will 
continue to seek the coveted 47th deputy.  Deputy Agustin 
Jarquin, of the Christian Democratic Union that is aligned 
with the FSLN in the Assembly, told us that parliamentary 
rules allowed for the legislature to convene a special 
session during a recess.  Aside from furthering their current 
political agendas, both sides will seek 47 votes to support 
their candidates for the new executive committee (Junta 
Directiva) of the Assembly that must be elected upon the 
legislature's return on January 9, 2009.  As usual, the 
executive committee will be instrumental in setting the 
legislative agenda. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The paralysis of the Assembly and the unresolved 
election fraud have Nicaraguans guessing what role Arnoldo 
Aleman, the informal leader of the PLC, will play in 
resolving the current political crisis.  During past 
political deadlocks, Aleman has negotiated directly with 
Ortega to reach a compromise.  However, several contacts 
close to Aleman have asserted that Aleman is feeling 
pressured from various fronts but has refused to deal 
directly with Ortega thus far.  Given the massive election 
fraud, Aleman might fear a public backlash if he were to 
negotiate with the FSLN.  On the other hand, Aleman might 
also fear that fully supporting the opposition's challenge of 
the municipal elections would strengthen the 
increasingly-held perception of Eduardo Montealegre as the 
leader of the opposition and further marginalize Aleman from 
the political scene. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) While legislation to annul the fraudulent municipal 
elections was seen as a long shot, it served as a message by 
a unified opposition to the FSLN that at least one state 
institution was willing to challenge the government.  It also 
has been promising to see the opposition parties working 
together - the PLC, the BDN, and the MRS.  The opposition's 
collaboration thus far has fallen short of garnering the 
necessary votes to move the legislation forward, but perhaps 
more importantly has thwarted the FSLN's legislative agenda 
and timeline on constitutional reform.  We note that the 
legislative deadlock also has prevented the Assembly's 
approval of the GON's 2009 budget.  For the moment this has 
worked in favor of the opposition by increasing the pressure 
on Ortega with respect to international assistance 
disbursements, including from the IMF and the World Bank. 
 
MANAGUA 00001505  003 OF 003 
 
 
However, if it persists, the lack of an approved budget could 
very quickly be turned to a liability for the opposition if 
the GON-controlled media successfully place the blame for 
mounting donor assistance cuts on the opposition. 
 
¶9.  (C) This political impasse also hints at the strains 
within the PLC's internal party dynamics.  With the 
opposition unable to garner a simple majority of 47 deputies 
to support its legislation, members from various parties have 
questioned Aleman's position as the leader of the opposition. 
 Similarly, questions linger as to the sustainability of 
Montealegre's efforts as the leader of the unified opposition. 
CALLAHAN