VZCZCXRO2490
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1829/01 3571445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221445Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2584
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KHARTOUM 001829 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL UPDATE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1434 
B) ASMARA 592 
C) KHARTOUM 567 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Darfur's rebels remain fundamentally divided 
according to what their  leaders told poloff during a December 14-18 
visit to Ndjamena, Chad. The rebel leaders claim that JEM, while 
rich in vehicles and equipment, lacks fighters and the popular 
support of the people of Darfur.  Almost all contacts stated that 
SLA/Unity presents a formidable military force, but suffers from 
internal political division.  Rebel leaders also discussed the 
quickly-changing loyalties and defections between the movements, the 
relationship between JEM and the Government of Chad, the lagging 
peace process, and the visit of Abdul Wahid's field commanders to 
Paris. JEM's Foreign Secretary asserted that JEM would soon tackle 
by itself the problems of car jacking and banditry in Darfur. 
Overall, rebel leaders appear to focus more energy and attention on 
undermining rival movements and leaders (particularly the Justice 
and Equality Movement) than preparing for negotiations, working 
towards unity, or presenting their grievances against the Government 
of Sudan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  From December 14-18, TDY poloff met the following Darfur 
rebel movements, civil society leaders, and political 
representatives in Ndjamena, Chad: 
 
REBEL MOVEMENTS: 
-  Justice and Equality Movement:  Foreign Secretary Bushara Suliman 
Nour 
-  SLA/Unity:  Zubier Muktar Salim, Musa Ahmat Omar, Abdallah Yehia 
(conversation via satellite phone) 
-  SLA/Field Command:  Adam Ali Shogar 
-  Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front: Omar Hassan Mohammed, 
Salah Mohammed Abdrahman (a.k.a. Abu Surra) (phone conversation) 
-  JEM/Collective Leadership - Omar Bakhit Abaker 
 
OTHERS: 
- "The Neutral and Independent Committee:" Kamal Eldin Ibrahim 
-  Umma Party Representative: Toufiq Ali 
- Ahlem Friga-Noy, Political Officer, French Embassy, Ndjamena 
 
REBELS' ASSESSMENT OF JEM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  Almost all contacts said JEM's military strength is 
exaggerated.  (Comment:  We recognize the biased and self-interested 
opinions of these non-JEM rebel leaders.  End Comment.)  JEM does 
have the most vehicles and  sophisticated equipment, thanks to the 
Government of Chad, but it lacks the troops necessary to operate 
such  equipment, stated these sources.  Omar Bakhit, a former JEM 
member until 2007 (and now a deputy to Bahr Abu Gharda in the 
JEM/Collective Leadership) told poloff that Khalil Ibrahim's JEM has 
just over 50 vehicles, 350 soldiers, "and more money than it knows 
what to do with."  Due to this lack of troops, Bakhit added   JEM 
focuses its recruitment efforts in the internally- displaced persons 
camps in eastern Chad.  Other contacts, such as SLA/Unity's Salim, 
said that the majority of JEM's fighters are actually Chadians, many 
of whom are formally affiliated with the GoC's security and 
military.  (NOTE:  Rumors continue to circulate about an impending 
JEM attack on the Sudanese capital or elsewhere in the country. 
Sudanese Armed Forces conducted air and land exercises throughout 
Khartoum during the weekend of December 19-20.  One member of the 
AU/UN's Joint Mediation Support Team also reported that GOS 
officials told Joint Special Representative Adada that JEM had 
allegedly crossed the border with 300 vehicles.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Ibrahim, a self-described "unaffiliated Darfuri exile 
trying to unite the rebels," said that JEM is second to SLA/Unity in 
terms of military strength.   JEM has the next highest number of 
vehicles, though it is weak in terms of soldiers and popular 
support.  When discussing JEM's apparent strength, SLA/Unity 
contacts such as Zubier Salim, reiterated that relative strength 
among the Darfuri rebels can quickly change.  For example, according 
to Salim, in 2003 JEM had only 3 cars while Unity had more than 60. 
SLA/Field Command's Adam Ali Shogar separately agreed stating, 
"rather than view rebel movements in terms of their current 
strength, you need to evaluate the rebel movements by their presence 
in Darfur, their popular support, and their dependence on others." 
(Note:  Shogar is one of the most experienced rebels.  In 1992, he 
and several other leaders tried to launch an anti-NIF rebel group 
from Chadian territory.  End Note) 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Almost all contacts criticized what they termed JEM's 
hidden Islamic agenda, its alleged relationship with Popular 
Congress Party (PCP) leader Hassan Al-Turabi, and JEM leaders' 
former close relationship with the Sudanese Government. JEM/CL's 
 
KHARTOUM 00001829  002 OF 006 
 
 
Bakhit asserted that several PCP leaders (Ibrahim Al-Maz and Sadig 
Maro) left their positions in the PCP and joined JEM following the 
May 10 attack. SLA/Unity representatives also separately claimed 
that JEM has a *secret* Islamic agenda, with Musa Ahmet Omar saying, 
"Khalil Ibrahim will be worse than Bashir - you just wait and see." 
 
 
CONSENSUS ON SLM/UNITY'S MILITARY STRENGTH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  All rebel leaders, including JEM's Foreign Secretary, 
acknowledged SLM/Unity's military strength.   JEM's Foreign 
Secretary noted, "Unity is a real military power, if they are not 
divided politically."  Darfur activist Ibrahim believes that 
SLM/Unity is the strongest rebel movement with between 1,000-3,000 
men and over 100 vehicles.  SLM/Unity representatives stated that 
they have positions all over Darfur, but their largest camps are in 
Shegag Karo, Furawiya, Muahjarriaya, and East Jebel Marra.  Other 
representatives stated that Unity, which formerly had a presence 
only in North Darfur, is starting to move to the South (towards 
Jebel Marra and Tabit) and to the East towards Yassine, Haskanita, 
and Muhjarriya.  SLM/Unity's Salim said that his movement has 
approximately 65 vehicles.  Forty of these "technicals" are 
constantly moving to different SLA/Unity locations.  The others are 
based permanently around SLA/Unity locations in Furawiya, Shegag 
Karo, Birmaza, and Helif.  Abaker Kado remains the General Commander 
of SLA/Unity, stated Salim. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  All contacts, including Unity representatives, also 
acknowledged political difficulties within SLA/Unity. Unity's Salim 
said that this division is often exaggerated, but then added there 
is a power struggle between Suliman Jamous and Abdallah Yehia. 
Salim described particular SLM/Unity commanders as being in 
"Jamous's camp" or "Yehia's camp."  According to Salim, Suliman 
Jamous "changed" during his stay in the Kadugli hospital, and that 
after all of the publicity received, he became more concerned about 
taking on a leadership role in the movement.  All Unity contacts 
noted that SLA/Unity hopes to hold a party conference early in 2008. 
 The preparatory council for this conference has already been 
established, according to these sources.  The last time that 
SLA/Unity had a large party conference was in January 2008.  He 
expected that the next conference will be held near Birmaza, in 
North Darfur. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  SLM/Unity representatives, including Abdallah Yehia, 
downplayed their relationship with Minni Minnawi and strongly 
criticized him and SLM/MM as a whole.  Darfur Activist Ibrahim also 
separately agreed that Minnawi and SLA/Unity are not as close as 
some people think. (Comment:  This came as a surprise given 
Minnawi's repeated claims as well as numerous reports of close 
coordination and good relations with SLM/Unity.  End Comment.) 
Salim dismissed Minnawi as an irrelevant player in Darfur.  He said 
that Unity's commanders have distanced themselves from Minnawi since 
they asked for his permission to stage a coordinated attack on 
Darfur.  Salim said that these Unity commanders hoped to stage an 
attack on Darfur's cities by posing as SLM/MM ("as they can move 
freely wherever they want,") but that Minnawi refused this proposal. 
 Salim said he is more interested in improving coordination with 
SLM/Field Command's Adam Ali Shogar and SLM/AW's Suliman Marjan than 
working with Minnawi. 
 
REBELS' RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  All rebels (including JEM) told poloff  that Chad's 
support to JEM remains strong, though representatives from the 
diplomatic community resident in Ndjamena cautioned that Deby may be 
stepping away from JEM.  SLA/Unity representative Omar said that JEM 
continues to receive direct support from Chad.  Many other rebels 
all separately claimed that Khalil Ibrahim maintains a base and is 
located in Njaras (phonetic), Eastern Chad, most of the time. JEM's 
Foreign Secretary Bushara Suliman claimed the GOC's support for JEM 
remains strong, as the GOC feels indebted to JEM for coming to its 
aid during Chadian rebel attacks. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  French Political Officer Friga-Noy based in Ndjamena 
believes that President Deby is intentionally backing away from JEM 
as "we have entered a new period in JEM-GOC relations."  According 
to Friga-Noy, the Chadian Government allows rebels to operate 
throughout Chad ("as many Zaghawa rebels crossed the border seeking 
refuge with their Chadian brethren,") but that its direct support, 
especially for JEM, has dramatically decreased over the last few 
months. As evidence, Friga-Noy asserted that the number of JEM 
representatives in Ndjamena has significantly decreased, and that 
the appointment of former JEM point-person Dausa Deby, the 
President's brother, as Ambassador of Libya signals a change in the 
GoC's attitude to JEM.  Friga-Noy dismissed JEM's claims of ongoing 
 
KHARTOUM 00001829  003 OF 006 
 
 
support from the GoC saying, "When JEM is in danger their 
representatives often talk about how great their relationship is 
with the GoC."  (Note:  On this point, SLA Unity's Omar claimed that 
Dausa Deby's appointment as Ambassador of Libya will not 
dramatically affect JEM's relationship with the GOC, because other 
officials such as the Sultan of Timane, Abd Al Rahim Bahr, are more 
involved in coordination with JEM.  Umma Party Representative and 
civil society leader Toufiq Ali also said that the government of 
Chad is engaging in "political theater."  According to him, Chad has 
not significantly reduced its support of the rebel movements, but is 
only being more discrete and quiet about its relationship with the 
rebel movements.  End Note) 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  SLA/Unity's Salim said that the GoC's support for JEM 
comes not only in military hardware, but also in recruitment for the 
movement.  In his view, President Deby has tried to bring other 
rebels into the fold by offering money to prominent SLA/Unity leader 
Suliman Jamous to join JEM - an offer Jamous rejected.  As for 
Unity's own relationship with Chad, Ibrahim said it was "weak." 
URF's Bakhit was more direct, saying, "If Chad ends its support to 
JEM, Khalil Ibrahim is done." 
 
PEACE PROCESS 
- - - - - - - 
¶13.  (SBU)  JEM continues to engage with the peace process, while 
SLA/Unity and the other smaller movements voiced skepticism and 
pessimism about the Chief Mediator, Qatari involvement, and the 
overall process.  JEM's Foreign Secretary stated that JEM is working 
closely with Bassole. In their most recent meetings with Bassole on 
December 16, JEM urged the latter to talk to Chad and focus on 
Chad-Sudan relations.  According to Suliman, Deby is still 
suspicious about Bassole, and believes he may have been co-opted by 
the Sudanese Government.  Suliman also said that JEM is working with 
other rebel movements on drafting a "framework agreement between the 
rebel movements prior to negotiations."  (Note:  SLA/Unity said that 
discussions had not significantly progressed with JEM on this 
document. URF Representative said that they had not been consulted 
by JEM about this platform.  End Note.)  Suliman also confidently 
asserted that in order for negotiations to succeed, only three rebel 
movements are needed at the table: JEM, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, and 
Unity. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  SLA/Unity's leader Abdallah Yehia told poloff via 
satellite phone that press reports from December 16, announcing that 
SLA/Unity had rejected peace negotiations in Qatar, were incorrect. 
Yehia admitted that he was skeptical about the Qatari involvement, 
and that Unity had not been in direct communication with the Qataris 
and therefore could not make a decision on their involvement.  Yehia 
said that he assigned Unity's Sharif Harir (currently in Asmara, 
reftel b) to lead the negotiations for his movement.  Yehia said 
that Unity demands that any negotiations must be separate from 
discussions on postponing an ICC indictment, and that Unity believes 
only "getting rid of this Islamic regime will bring peace to 
Darfur." 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Despite being in semi-regular contact with the JMST 
(namely Boubou Niang,) Yehia said that the relationship between the 
Chief Mediator and the Qataris was unclear.  Yehia stated that it is 
regrettable that Bassole has not been able to meet him in the field. 
 Unity's Salim was more direct, saying that SLA/Unity has not been 
adequately included in the peace process.  According to this 
representative, Chief Mediator Bassole has only conducted meetings 
with senior Unity representatives over the phone - something that 
"is not acceptable for SLA/Unity." 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Other rebel leaders from smaller movements such as 
JEM/Collective Leadership and SLA/Field Command were even more 
critical of the peace process.  "If only JEM and Abdul Wahid sign an 
agreement, that will never solve the problems of Darfur," said Omar 
Bakhit.  Abu Surra, the leader of one of the largest Arab rebel 
movements, said that the peace process must include disaffected 
Arabs, and threatened, "if you want to see a real rebellion, wait 
and see the Arab reaction if they cut another deal with just the 
Zaghawa or the Fur." 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Darfur activist and Umma party representative Toufiq Ali 
commented that he believes the Justice and Equality movement is 
trying to prevent  other more legitimate movements from taking the 
lead in peace negotiations. Ali claimed that JEM is significantly 
weaker following the Omdurman attack, and therefore ready to cut a 
deal with the GoS. 
 
DEFECTIONS, SHIFTING LOYALTIES, AND COMPETING CLAIMS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶18.  (SBU)  All rebel representatives described frequent defections, 
 
KHARTOUM 00001829  004 OF 006 
 
 
shifting alliances, and an overall chaotic, fractured, and dynamic 
rebel landscape. For example, multiple representatives from 
differing movements claimed the loyalty of prominent field 
commanders, and debated whether the United Resistance Front actually 
still exists.  Almost all contacts said that both Sudanese 
newspapers and written statements on rebel websites and dissident 
bulletin boards cannot be trusted, and often publish misinformation 
to distort the image of the rebels and create confusion. 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  All rebels did agree, however, that Adam Bakhit of SLA 
Field Command did defect from the United Resistance Front (URF) to 
SLM/Minni Minnawi. Adam Ali Shogar was very critical of his former 
SLA/Field Command partner, saying that that it has been over two 
years since Adam Bakhit has been in the field.  (Note:  When a 
member of URF, Adam Bakhit was its e Chief Commander  and Shogar 
was the General Secretary.  End Note.)  According to Shogar, Bakhit 
left with only three cars and a handful of men, while his own forces 
control the remaining 30 vehicles.  JEM/CL's Bakhit says that the 
URF lives on after Bakhit's departure, as Abdallah Banda has assumed 
responsibility as URF's chief military commander. 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  SLA/Unity representatives (including Abdallah Yehia) 
denied that SLA/Unity commanders Sadiq Baro and Salah Jerbo had 
defected to JEM (as previously claimed by JEM's Bushara Suliman and 
as published in a written statement in SudaneseOnline.com.) (Note: 
Jerbo is widely rumored to be under investigation from the 
International Criminal Court.  End Note.)  With respect to Jerbo, 
Omar stated, "We did not kick him out of the movement, but if the 
ICC calls for him, we will immediately turn him over to the court." 
Yehia also denied expelling Osman Bushra from Unity, and said that 
the press release attributed to him on Sudanese Online was part of 
the Government's misinformation campaign.  SLM/FC's Shogar claimed 
that Salah Jerbo is actually independent of all movements, and 
believes that Unity adopts many different autonomous commanders 
without securing their loyalty or commanding their actions. 
 
¶21.  (SBU)  All movements except for JEM/CL claimed that the URF had 
completely disbanded (reftel C).  JEM/CL's Bakhit, however, insisted 
that URF lives on in four groups led by the following individuals: 
1) Khamis Abdallah (currently in Nairobi from the Masalit tribe) and 
his field commander Haidir Gola Koma.  2)  Sharif Adam Nasr from the 
former NMRD.  3)  Ibrahim Zubeidi  from the Arab dominated URFF 4) 
Bahr Abu Gharda of JEM Collective Leadership.  Bakhit said that Bahr 
is currently East of Muhajarriya and claimed that URF has a strong 
presence in Jebel Marra, Graida, Yassine, Muhajarriya, and Haskaina. 
Upon hearing Bakhit's claims of URF's strength, Darfur activist and 
head of the "Neutral Committee" Ibrahim commented, "URF is done. 
Bahar Abu Gharda is just dreaming that the URF exists and sees it as 
the only way to prove himself."  Shogar separately agreed, and said 
that he only entered URF on a trial basis.  Ibrahim added that Abu 
Gharda has less than ten cars, and that Abu Gharda now focuses his 
efforts on "poaching" members of rival movements such as Mansour 
Irbab, the General Secretary of Khamis Abdallah.  Of the former URF 
members, Ibrahim speculated that Khamis Abdallah is the strongest, 
while Adam Ali Shogar has a small, though respectable force. 
(Note:  Shogar claimed that he controls the area between Birmaza and 
Omr Rahik in particular an area called Omraras south of Muzbet.  He 
said that in September, he took six cars from the Government of 
Sudan, a significant addition to his force.  Despite his claims, 
Shogar admitted that it is difficult to sustain his movement, and 
added that he is envious of JEM's continued support from the GOC. 
End Note.) 
 
PLEA FOR UNIFICATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶22.  (SBU)  Almost all rebel representatives except for JEM 
requested assistance from the U.S. in helping unite Darfur's rebel 
movements.   According to Shogar, Khalil Ibrahim, Bahr Abu Gharda, 
and Jibril Tek need to come to a common understanding and reunite 
the Justice and Equality Movement, while SLA/Field Command, Unity, 
Abdul Shafie, Abdul Wahid, Minni Minnawi, and Khamis Abdallah should 
focus on unification efforts among the former SLA.  Unification will 
require outside help.  This is such a big project that "no single 
leader today will be able to unite the movements by himself." 
Shogar predicted that there will be no progress in Darfur without 
unification of the movements.  JEM/CL's Bakhit separately requested 
US support for unification efforts among the rebel movements.  He 
said that although uniting with his former JEM colleagues might be 
impossible, JEM/CL and URF could easily unite with Abdul Wahid and 
SLA/Unity. 
 
¶23.  (SBU)  Kamal Eldin Ibrahim of "The Neutral and Independent 
Committee" believes that his organization presents the only hope for 
unification of Darfur's rebels.  Started in December 2007, the 
organization seeks to remain impartial to any group, while working 
 
KHARTOUM 00001829  005 OF 006 
 
 
for the "unity of the revolutionary movements."  (Note:  Materials 
from the "Neutral and Independent Committee" are available from Post 
on request.  End Note.)  According to Ibrahim, if the following 
individuals agree to work towards unification, the rebel movements 
can become united again and overthrow the Sudanese Government:  1) 
Khalil Ibrahim (JEM)  2)  Bahr Abu Gharda (JEM/Collective 
Leadership)  3) Sharif Harir (SLA/Unity)  4)  Adam Ali Shogar 
(SLA/Field Command)  5)  Suliman Jamous (SLA/Unity)  6)  Abdallah 
Yehia (SLA/Unity) 7) Adam Bahkit (SLM/MM). 
 
¶24.  (SBU)  Even before unification, Ibrahim believes that military 
coordination, based on geographic alliances, can lead to rebel 
unification.  He said that his committee has established 
coordinators for each region of Darfur. The following individuals 
are in contact with all rebel movements and will coordinate their 
regional efforts when attacked by the GoS:  1) Suliman Marjan (Helif 
/ Midob)  2)  Salah Mohammad (Berti areas)  3)  Jar Al-Nabi 
(Hashaba, North of Kas)  4)  Muhammad Terrada (Jebel Marra) 
 
ABDUL WAHID'S COMMANDERS TRAVEL TO PARIS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶25. (SBU)  French political officer in Ndjamena, Friga Noy stated 
that France discretely facilitated the travel of three senior field 
commanders for Abdul Wahid Al-Nur.  Abaker Kenso, Salah Al-Din Tur, 
and Muhammad Nimr to Paris during the week of December 14.  The 
commanders first traveled to Ndjamena and then were flown to Paris. 
She said that the field commanders are more interested in 
participating in negotiations than Abdul Wahid, and that the French 
see this as a way of putting pressure on him. 
 
JEM PLEDGES TO TAKE ON CAR JACKING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶26. (SBU)  According to JEM's Foreign Secretary, Bushara Suliman, 
JEM will soon start targeting the perpetrators of car jackings and 
banditry in Darfur.  Suliman emphasized that this phenomenon damages 
the image of the rebels, prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid 
to the region, and empowers the Government.  Suliman accused former 
JEM military commander, Jibril Tek, as one of the main "criminals" 
responsible for banditry along the Chad-Sudan border.  (Note: 
Jibril Abdel Karim Bahri 'Tek', a Zaghawa Kabka from Chad, was one 
of JEM's military leaders until his dismissal in February 2004. 
After his dismissal he went on to found the NMRD.  End Note.)  SLA 
Unity's Omar separately claimed that "as a movement" SLM/Unity has 
not been involved in car jacking, and that SLM/Unity helped the UN 
retrieve approximately 40 stolen vehicles. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶27.  (SBU)  The fragmentation of the rebel groups and animosity 
among them is troubling.  Even though some of the rebel leaders 
mentioned above are of marginal importance at the moment (e.g. 
former URF,) they could undermine the peace process.  They also 
could  continue to make Darfur a chaotic and violent region, even if 
there is progress in peace negotiations with the larger groups. 
Almost all contacts seem to agree that SLA/Unity carries significant 
military force, while admitting its political problems and 
personality conflicts among n Jamous, Harir, and Yehia.  In our 
view, SLM/Unity should receive more attention from the Chief 
Mediator; Bassole would benefit from meeting individually with 
Jamous, Harir, and Yehia.  Perhaps the common theme drawn from all 
of the meetings was the need for UNAMID to be better informed.  The 
lack of good intelligence on rebel movements, their positions, and 
their relative strengths makes it possible for rebel leaders to make 
unsubstantiated and inaccurate claims.  To date, UNAMID has not 
definitively mapped rebel positions, leaving this an open area for 
debate among the movements. 
 
¶28.  (SBU)  Former AU/UN mediators Salim and Eliasson spent  much of 
2007 focusing on  unification efforts that ultimately proved 
unrealistic.  Nevertheless, there still exists the possibility of 
unifying some SLA factions.    That said, such unification is a long 
term project, and one that we would recommend not be a top priority 
for the Chief Mediator.  As long as diverse personalities, vested 
interests, and ethnic differences dominate Darfur's rebel groups, 
the latter will remain divided, and Darfur's long-sought-after peace 
will remain elusive. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) The focus of the Chief Mediator, UNAMID, and the 
international community in early 2009 should be on defining 
unilateral security commitments that the GOS can take within the 
framework of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism.  According to UNAMID, 
the majority of offensive military actions in Darfur during 2009 
were taken by the GOS, though some in the context of (allegedly) 
routing out bandits; reducing or eliminating these actions would 
dramatically reduce the amount of violence in Darfur.  Meanwhile the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001829  006 OF 006 
 
 
Chief Mediator, UNAMID, and the international community can continue 
to urge rebels to sign onto a security framework and more clearly 
define their political demands.  If the GOS commits to unilateral 
security steps and lives up to them during 2009, cutting off support 
to rebels from Chad and Libya (and to a lesser extent from Eritrea) 
while offering a reasonable deal for them to sign onto when ready 
may be the only realistic approach to winding down the conflict over 
time. 
 
ASQUINO