VZCZCXRO7505
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1792/01 3511357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161357Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2541
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001792 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, PRM 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS EAID ASEC KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOSS VIEWS ON ABYEI VIOLENCE, CONCERNS OF SPILLOVER ALONG 
NORTH-SOUTH BORDER 
 
REFS:  A. Khartoum 1786 
¶B. Khartoum 1718 
¶C. Khartoum 1767 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a December 13 meeting with the Juba 
diplomatic corps, select Abyei Commissioners and GOSS Ministers 
placed responsibility for the December 12 gun battle in Abyei town 
(ref. A) on the Government of National Unity's  (GNU) rejection of 
international assistance for the Abyei Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) 
and on Khartoum's own failure to fund the SAF JIU contingent. 
Although forces are now separated, GOSS, Abyei, and UNMIS officials 
expressed concern about possible SAF retaliation.  UNMIS is 
reviewing Sector Six tripwires in addition to contingency planning 
for renewed violence in both Abyei and along the North/South border. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
DESPITE TENSIONS IN ABYEI, SAF REJECTS CALL FOR JDB 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On December 13, Abyei Chief Administrator Arop Mayok 
joined UNMIS SRSG Ashraf Qazi, the Force Commander, and Southern 
Sector Resident Coordinator David Gressly in Abyei in response to 
concerns by UN Abyei staff about the likelihood of imminent 
escalation.  Both Benjamin and Deng similarly noted the GOSS remains 
"gravely concerned" about potential retaliation following the death 
of two SAF soldiers December 12.  SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations MG James Hoth told CG Juba on December 13 that SAF 
counterparts are resisting SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak's call 
for an immediate session of the Joint Defense Board.  SAF leadership 
argued that it would be inappropriate to meet while National JIU 
Commander Thomas Cirillo remained outside of Sudan. 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
GOSS BLAMES FIREFIGHT ON ROADMAP FAILURE 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
¶3. (SBU) That same morning, Abyei Agriculture Commissioner Kuol 
Arop, GOSS Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, GOSS 
Minister for Regional Cooperation Barnabas Marial Benjamin, and GOSS 
Minister for Gender and Social Welfare Mary Kiden met with Juba's 
diplomatic corps to seek  additional funding for the Abyei region 
following the GNU's decision to allot less than $1 million to the 
region in its 2009 national budget: 500,000 SDG for Abyei's 
executive branch and 600,000 SDG for its legislative structures. 
(NOTE:  Both the GNU and the GoSS face sharp declines in oil 
revenues (ref B).  Transfers to states and to the GoSS are to fall 
14 percent under the GNU's 2009 budget.  The GOSS, citing falling 
oil prices, will not be able to budget any funds for Abyei in its 
2009 budget.  However, the larger issue is the GNU's delay in 
disbursing any significant amount of the substantial oil revenues 
which have been set aside for the Abyei Administration under the 
Roadmap Agreement.  The GNU claims this is because the Interim 
Administration does not yet have financial mechanisms in place; this 
issue must be resolved immediately between the GNU and the Abyei 
Interim Administration and the Embassy will continue to push for 
this to happen. END NOTE). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Agricultural Commissioner Arop charged that the December 12 
Abyei incident was triggered by "SAF 31st Brigade entrepreneurs" 
unhappy with the Abyei Administration's decision to relocate the 
town market, and by Khartoum's discomfort with the continued 
integration of Misseriya militias into the SPLA. (NOTE:  Arop 
contends the recent decision to move six SAF brigades into South 
Kordofan was an attempt to intimidate Misseriya SPLA recruits, 
though the GOS contends it is necessary to secure oil areas from JEM 
attacks.  END NOTE.)  The Abyei Administration, in collaboration 
with UNDP, has seized upon the May 2008 destruction of Abyei town to 
initiate broad-based urban planning within the town and its 
peripheral urban areas as a means to speed both economic growth and 
IDP returns, while also limiting future tensions between townspeople 
and transiting Misseriya pastoralists.  Arop contends that much of 
the current "regenerated market" in Abyei town is organized around 
SAF 31st Brigade soldiers who shed their SAF uniforms shortly after 
the May violence and established businesses on the remains of the 
market area.  (COMMENT:  In other areas along the 1956 border, the 
SPLA has accused such "SAF traders" of being SAF infiltrators 
waiting to reactivate in case of renewed conflict between SAF/SPA. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to both Arop and Minister for Presidential 
Affairs Luka Biong Deng, on December 12 one SAF officer became 
"belligerent" while Abyei officials spoke with traders about the 
need to relocate the market.  At that time, Abyei officials brought 
in an SPLA JIU officer into the argument who ordered the SAF soldier 
 
KHARTOUM 00001792  002 OF 003 
 
 
to report to "local Abyei police."  According to Deng, the SAF 
soldier then became "problematic" for the police, and ran from a 
physical altercation back to the SAF JIU barracks.  He returned with 
a contingent of JIU SAF soldiers on whom scared police opened fire, 
at which point the SAF returned fire.  Two SAF were killed and five 
wounded, with two police and two civilians also injured during the 
battle. 
 
¶6. (SBU) GoSS Minister for Regional Cooperation Barnabas Marial 
Benjamin and Presidential Affairs Minister Biong Deng both argued 
that this latest incident is not a reflection of issues between 
Abyei residents, but rather is rooted in frustration due to 
Khartoum's failure to implement the Abyei Roadmap.  "If the Joint 
Integrated Units were appropriately catered to by the Government of 
National Unity we would not have seen violence yesterday," Biong 
Deng asserted.  "We continue to supply the SPLA JIU contingent with 
direct assistance through the SPLA, despite the fact this is a duty 
of the national government in Khartoum.  They maintain it is a 
question of funding priorities, yet continue to reject offers of 
assistance from the like of Norway and the United Kingdom." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Local officials continue to make progress despite a lack 
of assistance from Khartoum, they said.  The December 5 meeting 
between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya traditional leaders (ref. C) 
culminated in the group's joint condemnation of the May violence and 
subsequent looting in Abyei, in addition to agreement that Misseriya 
pastoralists would travel into Abyei region unarmed.  (NOTE:  For 
the purposes of this latest agreement the region is defined as the 
totality of the ceasefire zone, including Former Western Kordofan -- 
an area not included in the Abyei Roadmap, but included in the CPA's 
Abyei Protocol.  UNMIS notes that SAF continues to refuse to permit 
UNMIS to patrol north of the Abyei Roadmap area (which is a 
reduction of the area delineated by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement) and so UNMIS' ability to monitor Misseriya commitment to 
this agreement is constrained.  END NOTE). 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
PROGRESS IN ABYEI MOVES FLASH-POINTS ELSEWHERE 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Deng fears that Khartoum's unhappiness with reconciliation 
at the Abyei local level will lead it to use Misseriya elsewhere 
along the 1956 North/South border to a "trigger a situation" that 
would provoke direct SAF/SPLA confrontation.  UNMIS Civil Affairs 
Acting Head Diane De Guzman endorsed this concern, noting a recent 
decision by SPLA to pull back from Abiennmon County in Unity State 
rather than risk confrontation with Misseriya groups that allegedly 
had recently been visited by NISS ersonnel assigned to the Unity 
oil fields.  Regional Cooperation Minister Benjamin also underscored 
Deng's point, saying that he had just left a meeting of the Southern 
Sudan Defense Council focused on the early-morning December 13 
arrival of 3,000 armed Misseriya in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NGEG) 
north of the state capital of Aweil.  Minister Benjamin reported 
that this group is equipped with gun-mounted vehicles, heavy and 
light weapons, and wear military uniforms.  According to Benjamin, 
the GOSS received reports of limited attacks on the (recently 
disarmed) civilian population and initial displacements, and that 
while the Area Joint Military Committee was set to convene shortly, 
"it is important that we have immediate international engagement on 
the issue because, while we are already reaching out to the NCP, we 
believe they will attempt to downplay the situation as usual." 
Commissioner Arop opined that Khartoum may have encouraged early 
Misseriya migration to NBEG in an attempt to undermine the agreement 
to transit the Abyei region unarmed.  (NOTE:  Others we have talked 
to, including Abyei Commissioner Mayok (ref. C), blame the early 
migration on the early end of the rainy season.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) UNMIS military observers (protect) assigned to Aweil told 
Acting CG on December 13 that reports of "armed Misseriya in 
uniform" are credible, and that the AJMC would be meeting "shortly" 
despite protests from SAF representatives that nomad migrations are 
outside of its mandate.  UN humanitarian agencies are assessing 
displacement levels, but are confident that contingency plans for 
natural disasters would allow for rapid and appropriate rollout of 
support to affected civilian populations, assuming the situation 
remains restive. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Acting CG met with SPLA D/COS (Operations) James Hoth to 
ascertain what measures the SPLA would take to protect civilian 
populations given the recent civilian disarmament in the area.  Hoth 
allowed that discussion with SPLA CoS MG Oyai Deng Ajak are still 
ongoing, but that GOSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit already had 
ordered the SPLA to exercise maximum restraint until a Joint Defense 
Board meeting could be convened. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001792  003 OF 003 
 
 
--- --- 
COMMENT 
--- --- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The December 12 incident shows clearly that Abyei remains 
a dangerous flashpoint and underscores the urgent need for credible 
implementation of the Roadmap.  In order to obstruct Dinka-Misseriya 
reconciliation, the NCP continues to hobble the capacity of the new 
Administration:  withholding revenues (now estimated to be at least 
$20 million) to which the Administration is entitled under the 
Roadmap, thwarting offers from Norway and the UK to assist the Abyei 
JIU, and refusing to allow UNMIS to monitor all of Southern Kordofan 
state as stipulated in the CPA.  While we are skeptical of GoSS 
suspicions that Khartoum wants to provoke a major incident that 
could lead back to war at this time, that the GoSS harbors such 
serious concerns shows just how tense the situation is and the 
limits of President Kiir's ability to restrain increasingly 
dissatisfied front-line SPLA.  The greater danger is that even a 
minor incident in Abyei could quickly draw nearby SAF and SPLA units 
into a general melee, as happened in May.  Embassy Khartoum will 
continue to urge restraint and will push the GNU to disburse funds 
to the Abyei Interim Administration immediately. 
 
ASQUINO