VZCZCXRO8519
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1755/01 3391407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041407Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2489
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001755 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MACHAR PERSISTS IN EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WITH THE LRA 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request for AF/SPG, please see paragraph 
¶11. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: Despite the latest failure of LRA leader Joseph 
Kony to sign the Juba Peace Accord, Chief LRA Peace Negotiator and 
Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riak Machar persists in 
his belief that it is better to continue peace talks than to pursue 
military options against Kony.  Kony, he said, cannot easily be 
killed or captured, and attempts to do so will result in the LRA 
taking to the field again, resulting in the deaths of thousands and 
the displacement of tens of thousands of innocent civilians 
throughout the region.  Machar is traveling to the DRC on December 4 
to discuss possible strategies for peacefully containing Kony there. 
End Summary. End summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting with ConGen Juba on December 3, GOSS Vice 
President Riak Machar confessed his frustration with the latest 
failure of Joseph Kony to sign the Juba Peace Accords.  However, 
despite the refusal of Kony since April of this year to agree to end 
hostilities, Machar remains firm in his belief that there is no 
viable alternative to the peace process.  Kony, he said, has been 
able to elude capture for over 15 years, and provoking him back into 
hostilities will only result in more innocent civilian deaths and 
displacement. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Machar said he had sent letters to President Museveni of 
Uganda and President Kabila of the DRC outlining his intention to 
continue to pursue the peaceful containment of Kony.  He told ConGen 
Juba he would travel to DRC on December 4 to discuss Kabila's plans 
for dealing with Kony, and to encourage him to give Kony safe 
sanctuary in a remote area of DRC where he and his LRA forces can 
live in peace so long as they refrain from operations against the 
civilian population in the region. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Asfor a military option to end the LRA threat once and for 
all, Machar said that the DRC is weak and lacks the capacity to 
engage Kony, who has proven himself adept over the last two decades 
at avoiding capture even against more capable forces.  Further, his 
information was that the DRC would not allow foreign forces to enter 
DRC to confront Kony.  Therefore, in his view it was better to give 
Kony a little food and let him sit peacefully in an isolated area of 
Congo rather than provoke him into new military action that would be 
sure to result in a new round of civilian misery and suffering. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the meantime, Machar said that with Kony contained he 
could continue his efforts to try to convince him to sign the Juba 
Peace Accords and lay down his arms.  The primary obstacle to Kony 
signing the accord, said Machar, was his suspicion that Uganda would 
turn him over to the ICC to stand trial.  Kony insists that the ICC 
warrants must be suspended before he will consider signing. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Machar said he was convinced that Kony still does not 
properly understand the terms of the Juba Peace Accords, especially 
the sections related to the ICC warrants, and he said he remains 
convinced that over time it would be possible to bring Kony along. 
Kony has asked for, and Machar would like to provide him with, an 
independent lawyer who can better explain the mechanism contained in 
the accords that will allow Kony to be tried in Uganda and avoid ICC 
prosecution. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Machar requested USG support for his continuing efforts to 
contain Kony, including funds to help feed the LRA as long as Kony 
stays contained, and money to hire a lawyer to advise him on the 
terms of the Juba Peace Accords.  ConGen Juba warned Machar that 
such financial assistance was very unlikely, but that his request 
would be passed on to Washington. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In subsequent talks with members of the SPLA and the GOSS, 
GonGen Juba found there was little support for continued engagement 
by Machar in his talks with the LRA leader.  However, inside sources 
also indicate that GOSS President Kiir does not want an open 
confrontation with Machar over this issue, and so is not inclined to 
force Machar to suspend his quixotic efforts.  It is expected that 
Machar will go to Congo on December 4 to talk to Kabila. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: While everyone ConGen Juba speaks to in the GOSS 
is heartily sick of Kony and would like to see an end to these 
endless and apparently futile peace talks, no one seems to have a 
viable alternative at this time for effectively dealing with the LRA 
leader - and Machar has a point that diplomatic engagement with Kony 
is better than a return to outright hostilities, which will hurt the 
civilian populations in the area.  If it is true that the DRC will 
not allow foreign troops to engage the LRA in the Congo, it seems 
highly unlikely that Kony can, in fact, be brought to bay. Machar's 
continuing interest in prolonging this charade has more to do with 
his own position within the GOSS than events in neighboring 
 
KHARTOUM 00001755  002 OF 002 
 
 
countries. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Action Request: GOSS Vice President Machar has requested 
USG financial assistance with his plan to contain Kony, and ConGen 
Juba will need to provide an answer.  We do not suggest providing 
such assistance.  Post does request guidance on a formal response to 
VP Machar's request. 
 
FERNANDEZ