VZCZCXRO8516
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1754/01 3391400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041400Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2487
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001754 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: RESPECTED CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER FEARS NCP REVERSION TO 
RADICALISM 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1549 
KHARTOUM 1504 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: NCP members accepted numerous recommendations from 
civil society leaders at the Sudan People's Initiative, including 
the formation of a consultative Presidential Council, but have shown 
no interest in actually carrying them out, the SPI drafting 
chairman, Khartoum University Professor Tayeb Hajj Atia, told 
polchief in a meeting on December 3. Attia also stated that the NCP 
remains bitterly divided on the Darfur issue and it is unclear who 
(if anyone) is leading the Darfur portfolio, though President Bashir 
reportedly dispatched Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie to Qatar on December 2. 
Attia also stated that there was widespread discontent within the 
NCP over the lack of decisive leadership and that Presidential 
Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahedeen and several other moderates have 
tendered their resignations in the past two weeks, though they were 
not accepted. He expressed grave concern that the regime's 
hardliners and Islamic fundamentalists were clustering around Bashir 
as its moderates were turning away, and feared the issuance of an 
ICC arrest warrant would only exacerbate this trend. End Summary. 
 
NO HOPES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SPI RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On December 3, polchief met with Professor Atayeb Hajj 
Attia, the Director of the Peace Research Center of the University 
of Khartoum who was enlisted at the last minute (despite his initial 
reluctance) to serve as Chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 
Sudan People's Initiative (SPI) in Kenana (ref A). His prominence at 
the SPI surprised many observers, perhaps none more than the 
professor himself. A mere week before the event, he had little 
interest in it and no plans to attend, preferring instead to 
continue his work on conflating the numerous civil society proposals 
on Darfur into a comprehensive background document (ref B). This 
changed when senior NCP officials approached him with a formal 
invitation. "I laid down conditions for my participation, and told 
them if they were not met I would walk away," he said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) During the SPI, Attia was thrust into the role of advising 
President Bashir on protocol, agenda and other matters in Kenana. He 
characterized the closed door meetings with President Bashir and his 
close advisors as very positive, noting that "they accepted all of 
our recommendations," including the formation of a consultative 
Presidential Council. But he was pessimistic that any of the adopted 
recommendations would actually be implemented. "Once the final 
speeches were made, everyone packed up their bags and left," he 
said. "It's over." 
 
NCP INTERNAL STRUGGLES 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Attia also noted that despite nominal and public consensus 
among the NCP, it was clear from the closed door sessions that key 
personnel remain divided on how to move forward in Darfur. "You 
could see the suppressed tensions," he said. "They tried their best 
not to reveal their differences in front of us (outsiders), but it 
was quite obvious," he said. It remains unclear who holds the lead 
on the Darfur portfolio, he said, noting that Salah Ghosh and 
representatives from the National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS) was conspicuously absent from the SPI, although many noted 
that Taha seemed to be calling the shots at Kenana, even silencing 
Nafie at one point. He also stated that President Bashir has sent 
Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie to Qatar, "but no one knows 
why." However, he was confident that there was "no way" that rebels 
would agree to meet with Nafie. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Attia speculated that there was widespread discontent 
within the NCP and that the party was beginning to resemble a 
rudderless ship. "They're at a stage where no one is making 
decisions," he said. "There's no process or mechanisms. They're just 
drifting." Several senior NCP figures have tendered their 
resignations within the past two weeks he said, including moderate 
Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahedeen. Ghazi's resignation was 
not accepted and the regime was trying to decide how to deal with 
this and other resignations, he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Attia also expressed grave concern that the regime's 
hardliners and Islamic fundamentalists (such as Bashir's advisor on 
Koranic matters) were clustering around Bashir as its moderates were 
turning away. "They're telling him that by targeting him, the ICC is 
targeting Islam," he said. If the easily swayed Bashir becomes 
susceptible to these modes of thinking, "we should expect a 
withdrawal of moderate voices and a decision-making process that is 
 
KHARTOUM 00001754  002 OF 002 
 
 
completely obscured," he said. The issuance of an ICC arrest warrant 
would only exacerbate this situation, he said. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVE CONTINUES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Despite his forecasts of doom and gloom, Attia plans to 
continue his vigorous work on compiling the proposals and 
recommendations of nine separate Darfurian civil society initiatives 
into one comprehensive background document, something he 
characterized as completely separate from the SPI. "This has nothing 
to with the SPI whatsoever," he said. "It is a Darfurian document. 
We're just the editors," he said. The document will not offer 
recommendations, he said, but rather serve as a backgrounder for all 
the stakeholders of the Darfur crisis, including the international 
community. "There are many people who need something to read," he 
said. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A 140-page draft of the backgrounder is in now existence 
and is expected to be completed within two weeks, said Attia, though 
funds to publish it are lacking and as of yet, no plans exist to 
translate it into English. Attia and his colleages will attempt to 
have consultations with 200 stakeholders in Khartoum prior to its 
publication, as well as try and solicit the opinions of IDPs in El 
Fasher, Nyala and Geneina and possibly other locations if time 
permits. He had initially been hopeful that he could work with the 
UN's Abdul Mohamed of the DDDC to solicit the opinions of Darfurians 
but "I've learned my lesson not to trust him, because he only comes 
with empty promises and does not deliver." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: Professor Attia's predictions of an NCP reversion 
to radicalism may come off as a bit alarmist, though it is true that 
some moderates within the party have reportedly been unhappy with 
its direction of late (some would say that the struggle within the 
NCP is not about moderates and radicals but about who rules).  The 
unprecedented level of stress placed on the regime from the crisis 
in the Darfur, the ICC indictment and (now) the falling price of oil 
requires decisive leadership, which hereto has been lacking and may 
now even be unraveling.  Our understanding is that Bashir often 
prefers not to make decisions and therefore relies on 
decision-making by committee, a process through which the more 
hard-line elements of the regime often carry the day. With regard to 
the civil society initiative, it is frustrating to see someone as 
thoughtful and well-intentioned as Professor Attia content to 
produce a mere background document. As substantive and as connected 
to the people of Darfur as it may be, without specific policy 
recommendations this document is unlikely to influence the 
intermittent Darfur peace process in a significant way. 
 
FERNANDEZ