VZCZCXRO7262
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1745/01 3381111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031111Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2462
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001745 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SOUTH DARFUR SECURITY UPDATE 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1707 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Fighting between rebel and government forces in 
South Darfur had been largely absent for several months until the 
November 19 SLA/MM and SLA/U attack on a central police convoy and 
subsequent government bombings, sources told poloffs during a trip 
to Nyala November 24-26. Meanwhile, violent clashes between tribes 
of South Darfur have unexpectedly subsided over the past month, 
though some questioned the sustainability of government-brokered 
reconciliation efforts.  Sources told poloffs that the government 
continues to recruit former janjaweed militiamen for regular and 
paramilitary forces, though some disgruntled Arab tribal factions in 
South Darfur have shown inclinations of turning against the 
government. Banditry on South Darfur's main transit routes has 
decreased since the GOS has deployed a company of Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) in Tortahan, southeast of Nyala.  Carjackings of UNAMID 
and INGO vehicles within the city of Nyala also have decreased since 
UNAMID instituted a two-car minimum for travel and boosted the use 
of its fleet of over 70 mini-buses.  The mini-buses and other 
non-sport utility vehicles are not very attractive targets for 
rebel/militia bandits due to lack of off-road capability.  While 
UNAMID officials claimed credit for helping reduce insecurity in 
South Darfur, traditional Fur leaders still dismissed the force as 
impotent and urged direct USG military intervention to establish 
security in the region.  End Summary. 
 
GOS-REBEL FIGHTING STARTS ANEW IN SOUTH DARFUR 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a November 24 meeting with poloffs, UNDSS Officer Will 
Mulders stated that he had heard reports of Russian MiG fighters 
bombing rebel positions in the area around Abu Ajura in South Darfur 
on November 22, though noted that UNAMID has not been able to 
confirm the details of the attack. Mulders speculated that the 
bombing was retaliation against SLA/MM and SLA/U for their assault 
on a Central Reserve Police convoy near Abu Hamra on November 19 
(Reftel).  Until these incidents, fighting between the rebels and 
the GOS have been largely absent from South Darfur for several 
months, he said.  There were also reports of internal fighting among 
Darfuri rebels in neighboring Bahr al Ghazal in mid-November. 
According to a UNAMID poloff, an exchange of fire between the forces 
of SLA/Ahmed Abdulshafie and Saddiq Abdelkarim Nasir, both members 
of the so-called "Group of 11" alliance of former SLA factions, 
resulted in the death of the latter.  Saddiq was one of the few 
members of the G-11 who had military strength on the ground with 
over 300 men, said the UNAMID poloff, but the implications of his 
death are unclear. Abdulshafie remains close to the SPLM since the 
Juba Darfur rebel unification process in late 2007. 
 
BUT TRIBAL CLASHES SUBSIDING 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Mulders stated the volatile relations between South 
Darfur's many tribal groups, often characterized by violent clashes, 
have actually calmed over the past month. Mounting tensions over 
land between the Zaghawa (primarily SLA/MM and SLA/Unity) and the 
Arab Maaliya tribe over grazing rights around the town Muhajiriya 
have unexpectedly dwindled, and clashes between the pro-regime 
Salamat, Habbania and Fallata tribes around Tulus have also 
subsided.  UNAMID has not been able to access the latter area, but 
it appears to be relatively calm, he said.  Mulders was unsure what 
to attribute this decrease in hostilities to, but noted that 
predictions of an earlier-than-usual southern migration of nomadic 
tribes had never materialized. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) UNAMID Sector South Commander Brigadier General F.E. Eze 
told poloffs that Sector South has remained relatively calm, noting 
that tensions between Zaghawa and Maaliya around Muhajiriya and 
Gereida subsided in part because of UNAMID intervention.  "The 
problems began when the Maaliya, the original owners of the land, 
were driven away by the Zaghawa," he said. "Minnawi's men tried to 
impose a tax on Maaliya for grazing rights," and that's when 
problems ensued.  He credited UNAMID with establishing a presence in 
the area as well as confidence building patrols for locals 
collecting water and firewood.  "We've gone into a lot of areas 
where we never had a presence before," he said. 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF RECONCILIATION EFFORTS QUESTIONED 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Tribal clashes in South Darfur are often settled by a 
government-brokered reconciliation, but some observers are skeptical 
that such deals provide lasting peace or solutions.  Dr. Mahmoud 
Adam Daoud, Lecturer at the University of Nyala, noted that such 
 
KHARTOUM 00001745  002 OF 003 
 
 
talks always take place among tribal elders based in the regional 
capital of Nyala.  "They spend time and money and sign documents" he 
said, "but those who are actually doing the fighting are not at the 
table."  As a result, the root causes of the conflict are never 
addressed, he said. Others were skeptical of the government's intent 
to really reconcile differences between warring tribes. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Among the most recent government-brokered reconciliation 
agreements was one concluded between the Arab Beni Halba and the 
Daju African tribe in early November, according to UNAMID Civil 
Affairs Officer Katherine Reyes.  Reyes noted that unlike previous 
reconciliations, the government did not offer to fund compensation 
arrangements, instead encouraging the parties to take on the 
responsibility themselves.  She also noted that while clashes 
between the Fallata and Salamat tribes have subsided in recent 
months, they were both being strongly encouraged by the government 
to follow the path of the Beni Halba and Daju and to reconcile.  But 
the Fallata and Salamat were both heavily armed by the Khartoum 
regime, making the situation much more difficult to resolve, she 
said. 
 
GOS RECRUITS ARAB MILITIA FOR ARMED FORCES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) SPLM Minister of Agriculture of South Darfur Omar 
Abdelrahman told poloffs that over the past few months several 
thousand new Janjaweed militiamen have been recruited to Central 
Reserve Police and Border Intelligence Forces, and dispatched to 
Khartoum for training.  The recruits are drawn most notably from the 
Mahamid of the Aballa (camel-herding) Rizeigat, he said, adding that 
since announcement of the ICC indictment of President Bashir there 
has been a complete turnaround from talking about disarmament of 
Janjaweed to recruiting them into military and security service 
ranks. The irony, he said, is that this recruitment is being carried 
out in the name of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR).  "The NCP tells us, 'You integrated southern militias into 
the SPLA, we're just doing the same,'" he said.  Abdelrahman also 
claimed that approximately 2,000 Arab militiamen who were not 
received by Sudanese military and paramilitary forces have sought to 
join the ranks of the SPLA, and that SPLA leadership remains worried 
about this prospect. 
 
THOUGH SOME ARAB TRIBES TURNING HOSTILE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) UNDSS Officer Mulders noted that certain Arab tribes in 
South Darfur have shown inclinations of turning to violent action 
against the government.  Back in August, a faction of Fallata 
militiamen upset with floundering reconciliation efforts attacked a 
police post near Tulus and threatened further action, he said.  And 
while the Beni Halba have apparently sorted out their differences 
with the Daju, they are still seething at the death of some of its 
members at the hands of GOS bombs on July 1.  "There is still a lot 
of tension between the Beni Halba and the government, though the 
government has paid them blood money," he said.  Mulders also 
recently heard an unsubstantiated rumor that the Southern Rizeigat 
were planning to form a militia to attack government forces moving 
through their areas. 
 
BANDITRY DECLINES WITH DEPLOYMENT OF GOS FORCES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) UNDSS Officer Mulders reported that banditry on South 
Darfur's main transit routes has decreased since the GOS has 
deployed a company in Tortahan, southeast of Nyala. The Central 
Reserve Police continues to provide protection for convoys of 
private trucks, he said, often with considerable skill and mobility. 
 Alas, such protection is not free, as it turns out; Mulders 
reported a recent convoy of over 100 trucks travelling from Bilal to 
Ed Daien had to pay a fee of up to $50 per truck (directly to the 
CRP).  UNAMID Sector South Commander Gen. Eze told poloffs there was 
significant GOS troop movement around Sharaya, but he was unsure 
whether the troops were reinforcements or constituted a new unit. 
 
CARJACKING DOWN DUE TO NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) UNDSS Officer Mulders also noted that carjackings of 
UNAMID and INGO vehicles within Nyala have decreased since UNAMID 
instituted a two-car minimum for travel and boosted the use of its 
fleet of over 70 mini-buses. "Not a single bus has been stolen," he 
stated, noting that vehicles lacking four-wheel drive are 
unappealing to potential carjackers who are either from rebel or 
militia groups or sell them to rebels or militia who need vehicles 
 
KHARTOUM 00001745  003 OF 003 
 
 
that can be turned into "technicals" capable of carrying fighters to 
battle across rough terrain.  (Note: More often than not, the 
vehicles wind up in the hands of the rebels, who are poorly funded 
and lack the government's ability to purchase and ship large numbers 
of vehicles into Darfur. End note.)  In November, only five UNAMID 
and INGO vehicles were carjacked in South Darfur, he said, and two 
of those had been recovered.  This compares to thirteen in October 
and nine in September according to UNAMID statistics.  Since the 
beginning of the year, more than 60 vehicles have been lost to 
carjacking in South Darfur, and "everybody's involved. Rebel 
movements, militias, government forces and organized crime are all a 
part of it," according to Mulders. 
 
UNAMID STILL SEEN AS WEAK 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) UNAMID Sector South Commander Brigadier General F.E. Eze 
stated that while his force is facing chronic logistical problems, 
it has succeeded in securing supply routes for humanitarian access 
and instituted a series of confidence building patrols.  But 
according to Eze, Sector South patrols are often restricted by 
Sudanese authorities who claim responsibility for certain areas.  A 
UNAMID poloff told Emboff in confidence that while there is need for 
a mechanism to monitor violence in Darfur, it should be independent 
from UNAMID.  "UNAMID is hampered by its relationship with the GOS," 
he said, adding that its leadership remains quite cautious of 
offending the GOS.  "UNAMID never issues press releases, even when 
we know the GOS is bombing villages around Darfur," he said. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Dr. Salahedeen Mohamed, the NCP-designated Maqdoum 
(Viceroy) of the Fur tribe, asserted that UNAMID has been "guarded" 
and essentially contained by the Central Reserve Police and that it 
could never constitute an effective peacekeeping force.  To that 
end, he hoped to see USG boots on the ground to establish security 
in Darfur. "We want to see U.S. intervention as soon as possible," 
he said. Even though Dr. Salahedeen was chosen as a pro-regime 
stooge, he has continued to distance himself from the NCP at least 
since the Kalma massacre in Kalma camp of August 25, 2008. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The one area where UNAMID has achieved relative success 
is in Kalma Camp.  UNDSS Officer Mulders reported there have been no 
serious incidents reported in Kalma camp since the Bangladeshi FPU 
instituted 24-hour patrols in early September.  UNAMID Civil Affairs 
Officer Katherine Reyes also reported that IDPs have told her there 
have been no killings in Kalma camp since the 24-hour patrols began. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) While UNAMID sources in South Darfur were generally 
optimistic about decreasing levels of violence and insecurity, 
Darfurians were discouraged and demoralized, and their perception of 
UNAMID remains largely negative.  Indeed, UNAMID's role in reducing 
tribal violence in South Darfur is questionable, and its presence on 
the ground deterred neither the November 19 rebel attack on a CRP 
convoy nor the subsequent GOS bombings.  The eventual deployment of 
the Ethiopian, Egyptian and Tanzanian battalions to Sector South 
could go a long way toward expanding UNAMID's capabilities on the 
ground, but the problem is not just numbers, it will also require a 
will to aggressively implement UNAMID's mandate on the part of its 
leadership which has so far been lacking.  The poloff's comments 
about UNAMID's ability to monitor a ceasefire and call out the 
government on violations are telling.  There is no question that an 
independent mechanism would be more effective, the problem will be 
funding it and getting the GOS to approve.  We will need to keep 
consistent pressure on UNAMID and DPKO in New York for them to live 
up to this aspect of its mandate. 
 
FERNANDEZ