VZCZCXRO3719
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1734/01 3370933
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020933Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2441
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001734 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DEWAAL ON "SUDAN'S POLITICAL MARKET" AT A DDDC BRIEFING 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  A December 1 Darfur Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC) briefing focused on the analysis of Sudan 
scholar Alex DeWaal.  DeWaal gave a lengthy, slick presentation 
asserting that the Sudanese political system is a "market" 
characterized by a system of patronage, the "buy-out" of actors at 
the regional and local levels, and essentially constitutes an 
economic compromise between only the Sudanese political elite. 
Unhelpfully, DDDC Chairman Abdul Muhammad gave a brief presentation 
on the work of his organization, publicly criticized Chief Mediator 
Bassole for relying on the usual UN negotiating blueprints (but did 
not offer any suggestions of his own), criticized UNAMID for 
focusing solely on deployment and logistics, and said that he 
intends to take the work of the DDDC outside of Sudan to the 
Diaspora. END SUMMARY. 
 
NO EXIT STRATEGY FOR UN IN SUDAN 
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¶2.  (U)  DeWaal opened his presentation at the December 1 "briefing 
on the work of the DDDC" said that he has studied how peacekeeping 
missions define success and determine a strategy for their exit. One 
definition of success is whether the peacekeeping mission builds 
political institutions that can manage conflict.  DeWaal said that 
if we apply this definition to Sudan in peacekeeping missions are 
failing and will never be able to leave. Overall, said DeWaal, Sudan 
is marked by an "irresolvable political landscape with a low 
political institutional capacity to solve these differences." 
 
SUDAN'S POLITICAL MARKET: MONEY IS THE ONLY CAPITAL 
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¶3.  (U)  As political institutions are weak and there is no 
consensus on the "political game," Sudanese politics are based on 
money, patronage, and local influence. "When political capital in a 
country is so weak, money is the only capital," said DeWaal.  DeWaal 
noted that there are multiple centers of patronage in Sudan, most 
notably in Khartoum, Juba, and at the regional level.  The high 
price of oil has so far enabled all of the necessary patrons to be 
satisfied and buy the loyalty of their local constituents. He noted 
that at the national level all patrons are roughly satisfied with 
the deal. 
 
DARFUR EASIER TO SOLVE THAN THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT 
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¶4.  (U)  Despite the mutually beneficial oil revenue sharing scheme 
between the North and the South, DeWaal asserted that the political 
differences between the North and the South are greater than that 
between Khartoum and Darfur.  He noted that Darfur is now 
characterized, by relatively low levels of violence and an asymmetry 
in the use of force between the rebels and the government of Sudan. 
According to DeWaal, insurgents target government interests to make 
a point and to sustain their movements. The government, meanwhile, 
targets the "assets of the elite" in Darfur when the patrons lose 
control over their areas of control.  For example, DeWaal stated 
that the GoS indiscriminately destroys whole villages to punish 
particular patrons.  (Note:  The GoS bombing of a well near Om Rahik 
in early November may serve as another example of this phenomenon. 
End Note).    The GoS does this to show that the very existence of 
the patrons depends on support from Khartoum. 
 
PROBLEMATIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN DARFUR 
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¶5.  (U) DeWaal theorized that the international community has driven 
up the political price of patronage at the local level by directly 
bringing in humanitarian aid to regional players.   It is therefore 
difficult, asserted DeWaal, for the international community to ever 
extricate itself from its massive support in Darfur.  Even in 
politics, said DeWaal, the international community has gotten too 
involved at the micro level. For example, said DeWaal, "it is absurd 
to think that the Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was 
debating who would be the local administrator in Korma or Kulbus." 
DeWaal said that the presence of the international community in 
Abuja encouraged a new form of political maneuvering among Darfuris. 
 DeWaal said that the rebel representatives at the negotiations were 
shrewd, astute, and not altogether honest actors. "It is impossible 
for someone from outside to outwit someone from Darfur, who knows 
all of the political games that are being played," said DeWaal. 
 
REBELS CAN BE BOUGHT OFF TOO 
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¶6.  (U)  DeWaal said that most of the rebel movements will accept 
offers to become local patrons in Darfur as long as the price is 
right.  For example, DeWaal said that at the Abuja talks, Abdul 
Wahid Al-Nur publicly took a principled position (on the need for 
justice, compensation, security, etc.) but was privately fixated on 
the actual sum of money necessary he would receive and control. 
"Abdul Wahid would call his people on the ground in Darfur and very 
 
KHARTOUM 00001734  002 OF 003 
 
 
crassly say things like 'they offered me 30 million - that isn't 
enough, but we might take 60 million." According to DeWaal, DPA 
negotiator for the NCP, the late Mahjoub Al-Khalifa, miscalculated 
the amount of money needed to buy off the key rebels.  More 
specifically, DeWaal asserted that the rebels are not interested in 
overall development in Darfur, but only the sums of money and power 
which they will personally control. "They don't care about the 
overall 700 million that will go to the TDRA, but only about the 
smaller sums of money which they can spend and disperse," said 
DeWaal.  The more sophisticated and ideological Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) may be the one exception to this, said DeWaal, and 
they may require significant convincing and pressure from the 
international community to participate in the next round of 
negotiations. 
 
SPI'S AND DDDC'S ROLE IN THE MARKET 
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¶7.  (U)  Continuing with his market analysis,  DeWaal said that the 
Sudan People's Initiative started a new round of bargaining among 
Sudanese elite over Darfur.   The Darfur Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation can help stabilize the rules of the game for this 
political market.  DeWaal said that these negotiations among the 
political elite, come at a time when the levels of violence in 
Darfur are relatively low and "yet no one seems to want to talk 
about it," said DeWaal. DeWaal speculated that a formal cease-fire 
body is very unlikely right now, as rebel movements (and in 
particular the Justice and Equality Movement,) would not agree to 
any ceasefire at this point. 
 
DDDC CHIEF SECONDS DEWAAL AND CRITICIZES THE CHIEF MEDIATOR 
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¶8.  (U)  DDDC's Abdul Mohammed agreed with DeWaal's analysis and 
said that the formation of the electoral commission was a prime 
example of the power play between Sudanese elite. Mohammed said that 
handling over negotiations would be the basis for future 
negotiations between these elite players.  Mohammed was also very 
critical of the UN and AU chief mediator Djibril Bassole and the 
overall slow pace of UNAMID deployment.   "The United Nations uses 
its blueprints of negotiations wherever it goes. The usual formula 
of wealth sharing, power-sharing, security arrangements -- all of 
this is an excuse for lazy thinking and we need creative solutions 
here," said Mohammed.  He said that Chief Mediator Bassole has not 
clearly articulated a strategy to solve the ongoing crisis in 
Darfur.   Mohammed said that the slow speed of deployment and all 
the focus on the logistical side of UNAMID has taken on a life of 
its own. 
 
DDDC REVIEW 
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¶9.  (U)  Although, the majority of the presentation focused on 
DeWaal's analysis, the final portion of the meeting was devoted to 
the DDDC.  Mohammed said that cooperation with the government of 
Sudan had improved in the last year, and that compared to previous 
years there was very little interference in the DDDC's work. 
Mohammed said that the DDDC will soon begin collaboration with the 
civil society initiatives started in five clusters - Dar es Salaam, 
Jeddah, Cambridge, Heidelberg, and Khartoum and take its 
consultations outside of Sudan.  (Note: This strategy merely builds 
on what the Sudanese themselves have already begun without any input 
from the DDDC. End note.) 
 
¶10. (U)  Other DDDC representatives gave brief presentations of 
their work. DDDC's Abdul Jibril (a dual Sudanese Canadian citizen) 
stated that internally displaced persons (IDPS) are most interested 
in security, administration and governance, and most importantly 
disarmament across all movements, militias, and GoS security forces. 
According to DDDC's work, tribal leaders are most interested in 
democracy, administration and governance, and land issues such as 
the hawakir system.  According to Abduljibril, the meetings with the 
pastoralists-Arabs have been the most interesting consultations to 
date. According to him, this group was particularly eager to 
participate in the consultations to change their negative image as 
janjaweed and tools of the GoS. This group emphasized that they are 
most interested in security for their communities and their 
migration routes. 
 
COMMENT 
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¶11.  (SBU)  DeWaal's analysis deserves attention.  If his portrayal 
of the political market is accurate, Qatar's involvement in upcoming 
negotiations could be successful, as far as enticing rebel groups to 
the negotiating table.  (Note:  For example, the latest rumors are 
that Qatar has secured the participation of Abdul Wahid through a 
financial enticement.  This has not been verified.  End Note.) 
DeWaal's analysis does ring true when applied to SLM/MM, as Minnawi 
 
KHARTOUM 00001734  003 OF 003 
 
 
and his inner circle have fixated on smaller sums of money which 
they would be able to control and use at their discretion.  Most 
importantly, if the regime's oil revenues do begin to dry up, 
DeWaal's analysis portends future instability in Sudan as the system 
of patronage based on bribery breaks down. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  DeWaal's focus on the relatively "low levels of 
violence" today may be accurate right now, but deemphasizes the 
level of ongoing suffering and deep-seated resentment in the region. 
 The effects of past violence live on today with over 3 million 
people in Darfur's many IDP camps.  Abdul Mohammed's role in the 
meeting also deserves close analysis.  Mohammed is an ambitious 
character, and it is all too clear that he has latched onto DeWaal 
to give himself and his organization more credibility. His public 
criticism of the Chief Mediator in front of Khartoum's ambassadors 
and diplomatic corps was inappropriate, and more evidence of the 
ongoing power struggle we see between UNAMID and the Chief Mediator. 
Although the work of the DDDC is valuable in surveying voices from 
Darfur, it is troubling to think that Mohammed will soon take his 
show on the road to Europe to work with the Diaspora.  Overall, the 
greater irony of the meeting was that DeWaal's market analysis of 
Sudanese politics essentially undermines the value of the DDDC's 
work.  Any deal in the region, according to DeWaal, will only 
continue Sudanese systems of patronage and leave out the voices the 
DDDC intends to survey. 
 
FERNANDEZ